@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.50.0 → 1.52.0

package/fixtures/already-applied.json

@@ -596,6 +596,10 @@
     {
       "id": "20261001000100_agent_board_claimpolicy_lock_grant_revoke",
       "sha256": "db73a9941d4601dd6db0c767fdc718534fe2856598a305f4747496cadc722afd"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "20261002000100_agent_board_session_challenge_supersede",
+      "sha256": "f10d8f539538fcf63d5b3538650160e7a4f9e345ccb7476b21756675f2b6ab80"
     }
   ]
 }

package/migrations/20261002000100_agent_board_session_challenge_supersede.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+-- F1 (code-review-2026-09-01): the per-key pending-challenge cap was a lockout lever.
+--
+-- THE DEFECT. `/session` step "challenge" is verify_jwt=false: it needs only an agent
+-- handle and a key id, both directory-visible, and each request inserts a challenge row
+-- through service_role. `issue_signing_key_challenge` capped pending challenges at 16
+-- per KEY and RAISED `challenge_pending_cap` at the cap. So any caller who could reach
+-- the endpoint could hold a victim's sixteen slots with one request every five minutes;
+-- every legitimate challenge for that key then failed. The client turned the 403 into a
+-- non-retryable SessionError and STOPPED its background refresh loop, so the outage
+-- outlived the flood and needed a restart to clear. The same shape occurred by accident
+-- after sixteen crashed mints inside one five-minute challenge lifetime.
+--
+-- THE CHANGE. Forward-only `create or replace` of two functions, both reproducing their
+-- current body verbatim with one edit each:
+--
+--   1. issue_signing_key_challenge — at the cap, SUPERSEDE the oldest pending challenge
+--      and issue, instead of refusing. The resource bound is unchanged (at most 16
+--      pending rows per key, still); what changes is that arrival is never refused.
+--   2. mint_fleet_agent_session — report a superseded challenge as `challenge_superseded`
+--      rather than `nonce_replay`, so an eviction is retryable without teaching a client
+--      to retry through a genuine replay.
+--
+-- WHY SUPERSEDE RATHER THAN NARROW THE CAP. The cap's purpose is to bound rows per key;
+-- refusing was how it was spelled, not what it was for. Making the cap per-source instead
+-- does NOT close this: sixteen requests over five minutes fit under any per-source limit
+-- a real fleet can use, and a caller with several sources is not bounded per key at all.
+-- The per-source rate cap added to the handler in this same change bounds the COST of
+-- driving the queue; superseding is what removes the denial.
+--
+-- WHAT IS CLOSED, AND THE RESIDUAL THAT IS NOT. What this closes is the HOLDABLE lockout:
+-- fill-and-walk-away no longer denies anything, and an outage can no longer outlive the
+-- attack. What it does NOT close is eviction under a SUSTAINED flood. A challenge is the
+-- NEWEST of its key when issued, so sixteen later issues rotate it out and its mint then
+-- raises challenge_superseded. Per source that is bounded by the `session:` rate cap;
+-- IN AGGREGATE IT IS UNBOUNDED, because a per-key aggregate bound is precisely the
+-- holdable lever this migration removes -- the two cannot both exist. N sources rotate the
+-- queue in 1/N of the per-source time, so a minter loses its challenge once its
+-- issue->mint gap exceeds ~32/N seconds at the default 30/min.
+--
+-- That residual is DoS-class, not stored state: it costs the attacker continuous traffic and
+-- stops when the traffic stops. NOTE WHAT IS NOT CLAIMED: "the victim's recovery is one
+-- retry" is true of a ONE-SHOT evictor (driven end-to-end by F1-F in
+-- session.integration.test.ts) and NOT of a sustained flood, where the retry re-enters on
+-- the same odds and the retry count is geometric in the ratio of the client's issue->mint
+-- window W to the flood's rotation period. W is asserted NOWHERE here and is dominated by
+-- the signer -- an OS-keychain prompt makes it seconds, at which point a handful of sources
+-- suffices. An earlier version of this header stated the one-retry recovery flatly.
