@consiliency/agent-board-schema 1.10.0 → 1.22.0

package/tests/agent_board_rejectsem.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+-- MBCONSENT-B(i) pgTAP: REJECTSEM -- a refusal is not an eviction (message-board#89).
+--
+-- The defect, reproduced on main before the fix: a subject requests to join an OPEN board, the
+-- owner rejects, and the subject can no longer join a board open to anyone. One refusal was a
+-- permanent, self-unrecoverable bar.
+--
+-- These assertions drive the REAL RPCs end to end. A structural check that resolve writes
+-- `left` would not prove the ban is lifted -- only re-joining afterwards does.
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(26);
+
+create function pg_temp.claims(p_sub text) returns void language plpgsql as $$
+begin
+  perform set_config('request.jwt.claims', json_build_object('role','authenticated','sub',p_sub)::text, true);
+end $$;
+-- Persisted-state reader (message-board#113): allow-side assertions read the RESULT from the
+-- table via this getter, not from the RPC's return in a bare select -- so an over-refusing gate
+-- surfaces as a NAMED `not ok` from the paired lives_ok and the file is not aborted.
+create function pg_temp.state(b uuid, a uuid) returns text language sql as $$
+  select membership_state from agent_board.board_memberships
+   where board_id = b and agent_id = a
+   order by case when membership_state in ('joined','subscribed') then 0 else 1 end,
+            created_at desc, id desc
+   limit 1;
+$$;
+
+insert into auth.users(id, instance_id, aud, role, email)
+select ('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-' || lpad(n::text,12,'0'))::uuid,
+       '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000','authenticated','authenticated','rs'||n||'@t.test'
+from generate_series(1,4) n;
+
+insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, kind, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id)
+select ('b1000000-0000-4000-8000-' || lpad(n::text,12,'0'))::uuid,
+       'agent','agent','rs-agent-'||n,'RS Agent '||n,'active',
+       ('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-' || lpad(n::text,12,'0'))::uuid
+from generate_series(1,4) n;
+
+-- An OPEN board: anyone may join, which is what makes the ban indefensible.
+insert into agent_board.boards(id, slug, name, created_by_agent_id, visibility, status)
+values ('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','rs-open','RS Open',
+        'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','open','active');
+insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, role, membership_state, created_by_agent_id)
+values ('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001',
+        'owner','joined','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 1. The reported defect: request -> reject -> re-join
+-- ===========================================================================
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.request_join_board(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002') $$,
+  'setup: the subject requests to join [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'),
+  'requested', 'setup: the subject requests to join');
+
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid,
+    'removed'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'REJECTSEM: rejecting a REQUEST succeeds [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'),
+  'left',
+  'REJECTSEM: rejecting a REQUEST writes `left`, not `removed`');
+
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.join_board(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid,
+    'joined'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'REJECTSEM: the subject CAN re-join afterwards [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'),
+  'joined',
+  'REJECTSEM: the subject CAN re-join afterwards -- the ban is lifted');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 2. The same trap on the INVITED origin, which #89 does not name
+-- ===========================================================================
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.invite_board_member(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'::uuid,
+    'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid) $$,
+  'setup: the owner invites a third agent [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'),
+  'invited', 'setup: the owner invites a third agent');
+
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'::uuid,
+    'removed'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'REJECTSEM: cancelling an INVITATION succeeds [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'),
+  'left',
+  'REJECTSEM: cancelling an INVITATION also writes `left` -- same trap, unnamed in the issue');
+
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000003');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.join_board(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'::uuid,
+    'joined'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'REJECTSEM: a cancelled invitee can join too [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'),
+  'joined',
+  'REJECTSEM: a cancelled invitee can join too');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 2b. The rewrite holds across EVERY board visibility
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- The first version of this suite tested only an OPEN board. The refusal rewrite is a property
+-- of resolve_board_request, not of visibility, and asserting it on one board type is the same
+-- instance-for-class error that has cost this work several rounds.
+--
+-- SCOPE, verified before writing this: on `private` and `directory_hidden` a subject cannot
+-- self-accept via join_board even as a FIRST-TIME invitee with NO prior refusal. That block is
+-- PRE-EXISTING join_board behaviour, not a residue of this change, and is tracked separately.
+-- So this asserts what this PR owns -- a refusal writes `left` on every board type -- and does
+-- not claim re-entry where acceptance was never possible.
+-- message-board#113: the per-visibility invite+refusal MUTATIONS run once, under lives_ok
+-- below, so an over-refusing gate surfaces as a NAMED `not ok` instead of aborting the file
+-- (the previous version ran resolve_board_request inside this helper, inside the is() value --
+-- a raise there took the whole file down with no `not ok`, transitively via the helper). This
+-- helper is now a PURE READ of the resulting state per board visibility.
+create function pg_temp.refusal_state(p_visibility text) returns text language sql as $$
+  select bm.membership_state
+    from agent_board.board_memberships bm
+    join agent_board.boards b on b.id = bm.board_id
+   where b.slug = 'rs-vis-' || p_visibility
+     and bm.agent_id = 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid
+   limit 1;
+$$;
+
+select lives_ok($$
+  do $do$
+  declare v text; b uuid;
+  begin
+    foreach v in array array['open','invite_only','private','directory_hidden'] loop
+      b := gen_random_uuid();
