@conarium-ai/core 0.2.32 → 0.2.34
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +60 -0
- package/README.md +11 -5
- package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md +47 -3
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.33.md +73 -0
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.34.md +119 -0
- package/docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md +92 -23
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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## 0.2.34 — 2026-08-19 — the prior-art claim that got narrower
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A comparative claim in this package was too strong, and the correction came from
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reading a competitor's source rather than from a gate of ours catching it.
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- **`docs/PRIOR-ART.md` no longer says nobody else has arrived at the idea.**
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Vaara (`vaaraio/vaara`, AGPL-3.0) specifies a coverage reconciliation in
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`credential-broker-spec.md` §D — joining each used credential to the receipt it
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should have produced, and reading a mismatch as a bypassed broker — with its
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limits stated in §E. The row is scored from source: the tree at `befdced` was
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cloned, its contiguity tests run, and searched for code implementing that
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design. None was found, so the column reads **"specified, not found
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implemented"** rather than yes.
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- **That row was scored twice, and the first scoring is left on the page.** It
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first read "Yes", on the strength of the design section alone — scoring a
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specification as behaviour, which is the confusion this file's own column
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definitions warn about two sections above. The correction is recorded where the
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row is, not quietly.
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- **What survives is stated in the narrower form.** The claim stands on
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implementation, which is what every other row is scored on. What it can no
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longer carry is that nobody else has had the idea. Anyone quoting the file
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should quote *"we have not found another implementation that masks values
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before the model sees them and then reconciles what it disclosed"* — not
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*"nobody else reconciles"* and not *"none of the ten has the third column"*.
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- **The Microsoft row said "Merkle-chained" and their tutorial describes a linear
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`parent_receipt_hash`.** Overstating a competitor's mechanism is the same defect
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as overstating our own, so it is corrected in the same pass.
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- **`README.md` says eleven projects, and says which way the eleventh moved the
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claim.** A comparison page that only ever gains rows it wins is not evidence.
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- **`docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md` documents the three release artefacts the
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full publish path is configured to produce** — the published tarball, a
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CycloneDX bill of materials, and a build attestation written to GitHub's
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attestation store — and says which of them any given release actually carries.
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The artefact path first ran on 19 August in `artefacts` mode against 0.2.33,
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which now carries the tarball and the attestation but no bill of materials.
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- **The changelog had stopped one version short of the package again**: 0.2.33
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shipped before its entry was written, and that entry is below. The publish
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workflow now refuses a version whose section does not exist, so the next
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occurrence is a red gate rather than a discovery.
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## 0.2.33 — 2026-08-19
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Written on 2026-08-19, after 0.2.33 had already shipped without it. The gap is
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recorded rather than backdated.
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- **The provenance page stopped saying there was nothing to verify.**
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`docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md` still read *"This is not a published
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release"* eight releases after the first one, and pointed readers at
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`gh attestation verify`, which answers `404` for a package published with npm
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provenance — that command reads GitHub's attestation store, while
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`npm publish --provenance` writes to the npm registry and its transparency log.
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A reader checking the honest way would have read that 404 as "no attestation",
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which is the opposite of the truth.
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- The working commands replaced it: `npm view … dist --json`, which returns the
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`attestations` block naming `slsa.dev/provenance/v1`, and `npm audit
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signatures`. The `gh` command stayed on the page as a warning with its reason,
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because a reader who tries it deserves to know why it fails.
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- Found by an external review, not by our own claim gate. The gate locks phrasings
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already caught; this file was never in the list of surfaces it reads.
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## 0.2.32 — 2026-08-19
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Tool descriptions now say what the tools do to the world, not just what they are
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package/README.md
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and [Governance Report 001](https://conarium.dev/report-001.html) lists its limits.
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That claim is hedged on purpose, and [`docs/PRIOR-ART.md`](docs/PRIOR-ART.md) is the
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evidence behind it:
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corrected.
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evidence behind it: eleven projects — ten checked on 6 August 2026 and Vaara added
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on 19 August — what each one has, the closest academic prior art
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([Sello / *Notarized Agents*](https://arxiv.org/html/2606.04193v1), which names this
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gap better than we did), and nine things we could **not** verify. If you know of an
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implementation combining all three, open an issue and it will be corrected.
