@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.60.0 → 1.63.0

package/tests/agent_board_consent_gating.test.sql

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(54);
+select plan(55);
 
 create function pg_temp.claims(p_sub text) returns void language plpgsql as $$
 begin
@@ -350,11 +350,25 @@ select is(
         'invite_board_member', -- writes `invited` only -- an offer, not a membership
         'request_join_board',  -- writes `requested` only
         'leave_board',         -- writes `left` only
-        'grant_board_role'     -- requires an already-active membership; never SETs the state
+        'grant_board_role',    -- requires an already-active membership; never SETs the state
+        'readmit_session_identity' -- human owner mints a NEW principal; positively pinned below and behaviorally in SID readmission
       )),
   '',
   'EC-4 CLASS: every authenticated route reaching an active membership is gated or exempt');
 
+select ok(
+  agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner', false)
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure)
+    ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agents', false)
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board.readmit_session_identity(uuid,text,text,jsonb,jsonb,interval)'::regprocedure, true)
+    ~ agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.call_frag('_upsert_board_membership_state', false) || '\s*v_board\s*,\s*v_new_id\s*,\s*''joined''')
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._session_identity_owner(uuid)'::regprocedure, true)
+    like '%human.agent_type = ''human''%'
+  and agent_board_test.stripped_body('agent_board._session_identity_owner(uuid)'::regprocedure)
+    like '%root.owner_user_id = auth.uid()%',
+  'EC-4-readmit: human-root-owner placement is onto a fresh principal, never manufactured target consent');
+
 -- ...and the exemptions are not assertions of convenience: the three "writes only X" claims are
 -- checked, because an exemption that stops being true is how the fifth route hid.
 -- Matches the literal passed to EITHER the shared sink OR update_board_membership. The first

package/tests/agent_board_delegate_role_class.test.sql

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ select f.oid, f.name,
 -- 24
 select is(
   (select string_agg(name || case when writes_role then '[role]' else '' end, ',' order by name) from _bm_writers),
-  '_fedsession_autojoin_default_board[role],_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent[role],bootstrap_board_owner_memberships[role],create_board[role],grant_board_role[role]',
+  '_fedsession_autojoin_default_board[role],_redeem_unbounded_invite_for_agent[role],bootstrap_board_owner_memberships[role],create_board[role],grant_board_role[role],link_session_alias[role],mint_delegated_child[role],readmit_session_identity[role],set_board_member_label',
   'the direct board_memberships writers outside the sink, derived (a new one names itself)');
 -- 25
 select is(

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_cap_ceiling.test.sql

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
 --   * REQUIRE DURABILITY (invariant 4): an operator require=true is not relaxed to false by
 --     self-service (the self-pin), so a keyless self-service mint is refused — mutate the pin
 --     (true -> coalesce(p_require,true)) and both the state read and the keyless-mint throw flip.
---   * OPERATOR LATITUDE (invariant 5): the operator path is unaffected — it honors the stored
---     caps and can still set/loosen its own ceiling.
+--   * SIDSCHEMA: both mint paths consume the tighter operator ceiling. The operator
+--     can still set/loosen that ceiling through its existing writer path.
 --   * NO REGRESSION: a root with no operator policy self-services bounded only by the global
 --     25/24h ceiling.
 --   * EXECUTE class: CREATE OR REPLACE (no DROP) kept the ACL — mint stays service_role-only,
@@ -31,7 +31,11 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(40);
+select plan(42);
+create temp table _a_opcap(child_agent_id uuid, grant_expires_at timestamptz, signing_key_id uuid);
+create temp table _b_ssttl(like _a_opcap);
+create temp table _b_opttl(like _a_opcap);
+create temp table _d_ss(like _a_opcap);
 
 create temp table _cf (
   owner_id uuid,
@@ -148,12 +152,19 @@ select throws_ok(
   '42501', 'max_active_children: root has reached its active delegated-child ceiling',
   'A: self-service mint clamps max_active_children to the operator ceiling of 1 (stored 25 NOT trusted)');
 
--- Operator path (p_self_service=false) honors the stored 25 and mints despite the 1 live grant
--- (operator latitude). require=true after the self-service pin, so supply a key.
+-- SIDSCHEMA's operator ceiling bounds BOTH mint paths, not merely self-service.
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($$ select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+     cap, 'cf-opfull-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k1) from _cf),
+  '42501', 'max_active_children: root has reached its active delegated-child ceiling',
+  'A: operator mint cannot bypass its tighter stored operator ceiling');
+select is((select count(*) from _a_opcap), 0::bigint,
+  'A: operator ceiling refusal leaves no returned child');
+update agent_board.delegation_grants set revoked_at = now() where child_agent_id = (select cap_child from _cf);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _a_opcap as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _a_opcap select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
      cap, 'cf-opcap-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k1) from _cf),
-  'A: operator mint honors the stored 25 (1 live grant < 25 => mints; latitude)');
+  'A: operator mint succeeds below the tighter ceiling (0 active grants < 1)');
 select is((select count(*) from _a_opcap), 1::bigint,
   'A: operator cap mint produced exactly one child (not a silent zero-row pass)');
 
