@conarium-ai/core 0.2.27 → 0.2.28

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,37 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.2.28 — 2026-08-17
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+
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+ The `indeterminate` class added in 0.2.27 was attacked the same day, and the
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+ attack got through. A legitimate receipt from the previous day, naming the same
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+ table, turned a real in-window bypass from exit 40 into 41 — and the run then
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+ said the access was **"NOT reported as unreceipted access"**. 41 is not a silent
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+ pass, and was not one then: the run still fails and CI still goes red. The damage
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+ was the sentence. At three seconds it is true; at twenty-three hours it points
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+ the reader away from what happened.
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+
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+ - **The exculpation is bounded by the window's own length.** An offset larger
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+ than `after.ts − before.ts` cannot be a boundary artefact, so the boundary is
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+ no longer offered as the explanation. The pattern stays `indeterminate` at 41,
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+ because the tool still cannot say which access that receipt belongs to, and the
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+ report says so in those terms: *"a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset
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+ larger than the window itself … NOT excused as a timing effect."*
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+
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+ - **The threshold is derived, not chosen.** It is the window the caller supplied.
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+ A number picked by us would be the kind of number this tool exists to refuse.
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+
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+ - **A declared `--skew` outranks it.** A five-second window with a six-second NTP
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+ step is a real case, and the operator is the one who knows their clocks.
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+
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+ - **The 0.2.27 fix is unchanged.** A genuinely skewed receipt three seconds
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+ outside a two-hour window still reads as the boundary, still exits 41, and
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+ still is not called a bypass. A pattern with even one table that has no receipt
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+ anywhere still exits 40 with the bypass sentence.
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+
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+ Found by an adversarial review commissioned after the fix shipped, on the ground
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+ that the fix had loosened a guard's default and its author should not be the one
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+ clearing it.
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+
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  ## 0.2.27 — 2026-08-17
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  `conarium-reconcile` could accuse the gateway of being bypassed because two
package/LIMITATIONS.md CHANGED
@@ -187,6 +187,23 @@ such deployment. The consequence is that a clean run establishes pattern and
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  object overlap within the window. It does not establish that each recorded
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  statement was itself receipted.
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+ ## Reconciliation cannot tell a trailing clock from a late receipt
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+
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+ The window comes from the database's snapshot timestamps and a receipt's
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+ timestamp comes from the gateway, so the boundary is decided by two clocks.
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+ A receipt that would have covered a pattern but falls outside the window is
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+ reported as `indeterminate` (exit 41) rather than as unreceipted access,
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+ because this tool has no way to know which of the two happened. That is a
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+ limit, not a verdict: 41 is a failure and the run does not pass, but nothing
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+ is proven either way.
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+
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+ The exculpation is bounded by the window's own length — an offset larger than
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+ the window cannot be a boundary artefact, and the report says so instead of
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+ excusing it. `--skew` lets an operator declare what their clocks can do, and
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+ that declaration outranks the inference. Neither mode establishes that the
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+ receipt belongs to the access the counters recorded. This limit was found by
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+ attack after the class shipped, not by reading it.
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+
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  A receipt that names an object while the database counters show no increase
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  for that object is listed as UNOBSERVED. It is not a failure. The same
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  shape appears when a counter was reset at the window edge, when a pooler
package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md CHANGED
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ Conarium'un yapmadıkları. Ölçülmüş. Tarih yok.
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  ## Sertifikasyon yok
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- SOC 2 yok. ISO yok. Bağımsız sızma testi yok. Yol haritasında.
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+ SOC 2 yok. ISO yok. İkisi de planlanmıyor: bu denetimler müşteri verisini
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+ elinde tutan kuruluşu denetler, Conarium'un yönettiği veri ise bize hiç
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+ ulaşmıyor. Bağımsız sızma testi de yok — o yol haritasında.
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  ## 1.0 değil
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@@ -150,3 +152,19 @@ Damgalama yerleşik takvim istemcisiyle yapılır (Node `crypto` + herkese açı
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  `javascript-opentimestamps` bağımlılık değil. `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` ağacı kurulmaz.
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  Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir; makbuz `pending` gösterir.