+      insert into agent_board.boards(id, slug, name, created_by_agent_id, visibility, status)
+        values (b, 'rs-vis-' || v, 'RS ' || v,
+                'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid, v, 'active');
+      insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, role, membership_state, created_by_agent_id)
+        values (b, 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid, 'owner', 'joined',
+                'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid);
+      perform set_config('request.jwt.claims',
+        '{"role":"authenticated","sub":"b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001"}', true);
+      perform agent_board.invite_board_member(b, 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid,
+                                              'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid);
+      perform agent_board.resolve_board_request(b, 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid,
+                                                'removed'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb);
+    end loop;
+  end $do$;
+$$, 'VISIBILITY setup: invite+refusal across every board type [call succeeds]');
+
+select is(
+  (select string_agg(v || '=' || pg_temp.refusal_state(v), ' ' order by v)
+     from unnest(array['open','invite_only','private','directory_hidden']) v),
+  'directory_hidden=left invite_only=left open=left private=left',
+  'VISIBILITY: a refusal writes `left` on EVERY board type, not just open');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 3. The refusal is still DURABLE -- the state changed, the record did not vanish
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- Scoped to the ORIGINAL board. An agent-wide count is polluted by the per-visibility helper
+-- above, which refuses the same subject on four further boards -- and that failure reads
+-- exactly like a real duplicate-emission defect.
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_membership_events
+    where agent_id = 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'
+      and board_id = 'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid
+      and result_state = 'left'),
+  1,
+  'DURABLE: the rejection is recorded in the ledger, not erased');
+
+-- #110 CLOSED. This assertion previously pinned `eviction` as current behaviour and named it a
+-- known gap, so that it would FAIL when the kind was threaded through the sink properly. It
+-- did exactly that -- a gap that announces itself beats one that is only written down.
+select is(
+  (select event_kind from agent_board.board_membership_events
+    where agent_id = 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'
+      and board_id = 'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid
+      and result_state = 'left' limit 1),
+  'reject_withdrawn',
+  'DURABLE: the ledger records a REJECTION, not an eviction (#110 closed)');
+
+select is(
+  (select provenance from agent_board.board_membership_events
+    where agent_id = 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'
+      and board_id = 'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid
+      and result_state = 'left' limit 1),
+  'board-authored',
+  'DURABLE: ...as a board-authored act, not the subject withdrawing');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 4. ACCEPTANCE is untouched -- this changes rejection only
+-- ===========================================================================
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.update_board_membership(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002','removed')
+$$, 'setup: an owner evicts through the eviction path');
+
+select is(
+  (select membership_state from agent_board.board_memberships
+    where board_id = 'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'
+      and agent_id = 'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'
+    order by created_at desc limit 1),
+  'removed',
+  'SCOPE: update_board_membership still writes `removed` -- it IS the eviction path');
+
+-- ...and a genuine eviction still bars self-re-entry. The fix must not have made eviction
+-- toothless; only REFUSAL is recoverable.
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002');
+select throws_ok($$
+  select agent_board.join_board(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000002'::uuid,
+    'joined'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)
+$$, 'board is not joinable by this agent',
+   'SCOPE: a genuine EVICTION still bars self-re-entry -- only refusal is recoverable');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 5. The RPC enum is unchanged: callers still reject with `removed`
+-- ===========================================================================
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001');
+select throws_ok($$
+  select agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000003'::uuid,
+    'left'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb)
+$$, '22023',
+   'resolve_board_request only accepts joined, subscribed, or removed',
+   'API: the enum is unchanged -- a client passing `left` is still refused');
+
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- 6. Approval still works, and resolve remains non-eviction by construction
+-- ===========================================================================
+-- Agent 4 is FRESH. Agent 3 is already joined by section 2, and request_join_board is now a
+-- no-op for an active member (MBCONSENT-B(iii) Option 3, closing the demotion/duplicate path),
+-- so it can no longer be used to manufacture a fresh request+approve here.
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000004');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.request_join_board(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000004')
+$$, 'setup: a fresh request to approve');
+
+select pg_temp.claims('b0000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001');
+select lives_ok($$
+  select agent_board.resolve_board_request(
+    'b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001'::uuid,'b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000004'::uuid,
+    'joined'::text, null::uuid, '{}'::jsonb) $$,
+  'SCOPE: approval still succeeds [call succeeds]');
+select is(pg_temp.state('b2000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000001','b1000000-0000-4000-8000-000000000004'),
+  'joined',
+  'SCOPE: approval is untouched -- this change only rewrites the REFUSAL state');
+
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
+    where n.nspname = 'agent_board' and p.proname = 'resolve_board_request'
+      and regexp_replace(pg_get_functiondef(p.oid), '--[^\n]*', '', 'g') ~ 'v_effective_state'),
+  1,
+  'the rewrite happens in resolve_board_request, not in the shared sink');
+
+select is((select version from agent_board.schema_version), 8,
+  'schema_version stays 8 -- additive');
+
+select finish();
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_resigning_refresh.test.sql

