@conarium-ai/core 0.2.27 → 0.2.28
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +32 -0
- package/LIMITATIONS.md +17 -0
- package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md +19 -1
- package/bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs +47 -17
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +24 -6
- package/docs/claims/reviews/0.2.28.md +45 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,5 +1,37 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
# Changelog
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
|
+
## 0.2.28 — 2026-08-17
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
The `indeterminate` class added in 0.2.27 was attacked the same day, and the
|
|
6
|
+
attack got through. A legitimate receipt from the previous day, naming the same
|
|
7
|
+
table, turned a real in-window bypass from exit 40 into 41 — and the run then
|
|
8
|
+
said the access was **"NOT reported as unreceipted access"**. 41 is not a silent
|
|
9
|
+
pass, and was not one then: the run still fails and CI still goes red. The damage
|
|
10
|
+
was the sentence. At three seconds it is true; at twenty-three hours it points
|
|
11
|
+
the reader away from what happened.
|
|
12
|
+
|
|
13
|
+
- **The exculpation is bounded by the window's own length.** An offset larger
|
|
14
|
+
than `after.ts − before.ts` cannot be a boundary artefact, so the boundary is
|
|
15
|
+
no longer offered as the explanation. The pattern stays `indeterminate` at 41,
|
|
16
|
+
because the tool still cannot say which access that receipt belongs to, and the
|
|
17
|
+
report says so in those terms: *"a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset
|
|
18
|
+
larger than the window itself … NOT excused as a timing effect."*
|
|
19
|
+
|
|
20
|
+
- **The threshold is derived, not chosen.** It is the window the caller supplied.
|
|
21
|
+
A number picked by us would be the kind of number this tool exists to refuse.
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
- **A declared `--skew` outranks it.** A five-second window with a six-second NTP
|
|
24
|
+
step is a real case, and the operator is the one who knows their clocks.
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
- **The 0.2.27 fix is unchanged.** A genuinely skewed receipt three seconds
|
|
27
|
+
outside a two-hour window still reads as the boundary, still exits 41, and
|
|
28
|
+
still is not called a bypass. A pattern with even one table that has no receipt
|
|
29
|
+
anywhere still exits 40 with the bypass sentence.
|
|
30
|
+
|
|
31
|
+
Found by an adversarial review commissioned after the fix shipped, on the ground
|
|
32
|
+
that the fix had loosened a guard's default and its author should not be the one
|
|
33
|
+
clearing it.
|
|
34
|
+
|
|
3
35
|
## 0.2.27 — 2026-08-17
|
|
4
36
|
|
|
5
37
|
`conarium-reconcile` could accuse the gateway of being bypassed because two
|
package/LIMITATIONS.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -187,6 +187,23 @@ such deployment. The consequence is that a clean run establishes pattern and
|
|
|
187
187
|
object overlap within the window. It does not establish that each recorded
|
|
188
188
|
statement was itself receipted.
|
|
189
189
|
|
|
190
|
+
## Reconciliation cannot tell a trailing clock from a late receipt
|
|
191
|
+
|
|
192
|
+
The window comes from the database's snapshot timestamps and a receipt's
|
|
193
|
+
timestamp comes from the gateway, so the boundary is decided by two clocks.
|
|
194
|
+
A receipt that would have covered a pattern but falls outside the window is
|
|
195
|
+
reported as `indeterminate` (exit 41) rather than as unreceipted access,
|
|
196
|
+
because this tool has no way to know which of the two happened. That is a
|
|
197
|
+
limit, not a verdict: 41 is a failure and the run does not pass, but nothing
|
|
198
|
+
is proven either way.
|
|
199
|
+
|
|
200
|
+
The exculpation is bounded by the window's own length — an offset larger than
|
|
201
|
+
the window cannot be a boundary artefact, and the report says so instead of
|
|
202
|
+
excusing it. `--skew` lets an operator declare what their clocks can do, and
|
|
203
|
+
that declaration outranks the inference. Neither mode establishes that the
|
|
204
|
+
receipt belongs to the access the counters recorded. This limit was found by
|
|
205
|
+
attack after the class shipped, not by reading it.