@@ -185,21 +196,21 @@ select is((select child_ttl_ceiling from agent_board.delegation_policies where r
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _b_ssttl as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _b_ssttl select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
      ttl, 'cf-ssttl-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k2) from _cf),
   'B: self-service mint under the 2h operator ceiling lives');
 select ok(
   (select grant_expires_at <= now() + interval '2 hours' + interval '1 minute' from _b_ssttl),
   'B: self-service child TTL clamped to the 2h operator ceiling (stored 24h NOT trusted)');
 
--- Operator path honors the stored 24h ceiling (NOT clamped to the 2h operator ceiling: latitude).
+-- The operator mint also consumes the durable 2h ceiling, per SIDSCHEMA's matrix.
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _b_opttl as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _b_opttl select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, false) $$,
      ttl, 'cf-opttl-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k3) from _cf),
   'B: operator mint under the same policy lives');
 select ok(
-  (select grant_expires_at > now() + interval '3 hours' from _b_opttl),
-  'B: operator path honors the stored 24h ceiling (not clamped to the 2h operator ceiling; latitude)');
+  (select grant_expires_at <= now() + interval '2 hours' + interval '1 minute' from _b_opttl),
+  'B: operator mint consumes the same tighter 2h operator ceiling');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
 -- C. Operator require_child_signing_key=true is durable: self-service cannot relax it
@@ -251,7 +262,7 @@ select is((select operator_child_ttl_ceiling from agent_board.delegation_policie
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
 select lives_ok(
-  (select format($$ create temp table _d_ss as select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
+  (select format($$ insert into _d_ss select * from agent_board.mint_delegated_child(%L::uuid, %L, '[]'::jsonb, %L, null, true) $$,
      none, 'cf-ssnone-'||replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text,1,8),'-',''), k4) from _cf),
   'D: self-service mint with no operator policy lives');
 select ok(
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ select is((select scope_attestation from agent_board.delegation_policies where r
 --    re-opened to PUBLIC/anon.
 -- ===========================================================================
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('authenticated',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: mint_delegated_child stays service_role-only (authenticated has NO EXECUTE after recreate)');
 select ok(not has_function_privilege('anon',
   'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid, text, jsonb, integer, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
@@ -293,7 +304,7 @@ select ok(has_function_privilege('authenticated',
   'agent_board.upsert_delegation_policy(uuid, text, jsonb, integer, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: authenticated retains EXECUTE on upsert_delegation_policy after recreate');
 select ok(has_function_privilege('service_role',
-  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'agent_board.mint_delegated_child(uuid, text, jsonb, text, interval, boolean, text, text, text, jsonb, jsonb, uuid)', 'EXECUTE'),
   'F: service_role retains EXECUTE on mint_delegated_child');
 
 select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_enforcement.test.sql

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ end
 $$;
 
 -- Function existence.
-select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_delegated_child', array['uuid','text','jsonb','text','interval','boolean'], 'mint_delegated_child exists');
+select has_function('agent_board', 'mint_delegated_child', array['uuid','text','jsonb','text','interval','boolean','text','text','text','jsonb','jsonb','uuid'], 'mint_delegated_child exists');
 select has_function('agent_board', 'renew_delegated_grant', array['uuid','interval'], 'renew_delegated_grant exists');
 
 -- Happy mint: grant row shape.

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_resumption.test.sql

@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(35);
+select plan(37);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- Fixtures
@@ -185,7 +185,10 @@ select is(
   '_enroll_federated_identity_once, enroll_federated_identity, onboard_federated_fleet_agent',
   'EC-1: exactly three agent_board routes accept an enrolled key fingerprint (pg_proc-derived)');
 
