@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.5.0 → 1.9.0

package/migrations/20260727000100_agent_board_roomuiapi.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+-- ROOMUIAPI: two read RPCs the room console/CLI need. Additive, no schema_version
+-- bump (stays 8). Adds:
+--   * agent_board.list_board_pending_memberships(p_board_id) — owner/admin-gated
+--     reader that returns the board's pending (requested + invited) memberships,
+--     latest-row-per-agent. board_memberships SELECT RLS is self-scoped, so a board
+--     owner/admin cannot see EITHER pending state today; this reader is the sole
+--     window. FLAT owner/admin gate ALWAYS, fail-closed on a null actor (mirrors
+--     set_board_role_gate 20260725000100:46-55; NOT the write-RPC `if v_actor is not
+--     null` bypass). Deliberately STRICTER than resolve_board_request: enumerating
+--     requesters is disclosure, so no creator-identity exemption and no gate-off
+--     relaxation. service_role (current_agent_id() = null) hits 42501 here; operators
+--     read the table directly, bypassing RLS.
+--   * agent_board.resolve_agent_handle(p_handle) — SECURITY INVOKER handle->identity
+--     resolver. Runs under caller RLS, so by construction it cannot exceed
+--     agent_board_authenticated_select_agents (20260512000003:49-54, which already
+--     lets any authenticated active agent read every handle) — zero new exposure. The
+--     status='active' filter is a UI affordance (invite accepts any status), not a
+--     security boundary. Returns 0-or-1 row.
+
+-- 1. list_board_pending_memberships (owner/admin-gated pending reader) --------------
+create or replace function agent_board.list_board_pending_memberships(
+  p_board_id uuid
+)
+returns table(
+  membership_id uuid,
+  board_id uuid,
+  agent_id uuid,
+  handle text,
+  display_name text,
+  agent_type text,
+  membership_state text,
+  role text,
+  created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  requested_at timestamptz,
+  updated_at timestamptz
+)
+language plpgsql
+stable
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  -- FLAT owner/admin gate, ALWAYS. Fail closed on a null actor (suspended/unmapped
+  -- principal, or service_role) — mirrors set_board_role_gate, NOT the write-RPC
+  -- `if v_actor is not null` bypass. Authz precedes disclosure.
+  if v_actor is null
+     or not exists (
+       select 1
+         from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+        where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+          and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+          and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+          and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     ) then
+    raise exception 'only a board owner or admin may list pending memberships' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Latest row per agent (in-place upserts append; the newest created_at is current
+  -- state), scoped to this board, filtered to the pending set. The dedup subquery is
+  -- ALSO scoped to p_board_id so no other board's rows can leak in.
+  return query
+  select
+    latest.id,
+    latest.board_id,
+    latest.agent_id,
+    a.handle,
+    a.display_name,
+    a.agent_type,
+    latest.membership_state,
+    latest.role,
+    latest.created_by_agent_id,
+    latest.created_at as requested_at,
+    latest.updated_at
+  from (
+    select distinct on (bm.agent_id) bm.*
+      from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     order by bm.agent_id, bm.created_at desc
+  ) latest
+  join agent_board.agents a on a.id = latest.agent_id
+  where latest.membership_state in ('requested', 'invited')
+  order by latest.created_at desc;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.list_board_pending_memberships(uuid) is
+  'Owner/admin-gated reader for a board''s pending (requested + invited) memberships, latest-row-per-agent. FLAT owner/admin gate ALWAYS, fail-closed on a null actor (else 42501). Board-scoped: gate + dedup subquery both filter p_board_id. service_role hits 42501 (null current_agent_id()); operators read the table directly.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.list_board_pending_memberships(uuid) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.list_board_pending_memberships(uuid) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+-- 2. resolve_agent_handle (SECURITY INVOKER handle resolver) ------------------------
+create or replace function agent_board.resolve_agent_handle(
+  p_handle text
+)
+returns table(
+  agent_id uuid,
+  handle text,
+  display_name text,
+  agent_type text
+)
+language sql
+stable
+security invoker
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+  -- limit 1 is deterministic only via the UNIQUE handle constraint
+  -- (20260502000000:8); at most one active agent can own a given handle.
+  select a.id, a.handle, a.display_name, a.agent_type
+    from agent_board.agents a
+   where a.handle = p_handle
+     and a.status = 'active'
+   limit 1;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.resolve_agent_handle(text) is
+  'SECURITY INVOKER handle->identity resolver: returns the 0-or-1 active agent for a handle, under caller RLS (cannot exceed agent_board_authenticated_select_agents). status=active is a UI affordance, not a security boundary. limit 1 deterministic via the UNIQUE handle constraint.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.resolve_agent_handle(text) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.resolve_agent_handle(text) to authenticated, service_role;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.5.0",
+  "version": "1.9.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.5.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.9.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 73,
-  "aggregateSha256": "a43737edf382d8aee59069d6a9aec9e39fce17b31f092a3d7fcd96303b6f70e9",
+  "migrationCount": 78,
+  "aggregateSha256": "4b6a5435c11341549636dfec4273c5bdc5773be23f8b8667ea816927e9412f87",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -705,6 +705,51 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 3716,
       "sha256": "40c9f585af16211fe9ab1d35efca6787e49b31afc7c85f208da22b9566a65575"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 73,
+      "id": "20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens",
+      "filename": "20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 22491,
+      "sha256": "98870e44a71eb648cfefd550f32eb30cc7a25e65ae1a7aa3852a3f9234eb98e2"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 74,
+      "id": "20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding",
+      "filename": "20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 12092,
+      "sha256": "60e289d99a212ff63cb99ea275b545f7e9c15ad8cc4e0ba42c98492bae342adc"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 75,
+      "id": "20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate",
+      "filename": "20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 9521,
+      "sha256": "23c1b1545540232bbd94a47cdcbdf30e6294fd714c4d961a0a273a018d4c3398"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 76,
+      "id": "20260726000100_agent_board_localauth_self_enroll",
+      "filename": "20260726000100_agent_board_localauth_self_enroll.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 7323,
+      "sha256": "38bcc86f0e6d4ad38bc76f5abe719456f5faa2ac5bd2ab24813c61d0160da664"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 77,
+      "id": "20260727000100_agent_board_roomuiapi",
+      "filename": "20260727000100_agent_board_roomuiapi.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 5217,
+      "sha256": "9c938c40115aa25f464bbb9d177f9f85214fb84f7b37abe5ae9df5b6a2485141"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/tooling.test.mjs