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ begin
 
   -- Enroll an active, proven signing key + a pending challenge so the agent can re-sign.
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_keys(id, agent_id, key_id, key_version, public_key, public_key_format, fingerprint, status, proof_state)
-  values (v_key, v_agent, 'primary', 1, repeat('A',43), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', 'sha256:'||rpad(replace(v_key::text,'-',''),43,'A'), 'active', 'proven');
+  values (v_key, v_agent, 'primary', 1, public.test_pubkey(v_key::text), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', public.test_key_fingerprint(v_key::text), 'active', 'proven');
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges(id, signing_key_id, agent_id, challenge_nonce, challenge_bytes, proof_state, expires_at)
   values (v_ch, v_key, v_agent, v_ch::text, 'agent-signing-key-proof.v1:'||v_ch||':n', 'pending', now() + interval '10 minutes');
 

package/tests/agent_board_resolve_noop_retire.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+-- #116 B1 — a no-op approve (owner "approves" a subject who is ALREADY active) must retire the
+-- redundant pending row so it stops dangling in pending listings, while leaving the authoritative
+-- active row untouched. Assertion 2 is the mutation pin: remove the B1 retire and the pending row
+-- survives -> count 1 -> fails.
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public, agent_board;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(4);
+
+create temp table _r116 (board uuid, subject uuid, creator uuid, creator_user uuid) on commit drop;
+
+do $$
+declare
+  v_suffix text := replace(substr(gen_random_uuid()::text, 1, 8), '-', '');
+  v_creator_user uuid;
+  v_creator uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_subject uuid := gen_random_uuid();
+  v_board uuid;
+begin
+  v_creator_user := public.ensure_github_user('r116-creator-' || v_suffix, 'r116-creator-' || v_suffix || '@example.test', 'r116-creator-' || v_suffix, 'R116 Creator');
+  insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, kind, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
+  values
+    (v_creator, 'agent', 'agent', 'r116-creator-' || v_suffix, 'R116 Creator', 'active', v_creator_user, v_creator_user),
+    (v_subject, 'agent', 'agent', 'r116-subject-' || v_suffix, 'R116 Subject', 'active', null, null);
+
+  select board_id into v_board
+    from agent_board.create_board(v_creator, 'r116-board-' || v_suffix, 'R116 Board', 'resolve no-op test', '{}'::jsonb, 'private');
+
+  -- The subject holds BOTH an active 'joined' row AND a dangling 'requested' row (a legal
+  -- duplicate — the partial unique index constrains only active rows). This is exactly the state
+  -- the Option-1 no-op is for.
+  insert into agent_board.board_memberships(board_id, agent_id, membership_state, created_by_agent_id, role)
+  values
+    (v_board, v_subject, 'joined',    v_creator, 'member'),
+    (v_board, v_subject, 'requested', v_creator, 'member');
+
+  insert into _r116 values (v_board, v_subject, v_creator, v_creator_user);
+end
+$$;
+
+-- Precondition: the subject has a pending (requested) row before the no-op.
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm, _r116 f
+    where bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.subject and bm.membership_state in ('requested', 'invited')),
+  1, 'precondition: the subject has a dangling pending row');
+
+-- The owner "approves" the already-active subject: a no-op success.
