@conarium-ai/core 0.2.38 → 0.2.40
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +74 -0
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +20 -19
- package/bin/conarium-init.mjs +10 -9
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +6 -6
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +63 -42
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit-hash.js +1 -1
- package/dist/audit-hash.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit.d.ts +22 -21
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit.js +104 -88
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.d.ts +69 -433
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.js +7 -4
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +7 -5
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console-receipts.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/console-receipts.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console-receipts.js +2 -2
- package/dist/console-receipts.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console.d.ts +6 -22
- package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console.js +13 -12
- package/dist/console.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts +32 -30
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/coverage.js +39 -36
- package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/governance.d.ts +14 -13
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/governance.js +52 -48
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http.d.ts +6 -5
- package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http.js +45 -41
- package/dist/http.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/iban.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/iban.js +13 -12
- package/dist/iban.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/llm-gate.d.ts +6 -6
- package/dist/llm-gate.js +6 -6
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts +8 -8
- package/dist/pseudonymize.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js +7 -7
- package/dist/pseudonymize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt-view.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt-view.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt-view.js +52 -51
- package/dist/receipt-view.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts +32 -28
- package/dist/receipt.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt.js +23 -20
- package/dist/receipt.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js +14 -12
- package/dist/scripts/discover_schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js +16 -16
- package/dist/scripts/dogfood_prove.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/server.d.ts +5 -4
- package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/server.js +44 -34
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.d.ts +8 -7
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.js +11 -9
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/tokens.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tokens.js +18 -18
- package/dist/tokens.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +200 -3
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.39.md +90 -0
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.40.md +70 -0
- package/package.json +6 -4
- package/public/app.js +6 -6
- package/public/index.html +7 -7
- package/public/receipts-panel.js +7 -7
- package/scripts/audit-chain-check.mjs +6 -6
- package/scripts/benchmark-overhead.mjs +4 -4
- package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +11 -11
- package/test-vectors/README.md +15 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,79 @@
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# Changelog
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## 0.2.40 — an exit code that answered a question it had not examined
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`conarium-verify --anchor-check` over a chain where every receipt is unanchored
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exited **0**. Each null anchor was skipped, which is correct — periodic anchoring
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leaves most receipts null and failing on that would make the flag unusable. What
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followed was not: with nothing left to compare, the run reported success. A
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caller who asked whether the anchors held was answered by a code path that never
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reached an anchor.
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The count was always printed — the summary line said `0/N anchored` — so the
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information was on screen. The exit code was the part that claimed more than had
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been examined, and the exit code is what a machine reads.
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It is now **15**, which already means "could not be checked" and is evaluated
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ahead of 14 so that "I could not check" is never swallowed by "it does not hold".
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`--require-head-anchor` keeps 14: there the caller asserted an anchor must be
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present, and its absence is a failed assertion rather than an unread one. A chain
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carrying at least one anchor is unaffected.
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**This is a behaviour change.** A caller who ran `--anchor-check` over
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never-anchored chains and treated 0 as success will now see 15. That is the
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point — but it is a break, and it is why this is a version rather than a patch to
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the last one.
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The old answer was not an oversight: `test/anchor_verify.mjs` A6.5 asserted it.
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The test had written the defect down, so the behaviour changed and the
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expectation was corrected — the opposite of vector 008, where the implementation
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was right and the expectation was wrong. A6.9 adds the multi-receipt case and a
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control proving that a run which never asked about anchors still exits 0.
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Found by applying a rule from the SCITT list to our own tool: a checker must
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report that it did not compare, rather than return a verdict it did not earn.
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Also here: four more Turkish identifiers in `bin/conarium-verify.mjs`
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(`modelBildirilmemis`, `clientBildirilmemis`, `notlar`, `ek`) that 0.2.39's word
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pass did not carry in its list. Translated, and the words added — which is the
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second time that list has grown by being wrong, and is exactly the limit recorded
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against it.
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## 0.2.39 — 2026-08-21 — the package speaks the language its documentation is written in
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The executable package carried operational text in Turkish. Not in the
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documentation, which has always been English, and not in the specification — in
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the running code, where a reader who installs the package meets it.