@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
     expect(manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(8);
     expect(manifest.minClientVersion).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
   });
-  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 71 + 2 = 73)', () => {
+  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG + one LOCALAUTH + one ROOMUIAPI forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 77 + 1 = 78)', () => {
     expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(manifest.migrations.length);
-    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(73);
+    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(78);
     // MBSESSION switched enforcement on (scoped-send re-grant): the client-visible
     // schema version bumped to 8. MBDELEG tightens delegation and MBFED adds only
     // enrollment-only additive surface (identity_providers registry, enrollment audit,
@@ -78,6 +78,19 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
       // bootstrap; grant_board_role activated for authenticated). schema stays 8.
       '20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql',
       '20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql',
+      // ROOMLINK: shareable board invite links + enroll-on-redeem binding. schema stays 8.
+      '20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens.sql',
+      '20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding.sql',
+      // ROOMDELEG Lane A: owner-gated set_board_role_gate + creator-identity gate-bypass
+      // fix on invite_board_member/resolve_board_request. schema stays 8.
+      '20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate.sql',
+      // LOCALAUTH: Portal-free standalone human self-enroll (self_enroll_human RPC +
+      // one-agent-per-real-auth-user backstop). schema stays 8.
+      '20260726000100_agent_board_localauth_self_enroll.sql',
+      // ROOMUIAPI: two read RPCs for the room console/CLI (owner/admin-gated
+      // list_board_pending_memberships + SECURITY INVOKER resolve_agent_handle).
+      // schema stays 8.
+      '20260727000100_agent_board_roomuiapi.sql',
     ]) {
       expect(names.has(f)).toBe(true);
     }