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
190
207
|
A receipt that names an object while the database counters show no increase
|
|
191
208
|
for that object is listed as UNOBSERVED. It is not a failure. The same
|
|
192
209
|
shape appears when a counter was reset at the window edge, when a pooler
|
package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ Conarium'un yapmadıkları. Ölçülmüş. Tarih yok.
|
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
## Sertifikasyon yok
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
|
-
SOC 2 yok. ISO yok.
|
|
7
|
+
SOC 2 yok. ISO yok. İkisi de planlanmıyor: bu denetimler müşteri verisini
|
|
8
|
+
elinde tutan kuruluşu denetler, Conarium'un yönettiği veri ise bize hiç
|
|
9
|
+
ulaşmıyor. Bağımsız sızma testi de yok — o yol haritasında.
|
|
8
10
|
|
|
9
11
|
## 1.0 değil
|
|
10
12
|
|
|
@@ -150,3 +152,19 @@ Damgalama yerleşik takvim istemcisiyle yapılır (Node `crypto` + herkese açı
|
|
|
150
152
|
`javascript-opentimestamps` bağımlılık değil. `web3` / `elliptic` / `crypto-js` / `request` / `lodash` ağacı kurulmaz.
|
|
151
153
|
Bitcoin onayı yine saatler sürebilir; makbuz `pending` gösterir.
|
|
152
154
|
Bitcoin blok doğrulaması `blockstream.info`'ya sorar. O host yoksa doğrulayıcı "kontrol edemedim" der, "geçerli" demez.
|
|
155
|
+
|
|
156
|
+
## Mutabakat, kayan saatle geç yazılmış makbuzu ayıramaz
|
|
157
|
+
|
|
158
|
+
Pencerenin iki ucu veritabanının snapshot damgalarından, makbuzun damgası ise
|
|
159
|
+
gateway'den geliyor. Yani sınıra iki ayrı saat karar veriyor. Bir deseni
|
|
160
|
+
kapsayacak olan makbuz pencerenin dışına düşerse sonuç `indeterminate` olur
|
|
161
|
+
(çıkış 41) — "makbuzsuz erişim" denmez, çünkü araç ikisinden hangisinin olduğunu
|
|
162
|
+
bilemez. Bu bir hüküm değil, bir sınır: 41 başarısızlıktır, koşu geçmez, ama
|
|
163
|
+
hiçbir yön kanıtlanmış olmaz.
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
Aklama, pencerenin kendi uzunluğuyla sınırlı: pencereden uzun bir fark sınır
|
|
166
|
+
etkisiyle açıklanamaz ve rapor bunu mazeret göstermek yerine açıkça yazar.
|
|
167
|
+
`--skew` ile operatör kendi saatlerinin ne kadar kayabileceğini beyan eder ve o
|
|
168
|
+
beyan, araçtan çıkarılan sınırı ezer. İki kipte de makbuzun, sayaçların
|
|
169
|
+
kaydettiği erişime ait olduğu kanıtlanmış olmaz. Bu sınır, sınıf yayına
|
|
170
|
+
çıktıktan sonra **saldırıyla** bulundu; okumayla değil.
|
|
@@ -393,7 +393,18 @@ export function reconcile(before, after, receipts, opts = {}) {
|
|
|
393
393
|
const withinDeclared = declaredSkewMs === null || requiredSkewMs <= declaredSkewMs
|
|
394
394
|
|
|
395
395
|
if (allExplained && withinDeclared) {
|
|
396
|
-
|
|
396
|
+
// Whether the boundary can plausibly explain the gap at all. A receipt
|
|
397
|
+
// further outside than the window is long is not sitting at the boundary;
|
|
398
|
+
// it is in a different window. Attacked on 2026-08-17: a legitimate
|
|
399
|
+
// receipt from the previous day turned a real in-window bypass from 40
|
|
400
|
+
// into 41, and the run then said the access was "NOT reported as
|
|
401
|
+
// unreceipted access" — an exculpation 23 hours of offset cannot support.