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The sharpest instance: a gateway started without a token printed
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`CONARIUM_MCP_TOKEN eksik ya da <24 karakter — fail-closed, baslamiyorum.` That
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is the first sentence an unaffiliated operator sees when their configuration is
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wrong, and it was unreadable to most of them. The receipt viewer rendered
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`lang="tr"` and translated its own labels into Turkish through a presentation
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map. The console UI in `public/` said `Yukleniyor...` and `zincir saglam`. The
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reasoning comments throughout `src/` — the part of this repository that explains
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why a thing is written the way it is, and the part with the most value to anyone
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extending it — were Turkish, and `tsc` carried them into `dist/`.
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This project claims to be implementable without us. A code base whose reasoning
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cannot be read by the people expected to implement it is a claim that was never
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measured. Nothing here changes behaviour: strings, comments, `lang`, and the
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presentation map whose values are now its keys. Thresholds, conditions and
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identifiers are untouched, including the Turkish tokens the PII detectors match
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on and the record-kind name they emit, which are data rather than prose.
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`test/pack_locale.mjs` keeps it that way. It reads the file list `npm pack`
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would ship and fails on Turkish-specific letters outside a narrow allow-list:
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the deliberately Turkish `*.tr.md`, the detector tokens, and the sample names
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the locale tests pin. It was shown failing before it was wired in, and again
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from a comment added to `src/http.ts` and carried into `dist/http.js` by a
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build, which is the path that put the text there in the first place.
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Two limits, stated rather than left to be found. The check tests for Turkish
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letters, not Turkish language: a sentence written without them passes. And the
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markdown that ships alongside the code — the changelog's own history, parts of
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`docs/` — is still Turkish in places and is a second pass, not this one.
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## 0.2.38 — 2026-08-20 — the conditional sentence that two other pages forgot
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The receipt is opt-in. Nothing is written until a receipt sink is configured, and
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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### Implementing the format yourself
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The receipt is meant to outlive this implementation, so it ships with
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conformance vectors —
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conformance vectors — thirteen frozen cases plus a machine-readable manifest in
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[`test-vectors/`](test-vectors/):
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```bash
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import { createHash, createPublicKey, verify as cryptoVerify } from 'crypto'
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import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'
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// v0.1
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// v0.2
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// v0.1 backward compatibility: old declarations remain verifiable (so the evidence is not thrown away).
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// v0.2 adds the coverage.unassignedReceiptCount field. Which version it is is stated in the output.
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const COVERAGE_V = 'conarium-coverage/0.2'
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const COVERAGE_V_LEGACY = 'conarium-coverage/0.1'
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if (!Number.isInteger(d.coverage.notRecorded)) return 'coverage.notRecorded not integer'
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if (!Array.isArray(d.coverage.accessedObjects)) return 'coverage.accessedObjects must be an array'
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if (!Array.isArray(d.coverage.notRecordedObjects)) return 'coverage.notRecordedObjects must be an array'
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// v0.2: unassignedReceiptCount
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// v0.2: unassignedReceiptCount is required. The field did not exist in v0.1 — if absent, assume 0 for backward compatibility.
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if (d.v === COVERAGE_V && !Number.isInteger(d.coverage.unassignedReceiptCount)) {
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return 'coverage.unassignedReceiptCount not integer'
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}
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}
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/**
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*
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*
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* "
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* Cross-check the declaration against receipts. Inconsistency → returns an error string, null if consistent.
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* Honesty rule: coverage.notRecordedObjects means "access was NOT RECORDED",
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* not "was not accessed" — this is preserved in these strings too.
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*/
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function crossCheck(d, receipts) {
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if (receipts.length !== d.chain.count) {
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return `count mismatch: declaration says ${d.chain.count}, receipts file has ${receipts.length}`
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}
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// seq
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// seq range + contiguity
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const seqs = receipts.map((r) => r.chain.seq).sort((a, b) => a - b)
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if (seqs[0] !== d.chain.firstSeq) {
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return `firstSeq mismatch: declaration says ${d.chain.firstSeq}, receipts start at ${seqs[0]}`
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return `decisions.${k} mismatch: declaration says ${d.decisions[k]}, receipts have ${dec[k]}`
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}
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}
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// coverage —
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//
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// list_tables
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// coverage — same logic as src/coverage.ts computeCoverage, one-to-one:
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// object source is dataRefs[].object + request.target on describe_table (second evidence).
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// list_tables is not data access (schema listing) — the object is not counted.
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const recorded = new Set()
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for (const r of receipts) {
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return `coverage.notRecorded mismatch: declaration says ${d.coverage.notRecorded}, receipts show ${notRecordedObjects.length}`
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}
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// v0.2:
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// v0.1
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// v0.2: the unassigned counter is computed from receipts and compared against the declaration.
