@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.4.0 → 1.5.0

package/fixtures/already-applied.json

@@ -284,6 +284,14 @@
     {
       "id": "20260719001300_agent_board_enroll_rate_events_reaper_rls",
       "sha256": "b2f58eadc13cb227991c4d978c5460878dc3cbada43c58285b55154b89a28459"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed",
+      "sha256": "ecfaf262832b3d499102ec3a2ee1d48e043b33282287d0e987555e868c07b804"
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live",
+      "sha256": "40c9f585af16211fe9ab1d35efca6787e49b31afc7c85f208da22b9566a65575"
     }
   ]
 }

package/migrations/20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+-- ROOMOWN Lane A: room creators actually OWN the room.
+--
+-- Before this migration create_board wrote ONLY the boards row and never seeded a
+-- board_memberships owner row, so the creator held no membership and could not act
+-- as owner (grant_board_role / set_board_authority_ceiling both resolve the grantor
+-- rank from a joined/subscribed membership). This migration:
+--
+--   1. create or replace create_board so that, on a GENUINE INSERT, it also seeds a
+--      joined `owner` board_memberships row bound to the board's ACTUAL
+--      created_by_agent_id. The pre-existing slug-collision UPDATE path is now
+--      OWNER-ONLY: a non-owner colliding on an existing slug raises 42501 and mutates
+--      nothing (closing a confidentiality bypass where any authenticated agent could
+--      overwrite another board's name/visibility/metadata). The effective actor is
+--      resolved through _resolved_actor_agent_id, so an authenticated caller can only
+--      create/own as itself while service_role retains create-on-behalf-of.
+--
+--   2. bootstrap_board_owner_memberships(): a service_role-only repair sweep that
+--      seeds the owner membership for pre-existing owner-less boards' created_by only.
+--
+-- Additive; no schema_version bump (net-new owner-seed + repair, no previously-live
+-- authenticated contract re-activated here).
+
+-- 1. create_board: seed owner on insert; owner-only slug-collision update ----------
+create or replace function agent_board.create_board(
+  p_created_by_agent_id uuid,
+  p_slug text,
+  p_name text,
+  p_description text default null,
+  p_metadata jsonb default '{}'::jsonb,
+  p_visibility text default 'private'
+)
+returns table(board_id uuid, slug text, name text, status text, visibility text, created_at timestamptz, updated_at timestamptz)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+#variable_conflict use_column
+declare
+  v_actor uuid;
+  v_existing agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+  v_board agent_board.boards%rowtype;
+begin
+  if nullif(trim(p_slug), '') is null or nullif(trim(p_name), '') is null then
+    raise exception 'board slug and name are required' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+  if coalesce(p_visibility, 'private') not in ('private', 'invite_only', 'open', 'directory_hidden') then
+    raise exception 'invalid board visibility' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Effective actor: service_role -> supplied arg (create-on-behalf-of);
+  -- authenticated -> current_agent_id() and rejects arg <> current (42501).
+  v_actor := agent_board._resolved_actor_agent_id(p_created_by_agent_id, 'p_created_by_agent_id');
+
+  if not exists (select 1 from agent_board.agents where id = v_actor) then
+    raise exception 'agent not found' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  select * into v_existing
+    from agent_board.boards b
+   where b.slug = trim(p_slug);
+
+  if found then
+    -- Slug-collision path is OWNER-ONLY, keyed on CURRENT authority: the actor must
+    -- hold an ACTIVE owner-role membership on the existing board — NOT merely be its
+    -- original `created_by_agent_id`. A demoted or departed original creator no longer
+    -- owns the board and must NOT be able to re-open/rename/flip-visibility it.
+    if not exists (
+      select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships m
+       where m.board_id = v_existing.id
+         and m.agent_id = v_actor
+         and m.role = 'owner'
+         and m.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+    ) then
+      raise exception 'board slug already in use' using errcode = '42501';
+    end if;
+
+    update agent_board.boards as b
+       set name = trim(p_name),
+           description = nullif(trim(p_description), ''),
+           status = 'active',
+           visibility = coalesce(p_visibility, 'private'),
+           metadata = coalesce(b.metadata, '{}'::jsonb) || coalesce(p_metadata, '{}'::jsonb),
+           updated_at = now()
+     where b.id = v_existing.id
+    returning * into v_board;
+    -- No owner re-seed: the owner was seeded at this board's original creation, and
+    -- re-promoting on every create_board would resurrect a deliberately demoted owner.
+  else
+    insert into agent_board.boards as b(slug, name, description, created_by_agent_id, visibility, metadata)
+    values (
+      trim(p_slug),
+      trim(p_name),
+      nullif(trim(p_description), ''),
+      v_actor,
+      coalesce(p_visibility, 'private'),
+      coalesce(p_metadata, '{}'::jsonb)
+    )
+    returning * into v_board;
+
+    -- Seed the creator's owner membership, bound to the board's ACTUAL
+    -- created_by_agent_id (never the raw param). Idempotent against the active
+    -- partial-unique index so at most one active owner row exists.
+    insert into agent_board.board_memberships as bm(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, role, created_by_agent_id)
+    values (v_board.id, v_board.created_by_agent_id, 'joined', 'owner', v_board.created_by_agent_id)
+    on conflict (board_id, agent_id) where (membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed'))
+      do update set role = 'owner', updated_at = now();
+  end if;
+
+  return query
+  select v_board.id, v_board.slug, v_board.name, v_board.status, v_board.visibility, v_board.created_at, v_board.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.create_board(uuid, text, text, text, jsonb, text) is
+  'Creates a board and, on genuine insert, seeds the creator''s joined owner membership (bound to the board''s created_by_agent_id). The slug-collision update path is owner-only (non-owner raises 42501, mutates nothing). Effective actor resolved via _resolved_actor_agent_id.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.create_board(uuid, text, text, text, jsonb, text) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.create_board(uuid, text, text, text, jsonb, text) to authenticated, service_role;
+
+-- 2. bootstrap_board_owner_memberships(): service_role-only owner-seed repair -------
+create or replace function agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships()
+returns table(board_id uuid, owner_agent_id uuid, membership_id uuid)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+#variable_conflict use_column
+declare
+  v_row record;
+  v_membership_id uuid;
+begin
+  -- service_role-only: current_agent_id() is null for service_role, non-null for any
+  -- authenticated principal (guarded here in addition to the EXECUTE revoke below).
+  if not agent_board._is_service_role() then
+    raise exception 'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships is service_role-only' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  for v_row in
+    select b.id as board_id, b.created_by_agent_id as owner_agent_id
+      from agent_board.boards b
+     where not exists (
+       select 1
+         from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+        where bm.board_id = b.id
+          and bm.agent_id = b.created_by_agent_id
+          and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')
+     )
+  loop
+    insert into agent_board.board_memberships as bm(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, role, created_by_agent_id)
+    values (v_row.board_id, v_row.owner_agent_id, 'joined', 'owner', v_row.owner_agent_id)
+    on conflict (board_id, agent_id) where (membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed'))
+      do update set role = 'owner', updated_at = now()
+    returning bm.id into v_membership_id;
+
+    board_id := v_row.board_id;
+    owner_agent_id := v_row.owner_agent_id;
+    membership_id := v_membership_id;
+    return next;
+  end loop;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships() is
+  'service_role-only repair sweep: seeds a joined owner membership for pre-existing owner-less boards, bound to each board''s created_by_agent_id. Takes no caller/role param.';
+
+revoke all on function agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships() from public, anon, authenticated;
+grant execute on function agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships() to service_role;

