@conarium-ai/core 0.2.3 → 0.2.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +97 -1
- package/README.md +32 -10
- package/SECURITY.md +6 -2
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +56 -4
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit.js +12 -6
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js +7 -0
- package/dist/connectors/supabase_rest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/digit_pii.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/digit_pii.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/digit_pii.js +152 -0
- package/dist/digit_pii.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/governance.js +53 -26
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/pii_normalize.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/pii_normalize.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/pii_normalize.js +95 -0
- package/dist/pii_normalize.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +22 -9
- package/package.json +2 -2
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@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
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/**
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* Content-scanner normalisation — runs BEFORE IBAN / digit / email detectors.
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*
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* Invisible and look-alike characters were splitting identifiers so the IBAN
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* scanner never fired, then the digit scanner ate the tail and left
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* `TR33<ZWSP>000610051[MASKED_PII]` — which looks like protection, increments
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* `maskedCount`, and still hands the prefix to the model. That is the failure
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* this pass exists to prevent.
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*
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* Conscious output change: the string that leaves the scanner is the
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* normalised form even when nothing was PII. Zero-width / format characters
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* are stripped; fullwidth digits and `@` become ASCII; unicode dashes become
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* ASCII hyphen. The model and the operator see the same bytes. A ZWSP that
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* was only there to hide an IBAN is gone; a ZWSP that was only there as
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* decoration is also gone. Documented, tested, not silent.
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*/
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export function normalizePiiText(input) {
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let s = input;
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// ZWSP, ZWNJ, ZWJ, BOM, soft hyphen
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s = s.replace(/[\u200B\u200C\u200D\uFEFF\u00AD]/g, '');
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s = s.replace(/\uFF20/g, '@'); // fullwidth commercial at
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s = s.replace(/[\uFF10-\uFF19]/g, (ch) => String.fromCharCode(ch.charCodeAt(0) - 0xff10 + 0x30));
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s = s.replace(/[\u2010-\u2015\u2212]/g, '-');
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return s;
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}
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/**
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* Backstop: any leftover alphanumeric prefix glued to a mask
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* (`411[MASKED_PII]`, `TR33000610051[MASKED_PII]`) is a partial mask.
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* Collapse it to a full mask so maskedCount cannot claim protection
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* while the prefix is still in the clear. The detectors must not produce
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* this; this exists so a future mid-run match still cannot lie.
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*/
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export function collapsePartialMask(text) {
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// The literal is required. Without this guard `[A-Za-z0-9]+` eats a
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// 12k-digit field, fails to find `[MASKED_PII]`, and backtracks O(n²).
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if (!text.includes('[MASKED_PII]'))
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return text;
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return text.replace(/[A-Za-z0-9]+\[MASKED_PII\]/g, '[MASKED_PII]');
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}
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/** @deprecated name — same function, kept so existing imports compile during the cut */
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export const collapsePartialIbanMask = collapsePartialMask;
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export function decodedLooksLikePii(decoded) {
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const n = normalizePiiText(decoded);
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if (/[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]{1,64}@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]{1,253}\.[a-zA-Z]{2,24}/.test(n))
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return true;
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if (/^[1-9][0-9]{10}$/.test(n) || /\b[1-9][0-9]{10}\b/.test(n))
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return true;
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* Mask *tokens inside a field* that decode to PII. Whole-field base64 is
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* handled separately. Length-capped so a 20 kB image blob is not scanned.
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* Non-PII payloads (hashes, greetings, signatures) are left alone.
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*/
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export function maskEmbeddedEncodedPii(text, ibanHit) {
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// A maximal digit run longer than a hex/b64 token cannot contain a
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// bounded token with word boundaries on both sides. Skipping avoids
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// `{24,80}` backtracking across 12k hex-looking digits.