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// The field did not exist in v0.1 — skip for backward compatibility.
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if (d.v === COVERAGE_V && unassignedReceiptCount !== d.coverage.unassignedReceiptCount) {
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return `coverage.unassignedReceiptCount mismatch: declaration says ${d.coverage.unassignedReceiptCount}, receipts show ${unassignedReceiptCount}`
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}
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}
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//
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// "ok:"
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//
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// Chain contiguity: the question CI asks is "is my coverage complete?" (b).
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// A gap in the chain = a receipt is MISSING = coverage is incomplete. Default
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// is STRICT: if there is a gap, do not print "ok:" and EXIT 12 (same meaning
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// as seq gap in conarium-verify).
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// --allow-gaps returns EXIT 0 only when the authenticity question (a) is asked.
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if (!d.chain.contiguous && !opts.allowGaps) {
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const gapDesc = d.chain.gaps
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.map((g) => `seq ${g.expectedSeq} (found ${g.foundSeq})`)
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const pinNote = windowStartPinned
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? 'window start pinned'
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: 'window start not pinned
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: 'window start not pinned'
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'warning: window start not pinned — prefix truncation is invisible; pass --expect-seq-from N',
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)
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}
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//
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// The phrase "not accessed" is FORBIDDEN — absence of a record is indeterminate, not absence of access.
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console.warn(
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package/bin/conarium-init.mjs
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console.log(` export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY=${signingKeyPath}`)
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}
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// --config
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// `--out <dir>`
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// doctor
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//
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// --config is ALWAYS printed. The previous form printed 'conarium-doctor --no-net',
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// which FAILED whenever `--out <dir>` was used: the config is written under <dir>
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// while doctor looks in the cwd. A tool whose own printed command fails is a direct
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// breach of the requirement that anyone can install this without asking us.
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console.log(` conarium-doctor --config ${configPath} --no-net`)
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console.log('')
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console.log('MCP client block (Cursor / Claude Code) — paste into mcp.json:')
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mcpServers: {
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conarium: {
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command: 'node',
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//
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//
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//
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//
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//
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// The config path is given EXPLICITLY: an MCP client starts the server in
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// ITS OWN working directory, not the user's install directory. Without the
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// path the gateway does not find the config and does NOT error — it comes up
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// with zero connectors, so nothing is governed at all. Doctor's "Config file:
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// not found" warning says exactly that, and we fell into the same trap once
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// while producing the walkthrough.
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args: [gatewayJs, '--config', configPath],
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env: NO_KEYS
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? {}
|
|
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ function loadSnapshot(path, label) {
|
|
|
134
134
|
export function extractTables(sql) {
|
|
135
135
|
const found = []
|
|
136
136
|
const seen = new Set()
|
|
137
|
-
// CTE
|
|
138
|
-
// `WITH pgrst_source AS (…) SELECT … FROM pgrst_source
|
|
139
|
-
//
|
|
137
|
+
// CTE names (WITH x AS (…)) are not relations — PostgREST wraps every query
|
|
138
|
+
// as `WITH pgrst_source AS (…) SELECT … FROM pgrst_source`; if the CTE name
|
|
139
|
+
// is taken for a table, every PostgREST pattern produces a false "unreconciled".
|
|
140
140
|
const cteNames = new Set()
|
|
141
141
|
const cteRe = /("([^"]+)"|[a-z_][a-z0-9_$]*)\s+as\s*\(/gi
|
|
142
142
|
let c
|
|
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ function loadReceipts(path) {
|
|
|
212
212
|
return { receipts }
|
|
213
213
|
}
|
|
214
214
|
|
|
215
|
-
/**
|
|
215
|
+
/** Last dotted segment: "zion.customers" → "customers". Schema prefixes are named differently by the binder. */
|
|
216
216
|
function normalizeObject(name) {
|
|
217
217
|
const parts = String(name).toLowerCase().split('.')
|
|
218
218
|
return parts[parts.length - 1]
|
|
@@ -937,8 +937,8 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
937
937
|
)
|
|
938
938
|
}
|
|
939
939
|
}
|
|
940
|
-
// Literal
|
|
941
|
-
// literal
|
|
940
|
+
// Literal exits are deliberately separate: the spec_exitcode_drift sentinel
|
|
941
|
+
// only scans literal numbers; a code inside a ternary would stay invisible.