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  Bitcoin blok doğrulaması `blockstream.info`'ya sorar. O host yoksa doğrulayıcı "kontrol edemedim" der, "geçerli" demez.
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+
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+ ## Mutabakat, kayan saatle geç yazılmış makbuzu ayıramaz
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+
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+ Pencerenin iki ucu veritabanının snapshot damgalarından, makbuzun damgası ise
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+ gateway'den geliyor. Yani sınıra iki ayrı saat karar veriyor. Bir deseni
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+ kapsayacak olan makbuz pencerenin dışına düşerse sonuç `indeterminate` olur
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+ (çıkış 41) — "makbuzsuz erişim" denmez, çünkü araç ikisinden hangisinin olduğunu
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+ bilemez. Bu bir hüküm değil, bir sınır: 41 başarısızlıktır, koşu geçmez, ama
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+ hiçbir yön kanıtlanmış olmaz.
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+
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+ Aklama, pencerenin kendi uzunluğuyla sınırlı: pencereden uzun bir fark sınır
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+ etkisiyle açıklanamaz ve rapor bunu mazeret göstermek yerine açıkça yazar.
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+ `--skew` ile operatör kendi saatlerinin ne kadar kayabileceğini beyan eder ve o
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+ beyan, araçtan çıkarılan sınırı ezer. İki kipte de makbuzun, sayaçların
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+ kaydettiği erişime ait olduğu kanıtlanmış olmaz. Bu sınır, sınıf yayına
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+ çıktıktan sonra **saldırıyla** bulundu; okumayla değil.
@@ -393,7 +393,18 @@ export function reconcile(before, after, receipts, opts = {}) {
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  const withinDeclared = declaredSkewMs === null || requiredSkewMs <= declaredSkewMs
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  if (allExplained && withinDeclared) {
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- indeterminate.push({ ...d, uncoveredTables: names, requiredSkewMs })
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+ // Whether the boundary can plausibly explain the gap at all. A receipt
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+ // further outside than the window is long is not sitting at the boundary;
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+ // it is in a different window. Attacked on 2026-08-17: a legitimate
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+ // receipt from the previous day turned a real in-window bypass from 40
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+ // into 41, and the run then said the access was "NOT reported as
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+ // unreceipted access" — an exculpation 23 hours of offset cannot support.
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+ //
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+ // The threshold is the window's own length, so it is derived from the
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+ // input rather than chosen. A declared --skew is the operator's own
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+ // statement about their clocks and outranks it.
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+ const boundaryPlausible = declaredSkewMs !== null || requiredSkewMs <= toMs - fromMs
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+ indeterminate.push({ ...d, uncoveredTables: names, requiredSkewMs, boundaryPlausible })
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  } else {
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  unreconciled.push({ ...d, uncoveredTables: names })
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  }
@@ -423,6 +434,7 @@ export function reconcile(before, after, receipts, opts = {}) {
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  window: before.source,
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  receipts: 'gateway',
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  declaredSkewMs,
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+ windowMs: toMs - fromMs,
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  },
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  reconciled,
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  unreconciled,
@@ -572,25 +584,43 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
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  }
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  }
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  if (result.indeterminate.length > 0) {
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- const bound =
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- result.clocks.declaredSkewMs === null
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- ? 'no --skew bound was declared, so nothing here decides the question'
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- : `declared --skew is ${result.clocks.declaredSkewMs}ms`
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- console.error(
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- `INDETERMINATE: ${result.indeterminate.length} pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — ` +
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- `${bound}:`,
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- )
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- for (const d of result.indeterminate) {
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+ const atBoundary = result.indeterminate.filter((d) => d.boundaryPlausible)
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+ const beyond = result.indeterminate.filter((d) => !d.boundaryPlausible)
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+ const line = (d) =>
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+ ` ~ (+${d.delta}) table(s) [${d.uncoveredTables.join(', ')}] have a receipt ${d.requiredSkewMs}ms outside ` +
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+ `the window: ${truncate(d.query)}`
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+
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+ if (atBoundary.length > 0) {
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+ const bound =
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+ result.clocks.declaredSkewMs === null
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+ ? 'no --skew bound was declared, so the window\'s own length is the only reference'
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+ : `declared --skew is ${result.clocks.declaredSkewMs}ms`
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+ console.error(
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+ `INDETERMINATE: ${atBoundary.length} pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — ${bound}:`,
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+ )
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+ for (const d of atBoundary) console.error(line(d))
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  console.error(
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- ` ~ (+${d.delta}) table(s) [${d.uncoveredTables.join(', ')}] have a receipt ${d.requiredSkewMs}ms outside ` +
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- `the window: ${truncate(d.query)}`,
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+ `the window comes from ${result.clocks.window} and receipt timestamps come from the ${result.clocks.receipts} — ` +
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+ 'two clocks. A receipt this close outside is either a trailing clock or a late receipt, and this tool ' +
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+ 'cannot tell them apart. It is NOT reported as unreceipted access.',
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+ )
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+ }
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+ // Never exculpated. The class stays indeterminate because this tool still
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+ // cannot prove what happened, but a receipt further out than the window is
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+ // long is not a boundary artefact, and saying otherwise would shield the
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+ // exact case an attacker would arrange.
