@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.4.0 → 1.7.0

package/migrations/20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+-- ROOMLINK Lane B: bind an invite code into federated enrollment.
+--
+-- Adds an OPTIONAL trailing p_invite_code to enroll_federated_identity and a widened
+-- return column invite_redeemed. After the agent + key + audit are established, when a
+-- non-empty code is present the RPC soft-honors it via _redeem_invite_for_agent inside
+-- a BEGIN/EXCEPTION subtransaction: a bad/expired/exhausted code rolls back ONLY the
+-- redeem sub-block (the agent-create persists) and enrollment still succeeds with
+-- invite_redeemed=false. This lets a stranger arrive with a shareable board link and
+-- land directly in the board in one call, while a bad code never blocks enrollment.
+--
+-- The return table WIDENS 8 -> 9 columns and the arity goes 13 -> 14, so
+-- create-or-replace cannot be used: the released 13-arg function (20260719001200) is
+-- DROPped and recreated here. The released 001200 bytes are NOT edited. A 13-positional
+-- or 13-named call still resolves (the new arg defaults null), so no old caller breaks.
+--
+-- Additive, forward-only. Writes no agent_board.schema_version (stays 8).
+
+drop function if exists agent_board.enroll_federated_identity(
+  text, text, text, jsonb, text, text, text, text, boolean, text, text, text[], text[]);
+
+create or replace function agent_board.enroll_federated_identity(
+  p_issuer text,
+  p_audience text,
+  p_subject text,
+  p_human_identity_claim jsonb,
+  p_slug text,
+  p_agent_public_key text,
+  p_agent_public_key_format text,
+  p_agent_public_key_fingerprint text,
+  p_pop_verified boolean,
+  p_actor_sub text default null,
+  p_agent_kind text default 'agent',
+  p_requested_scopes text[] default '{}',
+  p_requested_board_scopes text[] default '{}',
+  p_invite_code text default null
+)
+returns table(
+  agent_id uuid,
+  auth_user_id uuid,
+  provider_id text,
+  signing_key_id uuid,
+  granted_scopes text[],
+  key_id text,
+  key_version int,
+  agent_handle text,
+  invite_redeemed boolean
+)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_slug text;
+  v_kind text;
+  v_provider agent_board.identity_providers%rowtype;
+  v_owner_user_id uuid;
+  v_auth_user_id uuid;
+  v_agent_handle text;
+  v_agent_id uuid;
+  v_signing_key_id uuid;
+  v_fingerprint text;
+  v_key_hex text;
+  v_raw_key bytea;
+  v_reencoded text;
+  v_key_id text := 'portal-enroll';
+  v_key_version int := 1;
+  v_requested_scopes text[] := coalesce(p_requested_scopes, '{}');
+  v_requested_board_scopes text[] := coalesce(p_requested_board_scopes, '{}');
+  v_invite_code text := nullif(trim(coalesce(p_invite_code, '')), '');
+  v_invite_redeemed boolean := false;
+begin
+  -- service_role-only (defense in depth on top of the execute-grant revocation).
+  if not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'service_role required for enroll_federated_identity' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- A verified subject + human identity claim are always present from the EF.
+  if p_subject is null then
+    raise exception 'verified subject is required' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if p_human_identity_claim is null then
+    raise exception 'human identity claim is required' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (0) PoP gate — the EF Ed25519-verified the proof-of-possession over the token
+  -- bytes and passes true. Refuse false BEFORE any write (no agent/key/audit row).
+  if p_pop_verified is not true then
+    raise exception 'proof-of-possession was not verified; enrollment refused'
+      using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (1) Public-key shape gate. The enroll contract is raw Ed25519 (32 bytes -> 43
+  -- base64url chars).
+  if p_agent_public_key_format is distinct from 'raw_ed25519_base64url' then
+    raise exception 'agent public key format must be raw_ed25519_base64url' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if p_agent_public_key is null or p_agent_public_key !~ '^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$' then