--- ...and only two functions in the whole schema can CREATE a signing key, so
+-- Readmission creates a fresh pending key for a verified human owner, never an
+-- enrollment resumption. The exemption is positively checked below and exercised
+-- with a real human owner and proof challenge in the SIDSCHEMA readmission suite.
+-- The other creators still reach an enrolled key through the enroll wrapper, so
 -- onboard_federated_fleet_agent necessarily reaches an already-enrolled key through
 -- enroll_federated_identity rather than deciding the duplicate case itself.
 select is(
@@ -201,8 +204,23 @@ select is(
       -- invisible to the #196 lint because that lint only inspects POSITIONAL and
       -- NEGATIVE assertions, and this is a PRESENCE match -- see the note on the lint.
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agent_signing_keys')),
-  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child',
-  'EC-2: only the enroll creator and delegated-child mint insert signing keys (strip_sql-derived)');
+  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-2: only enroll, delegated-child mint and fresh readmission insert signing keys (strip_sql-derived)');
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,
+          unnest(array['anon', 'authenticated', 'public', 'service_role']) r
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'anon=false authenticated=true public=false service_role=false',
+  'EC-2: readmission is human-authenticated only, not a service enrollment route');
+select ok(
+  (select count(*) = 1 and bool_and(
+       agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+       -- Keep literals only because these two key-state values are the markers.
+       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ $$'pending_proof'\s*,\s*'unproven'$$)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'EC-2: readmission positively verifies the owner and writes a pending, unproven fresh key');
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- R-1 -- THE #176 FIX: an unstamped enrollment resumes for its owner

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_token_single_use.test.sql

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(66);
+select plan(68);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- Fixtures
@@ -452,8 +452,23 @@ select is(
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
     where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.prokind = 'f'
       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.stmt_re('insert into', 'agent_signing_keys')),
-  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child',
-  'EC-T2: exactly two functions insert signing keys (the EC-2 form)');
+  '_enroll_federated_identity_once, mint_delegated_child, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-T2: exactly three functions insert signing keys, including fresh readmission (the EC-2 form)');
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,
+          unnest(array['anon', 'authenticated', 'public', 'service_role']) r
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'anon=false authenticated=true public=false service_role=false',
+  'EC-T2: readmission is human-authenticated only, not a Portal-token enrollment route');
+select ok(
+  (select count(*) = 1 and bool_and(
+       agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid) ~ agent_board_test.call_re('_session_identity_owner')
+       -- Keep literals only because these two key-state values are the markers.
+       and agent_board_test.stripped_body(p.oid, true) ~ $$'pending_proof'\s*,\s*'unproven'$$)
+     from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'readmit_session_identity'),
+  'EC-T2: readmission positively verifies the owner and writes a pending, unproven fresh key');
 select is(
   (select string_agg(r || '=' || has_function_privilege(r, p.oid, 'EXECUTE')::text, ' ' order by r)
      from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace,

package/tests/agent_board_federated_lock_order_class.test.sql

@@ -233,8 +233,8 @@ select is(
   (select string_agg(split_part(sig, '(', 1), ', ' order by split_part(sig, '(', 1))
      from _lockclass where reaches_board and reaches_owner),
   '_enroll_federated_human_after_revocation_gate, _enroll_federated_identity_once, '
-  || 'enroll_federated_human, enroll_federated_identity, onboard_federated_fleet_agent',
-  'EC-2: the board+owner lock class is exactly the five federated write routes');
+  || 'enroll_federated_human, enroll_federated_identity, mint_delegated_child, onboard_federated_fleet_agent, readmit_session_identity',
+  'EC-2: the board+owner lock class includes the federated routes and both SID mints');
 
 -- EC-3: THE ORDERING INVARIANT. Never acquire auth.users before boards. The failure
 -- prints the offending signatures (pre-fix this named enroll_federated_identity and

package/tests/agent_board_fk_lock_edges.test.sql

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
 
 begin;
 
-select plan(18);
+select plan(21);
 