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+ if (beyond.length > 0) {
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+ console.error(
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+ `INDETERMINATE (not the boundary): ${beyond.length} pattern(s) have their only covering receipt further ` +
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+ `outside the window than the window is long (${result.clocks.windowMs}ms):`,
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+ )
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+ for (const d of beyond) console.error(line(d))
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+ console.error(
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+ 'a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset larger than the window itself, so clock skew is not the ' +
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+ 'reading here. This is NOT excused as a timing effect; it is left undecided because the receipt exists ' +
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+ 'and this tool cannot say which access it belongs to. Declare --skew to make the question decidable.',
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  )
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  }
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- console.error(
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- `the window comes from ${result.clocks.window} and receipt timestamps come from the ${result.clocks.receipts} — ` +
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- 'two clocks. A receipt this far outside is either a trailing clock or a late receipt, and this tool cannot ' +
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- 'tell them apart. It is NOT reported as unreceipted access.',
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- )
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  }
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  if (problems === 0 && undecided === 0) {
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  console.log('ok: every DB query pattern in the window is attributable to receipt(s) for the same table')
@@ -336,12 +336,30 @@ reported as `indeterminate` and exits 41. It is not a pass — 41 is a failure
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  but it is not the bypass sentence either, because this tool cannot tell a trailing
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  clock from a late receipt.
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- **Distance is reported, not judged, until you declare a bound.** Without `--skew`
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- there is no number that makes one offset skew and another not, so *any* covering
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- receipt outside the window puts its pattern here — three milliseconds out and six
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- hours out both land at 41, and the report prints which one it is. Reading that
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- number is the operator's job in the default mode; `--skew` is how you hand the
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- judgement to the tool:
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+ **Distance is reported, and only the boundary reading is bounded.** Without
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+ `--skew`, *any* covering receipt outside the window puts its pattern at 41 — the
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+ tool still cannot say which access that receipt belongs to. What the distance
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+ decides is whether the boundary can be *offered as the explanation*:
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+
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+ | Offset vs the window's own length | Class | What the report says |
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+ |---|---|---|
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+ | within | `indeterminate`, boundary-plausible | two clocks, cannot tell them apart, **not** reported as unreceipted access |
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+ | beyond | `indeterminate`, **not** boundary-plausible | a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset larger than the window itself; **not excused as a timing effect** |
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+
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+ The threshold is the window's own length (`after.ts − before.ts`), derived from
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+ the input rather than chosen. It exists because the exculpation was attacked and
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+ went through: a legitimate receipt from the previous day, naming the same table,
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+ turned a real in-window bypass from 40 into 41 and the run then said the access
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+ was *"NOT reported as unreceipted access"* — a sentence twenty-three hours of
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+ offset cannot support. 41 was never a silent pass, and is not one now; what
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+ changed is that the tool stops offering an excuse it cannot back.