+    raise exception 'malformed agent public key: expected a 43-char base64url raw Ed25519 key'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (1a) B2 — decode base64url -> raw 32 bytes and REJECT any non-canonical encoding.
+  v_raw_key := decode(translate(p_agent_public_key, '-_', '+/') || '=', 'base64');
+  if octet_length(v_raw_key) <> 32 then
+    raise exception 'agent public key must decode to exactly 32 raw Ed25519 bytes'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  v_reencoded := rtrim(translate(encode(v_raw_key, 'base64'), '+/', '-_'), '=');
+  if v_reencoded is distinct from p_agent_public_key then
+    raise exception 'agent public key is not canonical base64url (aliased encoding rejected)'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (1b) Reject the all-zero small-order placeholder over the RAW bytes.
+  if v_raw_key = decode(repeat('00', 32), 'hex') then
+    raise exception 'agent public key is the all-zero small-order placeholder and is rejected'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (2) Recompute-and-assert the fingerprint in-DB over the RAW 32 bytes.
+  v_fingerprint := 'sha256:' || rtrim(
+    translate(encode(extensions.digest(v_raw_key, 'sha256'), 'base64'), '+/', '-_'),
+    '=');
+  if p_agent_public_key_fingerprint is distinct from v_fingerprint then
+    raise exception 'agent public key fingerprint mismatch (recompute != supplied)'
+      using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (3) act.sub is audit-only, but when present it must be a real value.
+  if p_actor_sub is not null and length(trim(p_actor_sub)) = 0 then
+    raise exception 'actor sub, when present, must be non-empty' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  v_slug := agent_board._normalize_provision_slug(p_slug);
+  v_kind := lower(coalesce(trim(p_agent_kind), ''));
+
+  -- (4) allowlist lookup by (issuer, audience); must exist + supported + policy-approved.
+  select *
+    into v_provider
+    from agent_board.identity_providers
+   where issuer = p_issuer
+     and audience = p_audience
+   limit 1;
+  if v_provider.id is null then
+    raise exception 'issuer/audience not in the identity-provider allowlist' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not v_provider.supported then
+    raise exception 'identity provider is not supported' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not v_provider.policy_approved then
+    raise exception 'identity provider is not policy-approved' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (5) scope-ceiling + kind gate. 'system' is never federatable.
+  if v_kind = 'system' then
+    raise exception 'the system kind cannot be federated' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if v_kind not in ('human', 'agent') then
+    raise exception 'agent kind must be human or agent' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if array_length(v_provider.allowed_agent_kinds, 1) is not null
+     and not (v_kind = any (v_provider.allowed_agent_kinds)) then
+    raise exception 'agent kind % is outside the provider ceiling', v_kind using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not (v_requested_scopes <@ v_provider.allowed_scopes) then
+    raise exception 'requested scopes exceed the provider allowed_scopes ceiling' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+  if not (v_requested_board_scopes <@ v_provider.allowed_board_scopes) then
+    raise exception 'requested board scopes exceed the provider allowed_board_scopes ceiling' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (6) dedup on the enrolled key: a fingerprint already enrolled cannot be re-bound.
+  if exists (select 1 from agent_board.agent_signing_keys k where k.fingerprint = v_fingerprint) then
+    raise exception 'this signing key is already enrolled (duplicate fingerprint)'
+      using errcode = '23505';
+  end if;
+
+  -- (7) HUMAN OWNER — established idempotently per (issuer, sub).
+  v_owner_user_id := agent_board._ensure_agent_auth_user(
+    'fed-human-' || substr(encode(extensions.digest(convert_to(p_issuer || '|' || p_subject, 'UTF8'), 'sha256'), 'hex'), 1, 32));
+
+  -- (8) AGENT handle — unique per enrolled key.
+  v_key_hex := encode(extensions.digest(v_raw_key, 'sha256'), 'hex');
+  v_agent_handle := v_slug;