package/migrations/20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+-- ROOMOWN Lane B: activate the dormant grant_board_role chokepoint for authenticated
+-- board owners/admins, with a privilege-escalation-safe grantor binding.
+--
+-- 20260718000400 shipped grant_board_role dormant (revoked from authenticated,
+-- granted service_role) and TRUSTED p_grantor_agent_id. Now that create_board seeds
+-- the creator's owner membership (ROOMOWN Lane A), the owner can drive grants from
+-- their own authenticated session. Activating it safely requires binding the grantor
+-- to the RESOLVED actor, NOT coalesce(current_agent_id(), p_grantor_agent_id):
+-- current_agent_id() returns null for ANY authenticated caller whose agent is
+-- suspended/credential-rotating/unmapped (20260710000000:15 filters status='active'),
+-- and such a caller still carries a valid `authenticated` token. A coalesce would then
+-- honor an attacker-supplied p_grantor_agent_id (owner IDs are non-secret) and let them
+-- self-escalate. _resolved_actor_agent_id fails closed: service_role -> supplied arg;
+-- authenticated -> current_agent_id() and raises 42501 if null or if arg <> current.
+--
+-- Additive; no schema_version bump. grant_board_role was never authenticated, so no
+-- old client keys on it — this is a net-new capability, not a re-activation.
+
+create or replace function agent_board.grant_board_role(
+  p_board_id uuid,
+  p_agent_id uuid,
+  p_grantee_role text,
+  p_grantor_agent_id uuid default null
+)
+returns table(board_id uuid, agent_id uuid, role text, updated_at timestamptz)
+language plpgsql
+security definer
+set search_path = agent_board, public
+as $$
+declare
+  v_grantor uuid;
+  v_updated agent_board.board_memberships%rowtype;
+begin
+  if p_grantee_role not in ('owner', 'admin', 'member', 'observer') then
+    raise exception 'invalid grantee role' using errcode = '22023';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Grantor is the RESOLVED actor. service_role -> supplied arg; authenticated ->
+  -- current_agent_id() and raises 42501 if null (suspended/unmapped) or if the
+  -- supplied arg <> current_agent_id(). This closes the single-principal escalation.
+  v_grantor := agent_board._resolved_actor_agent_id(p_grantor_agent_id, 'p_grantor_agent_id');
+
+  if not exists (
+    select 1 from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     where bm.board_id = p_board_id and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+  ) then
+    raise exception 'grantee has no membership on this board' using errcode = 'P0002';
+  end if;
+
+  -- Ceiling consumption: grantee-bounded against min(grantor role, board ceiling).
+  if not agent_board._grant_within_ceiling(v_grantor, p_board_id, p_grantee_role) then
+    raise exception 'grant exceeds grantor role or board authority ceiling' using errcode = '42501';
+  end if;
+
+  update agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     set role = p_grantee_role,
+         updated_at = now()
+   where bm.board_id = p_board_id
+     and bm.agent_id = p_agent_id
+   returning * into v_updated;
+
+  return query
+  select v_updated.board_id, v_updated.agent_id, v_updated.role, v_updated.updated_at;
+end;
+$$;
+
+comment on function agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid, uuid, text, uuid) is
+  'Live board-role grant chokepoint. Grantor is the resolved actor (_resolved_actor_agent_id: service_role uses the supplied arg, authenticated uses current_agent_id() and fails closed on null/mismatch). Requires grantee membership (P0002), then enforces _grant_within_ceiling(grantor, board, grantee_role) before setting board_memberships.role.';
+
+-- Live: authenticated owners/admins may grant (within ceiling); service_role retained.
+revoke all on function agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid, uuid, text, uuid) from public, anon;
+grant execute on function agent_board.grant_board_role(uuid, uuid, text, uuid) to authenticated, service_role;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.5.0",
   "description": "Canonical, immutable, exact-pinnable agent_board schema bundle: ordered SQL migrations, digest + compatibility manifest, and deterministic materialize/plan/check tooling for adopters.",
   "repository": "https://github.com/Consiliency/message-board.git",
   "type": "module",

