@conarium-ai/core 0.2.24 → 0.2.26

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,72 @@
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.2.26 — 2026-08-17
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+
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+ The claim list that `test/claim_discipline.mjs` enforces now ships in the
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+ package, because the live site is a different repository and `test/` is not
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+ published. Copying the list into the site would have been a second source;
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+ the next overclaim would have been the two lists drifting.
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+
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+ - **Retracted phrasings are a published file.**
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+ `docs/claims/retracted-phrasings.json` is the only list. The test reads it.
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+ The site repository reads the same file from
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+ `node_modules/conarium-core/docs/claims/`. If the installed package does not
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+ carry it, the site check is red and says to update the package. It does not
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+ skip.
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+
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+ - **SOC 2 is the word, not an English suffix.** The previous pattern looked
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+ for `ready|compliant|certified` within twelve characters. The live site
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+ said `SOC2 & DSGVO-konform`, `SOC2 et RGPD`, `SOC2和GDPR要求` — and the
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+ check was green. The honest sentence is still allowed: `No SOC 2`,
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+ `SOC 2 yok`, and the same denial in the languages the site speaks.
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+
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+ ## 0.2.25 — 2026-08-17
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+
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+ A documented command was never installed. It was found by running the README on a
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+ machine that had never seen this package — the one path no test had walked, because
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+ every test walks it from the repository, where the paths resolve.
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+
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+ - **`npx conarium-anchor-service` resolves.** The countersigning endpoint was
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+ documented in the README, shipped in the tarball as
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+ `bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs`, correctly shebanged, and fail-closed on
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+ missing configuration. It was never listed in package.json `bin`, so npm looked
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+ for a package by that name in the registry and answered E404 — for as long as
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+ the file had existed. It is registered now; starting it without a token file or
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+ a signing key exits 2 and names what is missing, as the README says it does.
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+
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+ - **Documented commands are checked against installed commands, both ways.**
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+ `test/bin_claims.mjs` reads the `npx conarium-*` invocations out of README,
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+ SECURITY, LIMITATIONS and `docs/` and fails when one of them is absent from
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+ package.json `bin`; it also asserts every registered bin exists and carries a
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+ shebang. Neither list is restated in the test. A `stranger-install` CI job
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+ installs the packed tarball into an empty directory and checks the opposite
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+ direction — that every registered command resolves without asking the registry.
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+ A loop over `bin` cannot catch an unregistered name, and an offline test cannot
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+ see how npm resolves after install, so both directions are needed.
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+
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+ - **The README's commands run where the README puts them.** Four blocks were
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+ command references written as if they were sequences. `conarium-init` writes keys
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+ and config, not receipts, so three `conarium-verify` lines answered 20 on a file
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+ that does not exist yet; `declaration.json` and the `pg_stat_statements`
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+ snapshots are not generated either; the repository ships a
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+ `conarium.config.json`, so `node bin/conarium-init.mjs` correctly refused to
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+ overwrite it and exited 1; and `conarium-doctor` was placed before the step that
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+ points the config at a DSN, so it reported the placeholder host unreachable. The
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+ runnable commands now use the demo chain the reader downloaded in the section
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+ above, and the exit codes are stated — including `--anchor-check` answering 14 on
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+ a chain that ships without a sidecar, which is the intended answer, since an
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+ absent anchor is not a verified one. The rest name their prerequisites instead
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+ of implying they have none.
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+
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+ - **Policy pages no longer assert past their own inventory.** `privacy.html` said
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+ "We never receive, see, or store your data or your customers' data" and then
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+ itemised the waitlist email it stores, the chat it forwards to a third-party
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+ model, and the host logs it keeps; `terms.html` made the same claim with no
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+ itemisation at all. The self-hosted claim is true and kept, now scoped to what
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+ it covers: the data Conarium governs never reaches us. `test/claim_discipline.mjs`
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+ had been reading both files and could not see this, because it only knows
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+ phrasings already caught — the phrasing is in it now.
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+
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  ## 0.2.24 — 2026-08-17
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  Documentation that shipped with 0.2.23 still carried claims this project had
package/LIMITATIONS.md CHANGED
@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@ What Conarium has not done. Measured. No dates.
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  ## No certification
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- No SOC 2. No ISO. No independent penetration test. On the roadmap.
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+ No SOC 2. No ISO. Neither is planned: they certify organisations that hold
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+ customer data, and the data Conarium governs never reaches us. No independent
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+ penetration test — that one is on the roadmap.
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  ## Not 1.0
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package/README.md CHANGED
@@ -110,14 +110,21 @@ npx conarium-init
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  export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY=./audit-ed25519.pem
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+ # init writes keys and config, not receipts: your own audit file does not exist
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+ # until the gateway has served a query. The three commands below therefore run
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+ # against the demo chain downloaded above, so they work as written — swap in
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+ # your own sink (conarium.config.json → audit.sink) once it has records.