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_federated_identity.test.sql

@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ begin;
 
 select plan(28);
 
--- New 13-arg signature exists (the old 8-arg was dropped by 20260719001100). --------
+-- New 14-arg signature exists (ROOMLINK 20260724000200 added a trailing invite code). -
 select has_function(
   'agent_board', 'enroll_federated_identity',
-  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]'],
-  'enroll_federated_identity exists with the reworked 13-arg PoP signature');
+  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]','text'],
+  'enroll_federated_identity exists with the ROOMLINK-extended 14-arg PoP signature');
 select hasnt_function(
   'agent_board', 'enroll_federated_identity',
   array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text[]','text[]'],

package/tests/agent_board_identity_providers.test.sql

@@ -92,12 +92,12 @@ select is(
       and not policy_approved),
   1, 'the mock issuer row is untouched (present, supported, inert)');
 
--- enroll_federated_identity is service_role-only (reworked 13-arg signature) ----
+-- enroll_federated_identity is service_role-only (ROOMLINK-extended 14-arg signature)
 select function_privs_are(
   'agent_board', 'enroll_federated_identity',
-  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]'],
+  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]','text'],
   'authenticated', array[]::text[],
-  'reworked enroll_federated_identity execute is revoked from authenticated');
+  'ROOMLINK-extended enroll_federated_identity execute is revoked from authenticated');
 
 select finish();
 