+  if exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents a where a.handle = v_agent_handle) then
+    v_agent_handle := v_slug || '-' || substr(v_key_hex, 1, 12);
+  end if;
+
+  -- (9) the agent's OWN board principal (session-usable via its enrolled key).
+  v_auth_user_id := agent_board._ensure_agent_auth_user(v_agent_handle);
+
+  -- (10) create the SEPARATE agent row (never keyed on sub; owner = the human).
+  insert into agent_board.agents(
+    agent_type,
+    kind,
+    handle,
+    display_name,
+    status,
+    auth_user_id,
+    owner_user_id,
+    metadata
+  )
+  values (
+    v_kind,
+    v_kind::agent_board.agent_kind,
+    v_agent_handle,
+    agent_board._default_provision_display_name(v_agent_handle),
+    'active',
+    v_auth_user_id,
+    v_owner_user_id,
+    jsonb_build_object(
+      'federation', jsonb_build_object(
+        'issuer', p_issuer,
+        'audience', p_audience,
+        'subject', p_subject,
+        'actorSub', p_actor_sub,
+        'providerId', v_provider.id,
+        'signingKeyFingerprint', v_fingerprint,
+        'requestedScopes', to_jsonb(v_requested_scopes),
+        'requestedBoardScopes', to_jsonb(v_requested_board_scopes),
+        'popVerified', true,
+        'enrolledAt', now()
+      )
+    )
+  )
+  returning id into v_agent_id;
+
+  -- (11) enroll the public key as active + proven (satisfies active_requires_proof).
+  insert into agent_board.agent_signing_keys(
+    id, agent_id, key_id, key_version, public_key, public_key_format, fingerprint,
+    status, proof_state, metadata
+  )
+  values (
+    gen_random_uuid(), v_agent_id, v_key_id, v_key_version, p_agent_public_key,
+    p_agent_public_key_format, v_fingerprint,
+    'active', 'proven',
+    jsonb_build_object('enrolledVia', 'federated_identity', 'popVerified', true)
+  )
+  returning id into v_signing_key_id;
+
+  -- (12) one static claim-snapshot audit row (the verified claim contains act.sub).
+  insert into agent_board.enrollment_federation_audit(
+    issuer, audience, subject, human_identity_claim, provider_id,
+    agent_id, auth_user_id, requested_scopes, granted_scopes
+  )
+  values (
+    p_issuer, p_audience, p_subject, p_human_identity_claim, v_provider.id,
+    v_agent_id, v_auth_user_id, v_requested_scopes, v_requested_scopes
+  );
+
+  -- (13) ROOMLINK soft-honor: if a code is present, redeem it into a bounded board
+  -- membership for the freshly-created agent. Wrapped in a subtransaction so a
+  -- bad/expired/exhausted/unauthorized code rolls back ONLY this sub-block — the
+  -- agent-create above persists and enrollment still succeeds (invite_redeemed=false).
+  if v_invite_code is not null then
+    begin
+      perform agent_board._redeem_invite_for_agent(v_invite_code, v_agent_id);
+      v_invite_redeemed := true;
+    exception when others then
+      v_invite_redeemed := false;
+    end;
+  end if;
+
+  -- Server-authoritative identity: the client mints /session with the RETURNED
+  -- key_id/key_version/agent_handle (its private key stays in the keystore).
+  return query
+  select v_agent_id, v_auth_user_id, v_provider.id, v_signing_key_id, v_requested_scopes,
+         v_key_id, v_key_version, v_agent_handle, v_invite_redeemed;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.enroll_federated_identity(
+  text, text, text, jsonb, text, text, text, text, boolean, text, text, text[], text[], text) is
+  'PoP-at-enrollment federated identity (ROOMLINK-extended). Same server-authoritative '
+  'identity establishment as 20260719001200, plus an OPTIONAL trailing p_invite_code: '
+  'when present the RPC soft-honors it via _redeem_invite_for_agent in a BEGIN/EXCEPTION '
+  'subtransaction (bad code -> enrollment still succeeds, invite_redeemed=false) and '
+  'RETURNS invite_redeemed. service_role-only; never returns a Portal token.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.enroll_federated_identity(
+  text, text, text, jsonb, text, text, text, text, boolean, text, text, text[], text[], text)
+  from public, anon, authenticated;
+grant execute on function agent_board.enroll_federated_identity(
+  text, text, text, jsonb, text, text, text, text, boolean, text, text, text[], text[], text)
+  to service_role;