package/schema-manifest.json

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
   "schema": "agent_board_schema_manifest.v1",
   "interface": "IF-0-MBPLANE-BUNDLE-1",
   "package": "@consiliency/agent-board-schema",
-  "packageVersion": "1.4.0",
+  "packageVersion": "1.5.0",
   "schemaVersion": 8,
   "minClientVersion": "1.1.0",
   "source": {
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@
       "usage": "upsert (retention/monitoring defaults; on conflict do nothing)"
     }
   ],
-  "migrationCount": 71,
-  "aggregateSha256": "794661727d22a39e2d42ddfc5d6456fb93165cef68af11fb361385c29dbdead9",
+  "migrationCount": 73,
+  "aggregateSha256": "a43737edf382d8aee59069d6a9aec9e39fce17b31f092a3d7fcd96303b6f70e9",
   "migrations": [
     {
       "order": 0,
@@ -687,6 +687,24 @@
       "sourceRef": "message-board",
       "bytes": 3112,
       "sha256": "b2f58eadc13cb227991c4d978c5460878dc3cbada43c58285b55154b89a28459"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 71,
+      "id": "20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed",
+      "filename": "20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 7871,
+      "sha256": "ecfaf262832b3d499102ec3a2ee1d48e043b33282287d0e987555e868c07b804"
+    },
+    {
+      "order": 72,
+      "id": "20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live",
+      "filename": "20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql",
+      "origin": "message-board-forward",
+      "sourceRef": "message-board",
+      "bytes": 3716,
+      "sha256": "40c9f585af16211fe9ab1d35efca6787e49b31afc7c85f208da22b9566a65575"
     }
   ],
   "excludedBridge": {

package/src/tooling.test.mjs

@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
     expect(manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(8);
     expect(manifest.minClientVersion).toMatch(/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/);
   });
-  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 67 + 4 = 71)', () => {
+  it('registers the four MBAUTHZ + four MBSENDAUTHZ + four MBSESSION + four MBDELEG + three MBFED + three MBHARDEN + two MBPORTALGATE + two MBPORTAL-PR32 + two ROOMOWN forward migrations (migrationCount = prior 71 + 2 = 73)', () => {
     expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(manifest.migrations.length);
-    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(71);
+    expect(manifest.migrationCount).toBe(73);
     // MBSESSION switched enforcement on (scoped-send re-grant): the client-visible
     // schema version bumped to 8. MBDELEG tightens delegation and MBFED adds only
     // enrollment-only additive surface (identity_providers registry, enrollment audit,
@@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ describe('manifest integrity', () => {
       '20260719000300_agent_board_enroll_rate_cap.sql',
       '20260719001200_agent_board_enroll_federated_identity_raw_fingerprint.sql',
       '20260719001300_agent_board_enroll_rate_events_reaper_rls.sql',
+      // ROOMOWN: room ownership + self-service authority (create_board owner-seed +
+      // bootstrap; grant_board_role activated for authenticated). schema stays 8.
+      '20260723000100_agent_board_roomown_owner_seed.sql',
+      '20260723000200_agent_board_roomown_grant_role_live.sql',
     ]) {
       expect(names.has(f)).toBe(true);
     }