+-- It is pinned by assertions 19-20 of
+-- agent_board_signing_challenge_pending_cap.test.sql rather than left as prose, because a
+-- sentence is not re-checked (rule 5). ACCEPTED FOR THIS RELEASE AND TRACKED BY
+-- message-board#423, which owns whether an eventual-progress mechanism is wanted; this
+-- migration deliberately does not attempt one. An earlier version of this header called the race
+-- "rate-bounded in attempts": true per source, FALSE in aggregate. Deleted rather than
+-- softened -- it was the sentence that was wrong.
+--
+-- `create or replace` preserves both functions' ACLs; both are restated below anyway,
+-- with their COMMENTs, because a SECURITY DEFINER function grants EXECUTE to PUBLIC by
+-- default and this file must be self-contained if either is ever dropped and re-run.
+
+create or replace function agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_key_id text,
+  p_expires_in interval default interval '5 minutes'
+)
+returns table (
+  challenge_id uuid,
+  agent_id uuid,
+  key_id text,
+  key_version integer,
+  fingerprint text,
+  challenge text,
+  expires_at timestamptz
+)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_actor uuid;
+  v_key agent_board.agent_signing_keys%rowtype;
+  v_challenge_id uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_nonce text := encode(extensions.gen_random_bytes(24), 'base64');
+  v_expires_at timestamptz;
+  v_pending integer;
+  v_evicted uuid;
+  -- Frozen pending-challenge cap per signing key (IF-0-MBHARDEN-1a). N=16.
+  c_pending_cap constant integer := 16;
+begin
+  if p_expires_in is null or p_expires_in <= interval '0 seconds' or p_expires_in > interval '15 minutes' then
+    raise exception 'challenge expiry must be between 0 and 15 minutes' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  v_actor := agent_board._resolved_actor_agent_id(p_agent_id, 'p_agent_id');
+
+  select *
+    into v_key
+    from agent_board.agent_signing_keys ask
+   where ask.agent_id = v_actor
+     and ask.key_id = p_key_id
+   for update;
+
+  if not found then
+    raise exception 'signing key not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_key.status in ('revoked', 'compromised') then
+    raise exception 'key_revoked: signing key is revoked' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if v_key.expires_at is not null and v_key.expires_at <= now() then
+    update agent_board.agent_signing_keys
+       set status = 'expired',
+           proof_state = 'expired',
+           updated_at = now()
+     where id = v_key.id;
+    raise exception 'key_expired: signing key is expired' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Pending-challenge cap: at most N=16 unexpired, unconsumed, still-pending
+  -- challenges per key. Serialized by the `for update` above, so the count is
+  -- race-free and the eviction below cannot double-fire.
+  --
+  -- AT THE CAP THIS SUPERSEDES, IT DOES NOT REFUSE (review finding F1). The
+  -- previous behaviour raised challenge_pending_cap, which made a per-key RESOURCE
+  -- BOUND into a per-key LOCKOUT LEVER: /session step "challenge" is
+  -- verify_jwt=false and needs only a directory-visible handle and key id, so any
+  -- caller could hold all sixteen slots with one request every five minutes and the
+  -- key's legitimate owner could never obtain a challenge again. The client turned
+  -- the resulting 403 into a non-retryable error and stopped its refresh loop, so
+  -- the outage outlived the flood.
+  --
+  -- WHAT SUPERSEDING COSTS. It creates an eviction the refusal did not have: sixteen
+  -- later issues rotate any pending challenge out, so a sustained flood evicts a slow
+  -- minter for as long as it runs. Bounded per source by the `session:` rate cap,
+  -- UNBOUNDED in aggregate -- an aggregate per-key bound is the holdable lever this
+  -- removes. DoS-class rather than stored state: it stops when the traffic stops, and
+  -- the consequence is one retry rather than a stopped client. Pinned by assertions
+  -- 19-20 of agent_board_signing_challenge_pending_cap.test.sql.