package/migrations/20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+-- ROOMDELEG Lane A: owner-gated role-gate flip + creator-identity gate-bypass fix.
+--
+-- Additive, no schema_version bump (stays 8). Adds:
+--   * agent_board.set_board_role_gate(board, enforced) — lets a board OWNER flip the
+--     per-board boards.role_gate_enforced flag from their own authenticated session.
+--     Owner-membership gated (mirrors set_board_authority_ceiling's owner-gate + grant
+--     pattern; NOT its side-table upsert — this UPDATEs the boards row). service_role
+--     (current_agent_id() = null) is intentionally NOT an owner here; it retains its
+--     direct table-write grant for operator provisioning.
+--   * R-DELEG-1: create-or-replace invite_board_member / resolve_board_request so the
+--     creator-identity exemption does NOT apply when role_gate_enforced is true. The
+--     board creator (created_by_agent_id is immutable, so a DEMOTED creator kept its
+--     exemption) must, under an enforced gate, ALSO hold an active owner/admin
+--     membership like any other member. Gate-OFF behavior is byte-identical to today
+--     (creator bypasses; non-creator members need an active membership; a null actor /
+--     service_role still bypasses) so no existing test regresses.
+
+-- 1. set_board_role_gate (owner-settable per-board role gate) ------------------------
+-- NOTE: board status is NOT gated here (a role-gate flip is permitted on any board the
+-- caller owns regardless of status); this matches the sibling ceiling setter and is an
+-- accepted scope boundary for Lane A.
+create or replace function agent_board.set_board_role_gate(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_enforced boolean
+)
+returns table(
+  board_id uuid,
+  role_gate_enforced boolean,
+  updated_at timestamptz
+)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+  v_row agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+begin
+  if p_enforced is null then
+    raise exception 'p_enforced must not be null' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Owner gate: only an active owner-role member may flip the gate. service_role
+  -- (current_agent_id() = null) is not an owner and is rejected here (it keeps its
+  -- direct table-write grant for operator provisioning).
+  if v_actor is null
+     or not exists (
+       select 1
+         from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+        where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+          and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+          and bm.role = 'owner'
+          and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     ) then
+    raise exception 'only a board owner may set the role gate' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  update agent_board.boards b
+     set role_gate_enforced = p_enforced,
+         updated_at = now()
+   where b.id = p_board_id
+  returning * into v_row;
+
+  if v_row.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  return query
+  select v_row.id, v_row.role_gate_enforced, v_row.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.set_board_role_gate(uuid, boolean) is
+  'Owner-gated setter for a board''s role_gate_enforced flag: UPDATEs boards.role_gate_enforced only when current_agent_id() is an active owner of the board (else 42501; null p_enforced -> 22023; missing board -> P0002). service_role is not an owner here.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.set_board_role_gate(uuid, boolean) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.set_board_role_gate(uuid, boolean) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+-- 2. R-DELEG-1: role-gate-aware invite_board_member ---------------------------------
+-- Body is verbatim from 20260717000100 EXCEPT the actor gate-guard block: when the
+-- role gate is enforced the creator-identity exemption is dropped (the creator must
+-- then also hold an active owner/admin membership).
+create or replace function agent_board.invite_board_member(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
+)
+returns table(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, created_at timestamptz, updated_at timestamptz)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null then
+    if v_board.role_gate_enforced then
+      -- Gate ON: NO creator exemption. Every actor (including a demoted creator)
+      -- must hold an active owner/admin membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+           and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board invite requires owner or admin role' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    elsif v_actor <> v_board.created_by_agent_id then
+      -- Gate OFF: creator bypasses; any other actor needs an active membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board invite requires active membership' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    end if;
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = p_created_by_agent_id) then
+    raise exception 'creator agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    'invited',
+    p_created_by_agent_id,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.created_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+-- 3. R-DELEG-1: role-gate-aware resolve_board_request -------------------------------
+create or replace function agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_membership_state text,
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb
+)
+returns table(membership_id uuid, board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, membership_state text, left_at timestamptz, updated_at timestamptz)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_existing_state text;
+  v_membership agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+  v_actor uuid := agent_board.current_agent_id();
+begin
+  if p_membership_state not in ('joined', 'subscribed', 'removed') then
+    raise exception 'resolve_board_request only accepts joined, subscribed, or removed' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  select * into v_board from agent_board.boards where id = p_board_id and status = 'active';
+  if v_board.id is null then
+    raise exception 'board not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+  if v_actor is not null then
+    if v_board.role_gate_enforced then
+      -- Gate ON: NO creator exemption. Every actor (including a demoted creator)
+      -- must hold an active owner/admin membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+           and bm.role in ('owner', 'admin')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board request resolution requires owner or admin role' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    elsif v_actor <> v_board.created_by_agent_id then
+      -- Gate OFF: creator bypasses; any other actor needs an active membership.
+      if not exists (
+        select 1
+          from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+         where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+           and bm.agent_id = v_actor
+           and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+      ) then
+        raise exception 'board request resolution requires active membership' using errcode = '42501';
+      end if;
+    end if;
+  end if;
+
+  select bm.membership_state
+    into v_existing_state
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   order by bm.created_at desc
+   limit 1;
+
+  if v_existing_state not in ('requested', 'invited') then
+    raise exception 'pending board membership not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  v_membership := agent_board._upsert_board_membership_state(
+    p_board_id,
+    p_agent_id,
+    p_membership_state,
+    p_created_by_agent_id,
+    p_metadata
+  );
+
+  return query
+  select v_membership.id, v_membership.board_id, v_membership.agent_id, v_membership.membership_state, v_membership.left_at, v_membership.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+-- Re-assert grants (create or replace preserves them, but be explicit so a fresh
+-- replay is order-independent).
+grant execute on function agent_board.invite_board_member(uuid, uuid, uuid, jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;
+grant execute on function agent_board.resolve_board_request(uuid, uuid, text, uuid, jsonb) to authenticated, service_role;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.7.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.4.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.7.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 71,
-  "aggregateSha256": "794661727d22a39e2d42ddfc5d6456fb93165cef68af11fb361385c29dbdead9",
+  "migrationCount": 76,
+  "aggregateSha256": "fca8d220460ac16309d9a2d76cfa6f9ccc395e1c52c90c7cbd4bd5f04bbc42dc",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -687,6 +687,51 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 3112,
       "sha256": "b2f58eadc13cb227991c4d978c5460878dc3cbada43c58285b55154b89a28459"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 71,
+      "id": "20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed",
+      "filename": "20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 7871,
+      "sha256": "ecfaf262832b3d499102ec3a2ee1d48e043b33282287d0e987555e868c07b804"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 72,
+      "id": "20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live",
+      "filename": "20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 3716,
+      "sha256": "40c9f585af16211fe9ab1d35efca6787e49b31afc7c85f208da22b9566a65575"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 73,
+      "id": "20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens",
+      "filename": "20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 22491,
+      "sha256": "98870e44a71eb648cfefd550f32eb30cc7a25e65ae1a7aa3852a3f9234eb98e2"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 74,
+      "id": "20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding",
+      "filename": "20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 12092,
+      "sha256": "60e289d99a212ff63cb99ea275b545f7e9c15ad8cc4e0ba42c98492bae342adc"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 75,
+      "id": "20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate",
+      "filename": "20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 9521,
+      "sha256": "23c1b1545540232bbd94a47cdcbdf30e6294fd714c4d961a0a273a018d4c3398"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/tooling.test.mjs