|
|
942
942
|
if (problems > 0) {
|
|
943
943
|
process.exit(40)
|
|
944
944
|
}
|
package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ const RECEIPT_V1 = 'conarium-receipt/0.1'
|
|
|
31
31
|
const RECEIPT_V2 = 'conarium-receipt/0.2'
|
|
32
32
|
const RECEIPT_V3 = 'conarium-receipt/0.3'
|
|
33
33
|
const RECEIPT_V4 = 'conarium-receipt/0.4'
|
|
34
|
-
const
|
|
35
|
-
//
|
|
36
|
-
//
|
|
34
|
+
const VERSIONS = [RECEIPT_V1, RECEIPT_V2, RECEIPT_V3, RECEIPT_V4]
|
|
35
|
+
// Single vocabulary. v0.3 model/client use three values; v0.4 adds
|
|
36
|
+
// disclosure `measured`. There is no second DECLARED/VERIFIED set.
|
|
37
37
|
const META_KAYNAKLARI = ['protocol', 'measured', 'operator-declared', 'undeclared']
|
|
38
38
|
const META_V3 = ['protocol', 'operator-declared', 'undeclared']
|
|
39
39
|
const GENESIS = 'sha256:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000'
|
|
@@ -287,33 +287,33 @@ function loadReceipts(target) {
|
|
|
287
287
|
|
|
288
288
|
function schemaOk(r) {
|
|
289
289
|
if (!r || typeof r !== 'object') return 'not an object'
|
|
290
|
-
if (!
|
|
290
|
+
if (!VERSIONS.includes(r.v)) return `unsupported version ${r.v}`
|
|
291
291
|
if (typeof r.id !== 'string' || !r.id) return 'missing id'
|
|
292
292
|
if (typeof r.ts !== 'string') return 'missing ts'
|
|
293
293
|
if (!r.chain || typeof r.chain !== 'object') return 'missing chain'
|
|
294
294
|
if (!Number.isInteger(r.chain.seq)) return 'chain.seq not integer'
|
|
295
295
|
if (typeof r.chain.prevHash !== 'string') return 'missing chain.prevHash'
|
|
296
296
|
if (typeof r.chain.hash !== 'string') return 'missing chain.hash'
|
|
297
|
-
//
|
|
298
|
-
// (
|
|
297
|
+
// Must be null in both versions; undefined counts as a schema drift -> 20.
|
|
298
|
+
// (Binding consent is a future version's job, not v0.2's.)
|
|
299
299
|
if (r.consentRef !== null && r.consentRef !== undefined) {
|
|
300
300
|
return 'consentRef must be null'
|
|
301
301
|
}
|
|
302
302
|
if (!('consentRef' in r)) return 'missing consentRef (must be null)'
|
|
303
303
|
if (!('anchor' in r)) return 'missing anchor field'
|
|
304
|
-
//
|
|
305
|
-
// exit 10
|
|
306
|
-
//
|
|
307
|
-
//
|
|
308
|
-
for (const
|
|
309
|
-
if (!(
|
|
304
|
+
// Body fields are also part of the schema. Without them the hash already
|
|
305
|
+
// fails and we exit 10 — but the "tampered" DIAGNOSIS would be wrong: a
|
|
306
|
+
// record with missing fields is not a modified receipt, it is not a receipt
|
|
307
|
+
// at all. Caught here so the diagnosis is correct (test-vectors/007 locks this).
|
|
308
|
+
for (const field of ['period', 'request', 'dataRefs', 'policy', 'flags', 'masking', 'outcome']) {
|
|
309
|
+
if (!(field in r) || r[field] === null || r[field] === undefined) return `missing ${field}`
|
|
310
310
|
}
|
|
311
311
|
if (!Array.isArray(r.dataRefs)) return 'dataRefs must be an array'
|
|
312
312
|
if (!Array.isArray(r.flags)) return 'flags must be an array'
|
|
313
313
|
if (typeof r.policy !== 'object' || typeof r.policy.decision !== 'string') {
|
|
314
314
|
return 'policy.decision is required'
|
|
315
315
|
}
|
|
316
|
-
// v0.1:
|
|
316
|
+
// v0.1: actor must be "service" (unchanged — old receipts still verify as-is)
|
|
317
317
|
if (r.v === RECEIPT_V1) {
|
|
318
318
|
if (!r.actor || r.actor.type !== 'service') return 'actor.type must be "service" in v0.1'
|
|
319
319
|
} else {
|
|
@@ -327,23 +327,24 @@ function schemaOk(r) {
|
|
|
327
327
|
return 'actor.type "user" cannot carry assurance "shared-token"'
|
|
328
328
|
}
|
|
329
329
|
}
|
|
330
|
-
// v0.3: model/client
|
|
331
|
-
// "undeclared"
|
|
332
|
-
// v0.4
|
|
333
|
-
//
|
|
330
|
+
// v0.3: model/client now carry their SOURCE along with the VALUE.