+  --
+  -- The eviction is deliberately made LOUD instead of
+  -- cheap: the row is marked (below) and mint_fleet_agent_session reports
+  -- challenge_superseded, distinct from the nonce_replay a genuine replay raises, so
+  -- the client can retry the one without learning to ignore the other.
+  --
+  -- WHY OLDEST. The oldest pending challenge is the one most likely to be abandoned,
+  -- and taking it puts a freshly-issued challenge LAST in the eviction order — a
+  -- challenge is minted within milliseconds of issue, so the legitimate flow is the
+  -- one this ordering protects. `order by created_at` with `id` as the tiebreak keeps
+  -- the choice deterministic when two rows share a timestamp.
+  --
+  -- WHY `SKIP LOCKED`, WHICH IS NOT OPTIONAL. This function holds a FOR UPDATE on the
+  -- agent_signing_keys row and then writes an agent_signing_key_challenges row;
+  -- mint_fleet_agent_session takes those two in the OPPOSITE order (challenge row FOR
+  -- UPDATE at 20260718000600:73-76, then key row FOR UPDATE at :95-100). A plain
+  -- eviction would therefore deadlock against a concurrent mint of the very row being
+  -- evicted — an ABBA this change would have INTRODUCED, and exactly the traffic it
+  -- makes common: floods driving evictions while legitimate agents mint. SKIP LOCKED
+  -- removes the cycle by never waiting: a challenge row a mint already holds is passed
+  -- over for the next-oldest. It also happens to be the kinder choice, since the row a
+  -- mint is holding is the one row we most want not to evict. The pair is pinned as a
+  -- class by agent_board_fk_lock_edges.test.sql FKL-10, which named this inversion when
+  -- the first version of this migration omitted the clause.
+  select count(*)
+    into v_pending
+    from agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges c
+   where c.signing_key_id = v_key.id
+     and c.proof_state = 'pending'
+     and c.consumed_at is null
+     and c.expires_at > now();
+
+  if v_pending >= c_pending_cap then
+    update agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges
+       set proof_state = 'expired',
+           consumed_at = now(),
+           updated_at = now(),
+           metadata = metadata || jsonb_build_object(
+             'superseded_at', now(),
+             'superseded_by', v_challenge_id
+           )
+     where id = (
+       select c.id
+         from agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges c
+        where c.signing_key_id = v_key.id
+          and c.proof_state = 'pending'
+          and c.consumed_at is null
+          and c.expires_at > now()
+        order by c.created_at, c.id
+        for update skip locked
+        limit 1
+     )
+    returning id into v_evicted;
+
+    -- No evictable row. Under SKIP LOCKED this is reachable without the bound being
+    -- wrong: every one of the sixteen pending rows can be row-locked by a concurrent
+    -- mint of that same key. Issuing anyway would grow the pending set past the cap,
+    -- so refuse — the pre-change behaviour, now confined to a window in which sixteen
+    -- mints for one key are in flight at once, and retryable at the client rather than
+    -- terminal. ('expired'/consumed_at is the same closed-out shape the consumed-shape
+    -- CHECK requires, and reuses the existing proof_state vocabulary rather than adding
+    -- a value; the metadata marker is what distinguishes an eviction from a lapse.)