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⚠️ The Vaara row narrowed this claim rather than confirming it. That project
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*specifies* a coverage reconciliation in its design documents; a search of its
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tree found no code running it, so the row reads "specified, not found
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implemented". The idea is not ours alone — the running code, as far as this scan
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reaches, still is, and the file says so above its own table.
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---
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package/docs/PRIOR-ART.md
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> enforcement, and (3) coverage reconciliation against the data source's own
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> query counters.
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⚠️ **Read that as a claim about implementations.** Since 19 August this file
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carries a project that *specifies* part 3 without our finding it implemented —
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see the Vaara row and the note under the table. The idea is not ours alone; the
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running code, as far as this scan reaches, still is.
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A claim like that is unfalsifiable if we just assert it, so this file is the
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evidence behind it: what we searched, on what date, what we found, and — the part
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most comparison pages leave out — **what we could not verify.** If you know of an
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official site, plus targeted web searches. **Source-code-level search was not
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performed on any repository** — see Limitations.
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**Amended 19 August 2026.** Vaara was added after its author raised a related
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mechanism on the SCITT mailing list. It is the one row scored from source rather
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than from documentation: the repository was cloned at `befdced`, its contiguity
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tests were run (`PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/credential/test_contiguity.py`
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→ 18 passed), the cited design sections were read, and the tree was searched for
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code implementing them. That search is why the row was rescored the same day —
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see the note under the table.
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## What the three parts mean
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Precision matters here, because two of them are commonly confused:
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| Project | Enforcement | Portable signed receipt | Coverage reconciliation |
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| [microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) | Partial — Cedar allow/deny, DLP attribute ratchets; PII masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519,
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| [microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) | Partial — Cedar allow/deny, DLP attribute ratchets; PII masking not documented | **Yes** — Ed25519, hash-chained (`parent_receipt_hash`), `verify_receipt_chain()`. This said "Merkle-chained" until 19 August; their tutorial describes a linear parent hash, and overstating a competitor's mechanism is the same defect as overstating our own | No |
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| [Signet](https://github.com/Prismer-AI/signet) | Partial — policy bound into the receipt; no masking | **Yes** — Ed25519, hash-chained, offline | No |
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| [Handshake.AI](https://handshake.ai/) | No | **Yes** — signed action receipts, DID-issued, offline | No |
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| [hoophq/hoop](https://github.com/hoophq/hoop) | **Yes — strongest here.** ML-based masking before bytes leave the gateway | No — session recording/replay, no signed offline-verifiable artifact found | No |
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| [lasso-security/mcp-gateway](https://github.com/lasso-security/mcp-gateway) | **Yes** — Presidio PII masking, injection filters | No — no signing mechanism documented | No |
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| [h33.ai](https://h33.ai/) | **Yes, and further** — FHE; the model never sees plaintext | **Yes** — ZK-STARK + Dilithium, verifiable "years later, offline, without the original vendor" | No |
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| [CertNode](https://certnode.io/solutions/ai-agents) | Weak — no blocking gate | **Yes** — ES256 JWS + RFC 3161 | No |
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| [vaaraio/vaara](https://github.com/vaaraio/vaara) | Partial — `CredentialGateway` authorizes each tool call against a brokered credential and refuses without one; no value masking found. Its redaction is GDPR Art. 17 erasure inside the audit store, which is a different guarantee | **Yes** — signed decision record (ES256/HS256/RS256) over JCS-canonical blocks, evidence pinned by `evidenceRef.digest`, standalone checkers under `tests/vectors` that import none of their code | **Specified, not found implemented.** `docs/design/credential-broker-spec.md` §D designs the join — each used credential to a receipt on `attestationDigest`, a used credential with no matching receipt read as a bypassed broker — and §E states its limit: *"detection of a defeated broker, not a mathematical-completeness claim"*. At `befdced` we found no collector, join, CLI or test implementing it; `gateway.py` points at the design document for that residual rather than at code. **This is the only design for it we have found outside our own** |
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The landscape splits cleanly. One camp enforces well but issues no portable evidence
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(hoop.dev, Lasso). The other issues excellent portable evidence but does not enforce
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before the model (Signet, Circe, Acta, agentreceipts, Handshake, CertNode).
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projects do
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before the model (Signet, Circe, Acta, agentreceipts, Handshake, CertNode). Three
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projects do the first two — Microsoft's toolkit, h33.ai and Vaara — and none of
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them was found running the third.