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.role', 'authenticated', true);
+select set_config('request.jwt.claim.sub', (select creator_user from _r116)::text, true);
+select lives_ok(
+  (select format($q$select agent_board.resolve_board_request(%L::uuid, %L::uuid, 'joined', %L::uuid)$q$,
+     board, subject, creator) from _r116),
+  'no-op approve of an already-active subject succeeds');
+
+-- B1 PIN: the redundant pending row is retired (no requested/invited row remains).
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm, _r116 f
+    where bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.subject and bm.membership_state in ('requested', 'invited')),
+  0, 'the redundant pending row is retired after a no-op approve (B1)');
+
+-- The authoritative active row is untouched.
+select is(
+  (select count(*)::int from agent_board.board_memberships bm, _r116 f
+    where bm.board_id = f.board and bm.agent_id = f.subject and bm.membership_state in ('joined', 'subscribed')),
+  1, 'the active membership row is left untouched');
+
+select * from finish();
+
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_retention_metadata_acl.test.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+-- MBHARDEN / #97 — mark_retention_metadata must be operator-only (service_role),
+-- never callable by an ordinary authenticated agent.
+--
+-- The function is SECURITY DEFINER and performs unscoped bulk metadata/updated_at writes
+-- across eight core tables. Its defining migration granted service_role but left the default
+-- PUBLIC EXECUTE in place, so any authenticated caller could drive a global write. The
+-- revoke migration (20260811000100) closes that.
+--
+-- These assertions are two-sided and mutation-pinned:
+--   * removing the `revoke ... from public` flips the authenticated/anon/public asserts to
+--     true -> those `not ...` assertions fail.
+--   * over-revoking (dropping the service_role grant) flips the last assertion -> it fails.
+
+create extension if not exists pgtap with schema extensions;
+set search_path = extensions, public;
+
+begin;
+
+select plan(5);
+
+select has_function(
+  'agent_board',
+  'mark_retention_metadata',
+  array['text', 'timestamp with time zone', 'uuid', 'text'],
+  'mark_retention_metadata exists'
+);
+
+-- Core hole: an ordinary authenticated agent must NOT be able to drive the sweep.
+select ok(
+  not has_function_privilege('authenticated', 'agent_board.mark_retention_metadata(text,timestamp with time zone,uuid,text)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'authenticated agents cannot execute mark_retention_metadata'
+);
+
+select ok(
+  not has_function_privilege('anon', 'agent_board.mark_retention_metadata(text,timestamp with time zone,uuid,text)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'anonymous callers cannot execute mark_retention_metadata'
+);
+
+-- Pin the class property directly: PUBLIC (the =X ACL entry) must carry no EXECUTE.
+select ok(
+  not has_function_privilege('public', 'agent_board.mark_retention_metadata(text,timestamp with time zone,uuid,text)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'PUBLIC carries no EXECUTE on mark_retention_metadata'
+);
+
+-- Guard against over-revoke: the operator (service_role) retains its grant.
+select ok(
+  has_function_privilege('service_role', 'agent_board.mark_retention_metadata(text,timestamp with time zone,uuid,text)', 'EXECUTE'),
+  'service_role retains EXECUTE on mark_retention_metadata'
+);
+
+select * from finish();
+
+rollback;