|
|
331
|
+
// "undeclared" is a valid receipt — not missing, honestly empty.
|
|
332
|
+
// v0.4 keeps the same model/client rules; ADDS disclosure/destination.
|
|
333
|
+
// These fields are not required in older versions — a receipt missing 0.3
|
|
334
|
+
// fields does not return 20.
|
|
334
335
|
if (r.v === RECEIPT_V3 || r.v === RECEIPT_V4) {
|
|
335
|
-
for (const
|
|
336
|
-
const m = r[
|
|
337
|
-
if (!m || typeof m !== 'object') return `missing ${
|
|
336
|
+
for (const field of ['model', 'client']) {
|
|
337
|
+
const m = r[field]
|
|
338
|
+
if (!m || typeof m !== 'object') return `missing ${field}`
|
|
338
339
|
if (!META_V3.includes(m.source)) {
|
|
339
|
-
return `${
|
|
340
|
+
return `${field}.source must be one of ${META_V3.join('|')} in ${r.v === RECEIPT_V4 ? 'v0.4' : 'v0.3'}`
|
|
340
341
|
}
|
|
341
|
-
//
|
|
342
|
+
// Claiming undeclared while carrying values is a contradiction: a receipt either does not know or it does.
|
|
342
343
|
if (m.source === 'undeclared') {
|
|
343
|
-
const
|
|
344
|
+
const populated = field === 'model'
|
|
344
345
|
? [m.provider, m.name, m.version].some((x) => x !== null)
|
|
345
346
|
: [m.name, m.version].some((x) => x !== null)
|
|
346
|
-
if (
|
|
347
|
+
if (populated) return `${field}.source is "undeclared" but carries values`
|
|
347
348
|
}
|
|
348
349
|
}
|
|
349
350
|
}
|
|
@@ -604,10 +605,11 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
604
605
|
})
|
|
605
606
|
}
|
|
606
607
|
const otsResult = await verifyOtsProof(row.ots, receipt.chain.hash)
|
|
607
|
-
// 15
|
|
608
|
-
//
|
|
609
|
-
//
|
|
610
|
-
//
|
|
608
|
+
// 15 comes FIRST: "I could not check" and "the proof does not hold" are
|
|
609
|
+
// different answers, and if the second swallows the first the verifier
|
|
610
|
+
// claims something it does not know. Silently returning 0 would be
|
|
611
|
+
// equally wrong — the caller MUST KNOW the anchor was not verified,
|
|
612
|
+
// only that it could not be verified.
|
|
611
613
|
if (otsResult.unknown) {
|
|
612
614
|
fail(
|
|
613
615
|
15,
|
|
@@ -661,16 +663,18 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
661
663
|
}
|
|
662
664
|
}
|
|
663
665
|
|
|
664
|
-
//
|
|
665
|
-
// "N
|
|
666
|
-
//
|
|
667
|
-
//
|
|
668
|
-
//
|
|
669
|
-
|
|
670
|
-
|
|
671
|
-
const
|
|
672
|
-
|
|
673
|
-
|
|
666
|
+
// Undeclared metadata is NOT a failure — but it also does not pass silently.
|
|
667
|
+
// When the auditor reads "N receipts verified", they must see how many carry
|
|
668
|
+
// no model identity; otherwise verification reads as if it approved something
|
|
669
|
+
// it did not measure.
|
|
670
|
+
// NOTE: receipts elements are wrapped as {file, receipt} — reading r.model
|
|
671
|
+
// directly silently always yields 0 (this happened exactly once; the e2e run
|
|
672
|
+
// caught it).