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### What the Vaara row cost the claim, and what it did not
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worth leaving on the page.
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It first read **Yes** on coverage reconciliation, on the strength of
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`credential-broker-spec.md` §D. That section designs the join and states its own
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limit honestly, and reading it is enough to see that someone else has had this
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idea and thought it through. It is not enough to see it run. A search of the tree
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at `befdced` for a collector of used credentials, a join, a CLI or a test found
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none, and `gateway.py` refers that residual to the design document rather than to
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code. Scoring a specification as behaviour is the same confusion this file's own
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column definitions warn about two sections above — *"not that the log records that
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it happened, but that the value never left"* — committed by the person who wrote
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them.
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So the combined claim stands on implementation, which is what every other row in
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this table is scored on. What it can no longer carry is the suggestion that
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nobody else has arrived at the idea. Someone has, in public, with the limits
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stated. The honest form:
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> **We have not found another implementation that masks values before the model
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> sees them and then reconciles what it disclosed against the source's own
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> bookkeeping. One other project specifies such a reconciliation; we did not find
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> it implemented.**
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Anyone quoting this file should quote that, not "nobody else reconciles" and not
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"none of the ten has the third column".
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### Two near misses worth naming precisely
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# Claims review — 0.2.33
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- base: v0.2.32
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- head: b8756f3
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- surface: sha256:8eeabf25cea27362e070789c61c828eea291bd3c155362f098894d868f0f9b4b
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- verdict: pass
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- reviewer: Claude, reading on the maintainer's instruction — an assistant read, not an independent human one
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One surface changed and one surface was added: `docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md`
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is rewritten and listed. Eighteen documents are now read at release time.
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This release exists because of an external review of the repository, which
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flagged the provenance page as stale. Reading it confirmed two defects that are
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worse than staleness, and both are recorded below as findings rather than as
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housekeeping — a reader who followed that page would have drawn a false
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conclusion about whether this package can be trusted.
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## Findings
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### 1. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md:6 — the page denied a fact about itself
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- Claim: `"This is **not** a published release."`, followed by a verification
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section headed `"How to verify (after a provenance-backed release exists)"`
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and a setup section headed `"One-time setup before the first publish"`.
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- Mechanism: the npm registry, which records what was actually published.
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- Why it falls short: measured on 0.2.32 —
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`npm view @conarium-ai/core@0.2.32 dist --json` returns an `attestations`
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block naming `https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1` plus a registry `signatures`
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entry, and eight versions have shipped since the sentence was written. The
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page described a pre-release state inside a released package, and it ships in
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the tarball, so the reader most likely to open it is someone who already has
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the published artefact in their hands.
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- Disposition: rewritten. The page now states what exists, and the verification
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section carries the measured output rather than a promise that something will
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one day be verifiable.
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### 2. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md — the verification command cannot succeed
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- Claim: `"or, with GitHub CLI, verify the attestation against this repo: gh
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attestation verify --owner dogrucanemek-alt <downloaded.tgz>"`
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- Mechanism: `gh attestation verify` reads GitHub's own attestation store, which
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is populated by `actions/attest-build-provenance`.
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- Why it falls short: `npm publish --provenance` writes to the npm registry and
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the public transparency log, not to GitHub's store. Both forms were run
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against the published 0.2.32 tarball and both answered **HTTP 404** —
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`--owner dogrucanemek-alt` (which additionally targets an org endpoint for
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what is a user account) and `--repo dogrucanemek-alt/conarium`. The failure
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mode is the dangerous direction: a reader checking our provenance would see
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404 and reasonably conclude the attestation is missing, when it exists and
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verifies by another route.
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- Disposition: replaced with two commands that were run and do work —
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`npm view … dist --json` and `npm audit signatures` (107 registry signatures
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and 11 attestations verified on a clean install, exit 0). The `gh` command is
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kept in the page as an explicit warning, with the reason, so the next person
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who tries it does not repeat the diagnosis.
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### 3. test/denetci.mjs — the page was never on the claim surface list
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- Claim: not a sentence — the absence of a reader. The page ships in the tarball
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and its whole subject is how much of what we say can be checked without us.
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- Mechanism: the `SURFACES` list in `test/denetci.mjs`.
