@conarium-ai/core 0.2.37 → 0.2.38

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,29 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.2.38 — 2026-08-20 — the conditional sentence that two other pages forgot
4
+
5
+ The receipt is opt-in. Nothing is written until a receipt sink is configured, and
6
+ `conarium-init` configures one, so the default layout has receipts and a
7
+ hand-written config need not. The top of the README has said so since 0.2.32.
8
+
9
+ Two other places had not caught up. `README.md` listed "Ed25519-signed receipt per
10
+ access" among what ships, with no condition attached — the same file contradicting
11
+ itself sixty lines apart. `docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md` said every tool call "is
12
+ supposed to write a signed receipt", which is the one document where an unstated
13
+ precondition matters most: a reader consults a threat model to learn what the system
14
+ does *not* guarantee.
15
+
16
+ Both now name the condition. The threat model also gains the bypass it implies: a
17
+ gateway with no sink mediates access and leaves no evidence, and it starts either
18
+ way.
19
+
20
+ The verification quickstart now fetches its three proof files from `conarium.dev`
21
+ instead of `demo.conarium.dev`. The bytes are identical; the difference is that the
22
+ first command a newcomer runs no longer depends on a single machine that also runs
23
+ unrelated services.
24
+
25
+ Nothing in `src/` changed. This release is three sentences and an address.
26
+
3
27
  ## 0.2.37 — 2026-08-20 — a claim with no call site, and the bound that decided anyway
4
28
 
5
29
  `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` said "Receipts are anchored automatically." Nothing in
package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@ against its public key on your own machine, with no account and no data of yours
25
25
 
26
26
  ```bash
27
27
  npm i @conarium-ai/core
28
- curl -fsS https://demo.conarium.dev/proof/chain.jsonl -o chain.jsonl
29
- curl -fsS https://demo.conarium.dev/proof/key.pem -o key.pem
30
- curl -fsS https://demo.conarium.dev/proof/key.pem.keyid -o key.pem.keyid
28
+ curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/chain.jsonl -o chain.jsonl
29
+ curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/key.pem -o key.pem
30
+ curl -fsS https://conarium.dev/proof/key.pem.keyid -o key.pem.keyid
31
31
  npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem
32
32
  ```
33
33
 