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if (text.length > 80 && /^\d+$/.test(text))
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return { text, count: 0 };
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let count = 0;
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let out = text;
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out = out.replace(/(?<![A-Za-z0-9+/])([A-Za-z0-9+/]{16,80}={0,2})(?![A-Za-z0-9+/=])/g, (token) => {
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if (token.includes('[MASKED'))
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return token;
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try {
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const decoded = Buffer.from(token, 'base64').toString('utf8');
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if (!decoded || decoded.includes('\u0000'))
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return token;
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if (decodedLooksLikePii(decoded) || ibanHit(decoded)) {
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count++;
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return '[MASKED_PII]';
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}
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}
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catch { /* not base64 */ }
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return token;
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});
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out = out.replace(/\b([0-9A-Fa-f]{24,80})\b/g, (token) => {
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if (token.length % 2 !== 0)
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return token;
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try {
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const decoded = Buffer.from(token, 'hex').toString('utf8');
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if (!decoded || decoded.includes('\u0000'))
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return token;
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if (decodedLooksLikePii(decoded) || ibanHit(decoded)) {
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count++;
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return '[MASKED_PII]';
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}
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}
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catch { /* not hex */ }
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return token;
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});
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return { text: out, count };
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}
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//# sourceMappingURL=pii_normalize.js.map
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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{"version":3,"file":"pii_normalize.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/pii_normalize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAa;IAC5C,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAA;IACb,oCAAoC;IACpC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,mCAAmC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAA;IACtD,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA,CAAC,0BAA0B;IACxD,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,kBAAkB,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IAChG,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,wBAAwB,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;IAC5C,OAAO,CAAC,CAAA;AACV,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAY;IAC9C,oEAAoE;IACpE,uEAAuE;IACvE,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAA;IAC/C,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,6BAA6B,EAAE,cAAc,CAAC,CAAA;AACpE,CAAC;AAED,wFAAwF;AACxF,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAA;AAE1D,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAe;IACjD,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAA;IACnC,IAAI,6DAA6D,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAA;IACtF,IAAI,kBAAkB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,oBAAoB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAA;IAC3E,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;AACd,CAAC;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CACpC,IAAY,EACZ,OAA+B;IAE/B,mEAAmE;IACnE,oEAAoE;IACpE,wDAAwD;IACxD,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,CAAA;IAErE,IAAI,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC,CAAA;IACb,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,IAAI,CAAA;IAEd,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CACf,mEAAmE,EACnE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE;QACR,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;QAC3C,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;YAC7D,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;gBAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;YACxD,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACrD,KAAK,EAAE,CAAA;gBACP,OAAO,cAAc,CAAA;YACvB,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC;QAC5B,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;IACd,CAAC,CACF,CAAA;IAED,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,2BAA2B,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE;QACvD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;YAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;QACxC,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAA;YAC1D,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;gBAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;YACxD,IAAI,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACrD,KAAK,EAAE,CAAA;gBACP,OAAO,cAAc,CAAA;YACvB,CAAC;QACH,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;QACzB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAA;IACd,CAAC,CAAC,CAAA;IAEF,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAA;AAC7B,CAAC"}
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package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md
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@@ -12,13 +12,19 @@ Design source: `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md`.
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## Official claim (do not widen)
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> A Conarium Receipt proves that records have
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> reordered, or backdated after they were created
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>
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> A Conarium Receipt proves that the records **still in the file** have not been
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> altered, reordered, or backdated after they were created, and that none were
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> **removed from the middle** of the chain (`prevHash` / `seq`). It does **not**
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> prove they were correct at the moment of creation. It cannot, by itself, prove
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> that records were not **dropped from the end**: a shorter leftover chain is
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> still internally consistent. Catching tail truncation needs a pin from outside
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> the file (`--expect-count`, `--expect-last-hash`, an OpenTimestamps anchor, or
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> `conarium-reconcile`).
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*(TR)* Conarium Makbuzu, dosyada **hâlâ duran** kayıtların oluşturulduktan sonra
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değiştirilmediğini, **ortadan** silinmediğini, yeniden sıralanmadığını ve geriye
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dönük tarihlenmediğini kanıtlar. **Oluşturma anında doğru olduğunu kanıtlamaz.**
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Sondan kesmeyi tek başına göremez.
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## Media type
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## Verifier
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```
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conarium-verify <file|dir> --pubkey <path> [--pubkey <path2>] [--anchor-check] [--expect-seq-from N] [--json]
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conarium-verify <file|dir> --pubkey <path> [--pubkey <path2>] [--anchor-check] [--expect-seq-from N] [--expect-count N] [--expect-last-hash sha256:…] [--json]
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```
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`--expect-count` / `--expect-last-hash` are **opt-in tail pins**. Without them,
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a chain that had its last receipts deleted still exits 0 — the remainder is a
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valid shorter chain. With them, a count or last-hash miss is exit **11** (same
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code as a `prevHash` break: the chain as presented is not the chain you pinned).