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+
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+ A declared `--skew` is the operator's own statement about their clocks and
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+ outranks the window rule. A window shorter than a clock correction is possible —
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+ a five-second window and a six-second step would read as beyond the boundary
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+ while being exactly the case the class exists for — and the operator is the one
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+ who knows whether that is their deployment. We have not measured how often it
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+ happens; the flag exists so the answer does not have to come from us:
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  ```
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  INDETERMINATE: 1 pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — no --skew bound was declared…
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+ # Claims review — 0.2.28
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+
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+ - base: v0.2.27
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+ - head: 6e3ef41
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+ - surface: sha256:28349adb6948b360662a89eb7e4996d611f81fc89503a57879084e7d2c428edb
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+ - verdict: pass
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+ - reviewer: Claude (release review before publish)
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+
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+ One claim surface changed: `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`, where the two-clocks section
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+ was rewritten after an adversarial review got through the exculpation shipped in
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+ 0.2.27. The table describing the two readings matches the CLI output, verified by
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+ running both paths; the threshold named in the prose is the one in the code.
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+
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+ ## Findings
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+
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+ ### 1. docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md — an operational scenario asserted as observed, to justify a design choice
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+
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+ - Claim: "A declared `--skew` … outranks the window rule — a five-second window with a six-second NTP step **is a real case**, and the operator is the one who knows it."
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+ - Mechanism: none. Nothing in this repository measures how often a clock correction exceeds a reconciliation window; the sentence is a plausibility argument borrowed from the review that proposed the threshold.
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+ - Why it falls short: the design choice is right — an operator's declaration should outrank a value inferred from the input — but "is a real case" states operational frequency as fact in order to justify it. Asserting the world to defend a decision is the same move as asserting a mechanism that does not exist, one step removed.
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+ - Disposition: reworded in `3602609`. The text now says such a window is possible, describes how it would read, and states plainly that we have not measured how often it happens.
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+
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+ ### 2. LIMITATIONS.tr.md:7 — the SOC 2 answer given on 2026-08-17 never reached the Turkish surface
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+
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+ - Claim: "SOC 2 yok. ISO yok. Bağımsız sızma testi yok. **Yol haritasında.**" — no SOC 2, no ISO, no independent penetration test, on the roadmap.
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+ - Mechanism: the same question was answered this morning and the answer is in README.md, SECURITY.md, LIMITATIONS.md and the live site: not planned, because the audit certifies organisations that hold customer data and the data Conarium governs does not reach us.
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+ - Why it falls short: this file also ships to npm, so a Turkish reader of 0.2.26 and 0.2.27 was told SOC 2 is coming while every other surface said it is not. The correction landed on four surfaces and missed the fifth because the fifth is written in another language. `claim_discipline` cannot catch it — "SOC 2 yok" is an allowed denial, and no rule knows that the following sentence takes it back.
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+ - Disposition: corrected in `6e3ef41`, in Turkish rather than as a translation of the English sentence.
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+
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+ ### 3. LIMITATIONS said nothing about the limit this release documents in the spec
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+
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+ - Claim: absence. `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` states that reconciliation cannot distinguish a trailing clock from a late receipt; `LIMITATIONS.md` and `LIMITATIONS.tr.md` did not mention it.
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+ - Mechanism: LIMITATIONS is the file that states what has not been done, and it carries the other reconciliation limit (object attribution, not per-statement coverage) already.
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+ - Why it falls short: a limit documented only in the spec is a limit a reader of the limitations file does not have. The gap was created by this release: the class is new.
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+ - Disposition: named in both languages in `6e3ef41`, including that the exculpation is bounded by the window's own length and that the limit was found by attack.
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+
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+ ### 4. Recorded, not a finding: the exculpation this release bounds was itself the previous release's finding
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+
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+ The 0.2.27 record carries a finding about the same section describing a
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+ proximity the default mode did not enforce. That was a wording defect. The one
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+ fixed here is a behavioural one, found by attack rather than reading: a
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+ legitimate receipt from the previous day moved a real in-window bypass from 40
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+ to 41, and the run then said the access was "NOT reported as unreceipted
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+ access". Both are the same shape — an assertion the mechanism could not back —
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+ and the second was reachable only because someone was asked to attack it.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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- "version": "0.2.27",
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+ "version": "0.2.28",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
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  "//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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  "//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",