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- Why it falls short: it was unlisted, so both defects above survived eight
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releases and were found by someone outside this process rather than by the
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gate. This is the third instance of the same shape — `docs/PRICING.md` in
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0.2.31, the tool descriptions in 0.2.32, and now this — which is enough of a
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pattern to state plainly: the list is hand-written, and things that ship
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keep arriving outside it.
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- Disposition: listed. The structural repair suggested by 0.2.32 — deriving
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reviewable surfaces rather than maintaining a list — is still not done, and
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this finding is the argument for doing it.
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Nothing else on the claim surface moved: the surface hash covers eighteen
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documents and only this one differs from 0.2.32.
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# Claims review — 0.2.34
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- base: v0.2.33
|
|
4
|
+
- head: 0198ccf
|
|
5
|
+
- surface: sha256:e80fad84574da3554959e855d5e9cb4db1a32b9e4cc3f58f3dd87db369dad5c3
|
|
6
|
+
- verdict: pass
|
|
7
|
+
- reviewer: Claude (Opus 5), then an independent pass by Codex and one by Cursor
|
|
8
|
+
before the version was pushed
|
|
9
|
+
|
|
10
|
+
Four surfaces changed: `docs/PRIOR-ART.md`, `README.md`, `CHANGELOG.md`,
|
|
11
|
+
`docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md`. The release is itself a claims correction, so
|
|
12
|
+
most of the diff removes reach. The findings below are ordered by who found them,
|
|
13
|
+
because that ordering is the useful part of this record: **the first pass missed
|
|
14
|
+
the two that mattered, and both were found by readers who had not written the
|
|
15
|
+
text.**
|
|
16
|
+
|
|
17
|
+
## Findings
|
|
18
|
+
|
|
19
|
+
### 1. docs/PRIOR-ART.md — a design section scored as behaviour
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
- Claim: the Vaara row read **"Yes — the only other one here"** on coverage
|
|
22
|
+
reconciliation, and the file, `README.md` and `CHANGELOG.md` all said that
|
|
23
|
+
project *reconciles*.
|
|
24
|
+
- Mechanism: `docs/design/credential-broker-spec.md` §D at `befdced`, which
|
|
25
|
+
designs a join of used credentials to receipts on `attestationDigest`.
|
|
26
|
+
- Why it falls short: §D is a design document. A search of that tree for a
|
|
27
|
+
collector of used credentials, the join, a CLI or a test found none, and
|
|
28
|
+
`src/vaara/credential/gateway.py` refers that residual to the design document
|
|
29
|
+
rather than to code. Every other row in the table is scored on what a project
|
|
30
|
+
is found doing. Scoring a specification as behaviour is the confusion this
|
|
31
|
+
file's own column definitions warn about — *"not that the log records that it
|
|
32
|
+
happened, but that the value never left"* — committed by the person who wrote
|
|
33
|
+
them, in the row that changed the headline claim.
|
|
34
|
+
- Disposition: rescored **"Specified, not found implemented"** in `0198ccf`,
|
|
35
|
+
with the first scoring left visible on the page rather than quietly replaced.
|
|
36
|
+
`README.md` and `CHANGELOG.md` narrowed to match. The retired phrasings are
|
|
37
|
+
named so they are not requoted: *"nobody else reconciles"*, *"none of the ten
|
|
38
|
+
has the third column"*.
|
|
39
|
+
- **Found by: Codex.** Not by the first pass, which had read the same section and
|
|
40
|
+
taken it at its word.
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
### 2. docs/PRIOR-ART.md — the summary paragraph contradicted the new row
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
- Claim: *"Two projects do both — Microsoft's toolkit and h33.ai — and neither
|
|
45
|
+
does the third."*
|
|
46
|
+
- Mechanism: the table directly above it.
|
|
47
|
+
- Why it falls short: the sentence sat unchanged three lines under a row that
|
|
48
|
+
had just been scored **Yes** on the third column. The paragraph immediately
|
|
49
|
+
after it was rewritten in the same edit; this one was not. A reader opening the
|
|
50
|
+
file from the post's first comment meets the contradiction before the
|
|
51
|
+
correction.
|
|
52
|
+
- Disposition: rewritten in `0198ccf` to name three projects and say none was
|
|
53
|
+
found running the third.
|
|
54
|
+
- **Found by: Cursor.** The first pass edited the paragraph below it and did not
|
|
55
|
+
re-read the paragraph above.