package/tests/agent_board_localauth.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+-- LOCALAUTH pgTAP: self_enroll_human() — Portal-free human self-enrollment.
+--
+-- Harness mirrors agent_board_authbound_boundary.test.sql: seed auth.users via
+-- public.ensure_github_user, fake an authenticated caller with
+--   set local role authenticated + set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', <uid>),
+-- so auth.uid() = sub. reset role -> superuser (auth.uid() null / service_role).
+--
+-- CRITICAL harness notes:
+--  * L-7: `reset role` does NOT null auth.uid(); request.jwt.claim.sub is set
+--    is_local=true and PERSISTS. Cases 12/13 explicitly clear the sub GUC before
+--    asserting 42501, else the RPC finds the prior uid's agent (vacuous pass).
+--  * L-8: ensure_github_user sets email_confirmed_at = now() unconditionally, so
+--    the unverified case nulls it first.
+
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(17);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Phase 0 (superuser): function metadata + seed
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-- 1
+select has_function('agent_board', 'self_enroll_human', array['text'], 'self_enroll_human(text) exists');
+-- 2
+select function_privs_are('agent_board', 'self_enroll_human', array['text'], 'authenticated', array['EXECUTE'],
+  'authenticated may EXECUTE self_enroll_human');
+-- 3
+select function_privs_are('agent_board', 'self_enroll_human', array['text'], 'anon', array[]::text[],
+  'anon may NOT EXECUTE self_enroll_human');
+
+create temp table _lfix (
+  user_a uuid,
+  user_b uuid,
+  user_c uuid,
+  agent_a uuid,
+  agent_a2 uuid
+) on commit drop;
+grant all on table _lfix to authenticated, service_role;
+
+do $$
+declare
+  v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
+  v_a uuid;
+  v_b uuid;
+  v_c uuid;
+begin
+  -- verified user (email_confirmed_at defaults to now())
+  v_a := public.ensure_github_user(
+    'localauth-a-' || v_suffix,
+    'localauth-a-' || v_suffix || '@example.test',
+    'localauth-a-' || v_suffix,
+    'LOCALAUTH A ' || v_suffix);
+
+  -- unverified user: L-8 — null out the unconditionally-set email_confirmed_at
+  v_b := public.ensure_github_user(
+    'localauth-b-' || v_suffix,
+    'localauth-b-' || v_suffix || '@example.test',
+    'localauth-b-' || v_suffix,
+    'LOCALAUTH B ' || v_suffix);
+  update auth.users set email_confirmed_at = null where id = v_b;
+
+  -- user with a pre-existing SUSPENDED human agent (no self-reactivation case)
+  v_c := public.ensure_github_user(
+    'localauth-c-' || v_suffix,
+    'localauth-c-' || v_suffix || '@example.test',
+    'localauth-c-' || v_suffix,
+    'LOCALAUTH C ' || v_suffix);
+  insert into agent_board.agents(agent_type, kind, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
+  values ('human', 'human', 'localauth-suspended-' || v_suffix, 'Suspended Human', 'suspended', v_c, v_c);
+
+  insert into _lfix(user_a, user_b, user_c) values (v_a, v_b, v_c);
+end
+$$;
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Phase 1 (authenticated as user_a): enroll + auth-context assertions
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+set local role authenticated;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select user_a::text from _lfix), true);
+
+do $$
+declare
+  v_first uuid;
+  v_second uuid;
+begin
+  select s.agent_id into v_first from agent_board.self_enroll_human('Alice') s;
+  -- idempotent second call for the same uid returns the SAME agent
+  select s.agent_id into v_second from agent_board.self_enroll_human('Alice Again') s;
+  update _lfix set agent_a = v_first, agent_a2 = v_second;
+end
+$$;
+
+-- 4 (part 1 of case 8): current_agent_id() resolves to the freshly-enrolled agent
+select is(agent_board.current_agent_id(), (select agent_a from _lfix),
+  'current_agent_id() (no agent_credential_id claim) resolves to the self-enrolled agent');
+-- 5 (case 9): idempotent — second enroll returned the same agent_id
+select is((select agent_a2 from _lfix), (select agent_a from _lfix),
+  'second self_enroll_human for the same uid is idempotent (same agent_id)');
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Phase 2 (authenticated as user_b): enroll unverified user
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select user_b::text from _lfix), true);
+select agent_board.self_enroll_human(null);
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Phase 3 (superuser): row-shape assertions without RLS in the way
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+reset role;
+
+-- 6/7/8 (case 4): the enrolled row is a human bound to the uid
+select is((select kind::text from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  'human', 'self-enrolled agent kind = human');
+select is((select agent_type from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  'human', 'self-enrolled agent agent_type = human');
+select is((select auth_user_id from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  (select user_a from _lfix), 'self-enrolled agent auth_user_id = auth.uid()');
+-- 9 (case 5): self-owned
+select is((select owner_user_id from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  (select user_a from _lfix), 'self-enrolled agent owner_user_id = auth.uid() (self-owned)');
+-- 10 (case 6): active
+select is((select status from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  'active', 'self-enrolled agent status = active');
+-- 11 (case 7): verified user -> email_verified BOOLEAN true (never a plaintext email)
+select is((select metadata->'localauth'->>'email_verified' from agent_board.agents where id = (select agent_a from _lfix)),
+  'true', 'verified user -> metadata.localauth.email_verified = true');