package/tests/agent_board_board_role.test.sql

@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ begin
   select board_id into v_board
     from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'br-board-' || v_suffix, 'BR Board', 'board role test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
-  -- Creator + other memberships inserted with the column DEFAULT (member) to
-  -- exercise the one-time backfill; member/admin get explicit roles for gate tests.
+  -- The creator's owner membership is now seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN). The
+  -- `other` membership is inserted with the column DEFAULT (member) to exercise the
+  -- one-time backfill; member/admin get explicit roles for gate tests.
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id)
   values
-    (v_board, v_creator, 'joined', v_creator),
     (v_board, v_other, 'joined', v_creator);
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values

package/tests/agent_board_delegation_policies.test.sql

@@ -37,9 +37,10 @@ begin
   select board_id into v_board
     from agent_board.create_board(v_owner, 'dg-board-' || v_suffix, 'DG Board', 'delegation test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
+  -- The owner's owner membership is now seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN); only the
+  -- member membership needs an explicit insert.
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_board, v_owner, 'joined', v_owner, 'owner'),
     (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_owner, 'member');
 
   -- Policy with only root_agent_id set -> defaults apply (child_ttl_ceiling 8h).

package/tests/agent_board_enrollment_audit_content.test.sql

@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ select is(
      select pg_get_functiondef(p.oid) as def, p.proname
        from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
       where n.nspname = 'agent_board'
+        -- pg_get_functiondef() RAISES on aggregate ('a') / window ('w') procs
+        -- ("X is an aggregate function"); restrict to callable functions +
+        -- procedures (the RPC surface this invariant is about).
+        and p.prokind in ('f', 'p')
         and p.proname <> 'enroll_federated_identity'
    ) d
    where lower(d.def) like '%enrollment_federation_audit%'),
@@ -81,6 +85,7 @@ select is(
      select pg_get_functiondef(p.oid) as def
        from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
       where n.nspname = 'agent_board'
+        and p.prokind in ('f', 'p')  -- pg_get_functiondef raises on aggregate/window procs
         and p.proname in (
           'mint_fleet_agent_session', 'post_board_message', 'send_direct_message',
           'send_multicast_message', 'create_tasking_delivery', 'revoke_agent')

package/tests/agent_board_inbox_rpcs.test.sql

@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ begin
       '{}'::jsonb
     );
   v_board_message := v_result.message_id;
-  perform is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 2, 'board delivery reaches joined and subscribed members only');
+  perform is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 3, 'board delivery reaches joined and subscribed members only (incl. the seeded owner-creator)');
   perform is(
     (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.delivery_recipients where source_message_id = v_board_message and recipient_agent_id = v_left_member),
     0,
@@ -402,15 +402,15 @@ begin
       '{}'::jsonb
     );
   v_task := v_result.task_id;
-  perform is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 3, 'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts');
+  perform is(v_result.delivered_recipient_count, 4, 'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts (incl. the seeded owner-creator)');
   perform is(
     (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.delivery_recipients where source_task_id = v_task),
-    2,
+    3,
     'tasking suppresses duplicate recipient rows across explicit and board fan-out'
   );
   perform is(
     (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.inbox_items where source_task_id = v_task),
-    2,
+    3,
     'tasking writes one inbox row per unique recipient'
   );
 

package/tests/agent_board_portal_offline_invariant.test.sql

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ do $$
 declare
   s text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
   v_agent uuid; v_auth uuid;
+  v_creator uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_key uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_ch uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_board uuid; v_thread uuid := gen_random_uuid();
@@ -57,11 +58,14 @@ begin
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges(id, signing_key_id, agent_id, challenge_nonce, challenge_bytes, proof_state, expires_at, consumed_at)
   values (v_ch, v_key, v_agent, v_ch::text, 'agent-signing-key-proof.v1:'||v_ch||':n', 'pending', now() + interval '10 minutes', null);
 