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 -- The derivation, materialized once. `first_path` is the position PATH of the
@@ -49,7 +49,46 @@ select plan(18);
 -- function takes on that relation anywhere, which over-reports conflicts rather
 -- than under-reporting them.
 -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-create temp table _le on commit drop as select * from agent_board_test.lock_edges();
+create temp table _le_raw on commit drop as select * from agent_board_test.lock_edges();
+-- The fixture conservatively assigns every target-table FK to every INSERT.
+-- Bound these two exemptions by the executable column lists AND the catalog:
+-- every INSERT must use an explicit list, omit all nullable/default-free FK
+-- columns, and have no BEFORE INSERT trigger that could populate them. UPDATE
+-- edges and any new writer/constructor remain in the graph.
+create temp table _null_fk_insert on commit drop as
+with candidates as (
+  select distinct e.origin_oid, e.origin_name, e.rel_oid, e.path[1] as pos,
+    c.oid as constraint_oid, c.conname, c.conrelid, c.conkey,
+    cl.relname, agent_board_test.stripped_body(e.origin_oid) as body
+  from _le_raw e join pg_constraint c on e.via='fk-insert:' || c.conname and c.confrelid=e.rel_oid
+  join pg_class cl on cl.oid=c.conrelid
+  where e.own and e.origin_name in ('_session_identity_agent_lineage','_revoke_agent_principal')
+), proven as (
+  select c.*, (select count(*) from regexp_matches(c.body,
+    agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.stmt_frag('insert into', c.relname, true)
+      || '\s*(\([^)]*\))?'), 'g')) as insert_count
+  from candidates c
+  where not exists (select 1 from unnest(c.conkey) k join pg_attribute a
+    on a.attrelid=c.conrelid and a.attnum=k where a.attnotnull or a.atthasdef)
+    and not exists (select 1 from pg_trigger t where t.tgrelid=c.conrelid
+      and not t.tgisinternal and (t.tgtype & 2)=2 and (t.tgtype & 4)=4)
+    and not exists (select 1 from regexp_matches(c.body,
+      agent_board_test.re(agent_board_test.stmt_frag('insert into', c.relname, true)
+        || '\s*(\([^)]*\))?'), 'g') m
+      where m[1] is null or exists (select 1 from unnest(c.conkey) k join pg_attribute a
+        on a.attrelid=c.conrelid and a.attnum=k
+        where a.attname = any(string_to_array(trim(both '()' from
+          translate(lower(m[1]), ' "' || chr(9) || chr(10) || chr(13), '')), ','))))
+)
+select * from proven where insert_count>0;
+create temp table _le on commit drop as
+select e.* from _le_raw e where not exists (
+  select 1 from _null_fk_insert n where n.origin_oid=e.origin_oid and n.rel_oid=e.rel_oid
+    and n.pos=e.path[cardinality(e.path)]
+    and not exists (select 1 from _le_raw kept where kept.own and kept.origin_oid=e.origin_oid
+      and kept.rel_oid=e.rel_oid and kept.path[1]=n.pos
+      and not exists (select 1 from _null_fk_insert omitted where omitted.origin_oid=kept.origin_oid
+        and omitted.rel_oid=kept.rel_oid and omitted.pos=kept.path[1] and kept.via='fk-insert:' || omitted.conname)));
 create temp table _cl on commit drop as select * from agent_board_test.fn_call_closure();
 
 create temp table _acq on commit drop as
@@ -187,8 +226,28 @@ select is(
                          join pg_class cl on cl.oid = t.tgrelid
                          join pg_namespace n on n.oid = cl.relnamespace
                         where not t.tgisinternal and n.nspname = 'agent_board')),
-  '',
-  'FKL-8: no trigger function on an agent_board table takes a lock edge -- trigger locks are NOT folded in');
+  '_session_identity_agent_lineage',
+  'FKL-8: the catalog-derived locking trigger class is exactly the positively bounded fresh legacy-identity constructor; new trigger locks name themselves');
+
+-- This trigger may INSERT only the identity for NEW.id on an agents INSERT,
+-- never another ancestor and never on UPDATE. Its own-agent FK is already
+-- owned by the insert; parent/root KEY SHARE locks are the same FK targets the
+-- agents INSERT already acquired. The constructor is exercised positively by
+-- agent_board_session_identity_lineage.test.sql, including session-kind retention.
+select is((select string_agg(distinct e.rel_name || ' ' || e.lock_mode || ' via ' || e.via, ' | '
+  order by e.rel_name || ' ' || e.lock_mode || ' via ' || e.via)
+  from _le e where e.fn_name='_session_identity_agent_lineage' and e.own),
+  'agent_board.agents key share via fk-insert:session_identities_agent_id_fkey | agent_board.agents key share via fk-insert:session_identities_parent_agent_id_fkey | agent_board.agents key share via fk-insert:session_identities_root_agent_id_fkey',
+  'FKL-8-constructor-positive: every actual constructor FK lock is on its already inserted agent or the same parent/root agents targets; it has no independent identity update lock');
+
+select is((select string_agg(conname || ':' || insert_count, ', ' order by conname)
+  from _null_fk_insert where origin_name='_session_identity_agent_lineage'),
+  'session_identities_forked_from_fkey:1, session_identities_lease_alias_fkey:1, session_identities_readmitted_from_fkey:1',
+  'FKL-8-constructor-null-positive: all three nullable/default-free continuity columns are omitted from every constructor INSERT and no BEFORE INSERT trigger can populate them');
+select is((select string_agg(conname || ':' || insert_count, ', ' order by conname)
+  from _null_fk_insert where origin_name='_revoke_agent_principal'),
+  'fleet_revocation_events_harness_registration_id_fkey:2, fleet_revocation_events_machine_id_fkey:2, fleet_revocation_events_repo_scope_id_fkey:2, fleet_revocation_events_trust_domain_id_fkey:2',
+  'FKL-8-revoke-null-positive: every principal ledger INSERT omits all four nullable/default-free fleet links with no BEFORE INSERT trigger; real FK edges are retained');
 