|
|
673
|
+
const undeclaredModelCount = receipts.filter((r) => r.receipt?.model?.source === 'undeclared').length
|
|
674
|
+
const undeclaredClientCount = receipts.filter((r) => r.receipt?.client?.source === 'undeclared').length
|
|
675
|
+
const notes = []
|
|
676
|
+
if (undeclaredModelCount) notes.push(`${undeclaredModelCount} with undeclared model`)
|
|
677
|
+
if (undeclaredClientCount) notes.push(`${undeclaredClientCount} with undeclared client`)
|
|
674
678
|
|
|
675
679
|
if (opts.requireHeadAnchor && !headAnchored) {
|
|
676
680
|
fail(14, 'head anchor required but head is not anchored', opts.json, {
|
|
@@ -680,6 +684,23 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
680
684
|
})
|
|
681
685
|
}
|
|
682
686
|
|
|
687
|
+
// --anchor-check on a chain where no receipt carries an anchor used to exit 0:
|
|
688
|
+
// every null was skipped, nothing was compared, and the caller who asked
|
|
689
|
+
// whether the anchors held was told yes by a path that never reached one.
|
|
690
|
+
// That is the same defect as a checker returning a verdict on an input it
|
|
691
|
+
// never examined. The value for it already exists — 15 means "could not be
|
|
692
|
+
// checked", deliberately distinct from 14 "does not hold" — so this is 15.
|
|
693
|
+
// `--require-head-anchor` above stays 14: the caller asserted an anchor must
|
|
694
|
+
// be there, and its absence is a failed assertion rather than an unread one.
|
|
695
|
+
if (opts.anchorCheck && receipts.length > 0 && anchoredCount === 0) {
|
|
696
|
+
fail(
|
|
697
|
+
15,
|
|
698
|
+
`anchor check requested but no receipt carries an anchor: 0/${receipts.length} anchored, nothing was compared`,
|
|
699
|
+
opts.json,
|
|
700
|
+
{ anchored: 0, total: receipts.length, headAnchored: false },
|
|
701
|
+
)
|
|
702
|
+
}
|
|
703
|
+
|
|
683
704
|
const summary = `${anchoredCount}/${receipts.length} anchored, head anchored: ${headAnchored ? 'yes' : 'no'}`
|
|
684
705
|
const tailPinned = isTailPinned(opts)
|
|
685
706
|
if (!tailPinned) console.error(TAIL_UNPINNED_NOTE)
|
|
@@ -689,16 +710,16 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
689
710
|
ok: true,
|
|
690
711
|
code: 0,
|
|
691
712
|
count: receipts.length,
|
|
692
|
-
undeclaredModel:
|
|
693
|
-
undeclaredClient:
|
|
713
|
+
undeclaredModel: undeclaredModelCount,
|
|
714
|
+
undeclaredClient: undeclaredClientCount,
|
|
694
715
|
anchored: anchoredCount,
|
|
695
716
|
headAnchored,
|
|
696
717
|
anchorSummary: opts.anchorCheck ? summary : undefined,
|
|
697
718
|
tailPinned,
|
|
698
719
|
}))
|
|
699
720
|
} else {
|
|
700
|
-
const
|
|
701
|
-
console.log(`ok: ${receipts.length} receipt(s) verified${
|
|
721
|
+
const suffix = notes.length ? ` (${notes.join(', ')})` : ''
|
|
722
|
+
console.log(`ok: ${receipts.length} receipt(s) verified${suffix}`)
|
|
702
723
|
if (opts.anchorCheck) console.log(summary)
|
|
703
724
|
}
|
|
704
725
|
process.exit(0)
|
package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
/** validateChain / log()
|
|
1
|
+
/** Same rule as validateChain / log(): JSON excluding hash+signature+sig+anchor → sha256. */
|
|
2
2
|
export declare function computeEntryHash(entry: Record<string, unknown>): string;
|
|
3
3
|
export declare const GENESIS_HASH = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000";
|
|
4
4
|
//# sourceMappingURL=audit-hash.d.ts.map
|
package/dist/audit-hash.d.ts.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"audit-hash.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hash.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"audit-hash.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hash.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,6FAA6F;AAC7F,wBAAgB,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,CAOvE;AAED,eAAO,MAAM,YAAY,qEAAqE,CAAA"}
|
package/dist/audit-hash.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
import { createHash } from 'crypto';
|
|
2
|
-
/** validateChain / log()
|
|
2
|
+
/** Same rule as validateChain / log(): JSON excluding hash+signature+sig+anchor → sha256. */
|
|
3
3
|
export function computeEntryHash(entry) {
|
|
4
4
|
const signed = { ...entry };
|
|
5
5
|
delete signed.hash;
|
