@conarium-ai/core 0.2.32 → 0.2.33
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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# Claims review — 0.2.33
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- base: v0.2.32
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- head: b8756f3
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- surface: sha256:8eeabf25cea27362e070789c61c828eea291bd3c155362f098894d868f0f9b4b
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- verdict: pass
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- reviewer: Claude, reading on the maintainer's instruction — an assistant read, not an independent human one
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One surface changed and one surface was added: `docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md`
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is rewritten and listed. Eighteen documents are now read at release time.
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This release exists because of an external review of the repository, which
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flagged the provenance page as stale. Reading it confirmed two defects that are
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worse than staleness, and both are recorded below as findings rather than as
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housekeeping — a reader who followed that page would have drawn a false
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conclusion about whether this package can be trusted.
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## Findings
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### 1. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md:6 — the page denied a fact about itself
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- Claim: `"This is **not** a published release."`, followed by a verification
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section headed `"How to verify (after a provenance-backed release exists)"`
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and a setup section headed `"One-time setup before the first publish"`.
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- Mechanism: the npm registry, which records what was actually published.
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- Why it falls short: measured on 0.2.32 —
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`npm view @conarium-ai/core@0.2.32 dist --json` returns an `attestations`
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block naming `https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1` plus a registry `signatures`
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entry, and eight versions have shipped since the sentence was written. The
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page described a pre-release state inside a released package, and it ships in
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the tarball, so the reader most likely to open it is someone who already has
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the published artefact in their hands.
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- Disposition: rewritten. The page now states what exists, and the verification
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section carries the measured output rather than a promise that something will
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one day be verifiable.
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### 2. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md — the verification command cannot succeed
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- Claim: `"or, with GitHub CLI, verify the attestation against this repo: gh
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attestation verify --owner dogrucanemek-alt <downloaded.tgz>"`
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- Mechanism: `gh attestation verify` reads GitHub's own attestation store, which
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is populated by `actions/attest-build-provenance`.
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- Why it falls short: `npm publish --provenance` writes to the npm registry and
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the public transparency log, not to GitHub's store. Both forms were run
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against the published 0.2.32 tarball and both answered **HTTP 404** —
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`--owner dogrucanemek-alt` (which additionally targets an org endpoint for
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what is a user account) and `--repo dogrucanemek-alt/conarium`. The failure
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mode is the dangerous direction: a reader checking our provenance would see
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404 and reasonably conclude the attestation is missing, when it exists and
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verifies by another route.
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- Disposition: replaced with two commands that were run and do work —
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`npm view … dist --json` and `npm audit signatures` (107 registry signatures
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and 11 attestations verified on a clean install, exit 0). The `gh` command is
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kept in the page as an explicit warning, with the reason, so the next person
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who tries it does not repeat the diagnosis.
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### 3. test/denetci.mjs — the page was never on the claim surface list
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- Claim: not a sentence — the absence of a reader. The page ships in the tarball
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and its whole subject is how much of what we say can be checked without us.
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- Mechanism: the `SURFACES` list in `test/denetci.mjs`.
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- Why it falls short: it was unlisted, so both defects above survived eight
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releases and were found by someone outside this process rather than by the
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gate. This is the third instance of the same shape — `docs/PRICING.md` in
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0.2.31, the tool descriptions in 0.2.32, and now this — which is enough of a
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pattern to state plainly: the list is hand-written, and things that ship
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keep arriving outside it.
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- Disposition: listed. The structural repair suggested by 0.2.32 — deriving
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reviewable surfaces rather than maintaining a list — is still not done, and
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this finding is the argument for doing it.
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Nothing else on the claim surface moved: the surface hash covers eighteen
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documents and only this one differs from 0.2.32.
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How a bank checks that an `@conarium-ai/core` tarball was built from this
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repository, not from a laptop zip.
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[`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml) is
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dispatch-only
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Releases are published from
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[`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml), which is
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dispatch-only — it does not run on push, and each release is a human decision.
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Published versions carry a provenance attestation; the commands below are how
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you check that for yourself rather than taking this page's word for it.
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## What provenance is
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When `npm publish --provenance` runs on GitHub Actions with `id-token: write`,
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npm stores a signed attestation
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npm stores a signed attestation binding package version ↔ git commit ↔ workflow.
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The attestation lives in the npm registry and in the public transparency log,
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which is what makes it checkable without us.
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## How to verify
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## How to verify
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Ask the registry what it holds for a version:
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```bash
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npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> --json
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npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> dist --json
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```
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A provenance-backed version answers with an `attestations` block naming
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`https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1`, plus a registry `signatures` entry. Measured
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against 0.2.32:
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```
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```json
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"attestations": {
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"url": "https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/@conarium-ai%2fcore@0.2.32",
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"provenance": { "predicateType": "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1" }
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}
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```
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To have npm check the signatures and attestations of everything you installed,
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including this package:
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```bash
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npm i @conarium-ai/core
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npm audit signatures
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```
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That prints how many packages have verified registry signatures and how many
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have verified attestations, and exits non-zero if a signature fails.
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⛔ **`gh attestation verify` does not work here, and the reason is worth
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knowing.** That command reads GitHub's own attestation store, which is populated
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by `actions/attest-build-provenance`. `npm publish --provenance` writes to the
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npm registry and the transparency log instead, so GitHub answers `404` for a
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tarball published this way — for both `--owner` and `--repo`. A 404 there is not
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evidence of a missing attestation; it means you asked the wrong service. Use the
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two commands above.
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If a version has **no** attestation, it was not published through this workflow
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(or predates it). Treat that as undeclared origin — not as "verified".
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##
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## Publisher configuration
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Auth is **npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC)**, not a stored token. npm hands the
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workflow a short-lived credential in exchange for its GitHub identity, so there
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is no long-lived publish secret in this repository to leak.
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The trusted publisher is configured on npmjs.com against
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`dogrucanemek-alt/conarium` and `publish.yml`. To reproduce it on a fork:
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1. `@conarium-ai/core` → **Settings** → **Trusted Publisher**
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2. Publisher: **GitHub Actions**
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3. Repository:
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3. Repository: `<owner>/<repo>`
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4. Workflow file: `publish.yml`
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before it publishes
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Releasing: GitHub → **Actions** → **publish** → *Run workflow* → type `publish`
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in the confirm box. The workflow runs lint, tests and the adversarial checks
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before it publishes, and a claims review record must exist for the version being
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shipped; a red gate stops the release.
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If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an
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If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an `NPM_TOKEN`
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secret. Publish by hand from a workstation for that release and fix the trusted
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publisher configuration afterwards — provenance is worth less than a leaked
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publish credential costs.
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## What this does not prove
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@@ -62,3 +87,5 @@ a leaked publish credential costs.
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- Not that the commit is free of bugs.
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- Not that the operator's install matches the tarball (`npm ci` + lockfile
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does that locally).
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- Not that the code does what its documentation says. Provenance binds an
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artefact to a build, and stops there.
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CHANGED
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{
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"name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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"version": "0.2.
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"version": "0.2.33",
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"mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
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"//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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"//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
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