-  -- A board + membership + thread so the enrolled agent can send.
+  -- A board (created by a dedicated creator; owner seeded by create_board) +
+  -- membership + thread so the enrolled agent sends as a genuine NON-creator member.
+  insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status)
+  values (v_creator, 'agent', 'pofx-creator-'||s, 'POFX Creator', 'active');
   select board_id into v_board
-    from agent_board.create_board(v_agent, 'pofx-board-'||s, 'POFX Board', 'portal-offline', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'pofx-board-'||s, 'POFX Board', 'portal-offline', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
-  values (v_board, v_agent, 'joined', v_agent, 'member');
+  values (v_board, v_agent, 'joined', v_creator, 'member');
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, thread_type, created_by_agent_id, subject)
   values (v_thread, 'coordination', v_agent, 'POFX thread');
 

package/tests/agent_board_roomown.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+-- ROOMOWN pgTAP: room ownership (create_board owner-seed + owner-only slug-collision
+-- + bootstrap repair) and self-service authority (grant_board_role activated for
+-- authenticated owners/admins with a privilege-escalation-safe grantor binding).
+--
+-- Runs as the postgres db role; request.jwt.claim.role toggles _is_service_role()
+-- (''/service_role => true, 'authenticated' => false) and request.jwt.claim.sub picks
+-- the acting agent. Fixture style mirrors agent_board_board_role.test.sql.
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(21);
+
+create temp table _roomown_fixture (
+  board uuid,
+  board_slug text,
+  board2 uuid,
+  board2_owner uuid,
+  alice uuid,
+  bob uuid,
+  member_agent uuid,
+  grantee uuid,
+  nomember uuid,
+  suspended uuid,
+  alice_user uuid,
+  bob_user uuid,
+  member_user uuid,
+  suspended_user uuid
+) on commit drop;
+
+do $$
+declare
+  v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
+  v_alice_user uuid;
+  v_bob_user uuid;
+  v_member_user uuid;
+  v_suspended_user uuid;
+  v_alice uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_bob uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_member uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_grantee uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_nomember uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_suspended uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_b2owner uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_board uuid;
+  v_slug text := 'roomown-board-' || v_suffix;
+  v_board2 uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+begin
+  v_alice_user := public.ensure_github_user('ro-alice-' || v_suffix, 'ro-alice-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'ro-alice-' || v_suffix, 'RO Alice');
+  v_bob_user := public.ensure_github_user('ro-bob-' || v_suffix, 'ro-bob-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'ro-bob-' || v_suffix, 'RO Bob');
+  v_member_user := public.ensure_github_user('ro-member-' || v_suffix, 'ro-member-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'ro-member-' || v_suffix, 'RO Member');
+  v_suspended_user := public.ensure_github_user('ro-susp-' || v_suffix, 'ro-susp-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'ro-susp-' || v_suffix, 'RO Suspended');
+
+  insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
+  values
+    (v_alice, 'agent', 'ro-alice-' || v_suffix, 'RO Alice', 'active', v_alice_user, v_alice_user),
+    (v_bob, 'agent', 'ro-bob-' || v_suffix, 'RO Bob', 'active', v_bob_user, v_bob_user),
+    (v_member, 'agent', 'ro-member-' || v_suffix, 'RO Member', 'active', v_member_user, v_member_user),
+    -- Suspended agent WITH a valid auth user: current_agent_id() filters status='active'
+    -- so it resolves to null while auth.uid() still maps (the A1 escalation vector).
+    (v_suspended, 'agent', 'ro-susp-' || v_suffix, 'RO Suspended', 'suspended', v_suspended_user, v_suspended_user),
+    (v_grantee, 'agent', 'ro-grantee-' || v_suffix, 'RO Grantee', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_nomember, 'agent', 'ro-nomember-' || v_suffix, 'RO NoMember', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_b2owner, 'agent', 'ro-b2owner-' || v_suffix, 'RO B2 Owner', 'active', null, null);
+
+  -- Alice creates board B (service_role null-actor here -> supplied arg is honored):
+  -- create_board seeds Alice's joined owner membership.
+  select board_id into v_board
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_alice, v_slug, 'ROOMOWN Board', 'roomown test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+
+  -- Genuine NON-creator members: a member (rank member) + a grant target (observer).
+  insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
+  values
+    (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_alice, 'member'),
+    (v_board, v_grantee, 'joined', v_alice, 'observer');
+
+  -- Board B2: an owner-LESS board (direct insert, no membership) for the bootstrap sweep.
+  insert into agent_board.boards(id, slug, name, description, created_by_agent_id, visibility)
+  values (v_board2, 'roomown-board2-' || v_suffix, 'ROOMOWN Board2', 'owner-less', v_b2owner, 'private');
+
+  insert into _roomown_fixture values
+    (v_board, v_slug, v_board2, v_b2owner, v_alice, v_bob, v_member, v_grantee, v_nomember, v_suspended,
+     v_alice_user, v_bob_user, v_member_user, v_suspended_user);
+end
+$$;
+
+-- 1. create_board seeds the creator's joined owner membership --------------------
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     join _roomown_fixture f on bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.alice
+    where bm.membership_state = 'joined' and bm.role = 'owner'),
+  1, 'create_board seeds exactly one joined owner membership for the creator');
+
+-- A5.1 create_board actor-guard: authenticated Bob cannot create as Alice ---------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select bob_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.create_board(%L::uuid, %L, 'Bob As Alice', null, '{}'::jsonb, 'private')$q$,
+     alice, 'roomown-bobasalice-' || replace(board::text, '-', '')) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'p_created_by_agent_id must match current_agent_id()',
+  'actor-guard: authenticated Bob cannot create_board as Alice');
+
+-- A5.2 slug-collision guard: non-owner Bob colliding on Alice's slug -> 42501 -----
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.create_board(%L::uuid, %L, 'HIJACK', null, '{}'::jsonb, 'open')$q$,
+     bob, board_slug) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board slug already in use',
+  'slug-collision: non-owner colliding on an existing slug is rejected');
+select is(
+  (select name from agent_board.boards b join _roomown_fixture f on b.id = f.board),