+    if v_evicted is null then
+      raise exception 'challenge_pending_cap: too many pending signing-key challenges for this key (max %)', c_pending_cap
+        using errcode = '22023';
+    end if;
+  end if;
+
+  v_expires_at := now() + p_expires_in;
+
+  insert into agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges(
+    id,
+    signing_key_id,
+    agent_id,
+    challenge_nonce,
+    challenge_bytes,
+    expires_at,
+    metadata
+  )
+  values (
+    v_challenge_id,
+    v_key.id,
+    v_actor,
+    v_nonce,
+    'agent-signing-key-proof.v1:' || v_challenge_id::text || ':' || v_nonce,
+    v_expires_at,
+    jsonb_build_object('keyId', v_key.key_id, 'keyVersion', v_key.key_version)
+  );
+
+  update agent_board.agent_signing_keys
+     set proof_state = 'challenge_issued',
+         updated_at = now()
+   where id = v_key.id
+     and proof_state <> 'proven';
+
+  return query
+  select
+    v_challenge_id,
+    v_actor,
+    v_key.key_id,
+    v_key.key_version,
+    v_key.fingerprint,
+    'agent-signing-key-proof.v1:' || v_challenge_id::text || ':' || v_nonce,
+    v_expires_at;
+end;
+$$;
+comment on function agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(uuid, text, interval) is
+  'Issues a one-time PoP challenge for an agent signing key. Bounds the key to at most 16 concurrently-pending challenges; AT the bound it supersedes the OLDEST pending challenge (proof_state=''expired'', consumed_at set, metadata.superseded_by naming the new challenge) and issues, rather than refusing — refusing made the bound a lockout lever on the unauthenticated /session surface (F1). Serialized by the FOR UPDATE on the key row. authenticated + service_role.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(uuid, text, interval) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.issue_signing_key_challenge(uuid, text, interval) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+create or replace function agent_board.mint_fleet_agent_session(
+  p_challenge_id uuid,
+  p_nonce text,
+  p_signing_key_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_max_ttl_seconds integer default 900
+)
+returns table(session_id text, expires_at timestamptz)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_challenge agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges%rowtype;
+  v_key agent_board.agent_signing_keys%rowtype;
+  v_auth_user_id uuid;
+  v_parent_agent_id uuid;
+  v_ttl integer := least(coalesce(p_max_ttl_seconds, 900), 900);
+  v_session_id text := 'fas_' || replace(gen_random_uuid()::text, '-', '');
+  v_expires_at timestamptz;
+begin
+  if v_ttl <= 0 then
+    raise exception 'max_ttl_seconds must be positive' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (i) challenge: exists, bound to this agent + signing key, unconsumed, unexpired.
+  select * into v_challenge
+    from agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges c
+   where c.id = p_challenge_id
+   for update;
+  if not found then
+    raise exception 'signing key challenge not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_challenge.agent_id <> p_agent_id or v_challenge.signing_key_id <> p_signing_key_id then
+    raise exception 'actor_mismatch: challenge is not bound to this agent and signing key' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  -- An EVICTED challenge is not a replayed one. issue_signing_key_challenge closes
+  -- the oldest pending row out ('expired' + consumed_at) when a new challenge arrives
+  -- at the per-key cap; without this branch that row would arrive here and be reported
+  -- as nonce_replay, which is a security signal the client must never learn to retry
+  -- through. Named separately so the client can retry exactly this one. Checked BEFORE
+  -- the generic branch because the evicted row satisfies it.
+  if v_challenge.metadata ? 'superseded_by' then
+    raise exception 'challenge_superseded: this challenge was superseded by a newer one for the same key; request a fresh challenge'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if v_challenge.proof_state <> 'pending' or v_challenge.consumed_at is not null then
+    raise exception 'nonce_replay: signing key challenge already consumed' using errcode = '23505';
+  end if;
+  if v_challenge.expires_at <= now() then
+    raise exception 'timestamp_out_of_window: signing key challenge expired' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  -- #10 nonce binding (belt-and-suspenders on top of the challenge_id binding): the
+  -- caller must present the exact stored challenge_nonce for this challenge row.
+  if p_nonce is null or p_nonce <> v_challenge.challenge_nonce then
+    raise exception 'nonce_mismatch: presented nonce does not match the bound challenge' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (ii) signing key: bound to this agent, active, unrevoked.