+-- 12 (case 10): exactly one active row for the uid
+select is((select count(*) from agent_board.agents where auth_user_id = (select user_a from _lfix) and status = 'active'),
+  1::bigint, 'exactly one active agent per uid');
+-- 13 (case 11): unverified user -> email_verified BOOLEAN false
+select is((select metadata->'localauth'->>'email_verified' from agent_board.agents where auth_user_id = (select user_b from _lfix)),
+  'false', 'unverified user -> metadata.localauth.email_verified = false');
+-- 14 (case 15 / L-4b): the DB backstop unique index exists
+select ok(exists(
+  select 1 from pg_indexes
+   where schemaname = 'agent_board'
+     and indexname = 'idx_agent_board_agents_auth_user_id_unique'),
+  'L-4b one-agent-per-real-auth-user backstop index exists');
+
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- Phase 4: fail-closed cases
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+-- 15 (case 12): authenticated role but NO subject (L-7: clear the sub GUC) -> 42501
+set local role authenticated;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+select throws_ok($$ select agent_board.self_enroll_human(null) $$, '42501',
+  null, 'unauthenticated (no auth.uid()) is rejected with 42501');
+
+-- 16 (case 13): service-role / superuser (reset role) + cleared sub -> 42501
+reset role;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+select throws_ok($$ select agent_board.self_enroll_human(null) $$, '42501',
+  null, 'service-role / superuser (auth.uid() null) is rejected with 42501');
+
+-- 17 (case 14): a pre-existing non-active identity cannot self-reactivate -> 42501
+set local role authenticated;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select user_c::text from _lfix), true);
+select throws_ok($$ select agent_board.self_enroll_human(null) $$, '42501',
+  null, 'a suspended (non-active) identity cannot self-reactivate (42501)');
+
+select finish();
+
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_roomdeleg.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+-- ROOMDELEG Lane A pgTAP: owner-gated set_board_role_gate + R-DELEG-1 creator-identity
+-- gate-bypass fix on invite_board_member / resolve_board_request.
+--
+-- Runs as the postgres db role; request.jwt.claim.role toggles _is_service_role()
+-- (''/service_role => true, 'authenticated' => false) and request.jwt.claim.sub picks
+-- the acting agent. Fixture style mirrors agent_board_roomown.test.sql.
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(11);
+
+create temp table _roomdeleg_fixture (
+  board uuid,
+  alice uuid,          -- creator, seeded owner
+  bob uuid,            -- role 'member'
+  target uuid,         -- invite target (existing agent, no membership needed)
+  requester uuid,      -- has a pending 'requested' membership (resolve target)
+  nomember uuid,       -- existing agent, no membership on the board
+  suspended uuid,      -- suspended agent WITH a valid auth user
+  alice_user uuid,
+  bob_user uuid,
+  suspended_user uuid
+) on commit drop;
+
+do $$
+declare
+  v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
+  v_alice_user uuid;
+  v_bob_user uuid;
+  v_suspended_user uuid;
+  v_alice uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_bob uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_target uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_requester uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_nomember uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_suspended uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_board uuid;
+  v_slug text := 'roomdeleg-board-' || v_suffix;
+begin
+  v_alice_user := public.ensure_github_user('rd-alice-' || v_suffix, 'rd-alice-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'rd-alice-' || v_suffix, 'RD Alice');
+  v_bob_user := public.ensure_github_user('rd-bob-' || v_suffix, 'rd-bob-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'rd-bob-' || v_suffix, 'RD Bob');
+  v_suspended_user := public.ensure_github_user('rd-susp-' || v_suffix, 'rd-susp-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'rd-susp-' || v_suffix, 'RD Suspended');
+
+  insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
+  values
+    (v_alice, 'agent', 'rd-alice-' || v_suffix, 'RD Alice', 'active', v_alice_user, v_alice_user),
+    (v_bob, 'agent', 'rd-bob-' || v_suffix, 'RD Bob', 'active', v_bob_user, v_bob_user),
+    -- Suspended agent WITH a valid auth user: current_agent_id() filters status='active'
+    -- so it resolves to null while auth.uid() still maps.
+    (v_suspended, 'agent', 'rd-susp-' || v_suffix, 'RD Suspended', 'suspended', v_suspended_user, v_suspended_user),
+    (v_target, 'agent', 'rd-target-' || v_suffix, 'RD Target', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_requester, 'agent', 'rd-requester-' || v_suffix, 'RD Requester', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_nomember, 'agent', 'rd-nomember-' || v_suffix, 'RD NoMember', 'active', null, null);
+
+  -- Alice creates board (service_role null-actor here -> supplied arg honored):
+  -- create_board seeds Alice's joined owner membership (ROOMOWN).
+  select board_id into v_board
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_alice, v_slug, 'ROOMDELEG Board', 'roomdeleg test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+
+  -- Bob is a genuine NON-creator member (role member). Requester has a pending
+  -- 'requested' membership so resolve_board_request reaches the gate check.
+  insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
+  values
+    (v_board, v_bob, 'joined', v_alice, 'member'),
+    (v_board, v_requester, 'requested', v_alice, 'member');
+
+  insert into _roomdeleg_fixture values
+    (v_board, v_alice, v_bob, v_target, v_requester, v_nomember, v_suspended,
