@conarium-ai/core 0.2.32 → 0.2.33

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+ # Claims review — 0.2.33
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+
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+ - base: v0.2.32
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+ - head: b8756f3
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+ - surface: sha256:8eeabf25cea27362e070789c61c828eea291bd3c155362f098894d868f0f9b4b
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+ - verdict: pass
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+ - reviewer: Claude, reading on the maintainer's instruction — an assistant read, not an independent human one
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+
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+ One surface changed and one surface was added: `docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md`
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+ is rewritten and listed. Eighteen documents are now read at release time.
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+
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+ This release exists because of an external review of the repository, which
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+ flagged the provenance page as stale. Reading it confirmed two defects that are
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+ worse than staleness, and both are recorded below as findings rather than as
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+ housekeeping — a reader who followed that page would have drawn a false
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+ conclusion about whether this package can be trusted.
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+
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+ ## Findings
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+
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+ ### 1. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md:6 — the page denied a fact about itself
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+
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+ - Claim: `"This is **not** a published release."`, followed by a verification
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+ section headed `"How to verify (after a provenance-backed release exists)"`
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+ and a setup section headed `"One-time setup before the first publish"`.
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+ - Mechanism: the npm registry, which records what was actually published.
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+ - Why it falls short: measured on 0.2.32 —
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+ `npm view @conarium-ai/core@0.2.32 dist --json` returns an `attestations`
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+ block naming `https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1` plus a registry `signatures`
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+ entry, and eight versions have shipped since the sentence was written. The
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+ page described a pre-release state inside a released package, and it ships in
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+ the tarball, so the reader most likely to open it is someone who already has
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+ the published artefact in their hands.
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+ - Disposition: rewritten. The page now states what exists, and the verification
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+ section carries the measured output rather than a promise that something will
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+ one day be verifiable.
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+
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+ ### 2. docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md — the verification command cannot succeed
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+
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+ - Claim: `"or, with GitHub CLI, verify the attestation against this repo: gh
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+ attestation verify --owner dogrucanemek-alt <downloaded.tgz>"`
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+ - Mechanism: `gh attestation verify` reads GitHub's own attestation store, which
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+ is populated by `actions/attest-build-provenance`.
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+ - Why it falls short: `npm publish --provenance` writes to the npm registry and
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+ the public transparency log, not to GitHub's store. Both forms were run
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+ against the published 0.2.32 tarball and both answered **HTTP 404** —
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+ `--owner dogrucanemek-alt` (which additionally targets an org endpoint for
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+ what is a user account) and `--repo dogrucanemek-alt/conarium`. The failure
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+ mode is the dangerous direction: a reader checking our provenance would see
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+ 404 and reasonably conclude the attestation is missing, when it exists and
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+ verifies by another route.
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+ - Disposition: replaced with two commands that were run and do work —
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+ `npm view … dist --json` and `npm audit signatures` (107 registry signatures
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+ and 11 attestations verified on a clean install, exit 0). The `gh` command is
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+ kept in the page as an explicit warning, with the reason, so the next person
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+ who tries it does not repeat the diagnosis.
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+
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+ ### 3. test/denetci.mjs — the page was never on the claim surface list
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+
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+ - Claim: not a sentence — the absence of a reader. The page ships in the tarball
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+ and its whole subject is how much of what we say can be checked without us.
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+ - Mechanism: the `SURFACES` list in `test/denetci.mjs`.
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+ - Why it falls short: it was unlisted, so both defects above survived eight
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+ releases and were found by someone outside this process rather than by the
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+ gate. This is the third instance of the same shape — `docs/PRICING.md` in
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+ 0.2.31, the tool descriptions in 0.2.32, and now this — which is enough of a
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+ pattern to state plainly: the list is hand-written, and things that ship
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+ keep arriving outside it.
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+ - Disposition: listed. The structural repair suggested by 0.2.32 — deriving
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+ reviewable surfaces rather than maintaining a list — is still not done, and
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+ this finding is the argument for doing it.
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+
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+ Nothing else on the claim surface moved: the surface hash covers eighteen
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+ documents and only this one differs from 0.2.32.
@@ -3,58 +3,83 @@
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  How a bank checks that an `@conarium-ai/core` tarball was built from this
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  repository, not from a laptop zip.
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- This is **not** a published release. The workflow
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- [`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml) is
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- dispatch-only. It does not run on push. The first publish is a human decision.
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+ Releases are published from
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+ [`.github/workflows/publish.yml`](../../.github/workflows/publish.yml), which is
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+ dispatch-only — it does not run on push, and each release is a human decision.