+  'ROOMOWN Board', 'slug-collision: the existing board name is unchanged (no hijack mutation)');
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     join _roomown_fixture f on bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.bob),
+  0, 'slug-collision: the non-owner gains no membership on the existing board');
+
+-- 2. owner-seed idempotent: re-create by the owner does not add an owner row -------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.create_board(%L::uuid, %L, 'ROOMOWN Board', 'roomown test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private')$q$,
+     alice, board_slug) from _roomown_fixture),
+  'owner re-create on the same slug is admitted (owner-only update path)');
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     join _roomown_fixture f on bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.alice
+    where bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')),
+  1, 'owner-seed is idempotent: re-create does not duplicate the owner membership');
+
+-- 3. bootstrap repairs an owner-less board's created_by membership ----------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+select lives_ok(
+  $$select agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships()$$,
+  'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships runs for service_role');
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+     join _roomown_fixture f on bm.board_id = f.board2 and bm.agent_id = f.board2_owner
+    where bm.membership_state = 'joined' and bm.role = 'owner'),
+  1, 'bootstrap seeds a joined owner membership for the owner-less board''s created_by');
+
+-- 4. bootstrap is service_role-only ----------------------------------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  $$select agent_board.bootstrap_board_owner_memberships()$$,
+  '42501', 'bootstrap_board_owner_memberships is service_role-only',
+  'bootstrap rejects an authenticated (mapped) caller');
+
+-- 5. owner grants admin (within ceiling, no ceiling row = owner) ------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'admin')$q$, board, grantee) from _roomown_fixture),
+  'owner grants admin (grantor bound to current_agent_id, no explicit arg)');
+select is(
+  (select role from agent_board.board_memberships bm join _roomown_fixture f on bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.grantee),
+  'admin', 'the grantee role is upserted to admin');
+
+-- 6. a member cannot grant above its own rank ------------------------------------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select member_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'admin')$q$, board, grantee) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'grant exceeds grantor role or board authority ceiling',
+  'a member grantor cannot grant admin (grantee-bounded ceiling)');
+
+-- 7. grantor binding: a member passing p_grantor=<owner> is still rejected (A1) ---
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'admin', %L::uuid)$q$, board, grantee, alice) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'p_grantor_agent_id must match current_agent_id()',
+  'grantor binding: an authenticated member cannot impersonate the owner via p_grantor_agent_id');
+
+-- 8. board ceiling caps an owner grant -------------------------------------------
+insert into agent_board.board_authority_ceilings(board_id, max_grantable_role)
+select board, 'member' from _roomown_fixture;
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'admin')$q$, board, grantee) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'grant exceeds grantor role or board authority ceiling',
+  'the board ceiling caps an over-ceiling grant even for an owner grantor');
+
+-- A5.3 grantee-membership required -> P0002 --------------------------------------
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'member')$q$, board, nomember) from _roomown_fixture),
+  'P0002', 'grantee has no membership on this board',
+  'grant to an agent with no membership raises P0002');
+
+-- A5.4 service_role regression: explicit p_grantor honored on the null actor ------
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'member', %L::uuid)$q$, board, grantee, alice) from _roomown_fixture),
+  'service_role: an explicit p_grantor_agent_id is honored (null actor via _is_service_role)');
+
+-- A5.5 null-actor escalation BLOCKED (proves A1) ---------------------------------
+-- An authenticated sub mapped to a SUSPENDED agent (current_agent_id() null) passing
+-- p_grantor=<owner> must be rejected at actor resolution, NOT self-escalated.
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select suspended_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.grant_board_role(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'owner', %L::uuid)$q$, board, grantee, alice) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'current agent principal not resolved',
+  'null-actor escalation is blocked: a suspended principal cannot grant via a supplied owner id');
+
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+
+-- 9. grant_board_role EXECUTE is granted to authenticated (live) -----------------
+select function_privs_are(
+  'agent_board', 'grant_board_role', array['uuid', 'uuid', 'text', 'uuid'],
+  'authenticated', array['EXECUTE'], 'grant_board_role execute is granted to authenticated (self-service authority live)');
+
+-- A5.6 demoted creator cannot mutate via slug-collision (current-owner authz, NOT created_by) --
+-- Panel finding: the slug-collision UPDATE path must key on CURRENT owner membership, not the
+-- immutable created_by. Alice (still owner after the grant tests) self-demotes to member, then
+-- her re-create on the same slug must be rejected and mutate nothing.
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select alice_user from _roomown_fixture)::text, true);
+-- self-demote to member (member <= min(owner, ceiling)); bare statement, not an assertion
+select agent_board.grant_board_role(board, alice, 'member') from _roomown_fixture;
+select throws_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.create_board(%L::uuid, %L, 'REOPEN', null, '{}'::jsonb, 'open')$q$,
+     alice, board_slug) from _roomown_fixture),
+  '42501', 'board slug already in use',
+  'demoted creator (no current owner membership) cannot mutate the board via slug-collision');
+select is(
+  (select visibility from agent_board.boards b join _roomown_fixture f on b.id = f.board),
+  'private', 'demoted-creator slug-collision leaves visibility unchanged (no private->open flip)');
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', '', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', '', true);
+
+select finish();
+
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_scoped_send_regrant.test.sql