@@ -674,7 +674,8 @@ Conarium is **early access** — and honest about what's real:
674
674
  **Shipping now:** governed MCP gateway (stdio + HTTP) · deterministic PII masking,
675
675
  including labelled names in free text · allow/deny + row caps · per-person masking
676
676
  profiles · tamper-evident hash-chained audit ledger · Ed25519-signed receipt per access
677
- with an offline verifier · signed coverage declarations · two-sided reconciliation
677
+ once a receipt sink is configured, with an offline verifier · signed coverage
678
+ declarations · two-sided reconciliation
678
679
  against the database's own counters · OpenTimestamps anchoring and an optional
679
680
  anchoring service · conformance vectors · SQL gate: Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle
680
681
  (MySQL is not implemented; Oracle synonyms and database links are not resolved — see LIMITATIONS) · Postgres, Supabase, docs, OpenAPI, Jira
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
1
+ # Claims review — 0.2.38
2
+
3
+ - base: ef7b1dd
4
+ - head: 62e33e0
5
+ - surface: sha256:242f31fdcd8f29cc703230e9be7fdae412cfea48b5e23bd75ab513094cf1788a
6
+ - verdict: pass
7
+ - reviewer: maintainer, on a review by an outside model (Codex) that read the tree independently
8
+
9
+ ## Findings
10
+
11
+ ### 1. README.md:676 — "Ed25519-signed receipt per access"
12
+
13
+ - Claim: "tamper-evident hash-chained audit ledger · Ed25519-signed receipt per access
14
+ with an offline verifier"
15
+ - Mechanism: `Audit.log` writes a receipt only when a receipt sink is configured
16
+ (`src/audit.ts`); with no sink, nothing is written. `conarium-init` configures one,
17
+ so the default layout has receipts and a hand-written config need not.
18
+ - Why it falls short: the line states the receipt as a shipped property with no
19
+ condition attached, sixty lines below a paragraph in the same file that states the
20
+ condition correctly. A reader who skims the feature list and never reaches the top
21
+ gets the stronger claim.
22
+ - Disposition: reworded in `62e33e0` — "per access once a receipt sink is configured".
23
+
24
+ ### 2. docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md:41 — "Every tool call ... is supposed to write a signed receipt"
25
+
26
+ - Claim: "Every tool call — allowed or denied — is supposed to write a signed receipt."
27
+ - Mechanism: same as above. The sentence sits in the trust-boundary section, directly
28
+ above the bypass list for that boundary.
29
+ - Why it falls short: this is the document where an unstated precondition costs the
30
+ most. A reader opens a threat model to learn what the system does *not* guarantee,
31
+ and the absence of a receipt sink was not among the bypasses listed.
32
+ - Disposition: reworded in `62e33e0`, and the implied bypass added to the list — a
33
+ gateway with no sink mediates access, leaves no evidence, and starts anyway.
34
+
35
+ ### 3. standards/draft-dogru-scitt-disclosure-evidence-05.md — new surface, first review
36
+
37
+ - Claim: the whole document, added since the last review and now a claim surface by
38
+ derivation (`currentDraft()` in `test/claim_surfaces.mjs`).
39
+ - Mechanism: its Implementation Status section was written from measurement against
40
+ the published 0.2.37 package, and the six behaviours it describes were re-measured
41
+ from that package before submission.
42
+ - Why it falls short: nothing in the suite compares that section against the code, so
43
+ it can go stale again between releases. The draft says so in its own text rather
44
+ than leaving a reader to discover it.
45
+ - Disposition: accepted — posted as `-05` on 2026-08-20; the published archive copy is
46
+ byte-identical to the file on `main`.
47
+
48
+ ### 4. README.md:28-30 — verification quickstart address
49
+
50
+ - Claim: the first instruction in the README, telling a reader to verify a live receipt
51
+ chain before trusting anything else on the page.
52
+ - Mechanism: the three files were served from `demo.conarium.dev`, which resolves to a
53
+ single machine that also runs unrelated services.
54
+ - Why it falls short: not a false claim, a fragile one. The one command a newcomer runs
55
+ first was the least resilient thing published.
56
+ - Disposition: moved to `conarium.dev/proof/*` (CDN) in `62e33e0`; bytes verified
57
+ identical (`sha256:32a1ea69…`) and the quickstart re-run from the new address on a
58
+ clean machine, exit 0.
@@ -38,9 +38,14 @@ Whoever controls the config controls the policy. The code cannot save you from y
38
38
  **Today:** MCP stdio or Streamable HTTP. SQL is parsed (`pgsql-ast-parser`), not grepped.
39
39
  Writes are refused by the connector. Tables not on `allowTables` are denied.
40
40
  `maskColumns` plus content scanners run before the model sees a row.
41
- Every tool call — allowed or denied — is supposed to write a signed receipt.
41
+ Every tool call — allowed or denied — is supposed to write a signed receipt once a
42
+ receipt sink is configured. Without one, nothing is written and there is nothing to
43
+ verify later.
42
44
 
43
45
  **Bypass surface:**
46
+ - A gateway with no receipt sink mediates access and leaves no evidence of it.
47
+ `conarium-init` configures a sink, so the default layout has one, but a
48
+ hand-written config need not — and the gateway starts either way.
44
49
  - A bare name in running prose is not detected. "Ahmet called" goes through.
45
50
  - Street addresses are not detected.
46
51
  - Passport numbers in free text (non-MRZ) are not detected.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@conarium-ai/core",
3
- "version": "0.2.37",
3
+ "version": "0.2.38",
4
4
  "mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
5
5
  "//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
6
6
  "//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",