|
|
402
|
+
//
|
|
403
|
+
// The threshold is the window's own length, so it is derived from the
|
|
404
|
+
// input rather than chosen. A declared --skew is the operator's own
|
|
405
|
+
// statement about their clocks and outranks it.
|
|
406
|
+
const boundaryPlausible = declaredSkewMs !== null || requiredSkewMs <= toMs - fromMs
|
|
407
|
+
indeterminate.push({ ...d, uncoveredTables: names, requiredSkewMs, boundaryPlausible })
|
|
397
408
|
} else {
|
|
398
409
|
unreconciled.push({ ...d, uncoveredTables: names })
|
|
399
410
|
}
|
|
@@ -423,6 +434,7 @@ export function reconcile(before, after, receipts, opts = {}) {
|
|
|
423
434
|
window: before.source,
|
|
424
435
|
receipts: 'gateway',
|
|
425
436
|
declaredSkewMs,
|
|
437
|
+
windowMs: toMs - fromMs,
|
|
426
438
|
},
|
|
427
439
|
reconciled,
|
|
428
440
|
unreconciled,
|
|
@@ -572,25 +584,43 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
572
584
|
}
|
|
573
585
|
}
|
|
574
586
|
if (result.indeterminate.length > 0) {
|
|
575
|
-
const
|
|
576
|
-
|
|
577
|
-
|
|
578
|
-
|
|
579
|
-
|
|
580
|
-
|
|
581
|
-
|
|
582
|
-
|
|
583
|
-
|
|
587
|
+
const atBoundary = result.indeterminate.filter((d) => d.boundaryPlausible)
|
|
588
|
+
const beyond = result.indeterminate.filter((d) => !d.boundaryPlausible)
|
|
589
|
+
const line = (d) =>
|
|
590
|
+
` ~ (+${d.delta}) table(s) [${d.uncoveredTables.join(', ')}] have a receipt ${d.requiredSkewMs}ms outside ` +
|
|
591
|
+
`the window: ${truncate(d.query)}`
|
|
592
|
+
|
|
593
|
+
if (atBoundary.length > 0) {
|
|
594
|
+
const bound =
|
|
595
|
+
result.clocks.declaredSkewMs === null
|
|
596
|
+
? 'no --skew bound was declared, so the window\'s own length is the only reference'
|
|
597
|
+
: `declared --skew is ${result.clocks.declaredSkewMs}ms`
|
|
598
|
+
console.error(
|
|
599
|
+
`INDETERMINATE: ${atBoundary.length} pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — ${bound}:`,
|
|
600
|
+
)
|
|
601
|
+
for (const d of atBoundary) console.error(line(d))
|
|
584
602
|
console.error(
|
|
585
|
-
`
|
|
586
|
-
|
|
603
|
+
`the window comes from ${result.clocks.window} and receipt timestamps come from the ${result.clocks.receipts} — ` +
|
|
604
|
+
'two clocks. A receipt this close outside is either a trailing clock or a late receipt, and this tool ' +
|
|
605
|
+
'cannot tell them apart. It is NOT reported as unreceipted access.',
|
|
606
|
+
)
|
|
607
|
+
}
|
|
608
|
+
// Never exculpated. The class stays indeterminate because this tool still
|
|
609
|
+
// cannot prove what happened, but a receipt further out than the window is
|
|
610
|
+
// long is not a boundary artefact, and saying otherwise would shield the
|
|
611
|
+
// exact case an attacker would arrange.