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
### 3. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md — a limitation that expired the same day
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
- Claim: *"Those steps have not run yet — 0.2.34 is the first release that will
|
|
60
|
+
execute them"*, and *"every version published so far has only npm's
|
|
61
|
+
attestation"*.
|
|
62
|
+
- Mechanism: the workflow runs and the release pages.
|
|
63
|
+
- Why it falls short: both were true when written and false a few hours later.
|
|
64
|
+
The `artefacts` mode added in #32 was dispatched against 0.2.33 (runs
|
|
65
|
+
`32295097847`, `32295276511`), which verified the registry tarball, produced a
|
|
66
|
+
GitHub attestation and created that release. `v0.2.33` now carries
|
|
67
|
+
`conarium-ai-core-0.2.33.tgz` and `.tgz.intoto.jsonl`, and
|
|
68
|
+
`gh attestation verify` returns 0 for it.
|
|
69
|
+
- Disposition: replaced in `0198ccf` with what has actually run, including that
|
|
70
|
+
0.2.33 carries no bill of materials because that step is skipped in artefacts
|
|
71
|
+
mode, and that the full publish path has still not run.
|
|
72
|
+
- **Found by: Codex.** Worth noting how it expired: this was a self-correction in
|
|
73
|
+
the first pass (finding 5 below), written carefully, and then invalidated by
|
|
74
|
+
our own action. A sentence about what has not happened yet has a shelf life.
|
|
75
|
+
|
|
76
|
+
### 4. CHANGELOG.md — three assets described as an existing state
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
- Claim: *"releases now carry: the published tarball, a CycloneDX bill of
|
|
79
|
+
materials, and a build attestation"*.
|
|
80
|
+
- Mechanism: `publish.yml` produces the SBOM only in `publish` mode and uploads
|
|
81
|
+
only the assets that exist.
|
|
82
|
+
- Why it falls short: no release carries all three. 0.2.33 carries two; 0.2.34
|
|
83
|
+
was not on npm when this was written.
|
|
84
|
+
- Disposition: narrowed to what the publish path is *configured* to produce, with
|
|
85
|
+
0.2.33's actual contents named. The neighbouring *"stops one version short …
|
|
86
|
+
again"* was in the present tense for a past event and is now *"had stopped"*.
|
|
87
|
+
- **Found by: Codex.**
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
### 5. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md — an artefact described before it existed
|
|
90
|
+
|
|
91
|
+
- Claim: *"From 0.2.34 the publish workflow attaches three files to the GitHub
|
|
92
|
+
release"*, over a table of them.
|
|
93
|
+
- Mechanism: the steps added in #28, which had never executed.
|
|
94
|
+
- Why it falls short: it described an intention as an artefact — the defect
|
|
95
|
+
0.2.33 was published to fix, with the sign reversed.
|
|
96
|
+
- Disposition: reworded in `d816ce1`, then superseded by finding 3 once the steps
|
|
97
|
+
actually ran.
|
|
98
|
+
- **Found by: the first pass**, which is recorded here mainly to be honest about
|
|
99
|
+
its hit rate: it caught the claim it had just written, and missed the two that
|
|
100
|
+
came from reading someone else's code and re-reading its own file.
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
### 6. docs/PRIOR-ART.md — a competitor's mechanism overstated
|
|
103
|
+
|
|
104
|
+
- Claim: the Microsoft row read *"Ed25519, **Merkle-chained**"*.
|
|
105
|
+
- Mechanism: their own tutorial, which describes a linear `parent_receipt_hash`.
|
|
106
|
+
- Why it falls short: it is wrong, and wrong in their favour. A comparison table
|
|
107
|
+
that inflates a competitor is no more trustworthy than one that inflates its
|
|
108
|
+
author; both mean the rows were not checked.
|
|
109
|
+
- Disposition: corrected in `0198ccf`, with the previous wording named.
|
|
110
|
+
- **Found by: Cursor.**
|
|
111
|
+
|
|
112
|
+
## Verification note
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
Vaara's contiguity tests were run during the first pass —
|
|
115
|
+
`PYTHONPATH=src python -m pytest tests/credential/test_contiguity.py` → 18
|
|
116
|
+
passed, at `befdced`. Codex could not reproduce that (`rfc8785` missing, no
|
|
117
|
+
package import environment) and correctly flagged that the claim had no command
|
|
118
|
+
recorded against it. The command and result are now in `docs/PRIOR-ART.md` beside
|
|
119
|
+
the claim rather than only in a session transcript.