package/tests/agent_board_revoke_agent_subtree.test.sql

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ begin
   insert into agent_board.delegation_policies(root_agent_id, mode, max_active_children, allowed_scopes, child_ttl_ceiling, require_child_signing_key)
   values (v_r, 'root_minted', 5, jsonb_build_array('scope:a'), interval '8 hours', true);
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_keys(id, agent_id, key_id, key_version, public_key, public_key_format, fingerprint, status, proof_state)
-  values (v_rkey, v_r, 'primary', 1, repeat('A',43), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', 'sha256:'||rpad(replace(v_rkey::text,'-',''),43,'A'), 'active', 'proven');
+  values (v_rkey, v_r, 'primary', 1, public.test_pubkey(v_rkey::text), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', public.test_key_fingerprint(v_rkey::text), 'active', 'proven');
 
   -- Delegated child C under R (gets an ephemeral revocable key + a grant).
   select child_agent_id, signing_key_id into v_c, v_ckey
@@ -78,13 +78,13 @@ begin
   insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
   values (v_i, 'agent', 'rev-i-'||s, 'I', 'active', u_i, u_owner);
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_keys(id, agent_id, key_id, key_version, public_key, public_key_format, fingerprint, status, proof_state)
-  values (v_ikey, v_i, 'primary', 1, repeat('A',43), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', 'sha256:'||rpad(replace(v_ikey::text,'-',''),43,'A'), 'active', 'proven');
+  values (v_ikey, v_i, 'primary', 1, public.test_pubkey(v_ikey::text), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', public.test_key_fingerprint(v_ikey::text), 'active', 'proven');
 
   -- Z: independent bystander (distinct owner) used only for the inert-ledger proof.
   insert into agent_board.agents(id, agent_type, handle, display_name, status, auth_user_id, owner_user_id)
   values (v_z, 'agent', 'rev-z-'||s, 'Z', 'active', u_z, u_z);
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_keys(id, agent_id, key_id, key_version, public_key, public_key_format, fingerprint, status, proof_state)
-  values (v_zkey, v_z, 'primary', 1, repeat('A',43), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', 'sha256:'||rpad(replace(v_zkey::text,'-',''),43,'A'), 'active', 'proven');
+  values (v_zkey, v_z, 'primary', 1, public.test_pubkey(v_zkey::text), 'raw_ed25519_base64url', public.test_key_fingerprint(v_zkey::text), 'active', 'proven');
 
   -- Challenges (pending, unexpired), bound to (key, agent).
   insert into agent_board.agent_signing_key_challenges(id, signing_key_id, agent_id, challenge_nonce, challenge_bytes, proof_state, expires_at)