+  select * into v_key
+    from agent_board.agent_signing_keys ask
+   where ask.id = p_signing_key_id
+     and ask.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   for update;
+  if not found then
+    raise exception 'signing key not found for agent' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_key.status <> 'active' or v_key.revoked_at is not null then
+    raise exception 'key_revoked: signing key is not active' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  -- #12 key expiry: today only the challenge RPC checks agent_signing_keys.expires_at;
+  -- the mint must reject an expired key as well.
+  if v_key.expires_at is not null and v_key.expires_at <= now() then
+    raise exception 'key_expired: signing key is past its expires_at' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (iii) whole principal active (self + every ancestor up to lineage root).
+  if not agent_board._agent_principal_active(p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'principal_inactive: agent principal is not fully active' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (iv) #4 governing delegation-grant liveness for root_minted children. A child
+  -- that holds a delegation_grants row may mint ONLY while that grant is unrevoked
+  -- and unexpired (grant_expires_at > now()). independent_auth principals hold no
+  -- grant row and skip this gate. This binds the hours-scale grant clock to the mint
+  -- so an expired/revoked grant cannot keep re-minting <=900s tokens indefinitely.
+  if exists (select 1 from agent_board.delegation_grants g where g.child_agent_id = p_agent_id) then
+    if not exists (
+      select 1
+        from agent_board.delegation_grants g
+       where g.child_agent_id = p_agent_id
+         and g.revoked_at is null
+         and g.grant_expires_at > now()
+    ) then
+      raise exception 'grant_expired: the governing delegation grant is revoked or expired' using errcode = '42501';
+    end if;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Scope to the agent's authenticated principal. A fleet_agent_session must bind to
+  -- an auth-bound agent (no auth_user_id column on nonfleet_sessions; this is a mint
+  -- invariant flowed to the EF token sub, not a stored value).
+  select a.auth_user_id, a.parent_agent_id
+    into v_auth_user_id, v_parent_agent_id
+    from agent_board.agents a
+   where a.id = p_agent_id;
+  if v_auth_user_id is null then
+    raise exception 'agent has no auth_user_id principal to scope the session' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Consume the challenge (one-time).
+  update agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges
+     set proof_state = 'consumed',
+         consumed_at = now(),
+         updated_at = now()
+   where id = p_challenge_id;
+
+  v_expires_at := now() + make_interval(secs => v_ttl);
+
+  insert into agent_board.nonfleet_sessions(
+    id, session_id, identity_class, agent_id, parent_agent_id,
+    max_ttl_seconds, issued_at, expires_at
+  )
+  values (
+    v_session_id, v_session_id, 'fleet_agent_session', p_agent_id, v_parent_agent_id,
+    v_ttl, now(), v_expires_at
+  );
+
+  return query select v_session_id, v_expires_at;
+end;
+$$;
+comment on function agent_board.mint_fleet_agent_session(uuid, text, uuid, uuid, integer) is
+  'Whole-principal PoP session mint: re-validates challenge (incl. bound nonce) + active/unrevoked/unexpired signing key + full-lineage liveness + governing delegation-grant liveness, consumes the challenge, and inserts a <=900s fleet_agent_session. A challenge superseded by issue_signing_key_challenge raises challenge_superseded (retryable: request a fresh challenge), distinct from the nonce_replay a genuine replay raises. service_role-only.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.mint_fleet_agent_session(uuid, text, uuid, uuid, integer) from public, anon, authenticated;