|
|
@@ -3,58 +3,125 @@
|
|
|
3
3
|
How a bank checks that an `@conarium-ai/core` tarball was built from this
|
|
4
4
|
repository, not from a laptop zip.
|
|
5
5
|
|
|
6
|
-
|
|
7
|
-
[`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml) is
|
|
8
|
-
dispatch-only
|
|
6
|
+
Releases are published from
|
|
7
|
+
[`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml), which is
|
|
8
|
+
dispatch-only — it does not run on push, and each release is a human decision.
|
|
9
|
+
Published versions carry a provenance attestation; the commands below are how
|
|
10
|
+
you check that for yourself rather than taking this page's word for it.
|
|
9
11
|
|
|
10
12
|
## What provenance is
|
|
11
13
|
|
|
12
14
|
When `npm publish --provenance` runs on GitHub Actions with `id-token: write`,
|
|
13
|
-
npm stores a signed attestation
|
|
15
|
+
npm stores a signed attestation binding package version ↔ git commit ↔ workflow.
|
|
16
|
+
The attestation lives in the npm registry and in the public transparency log,
|
|
17
|
+
which is what makes it checkable without us.
|
|
14
18
|
|
|
15
|
-
## How to verify
|
|
19
|
+
## How to verify
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
Ask the registry what it holds for a version:
|
|
16
22
|
|
|
17
23
|
```bash
|
|
18
|
-
npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> --json
|
|
24
|
+
npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> dist --json
|
|
25
|
+
```
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
A provenance-backed version answers with an `attestations` block naming
|
|
28
|
+
`https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1`, plus a registry `signatures` entry. Measured
|
|
29
|
+
against 0.2.32:
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
```json
|
|
32
|
+
"attestations": {
|
|
33
|
+
"url": "https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/@conarium-ai%2fcore@0.2.32",
|
|
34
|
+
"provenance": { "predicateType": "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1" }
|
|
35
|
+
}
|
|
19
36
|
```
|
|
20
37
|
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
38
|
+
To have npm check the signatures and attestations of everything you installed,
|
|
39
|
+
including this package:
|
|
22
40
|
|
|
23
41
|
```bash
|
|
24
|
-
|
|
42
|
+
npm i @conarium-ai/core
|
|
43
|
+
npm audit signatures
|
|
25
44
|
```
|
|
26
45
|
|
|
27
|
-
|
|
46
|
+
That prints how many packages have verified registry signatures and how many
|
|
47
|
+
have verified attestations, and exits non-zero if a signature fails.
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
⛔ **`gh attestation verify` does not work here, and the reason is worth
|
|
50
|
+
knowing.** That command reads GitHub's own attestation store, which is populated
|
|
51
|
+
by `actions/attest-build-provenance`. `npm publish --provenance` writes to the
|
|
52
|
+
npm registry and the transparency log instead, so GitHub answers `404` for a
|
|
53
|
+
tarball published this way — for both `--owner` and `--repo`. A 404 there is not
|
|
54
|
+
evidence of a missing attestation; it means you asked the wrong service. Use the
|
|
55
|
+
two commands above.
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
If a version has **no** attestation, it was not published through this workflow
|
|
58
|
+
(or predates it). Treat that as undeclared origin — not as "verified".
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
## What a release page carries
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
The publish workflow is configured to attach three files to the GitHub release.
|
|
63
|
+
Which of them a given version actually carries is answered by its release page,
|
|
64
|
+
not by this table:
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
| Asset | What it is |
|
|
67
|
+
|---|---|
|
|
68
|
+
| `conarium-ai-core-<version>.tgz` | the published tarball, **downloaded from the registry**, not rebuilt |
|
|
69
|
+
| `conarium-ai-core-<version>.cdx.json` | CycloneDX bill of materials, read from the lockfile the release was built against |
|
|
70
|
+
| `conarium-ai-core-<version>.tgz.intoto.jsonl` | a build attestation over that tarball, also written to GitHub's attestation store |
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
The tarball is fetched rather than packed again on purpose. `npm pack` is not
|
|
73
|
+
byte-reproducible across environments — file modes, line endings and the gzip
|
|
74
|
+
implementation differ — so a rebuilt asset can be a lookalike of the release
|
|
75
|
+
rather than the release. Its sha512 is checked against the registry's
|
|
76
|
+
`dist.integrity` before anything is attested or uploaded.