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+ Published versions carry a provenance attestation; the commands below are how
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+ you check that for yourself rather than taking this page's word for it.
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  ## What provenance is
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  When `npm publish --provenance` runs on GitHub Actions with `id-token: write`,
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- npm stores a signed attestation: package version ↔ git commit ↔ workflow.
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+ npm stores a signed attestation binding package version ↔ git commit ↔ workflow.
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+ The attestation lives in the npm registry and in the public transparency log,
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+ which is what makes it checkable without us.
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- ## How to verify (after a provenance-backed release exists)
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+ ## How to verify
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+
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+ Ask the registry what it holds for a version:
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  ```bash
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- npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> --json
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+ npm view @conarium-ai/core@<version> dist --json
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  ```
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- Look for attestations / provenance on that version. Then:
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+ A provenance-backed version answers with an `attestations` block naming
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+ `https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1`, plus a registry `signatures` entry. Measured
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+ against 0.2.32:
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- ```bash
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- npx npm-provenance-check @conarium-ai/core@<version>
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+ ```json
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+ "attestations": {
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+ "url": "https://registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/attestations/@conarium-ai%2fcore@0.2.32",
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+ "provenance": { "predicateType": "https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1" }
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+ }
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  ```
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- or, with GitHub CLI, verify the attestation against this repo:
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+ To have npm check the signatures and attestations of everything you installed,
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+ including this package:
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  ```bash
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- gh attestation verify --owner dogrucanemek-alt <downloaded.tgz>
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+ npm i @conarium-ai/core
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+ npm audit signatures
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  ```
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- If a version has **no** attestation, it was not published through this
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- workflow (or was published before the workflow existed). Treat that as
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- undeclared origin — not as "verified".
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+ That prints how many packages have verified registry signatures and how many
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+ have verified attestations, and exits non-zero if a signature fails.
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+
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+ ⛔ **`gh attestation verify` does not work here, and the reason is worth
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+ knowing.** That command reads GitHub's own attestation store, which is populated
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+ by `actions/attest-build-provenance`. `npm publish --provenance` writes to the
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+ npm registry and the transparency log instead, so GitHub answers `404` for a
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+ tarball published this way — for both `--owner` and `--repo`. A 404 there is not
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+ evidence of a missing attestation; it means you asked the wrong service. Use the
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+ two commands above.
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+
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+ If a version has **no** attestation, it was not published through this workflow
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+ (or predates it). Treat that as undeclared origin — not as "verified".
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- ## One-time setup before the first publish
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+ ## Publisher configuration
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  Auth is **npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC)**, not a stored token. npm hands the
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  workflow a short-lived credential in exchange for its GitHub identity, so there
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  is no long-lived publish secret in this repository to leak.
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- On npmjs.com, as the package owner:
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+ The trusted publisher is configured on npmjs.com against
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+ `dogrucanemek-alt/conarium` and `publish.yml`. To reproduce it on a fork:
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  1. `@conarium-ai/core` → **Settings** → **Trusted Publisher**
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  2. Publisher: **GitHub Actions**
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- 3. Repository: `dogrucanemek-alt/conarium`
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+ 3. Repository: `<owner>/<repo>`
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  4. Workflow file: `publish.yml`
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- Then publish: GitHub → **Actions** → **publish** → *Run workflow* →
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- type `publish` in the confirm box. The workflow runs lint, tests and checks
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- before it publishes; a red gate stops the release.
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+ Releasing: GitHub → **Actions** → **publish** → *Run workflow* → type `publish`
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+ in the confirm box. The workflow runs lint, tests and the adversarial checks
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+ before it publishes, and a claims review record must exist for the version being
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+ shipped; a red gate stops the release.
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- If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an
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- `NPM_TOKEN` secret. Publish by hand from a workstation for that release and fix
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- the trusted publisher configuration afterwards — provenance is worth less than
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- a leaked publish credential costs.
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+ If npm rejects the OIDC exchange, do **not** fall back to adding an `NPM_TOKEN`
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+ secret. Publish by hand from a workstation for that release and fix the trusted
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+ publisher configuration afterwards — provenance is worth less than a leaked
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+ publish credential costs.
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  ## What this does not prove
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@@ -62,3 +87,5 @@ a leaked publish credential costs.
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  - Not that the commit is free of bugs.
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  - Not that the operator's install matches the tarball (`npm ci` + lockfile
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  does that locally).
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+ - Not that the code does what its documentation says. Provenance binds an
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+ artefact to a build, and stops there.
package/package.json CHANGED
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  {
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  "name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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- "version": "0.2.32",
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+ "version": "0.2.33",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
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  "//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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  "//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",