+grant execute on function agent_board.mint_fleet_agent_session(uuid, text, uuid, uuid, integer) to service_role;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.50.0",
+  "version": "1.52.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.50.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.52.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 149,
-  "aggregateSha256": "c15239411cdaff38ce6a52294d6586ae6fe711cdea40938785c55e7e38e13c0b",
+  "migrationCount": 150,
+  "aggregateSha256": "94b8945ab506a02a31ffd0ed6daad37d5655f209214558ca868dbb22693fb57d",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -1389,6 +1389,15 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 10193,
       "sha256": "db73a9941d4601dd6db0c767fdc718534fe2856598a305f4747496cadc722afd"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 149,
+      "id": "20261002000100_agent_board_session_challenge_supersede",
+      "filename": "20261002000100_agent_board_session_challenge_supersede.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 19273,
+      "sha256": "f10d8f539538fcf63d5b3538650160e7a4f9e345ccb7476b21756675f2b6ab80"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/tooling.test.mjs

@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
     expect(manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(8);
     expect(manifest.minClientVersion).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
   });
-  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG + one LOCALAUTH + one ROOMUIAPI + one FEDSESSION + one FEDSESSION-AUTOJOIN + one GATENULL + one MEMBSTATE + one AGENTSDIR + one LEAVEIDEM + one ROLERESET + one MBROWID + one MBHYGIENE + one MBCONSENT-A + one MBCONSENT-B(a) + one MBCONSENT-B(i) + one MBCONSENT-B(ii) + one MBCONSENT-B(iii) + one MBHARDEN-#97 + one MBHARDEN-#118 + one INVITEPOLICY + one OBSGATE + one OBSGATE-2 + one OBSGATE-3 + one OBSGATE-4 + one FLEETMACHINERLS + one RESOLVENOOP + one ROOMDELEG-LANEB + one CLAIMKEY + two MINTHARDEN + one FLEETMACHINEHIJACK + one CLAIMGATE-SHADOW + one CLAIMGATE-ENFORCE + one FLEETMACHINEREACTIVATION + one DELEGCAPCEILING + one FLEETMACHINERECLAIM + one DELEGSOLEWRITER + one FLEETDOMAINRECLAIM + five ATOMICFLEETONBOARDING (onboarding + ceiling-lock + revocation-evidence + fedsession-gate + fedsession-lock-order) + one OUTBOXWAKE + one ENROLLLOCKORDER + one FEDPROVIDERABSENCE + one WAKERECOVERY + one CONSENTRECONCILE + one ENROLLRESUMPTION + one SIGNEDAUTHORITY + one SIGNERLIFECYCLE + one LEDGERAUTHORITY + one CEILINGLOCKCOMMENT + one LEDGERBOARDCREATE + one RECEIPTSUBJECTGATE + one TASKTHREADLOCKORDER + one CLAIMSUBJECTGATE + one FEDSESSIONIDENTITYGATE + one FEDIDENTITYSLUG + one INVITENODOWNGRADE + one SIGNEDWRITEFLAG + one SIGNEDWRITEMODEL + one RTCREDCLAIM + one ORIGINPOSTURE + one BOARDCLAIMPOLICY + one HEARTBEATPRESERVE + one LIVENESSDENOM + one OWNERLESSRENEWTTL + one OWNERLESSQUOTACENSUS + one FLEETDOMAINNODOWNGRADE + one OWNERLESSQUOTACONVERGE + one ADVISORYREVERTRESET + one CLAIMPOLICYRACE + one CLAIMPOLICYLOCKGRANT forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 113 + 5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 149)', () => {