|
|
77
|
+
|
|
78
|
+
**What has actually run.** The artefact path first executed on 19 August 2026 in
|
|
79
|
+
the workflow's `artefacts` mode — a dispatch that attaches files to a version
|
|
80
|
+
already on npm and skips publishing, tagging and the registry entirely. It was
|
|
81
|
+
run against **0.2.33**, whose release page had been left empty when that version
|
|
82
|
+
shipped. So 0.2.33 carries the tarball and the attestation and **no bill of
|
|
83
|
+
materials**: that step is skipped in artefacts mode, because the lockfile in the
|
|
84
|
+
tree belongs to a later version. The full publish path, producing all three, has
|
|
85
|
+
not run yet.
|
|
86
|
+
|
|
87
|
+
⛔ **The `gh` command below works only for versions whose release page actually
|
|
88
|
+
carries the `.intoto.jsonl` asset** — check the page, do not assume from the
|
|
89
|
+
version number. That attestation is a second one, written to GitHub's store; it
|
|
90
|
+
does not replace npm's. For a version without it, the 404 explanation above still
|
|
91
|
+
applies.
|
|
28
92
|
|
|
29
93
|
```bash
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
94
|
+
# only for a version whose release page lists the .intoto.jsonl asset
|
|
95
|
+
gh attestation verify conarium-ai-core-<version>.tgz --repo dogrucanemek-alt/conarium
|
|
31
96
|
```
|
|
32
97
|
|
|
33
|
-
|
|
34
|
-
|
|
35
|
-
|
|
98
|
+
Two attestations over the same bytes are not redundancy for its own sake: one is
|
|
99
|
+
checkable without GitHub, the other without npm, and the bill of materials is
|
|
100
|
+
checkable without either.
|
|
36
101
|
|
|
37
|
-
##
|
|
102
|
+
## Publisher configuration
|
|
38
103
|
|
|
39
104
|
Auth is **npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC)**, not a stored token. npm hands the
|
|
40
105
|
workflow a short-lived credential in exchange for its GitHub identity, so there
|
|
41
106
|
is no long-lived publish secret in this repository to leak.
|
|
42
107
|
|
|
43
|
-
|
|
108
|
+
The trusted publisher is configured on npmjs.com against
|
|
109
|
+
`dogrucanemek-alt/conarium` and `publish.yml`. To reproduce it on a fork:
|
|
44
110
|
|
|
45
111
|
1. `@conarium-ai/core` → **Settings** → **Trusted Publisher**
|
|
46
112
|
2. Publisher: **GitHub Actions**
|
|
47
|
-
3. Repository:
|
|
113
|
+
3. Repository: `<owner>/<repo>`
|
|
48
114
|
4. Workflow file: `publish.yml`
|
|
49
115
|
|
|
50
|
-
|
|
51
|
-
|
|
52
|
-
before it publishes
|
|
116
|
+
Releasing: GitHub → **Actions** → **publish** → *Run workflow* → type `publish`
|
|
117
|
+
in the confirm box. The workflow runs lint, tests and the adversarial checks
|
|
118
|
+
before it publishes, and a claims review record must exist for the version being
|
|
119
|
+
shipped; a red gate stops the release.
|
|
53
120
|
|
|
54
|
-
If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an
|
|
55
|
-
|
|
56
|
-
|
|
57
|
-
|
|
121
|
+
If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an `NPM_TOKEN`
|
|
122
|
+
secret. Publish by hand from a workstation for that release and fix the trusted
|
|
123
|
+
publisher configuration afterwards — provenance is worth less than a leaked
|
|
124
|
+
publish credential costs.
|
|
58
125
|
|
|
59
126
|
## What this does not prove
|
|
60
127
|
|
|
@@ -62,3 +129,5 @@ a leaked publish credential costs.
|
|
|
62
129
|
- Not that the commit is free of bugs.
|
|
63
130
|
- Not that the operator's install matches the tarball (`npm ci` + lockfile
|
|
64
131
|
does that locally).
|
|
132
|
+
- Not that the code does what its documentation says. Provenance binds an
|
|
133
|
+
artefact to a build, and stops there.
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@conarium-ai/core",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.34",
|
|
4
4
|
"mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
|
|
5
5
|
"//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
|
|
6
6
|
"//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
|