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ declare
   v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
   v_member_user uuid;
   v_other_user uuid;
+  v_creator uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_member uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_other uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_recipient uuid := gen_random_uuid();
@@ -42,13 +43,16 @@ begin
   values
     (v_member, 'agent', 'rg-member-' || v_suffix, 'RG Member', 'active', v_member_user, v_member_user),
     (v_other, 'agent', 'rg-other-' || v_suffix, 'RG Other', 'active', v_other_user, v_other_user),
-    (v_recipient, 'agent', 'rg-recipient-' || v_suffix, 'RG Recipient', 'active', null, null);
+    (v_recipient, 'agent', 'rg-recipient-' || v_suffix, 'RG Recipient', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_creator, 'agent', 'rg-creator-' || v_suffix, 'RG Creator', 'active', null, null);
 
+  -- Dedicated creator (owner seeded by create_board); v_member is a genuine
+  -- NON-creator member so the member send path is exercised as role 'member'.
   select board_id into v_board
-    from agent_board.create_board(v_member, 'rg-board-' || v_suffix, 'RG Board', 'regrant test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'rg-board-' || v_suffix, 'RG Board', 'regrant test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
-  values (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_member, 'member');
+  values (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_creator, 'member');
 
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, thread_type, created_by_agent_id, subject)
   values

package/tests/agent_board_send_authz_matrix.test.sql

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ declare
   v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
   v_sb_member_user uuid;
   v_sb_observer_user uuid;
+  v_sb_creator uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_sb_member uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_sb_observer uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_sb_board uuid;
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ begin
     (v_sb_observer, 'agent', 'mtx-observer-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Observer', 'active', v_sb_observer_user, v_sb_observer_user);
   insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name)
   values
+    (v_sb_creator, 'agent', 'mtx-sbcreator-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Send Board Creator'),
     (v_nf_sender, 'agent', 'mtx-nf-' || v_suffix, 'MTX NonFleet'),
     (v_nf_allow, 'agent', 'mtx-nfa-' || v_suffix, 'MTX NonFleet Allow'),
     (v_g_owner, 'agent', 'mtx-gowner-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Grant Owner'),
@@ -53,12 +55,13 @@ begin
     (v_g2_owner, 'agent', 'mtx-g2owner-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Grant2 Owner'),
     (v_g2_grantee, 'agent', 'mtx-g2grantee-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Grant2 Grantee');
 
-  -- Send board with member/observer roles + accessible threads.
-  select board_id into v_sb_board from agent_board.create_board(v_sb_member, 'mtx-sb-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Send Board', 'matrix', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+  -- Send board created by a dedicated creator (owner is seeded by create_board);
+  -- member/observer are genuine NON-creator members so their roles drive the gate.
+  select board_id into v_sb_board from agent_board.create_board(v_sb_creator, 'mtx-sb-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Send Board', 'matrix', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_sb_board, v_sb_member, 'joined', v_sb_member, 'member'),
-    (v_sb_board, v_sb_observer, 'joined', v_sb_member, 'observer');
+    (v_sb_board, v_sb_member, 'joined', v_sb_creator, 'member'),
+    (v_sb_board, v_sb_observer, 'joined', v_sb_creator, 'observer');
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, thread_type, created_by_agent_id, subject)
   values
     (v_thread_member, 'coordination', v_sb_member, 'MTX member thread'),
@@ -66,17 +69,17 @@ begin
 