@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
     expect(manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(8);
     expect(manifest.minClientVersion).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
   });
-  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 67 + 4 = 71)', () => {
+  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN + two ROOMLINK + one ROOMDELEG forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 75 + 1 = 76)', () => {
     expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(manifest.migrations.length);
-    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(71);
+    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(76);
     // MBSESSION switched enforcement on (scoped-send re-grant): the client-visible
     // schema version bumped to 8. MBDELEG tightens delegation and MBFED adds only
     // enrollment-only additive surface (identity_providers registry, enrollment audit,
@@ -74,6 +74,16 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
       '20260719000300_agent_board_enroll_rate_cap.sql',
       '20260719001200_agent_board_enroll_federated_identity_raw_fingerprint.sql',
       '20260719001300_agent_board_enroll_rate_events_reaper_rls.sql',
+      // ROOMOWN: room ownership + self-service authority (create_board owner-seed +
+      // bootstrap; grant_board_role activated for authenticated). schema stays 8.
+      '20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql',
+      '20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql',
+      // ROOMLINK: shareable board invite links + enroll-on-redeem binding. schema stays 8.
+      '20260724000100_agent_board_roomlink_invite_tokens.sql',
+      '20260724000200_agent_board_roomlink_enroll_binding.sql',
+      // ROOMDELEG Lane A: owner-gated set_board_role_gate + creator-identity gate-bypass
+      // fix on invite_board_member/resolve_board_request. schema stays 8.
+      '20260725000100_agent_board_roomdeleg_role_gate.sql',
     ]) {
       expect(names.has(f)).toBe(true);
     }