 -- ===========================================================================
 -- FKL-9: THE CLASS section 9 could not compute. Every function whose lock graph
@@ -239,8 +298,13 @@ select is(
     'invite_board_member: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
     'join_board: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
     'leave_board: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
+    -- SIDSCHEMA role writers use the existing consent sink and board mutex.
+    -- Their installed lock order is asserted, not exempted from the class.
+    'link_session_alias: agents(update) then memberships(update) [advisory]',
+    'mint_delegated_child: agents(update) then memberships(update) [advisory]',
     'onboard_federated_fleet_agent: agents(update) then memberships(update) [advisory]',
     'post_board_message: agents(key share) then memberships(key share) [unserialised]',
+    'readmit_session_identity: agents(update) then memberships(update) [advisory]',
     'redeem_invite_link: memberships(key share) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
     'request_join_board: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
     'resolve_board_request: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
@@ -252,12 +316,9 @@ select is(
     'signed_send_direct_message: agents(key share) then memberships(key share) [unserialised]',
     'signed_send_multicast_message: agents(key share) then memberships(key share) [unserialised]',
     'subscribe_callback_endpoint: memberships(key share) then agents(key share) [unserialised]',
-    -- HOSTED (20261008000100). Unserialised, and deliberately NOT given the advisory lock:
-    -- add_delegate_to_board takes the instance row and THEN the advisory lock, so a tombstone
-    -- (instance row FOR UPDATE first) taking the advisory lock after it would be the ABBA this
-    -- file exists to catch. Every row it locks belongs to the tombstoned delegate -- its agents
-    -- row, its credentials, its memberships -- which onboarding never locks.
-    'tombstone_delegate_instance: agents(update) then memberships(update) [unserialised]',
+    -- SIDSCHEMA integrity repair: board mutexes precede owner/instance and family row locks,
+    -- matching add_delegate_to_board's board-before-instance order. No withdrawal exemption.
+    'tombstone_delegate_instance: agents(update) then memberships(update) [advisory]',
     'update_board_membership: memberships(update) then agents(key share) [unserialised]'
   ]::text[],
   'FKL-9: the agents+board_memberships lock class, FK edges included (section 9''s text scan sees 3 of these)');
@@ -267,6 +328,9 @@ select is(
 -- orders with CONFLICTING modes and no shared advisory lock. Pinned at the
 -- relation-pair level rather than the function-pair level (146 of those today)
 -- because a pair of tables entering this set is the reviewable event.
+-- SIDSCHEMA's positively proved NULL-insert filtering above removes four
+-- previously inferred fleet-machine/trust-domain pairs: PostgreSQL cannot take
+-- an FK row lock for a NULL reference. No new relation pair is exempted.
 --
 -- KNOWN-BAD and deliberately not fixed -- see the file header. ONE pair has been
 -- removed since: #281 R1 fixed `agent_board.tasks <-> agent_board.threads` by
@@ -340,14 +404,12 @@ select is(
     'agent_board.agent_signing_keys <-> agent_board.agents',
     'agent_board.agent_signing_keys <-> agent_board.board_memberships',
     'agent_board.agent_signing_keys <-> agent_board.fleet_machine_agents',
-    'agent_board.agent_signing_keys <-> agent_board.fleet_machines',
     'agent_board.agent_signing_keys <-> agent_board.fleet_trust_domains',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.board_invite_tokens',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.board_memberships',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.boards',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.enroll_token_uses',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.fleet_machine_agents',
-    'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.fleet_machines',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.fleet_trust_domains',
     'agent_board.agents <-> agent_board.identity_providers',
     'agent_board.agents <-> auth.users',
@@ -361,8 +423,6 @@ select is(
     'agent_board.fleet_harness_registrations <-> agent_board.fleet_machine_agents',
     'agent_board.fleet_machine_agents <-> agent_board.fleet_repo_scopes',
     'agent_board.fleet_machine_agents <-> agent_board.fleet_trust_domains',
-    'agent_board.fleet_machines <-> auth.users',
-    'agent_board.fleet_trust_domains <-> auth.users',
     'agent_board.identity_providers <-> auth.users'
   ]::text[],
   'FKL-10: the relation pairs held in opposite orders with conflicting modes and no shared advisory lock');