   -- Grant board B1: no ceiling row (ceiling defaults to owner).
   select board_id into v_b1 from agent_board.create_board(v_g_owner, 'mtx-b1-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Grant B1', 'ceiling', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+  -- v_g_owner's owner membership is seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN).
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_b1, v_g_owner, 'joined', v_g_owner, 'owner'),
     (v_b1, v_g_admin, 'joined', v_g_owner, 'admin'),
     (v_b1, v_g_grantee, 'joined', v_g_owner, 'observer');
 
   -- Grant board B2: ceiling lowered to member.
   select board_id into v_b2 from agent_board.create_board(v_g2_owner, 'mtx-b2-' || v_suffix, 'MTX Grant B2', 'ceiling', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+  -- v_g2_owner's owner membership is seeded by create_board (ROOMOWN).
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_b2, v_g2_owner, 'joined', v_g2_owner, 'owner'),
     (v_b2, v_g2_grantee, 'joined', v_g2_owner, 'observer');
   insert into agent_board.board_authority_ceilings(board_id, max_grantable_role) values (v_b2, 'member');
 
@@ -149,10 +152,10 @@ select throws_ok(
   '42501', 'grant exceeds grantor role or board authority ceiling',
   'matrix: an over-ceiling grant is rejected even for an owner grantor');
 
--- E. Dormancy: grant_board_role is revoked from authenticated -----------------
+-- E. Live: grant_board_role is now granted EXECUTE to authenticated (ROOMOWN) ---
 select function_privs_are(
   'agent_board', 'grant_board_role', array['uuid', 'uuid', 'text', 'uuid'],
-  'authenticated', array[]::text[], 'matrix: grant_board_role execute is revoked from authenticated');
+  'authenticated', array['EXECUTE'], 'matrix: grant_board_role execute is granted to authenticated (self-service authority live)');
 
 select finish();
 

package/tests/agent_board_send_role_gate.test.sql

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ declare
   v_member_user uuid;
   v_observer_user uuid;
   v_nonmember_user uuid;
+  v_creator uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_member uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_observer uuid := gen_random_uuid();
   v_nonmember uuid := gen_random_uuid();
@@ -50,16 +51,19 @@ begin
     (v_member, 'agent', 'srg-member-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Member', 'active', v_member_user, v_member_user),
     (v_observer, 'agent', 'srg-observer-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Observer', 'active', v_observer_user, v_observer_user),
     (v_nonmember, 'agent', 'srg-nonmember-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Nonmember', 'active', v_nonmember_user, v_nonmember_user),
-    (v_recipient, 'agent', 'srg-recipient-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Recipient', 'active', null, null);
+    (v_recipient, 'agent', 'srg-recipient-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Recipient', 'active', null, null),
+    (v_creator, 'agent', 'srg-creator-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Creator', 'active', null, null);
 
+  -- Dedicated creator (owner seeded by create_board); member/observer are genuine
+  -- NON-creator members so their roles drive the send gate.
   select board_id into v_board
-    from agent_board.create_board(v_member, 'srg-board-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Board', 'send role gate test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'srg-board-' || v_suffix, 'SRG Board', 'send role gate test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
 
   -- member: role member; observer: role observer. Both active.
   insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
   values
-    (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_member, 'member'),
-    (v_board, v_observer, 'joined', v_member, 'observer');
+    (v_board, v_member, 'joined', v_creator, 'member'),
+    (v_board, v_observer, 'joined', v_creator, 'observer');
 
   -- Threads each sending actor can access (inherit mode; creator has access).
   insert into agent_board.threads(id, thread_type, created_by_agent_id, subject)

package/tests/agent_board_v2_invariants.test.sql

@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ select *
 
 select is(
   (select delivered_recipient_count from v2_board_delivery),
-  2,
-  'post_board_message only reaches active joined or subscribed board members'
+  3,
+  'post_board_message only reaches active joined or subscribed board members (incl. the seeded owner-creator)'
 );
 
 select is(
@@ -369,13 +369,13 @@ select *
 
 select is(
   (select delivered_recipient_count from v2_tasking_delivery),
-  3,
-  'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts before duplicate collapse'
+  4,
+  'tasking counts explicit and board fan-out attempts before duplicate collapse (incl. the seeded owner-creator)'
 );
 
 select is(
   (select count(*)::integer from agent_board.delivery_recipients where source_task_id = (select task_id from v2_tasking_delivery)),
-  2,
+  3,
   'tasking suppresses duplicate durable recipient rows across explicit and board fan-out'
 );