package/dist/audit-hash.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"audit-hash.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hash.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAA;AAEnC,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"audit-hash.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit-hash.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAA;AAEnC,6FAA6F;AAC7F,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAA8B;IAC7D,MAAM,MAAM,GAA4B,EAAE,GAAG,KAAK,EAAE,CAAA;IACpD,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAA;IAClB,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAA;IACvB,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAA;IACjB,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAA;IACpB,OAAO,UAAU,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAA;AAC1E,CAAC;AAED,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,kEAAkE,CAAA"}
|
package/dist/audit.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ import type { CustomPiiPattern, DetectorToggles } from './types.js';
|
|
|
4
4
|
export interface AuditEntry {
|
|
5
5
|
timestamp: string;
|
|
6
6
|
actor: string;
|
|
7
|
-
/**
|
|
7
|
+
/** How the identity was established. The artefact carries not just who, but HOW they were known. */
|
|
8
8
|
actorAssurance?: ActorAssurance;
|
|
9
|
-
/**
|
|
9
|
+
/** Name of the active masking profile (if any). Undefined on the base policy. */
|
|
10
10
|
policyProfile?: string;
|
|
11
11
|
tool: string;
|
|
12
12
|
args?: any;
|
|
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ export interface AuditEntry {
|
|
|
19
19
|
reason?: string;
|
|
20
20
|
governance?: unknown;
|
|
21
21
|
/**
|
|
22
|
-
*
|
|
23
|
-
*
|
|
22
|
+
* Connected client, if it reported during MCP `initialize` (`clientInfo`).
|
|
23
|
+
* OVERRIDES the config declaration: a measured value outranks a declared one.
|
|
24
24
|
*/
|
|
25
25
|
client?: {
|
|
26
26
|
name: string;
|
|
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ export interface AuditEntry {
|
|
|
28
28
|
source?: MetaSource;
|
|
29
29
|
};
|
|
30
30
|
/**
|
|
31
|
-
*
|
|
32
|
-
*
|
|
31
|
+
* Text sent to the client. Only the hash is written to the receipt. NEVER
|
|
32
|
+
* written to the audit JSONL — the result line must not leak into the audit trail.
|
|
33
33
|
*/
|
|
34
34
|
disclosurePayload?: string;
|
|
35
35
|
prevHash?: string;
|
|
@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ export interface AuditEntry {
|
|
|
43
43
|
};
|
|
44
44
|
}
|
|
45
45
|
/**
|
|
46
|
-
*
|
|
47
|
-
*
|
|
46
|
+
* Receipt metadata. Since v0.3 BOTH are OPTIONAL — a gap is not invented;
|
|
47
|
+
* it is written on the receipt as `source: 'undeclared'`.
|
|
48
48
|
*
|
|
49
|
-
*
|
|
50
|
-
*
|
|
51
|
-
*
|
|
52
|
-
*
|
|
49
|
+
* Why it was relaxed: model identity is not in the MCP protocol, so it cannot
|
|
50
|
+
* come from anywhere unless the operator declares it. Making it required kept
|
|
51
|
+
* the receipt completely shut — the "signed receipt for every access" promise
|
|
52
|
+
* was therefore unmet in production. Receipts are now produced and mark the
|
|
53
|
+
* unknown field as undeclared instead of hiding it.
|
|
53
54
|
*/
|
|
54
55
|
export interface ReceiptMeta {
|
|
55
56
|
model?: {
|
|
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ export interface ReceiptMeta {
|
|
|
62
63
|
version: string;
|
|
63
64
|
source?: MetaSource;
|
|
64
65
|
};
|
|
65
|
-
/**
|
|
66
|
+
/** Operator declaration. Not verified. Policy does not read this. */
|
|
66
67
|
destination?: string;
|
|
67
68
|
}
|
|
68
69
|
export declare class Audit {
|
|
@@ -74,9 +75,9 @@ export declare class Audit {
|
|
|
74
75
|
/** keyId → verify key (current signing pubkey + CONARIUM_AUDIT_TRUST_PUBKEYS). */
|
|
75
76
|
private trustStore;
|
|
76
77
|
private lastHash;
|
|
77
|
-
/** Sink byte size at last sync —
|
|
78
|
+
/** Sink byte size at last sync — if another writer interleaved, a stale lastHash is caught. */
|
|
78
79
|
private sinkSize;
|
|
79
|
-
/**
|
|
80
|
+
/** Receipt chain state — opt-in (active when receiptSink is provided). */
|
|
80
81
|
private receiptSink?;
|
|
81
82
|
private receiptMeta?;
|
|
82
83
|
private receiptLastHash;
|
|
@@ -99,23 +100,23 @@ export declare class Audit {
|
|
|
99
100
|
private requireSigningCapability;
|
|
100
101
|
private currentSinkSize;
|
|
101
102
|
/**
|
|
102
|
-
*
|
|
103
|
-
*
|
|
104
|
-
*
|
|
103
|
+
* If another writer appended to the sink, the in-memory lastHash is stale.