+     v_alice_user, v_bob_user, v_suspended_user);
+end
+$$;
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+
+-- === Part A: set_board_role_gate authz (gate starts false) ========================
+-- 1. non-owner member (Bob) cannot flip the gate -> 42501 (gate unchanged) ----------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select bob_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.set_board_role_gate(%L::uuid, true)$q$, board) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'only a board owner may set the role gate',
+  'set_board_role_gate: a non-owner member is rejected');
+
+-- 2. non-member cannot flip the gate -> 42501 --------------------------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', gen_random_uuid()::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.set_board_role_gate(%L::uuid, true)$q$, board) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'only a board owner may set the role gate',
+  'set_board_role_gate: a non-member (unmapped sub) is rejected');
+
+-- 3. suspended principal (current_agent_id() null) cannot flip the gate -> 42501 ----
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select suspended_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.set_board_role_gate(%L::uuid, true)$q$, board) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'only a board owner may set the role gate',
+  'set_board_role_gate: a suspended principal (null actor) is rejected');
+
+-- 4. owner (Alice) flips false->true (pinned to a single assertion) -----------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select is(
+  (select role_gate_enforced from agent_board.set_board_role_gate((select board from _roomdeleg_fixture), true)),
+  true, 'set_board_role_gate: the owner flips role_gate_enforced false->true');
+
+-- === Part B: the flipped gate restricts invite/resolve (gate now ON) ==============
+-- 5. gate ON -> non-owner/admin member (Bob) invite rejected -> 42501 ---------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select bob_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.invite_board_member(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, target, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board invite requires owner or admin role',
+  'gate ON: a role-member actor is denied invite');
+
+-- 6. gate ON -> non-owner/admin member (Bob) resolve rejected -> 42501 --------------
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.resolve_board_request(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'joined', %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, requester, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board request resolution requires owner or admin role',
+  'gate ON: a role-member actor is denied resolve');
+
+-- === Part C: R-DELEG-1 creator-identity exemption dropped under an enforced gate ===
+-- 7. creator-who-is-still-owner (Alice) + gate ON -> invite still succeeds ----------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.invite_board_member(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, target, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  'gate ON: the creator who still holds owner membership may invite');
+
+-- Demote the creator to member (bare statement, not an assertion). created_by is
+-- immutable, so this models a creator who has lost owner authority.
+update agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   set role = 'member'
+  from _roomdeleg_fixture f
+ where bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.alice;
+
+-- 8. demoted creator + gate ON -> invite rejected -> 42501 (R-DELEG-1) --------------
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.invite_board_member(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, target, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board invite requires owner or admin role',
+  'gate ON: a DEMOTED creator no longer bypasses invite (creator-identity gate closed)');
+
+-- 9. demoted creator + gate ON -> resolve rejected -> 42501 (R-DELEG-1) -------------
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.resolve_board_request(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'joined', %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, requester, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board request resolution requires owner or admin role',
+  'gate ON: a DEMOTED creator no longer bypasses resolve (creator-identity gate closed)');
+
+-- === Part D: gate OFF regression (creator/any active member bypass unchanged) ======
+-- Flip the gate back OFF via a direct update (demoted Alice can no longer use the RPC).
+update agent_board.boards b
+   set role_gate_enforced = false
+ where b.id = (select board from _roomdeleg_fixture);
+
+-- 10. gate OFF + demoted creator -> invite still bypasses (creator exemption intact) -
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.invite_board_member(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, target, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  'gate OFF: the demoted creator still bypasses (gate-OFF behavior unchanged)');
+
+-- 11. gate OFF + any active member (Bob) -> invite succeeds -------------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select bob_user from _roomdeleg_fixture)::text, true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.invite_board_member(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, %L::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)$q$, board, target, alice) from _roomdeleg_fixture),
+  'gate OFF: any active member may invite (any-active-member behavior preserved)');
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+
+select finish();
+
+rollback;