|
|
612
|
+
if (beyond.length > 0) {
|
|
613
|
+
console.error(
|
|
614
|
+
`INDETERMINATE (not the boundary): ${beyond.length} pattern(s) have their only covering receipt further ` +
|
|
615
|
+
`outside the window than the window is long (${result.clocks.windowMs}ms):`,
|
|
616
|
+
)
|
|
617
|
+
for (const d of beyond) console.error(line(d))
|
|
618
|
+
console.error(
|
|
619
|
+
'a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset larger than the window itself, so clock skew is not the ' +
|
|
620
|
+
'reading here. This is NOT excused as a timing effect; it is left undecided because the receipt exists ' +
|
|
621
|
+
'and this tool cannot say which access it belongs to. Declare --skew to make the question decidable.',
|
|
587
622
|
)
|
|
588
623
|
}
|
|
589
|
-
console.error(
|
|
590
|
-
`the window comes from ${result.clocks.window} and receipt timestamps come from the ${result.clocks.receipts} — ` +
|
|
591
|
-
'two clocks. A receipt this far outside is either a trailing clock or a late receipt, and this tool cannot ' +
|
|
592
|
-
'tell them apart. It is NOT reported as unreceipted access.',
|
|
593
|
-
)
|
|
594
624
|
}
|
|
595
625
|
if (problems === 0 && undecided === 0) {
|
|
596
626
|
console.log('ok: every DB query pattern in the window is attributable to receipt(s) for the same table')
|
package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -336,12 +336,30 @@ reported as `indeterminate` and exits 41. It is not a pass — 41 is a failure
|
|
|
336
336
|
but it is not the bypass sentence either, because this tool cannot tell a trailing
|
|
337
337
|
clock from a late receipt.
|
|
338
338
|
|
|
339
|
-
**Distance is reported,
|
|
340
|
-
|
|
341
|
-
|
|
342
|
-
|
|
343
|
-
|
|
344
|
-
|
|
339
|
+
**Distance is reported, and only the boundary reading is bounded.** Without
|
|
340
|
+
`--skew`, *any* covering receipt outside the window puts its pattern at 41 — the
|
|
341
|
+
tool still cannot say which access that receipt belongs to. What the distance
|
|
342
|
+
decides is whether the boundary can be *offered as the explanation*:
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
| Offset vs the window's own length | Class | What the report says |
|
|
345
|
+
|---|---|---|
|
|
346
|
+
| within | `indeterminate`, boundary-plausible | two clocks, cannot tell them apart, **not** reported as unreceipted access |
|
|
347
|
+
| beyond | `indeterminate`, **not** boundary-plausible | a boundary artefact cannot explain an offset larger than the window itself; **not excused as a timing effect** |
|
|
348
|
+
|
|
349
|
+
The threshold is the window's own length (`after.ts − before.ts`), derived from
|
|
350
|
+
the input rather than chosen. It exists because the exculpation was attacked and
|
|
351
|
+
went through: a legitimate receipt from the previous day, naming the same table,
|
|
352
|
+
turned a real in-window bypass from 40 into 41 and the run then said the access
|
|
353
|
+
was *"NOT reported as unreceipted access"* — a sentence twenty-three hours of
|
|
354
|
+
offset cannot support. 41 was never a silent pass, and is not one now; what
|
|
355
|
+
changed is that the tool stops offering an excuse it cannot back.
|
|
356
|
+
|
|
357
|
+
A declared `--skew` is the operator's own statement about their clocks and
|
|
358
|
+
outranks the window rule. A window shorter than a clock correction is possible —
|
|
359
|
+
a five-second window and a six-second step would read as beyond the boundary
|
|
360
|
+
while being exactly the case the class exists for — and the operator is the one
|
|
361
|
+
who knows whether that is their deployment. We have not measured how often it
|
|
362
|
+
happens; the flag exists so the answer does not have to come from us:
|
|
345
363
|
|
|
346
364
|
```
|
|
347
365
|
INDETERMINATE: 1 pattern(s) are uncovered only by the window boundary — no --skew bound was declared…
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
# Claims review — 0.2.28
|
|
2
|
+
|
|
3
|
+
- base: v0.2.27
|
|
4
|
+
- head: 6e3ef41
|
|
5
|
+
- surface: sha256:28349adb6948b360662a89eb7e4996d611f81fc89503a57879084e7d2c428edb
|
|
6
|
+
- verdict: pass
|
|
7
|
+
- reviewer: Claude (release review before publish)
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
One claim surface changed: `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`, where the two-clocks section
|
|
10
|
+
was rewritten after an adversarial review got through the exculpation shipped in
|
|
11
|
+
0.2.27. The table describing the two readings matches the CLI output, verified by
|
|
12
|
+
running both paths; the threshold named in the prose is the one in the code.