package/tests/agent_board_board_role.test.sql

@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ begin
   select board_id into v_board
     from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'br-board-' || v_suffix, 'BR Board', 'board role test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
-  -- Creator + other memberships inserted with the column DEFAULT (member) to
-  -- exercise the one-time backfill; member/admin get explicit roles for gate tests.
+  -- The creator's owner membership is now seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN). The
+  -- `other` membership is inserted with the column DEFAULT (member) to exercise the
+  -- one-time backfill; member/admin get explicit roles for gate tests.
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id)
   values
-    (v_board, v_creator, 'joined', v_creator),
     (v_board, v_other, 'joined', v_creator);
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_policies.test.sql

@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ begin
   select board_id into v_board
     from agent_board.create_board(v_owner, 'dg-board-' || v_suffix, 'DG Board', 'delegation test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
+  -- The owner's owner membership is now seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN); only the
+  -- member membership needs an explicit insert.
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_board, v_owner, 'joined', v_owner, 'owner'),
     (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_owner, 'member');
 
   -- Policy with only root_agent_id set -> defaults apply (child_ttl_ceiling 8h).

package/tests/agent_board_enroll_federated_identity.test.sql

@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@ begin;
 
 select plan(28);
 
--- New 13-arg signature exists (the old 8-arg was dropped by 20260719001100). --------
+-- New 14-arg signature exists (ROOMLINK 20260724000200 added a trailing invite code). -
 select has_function(
   'agent_board', 'enroll_federated_identity',
-  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]'],
-  'enroll_federated_identity exists with the reworked 13-arg PoP signature');
+  array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text','text','boolean','text','text','text[]','text[]','text'],
+  'enroll_federated_identity exists with the ROOMLINK-extended 14-arg PoP signature');
 select hasnt_function(
   'agent_board', 'enroll_federated_identity',
   array['text','text','text','jsonb','text','text','text[]','text[]'],