+  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG + one LOCALAUTH + one ROOMUIAPI + one FEDSESSION + one FEDSESSION-AUTOJOIN + one GATENULL + one MEMBSTATE + one AGENTSDIR + one LEAVEIDEM + one ROLERESET + one MBROWID + one MBHYGIENE + one MBCONSENT-A + one MBCONSENT-B(a) + one MBCONSENT-B(i) + one MBCONSENT-B(ii) + one MBCONSENT-B(iii) + one MBHARDEN-#97 + one MBHARDEN-#118 + one INVITEPOLICY + one OBSGATE + one OBSGATE-2 + one OBSGATE-3 + one OBSGATE-4 + one FLEETMACHINERLS + one RESOLVENOOP + one ROOMDELEG-LANEB + one CLAIMKEY + two MINTHARDEN + one FLEETMACHINEHIJACK + one CLAIMGATE-SHADOW + one CLAIMGATE-ENFORCE + one FLEETMACHINEREACTIVATION + one DELEGCAPCEILING + one FLEETMACHINERECLAIM + one DELEGSOLEWRITER + one FLEETDOMAINRECLAIM + five ATOMICFLEETONBOARDING (onboarding + ceiling-lock + revocation-evidence + fedsession-gate + fedsession-lock-order) + one OUTBOXWAKE + one ENROLLLOCKORDER + one FEDPROVIDERABSENCE + one WAKERECOVERY + one CONSENTRECONCILE + one ENROLLRESUMPTION + one SIGNEDAUTHORITY + one SIGNERLIFECYCLE + one LEDGERAUTHORITY + one CEILINGLOCKCOMMENT + one LEDGERBOARDCREATE + one RECEIPTSUBJECTGATE + one TASKTHREADLOCKORDER + one CLAIMSUBJECTGATE + one FEDSESSIONIDENTITYGATE + one FEDIDENTITYSLUG + one INVITENODOWNGRADE + one SIGNEDWRITEFLAG + one SIGNEDWRITEMODEL + one RTCREDCLAIM + one ORIGINPOSTURE + one BOARDCLAIMPOLICY + one HEARTBEATPRESERVE + one LIVENESSDENOM + one OWNERLESSRENEWTTL + one OWNERLESSQUOTACENSUS + one FLEETDOMAINNODOWNGRADE + one OWNERLESSQUOTACONVERGE + one ADVISORYREVERTRESET + one CLAIMPOLICYRACE + one CLAIMPOLICYLOCKGRANT + one SESSIONCHALLENGESUPERSEDE forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 113 + 5 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 150)', () => {
     expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(manifest.migrations.length);
-    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(149);
+    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(150);
     // MBSESSION switched enforcement on (scoped-send re-grant): the client-visible
     // schema version bumped to 8. MBDELEG tightens delegation and MBFED adds only
     // enrollment-only additive surface (identity_providers registry, enrollment audit,
@@ -327,6 +327,14 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
       // wait would not advance the snapshot and the lock would be silently inert.
       '20260930000100_agent_board_claim_policy_race.sql',
       '20261001000100_agent_board_claimpolicy_lock_grant_revoke.sql',
+      // F1: the per-key pending-challenge cap SUPERSEDES the oldest pending challenge
+      // instead of raising challenge_pending_cap. Refusing at the cap turned a resource
+      // bound into a lockout lever on the unauthenticated /session surface -- sixteen
+      // requests naming a directory-visible handle and key id denied that key every
+      // further challenge, and the client stopped its refresh loop on the 403. The bound
+      // is unchanged; mint_fleet_agent_session now names an eviction challenge_superseded
+      // so it is retryable without making nonce_replay retryable with it.
+      '20261002000100_agent_board_session_challenge_supersede.sql',
     ]) {
       expect(names.has(f)).toBe(true);
     }

package/tests/agent_board_agent_liveness.test.sql

@@ -263,7 +263,9 @@ select is(
   (select string_agg(c.relname, ', ' order by c.relname)
      from pg_class c join pg_namespace n on n.oid = c.relnamespace
     where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and c.relkind = 'v'
-      and pg_get_viewdef(c.oid) ~ 'presence'),
+      -- literals KEPT on purpose: v_ops_table_growth names presence as a row-count subject
+      -- inside a string literal, and it is in the expected set below
+      and agent_board_test.stripped_viewdef(c.oid, true) ~ agent_board_test.qname_re('presence')),
   'v_agent_dashboard, v_agent_liveness, v_ops_presence_heartbeats, v_ops_table_growth',
   'AL-11 CLASS: exactly these four agent_board views read presence — a new one fails here and names itself, so its join direction gets stated instead of assumed');