|
|
13
|
+
|
|
14
|
+
## Findings
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
16
|
+
### 1. docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md — an operational scenario asserted as observed, to justify a design choice
|
|
17
|
+
|
|
18
|
+
- Claim: "A declared `--skew` … outranks the window rule — a five-second window with a six-second NTP step **is a real case**, and the operator is the one who knows it."
|
|
19
|
+
- Mechanism: none. Nothing in this repository measures how often a clock correction exceeds a reconciliation window; the sentence is a plausibility argument borrowed from the review that proposed the threshold.
|
|
20
|
+
- Why it falls short: the design choice is right — an operator's declaration should outrank a value inferred from the input — but "is a real case" states operational frequency as fact in order to justify it. Asserting the world to defend a decision is the same move as asserting a mechanism that does not exist, one step removed.
|
|
21
|
+
- Disposition: reworded in `3602609`. The text now says such a window is possible, describes how it would read, and states plainly that we have not measured how often it happens.
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
### 2. LIMITATIONS.tr.md:7 — the SOC 2 answer given on 2026-08-17 never reached the Turkish surface
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
- Claim: "SOC 2 yok. ISO yok. Bağımsız sızma testi yok. **Yol haritasında.**" — no SOC 2, no ISO, no independent penetration test, on the roadmap.
|
|
26
|
+
- Mechanism: the same question was answered this morning and the answer is in README.md, SECURITY.md, LIMITATIONS.md and the live site: not planned, because the audit certifies organisations that hold customer data and the data Conarium governs does not reach us.
|
|
27
|
+
- Why it falls short: this file also ships to npm, so a Turkish reader of 0.2.26 and 0.2.27 was told SOC 2 is coming while every other surface said it is not. The correction landed on four surfaces and missed the fifth because the fifth is written in another language. `claim_discipline` cannot catch it — "SOC 2 yok" is an allowed denial, and no rule knows that the following sentence takes it back.
|
|
28
|
+
- Disposition: corrected in `6e3ef41`, in Turkish rather than as a translation of the English sentence.
|
|
29
|
+
|
|
30
|
+
### 3. LIMITATIONS said nothing about the limit this release documents in the spec
|
|
31
|
+
|
|
32
|
+
- Claim: absence. `docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md` states that reconciliation cannot distinguish a trailing clock from a late receipt; `LIMITATIONS.md` and `LIMITATIONS.tr.md` did not mention it.
|
|
33
|
+
- Mechanism: LIMITATIONS is the file that states what has not been done, and it carries the other reconciliation limit (object attribution, not per-statement coverage) already.
|
|
34
|
+
- Why it falls short: a limit documented only in the spec is a limit a reader of the limitations file does not have. The gap was created by this release: the class is new.
|
|
35
|
+
- Disposition: named in both languages in `6e3ef41`, including that the exculpation is bounded by the window's own length and that the limit was found by attack.
|
|
36
|
+
|
|
37
|
+
### 4. Recorded, not a finding: the exculpation this release bounds was itself the previous release's finding
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
The 0.2.27 record carries a finding about the same section describing a
|
|
40
|
+
proximity the default mode did not enforce. That was a wording defect. The one
|
|
41
|
+
fixed here is a behavioural one, found by attack rather than reading: a
|
|
42
|
+
legitimate receipt from the previous day moved a real in-window bypass from 40
|
|
43
|
+
to 41, and the run then said the access was "NOT reported as unreceipted
|
|
44
|
+
access". Both are the same shape — an assertion the mechanism could not back —
|
|
45
|
+
and the second was reachable only because someone was asked to attack it.
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@conarium-ai/core",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.2.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.2.28",
|
|
4
4
|
"mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
|
|
5
5
|
"//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
|
|
6
6
|
"//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
|