|
|
104
|
+
* Cheap exit if size did not change; re-read the tail if it did.
|
|
105
|
+
* Does not close a real race of two instances writing at once — that needs a file lock.
|
|
105
106
|
*/
|
|
106
107
|
private syncLastHashIfStale;
|
|
107
108
|
private getLastHash;
|
|
108
|
-
/**
|
|
109
|
+
/** Load the receipt chain's last state from the file (seq + hash). */
|
|
109
110
|
private loadReceiptChainState;
|
|
110
111
|
/** Same pipeline as audit args — used for client-facing error text (G13). */
|
|
111
112
|
maskText(value: string): string;
|
|
112
113
|
private maskArgs;
|
|
113
114
|
log(entry: Omit<AuditEntry, 'timestamp' | 'actor' | 'prevHash' | 'hash'> & {
|
|
114
|
-
/**
|
|
115
|
+
/** The person who performed the access. If omitted, the per-instance fixed consumer is used. */
|
|
115
116
|
actor?: string;
|
|
116
117
|
actorAssurance?: ActorAssurance;
|
|
117
118
|
}): AuditEntry;
|
|
118
|
-
/**
|
|
119
|
+
/** Build a receipt from AuditEntry, append to the chain, write to receiptSink. */
|
|
119
120
|
private writeReceipt;
|
|
120
121
|
private validateChain;
|
|
121
122
|
}
|
package/dist/audit.d.ts.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"audit.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAaA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAGjD,OAAO,EAIL,KAAK,UAAU,EAIhB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAErB,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAA;AAMnE,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACb,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"audit.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/audit.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAaA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAA;AAGjD,OAAO,EAIL,KAAK,UAAU,EAIhB,MAAM,cAAc,CAAA;AAErB,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAA;AAMnE,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACb,oGAAoG;IACpG,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,CAAA;IAC/B,iFAAiF;IACjF,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACtB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACZ,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,CAAA;IACV,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACrB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACpB,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACf,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACf,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;IACpB;;;OAGG;IACH,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAA;KAAE,CAAA;IAC/D;;;OAGG;IACH,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAC1B,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACjB,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IACb,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;IAClB,gDAAgD;IAChD,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;QAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,CAAA;CACvD;AAED;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW;IAC1B,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,CAAA;IAC3D,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE;QAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,CAAA;KAAE,CAAA;IAC/D,qEAAqE;IACrE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CACrB;AAoRD,qBAAa,KAAK;IAChB,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAQ;IACrB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAQ;IACxB,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAS;IAC3B,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAQ;IACxB,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAmB;IACrC,kFAAkF;IAClF,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAuB;IACzC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAe;IAC/B,+FAA+F;IAC/F,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAK;IAErB,0EAA0E;IAC1E,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAQ;IAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAa;IACjC,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAuB;IAC9C,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAI;IACtB,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAQ;IAC5B,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAiB;IACnC,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAA8B;IACpD,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAQ;IAEzB,YAAY,IAAI,GAAE;QAChB,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;QACb,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;QACjB,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAA;QACpB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;QACpB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAA;QACzB,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;QACpB,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,eAAe,CAAA;QAC3B,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAA;KAC/B,EA0DL;IAED,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,CAIZ;IAED,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB;IAWhC,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe;IASvB;;;;OAIG;IACH,OAAO,CAAC,mBAAmB;IAQ3B,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW;IASnB,sEAAsE;IACtE,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB;IAY7B,6EAA6E;IAC7E,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAM9B;IAED,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ;IAiBhB,GAAG,CACD,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,WAAW,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG;QACrE,gGAAgG;QAChG,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;QACd,cAAc,CAAC,EAAE,cAAc,CAAA;KAChC,GACA,UAAU,CA4EZ;IAED,kFAAkF;IAClF,OAAO,CAAC,YAAY;IAiCpB,OAAO,CAAC,aAAa;CAqHtB"}
|