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Default behaviour and the exit-code list are unchanged.
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| Exit | Meaning |
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|---|---|
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| 0 | Chain intact, signatures valid |
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| 10 | Hash mismatch — record altered |
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-
| 11 | `prevHash` break — deleted or inserted |
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| 11 | `prevHash` break — deleted or inserted; also `--expect-count` / `--expect-last-hash` mismatch |
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| 12 | `seq` gap / non-increasing — missing or reordered |
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| 13 | Signature invalid / pubkey missing (fail-closed) |
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| 14 | Anchor missing/invalid under `--anchor-check` |
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3. **Creation-time truth is not proven.** Without hardware attestation, an operator can still write false-but-well-formed receipts *before* anchoring.
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4. **In-file `sig` stripping + HMAC/`anchor` reduction.** Content `hash` is computed with `{hash, sig, anchor}` (and audit `signature`/`sig`) excluded, so an operator who controls the file can drop or thin those fields without invalidating the content hash itself. Contiguity and the trust store catch some boot-time cases, but full protection against in-file strip/reduce games is **not solvable in-file** (*in-file çözülemez*) — it needs an external transparency-log anchor and/or out-of-band key ceremony. **Mitigation available today, measured:** keep `CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY` enabled alongside Ed25519. HMAC is keyed, so an actor who strips `sig` and recomputes the unkeyed hashes still fails the HMAC check (`entry signature mismatch`). Verified by test: Ed25519 alone → strip-all passes the boot check; Ed25519 + HMAC → caught. `conarium-verify --pubkey` also catches it (exit 13, `missing sig`) because it is told to expect signatures. **Anchor is available** (`CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SINK=opentimestamps`) but starts as `pending` — Bitcoin finality is delayed (hours); see §Anchoring.
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5. **`argsHash` hurts debugging.** Support cases need the customer's own logs to correlate.
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6. **Tail truncation is invisible to `conarium-verify` unless pinned.** Deleting the last N receipts leaves a consistent leftover chain (exit 0). `--expect-count` / `--expect-last-hash` exist for operators who have an external length or last-hash; they are opt-in so a verifier that saw the same file yesterday still exits 0 today. Anchoring the head, or `conarium-reconcile` against the database's own counters, are the other pins.
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## Anchoring (OpenTimestamps)
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package/package.json
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{
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"name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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"version": "0.2.
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"version": "0.2.5",
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"//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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"//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
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"files": [
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"build": "tsc",
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"test": "vitest run",
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"test:anchor-verify": "npm run build && node test/anchor_verify.mjs",
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-
"test:checks": "npm run build && node test/doctor.mjs && node test/console_cli.mjs && node test/console_policy.mjs && node test/init.mjs && node test/demo_bank_seed.mjs && node test/pack_artefakt.mjs && node test/connectors.mjs && node test/governance_lineage_adversarial.mjs && node test/governance_security_regression.mjs && node test/security_hardening_14.mjs && node test/anchor_verify.mjs && node test/spec_exitcode_drift.mjs && node test/vectors_run.mjs && node test/http_gateway.e2e.mjs",
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+
"test:checks": "npm run build && node test/doctor.mjs && node test/console_cli.mjs && node test/console_policy.mjs && node test/init.mjs && node test/demo_bank_seed.mjs && node test/pack_artefakt.mjs && node test/connectors.mjs && node test/governance_lineage_adversarial.mjs && node test/governance_security_regression.mjs && node test/security_hardening_14.mjs && node test/anchor_verify.mjs && node test/spec_exitcode_drift.mjs && node test/encoding_evasion_mask.mjs && node test/verify_tail_pin.mjs && node test/partial_mask_root.mjs && node test/pii_regression_matrix.mjs && node test/scanner_perf.mjs && node test/vectors_run.mjs && node test/http_gateway.e2e.mjs",
|
|
73
73
|
"test:all": "npm run lint && npm run test && npm run test:checks",
|
|
74
74
|
"dev": "tsx watch src/index.ts",
|
|
75
75
|
"start": "node dist/index.js",
|