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+
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  # Verify a receipt chain (exit 0 = the records *in the file* are intact)
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- npx conarium-verify ./receipts.jsonl --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem
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+ npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem
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  # Pin length / last hash if you need to catch records dropped from the end
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- npx conarium-verify ./receipts.jsonl --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem --expect-count 3
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+ npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --expect-count 3
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- # Optional: check OpenTimestamps sidecar (pending → exit 0 + warning; missing → 14)
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- npx conarium-verify ./receipts.jsonl --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem --anchor-check
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+ # Check the OpenTimestamps sidecar. The demo chain ships without one, so this
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+ # answers 14, deliberately not 0: an absent anchor is not a verified anchor.
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+ # A sidecar that exists but is not yet confirmed → exit 0 with a warning.
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+ npx conarium-verify chain.jsonl --pubkey key.pem --anchor-check
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  ```
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  A second verifier, Go and the standard library only, is in [`verifiers/go`](verifiers/go). `go build -o conarium-verify .` then the same arguments as `conarium-verify`; `test-vectors/` is the contract.
@@ -248,6 +255,12 @@ everywhere and would shred the output) and matches on Unicode word boundaries, s
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  Receipts prove what went **through** the gateway. Reconciliation asks the database
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  what it saw, and compares:
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+ Neither command invents its inputs and `conarium-init` does not create them, so
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+ both answer **20 (input missing)** until you have produced them: `declaration.json`
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+ is your own period-and-scope statement ([`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`](docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md)
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+ names the fields), and the two snapshots come from
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+ [`scripts/pg-snapshot.sql`](scripts/pg-snapshot.sql).
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+
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  ```bash
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  # One-sided: signed coverage declaration over a period + declared scope
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  npx conarium-coverage ./declaration.json --pubkey ./audit-ed25519.pub.pem --receipts ./receipts.jsonl
@@ -286,13 +299,17 @@ The service is in this package, so you can run your own and sign your own heads
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  above. What makes it worth anything is that the signer is not you.
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  ```bash
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- # Run the endpoint (refuses to start without a signing key or a token file)
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+ # Run the endpoint. It refuses to start without a signing key or a token file:
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+ # with neither present the three lines below exit 2 and name what is missing,
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+ # which is the intended answer, not a failed install. Generating both is in
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+ # deploy/anchor-service/.
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  CONARIUM_ANCHOR_TOKENS=./anchor.tokens.json \
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  CONARIUM_ANCHOR_SIGNING_KEY=./anchor.pem \
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  CONARIUM_ANCHOR_BASE_URL=https://anchor.example.com \
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  npx conarium-anchor-service
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- # Verify a countersignature you were given — offline, no network, no package
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+ # Verify a countersignature you were given — offline, no network, no package.
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+ # record.json is what the endpoint returned to you; without it, exit 20.
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  npx conarium-countersign-verify ./record.json --pubkey ./anchor.pub.pem
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  # exit 0 = signature valid (and inclusion valid if a proof or --log-url was given)
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  # exit 13 = signature invalid / unknown keyId
@@ -438,7 +455,11 @@ npm i @conarium-ai/core
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  npx conarium-init
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  export CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY="$PWD/audit-ed25519.pem"
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- # 3. Check the install before trusting it
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+ # 3. Check the install before trusting it. Until step 4 points the config at a
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+ # reachable DSN, doctor reports the placeholder host unreachable and exits 1.
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+ # That FAIL is the check working, not the install being broken — it is the one
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+ # thing a gateway must not be quiet about, because it keeps running with zero
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+ # connectors and looks healthy while serving nothing.
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  npx conarium-doctor
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  # 4. Point the generated conarium.config.json at your read-only DSN,
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  git clone https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/conarium.git
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  cd conarium
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  npm install && npm run build
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- node bin/conarium-init.mjs
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+ # The repository already ships a conarium.config.json, so init refuses rather
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+ # than overwrite it (exit 1). Pass --force only if you want it regenerated.
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+ node bin/conarium-init.mjs --force
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  node bin/conarium-doctor.mjs --no-net
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  npm start
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  ```
@@ -646,8 +669,12 @@ per-user identity bound to an identity provider rather than an operator token ma
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  probabilistic mask would make a probabilistic receipt, which is not a receipt.
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  - **Hosted cloud console.** Self-hosted is the claim; a hosted console would put
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  us in the data path we tell you we are not in.
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- - **SOC 2.** It audits organisations that hold customer data. We never receive
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- yours. If that ever stops being true, this line changes first.
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+ - **No SOC 2 for us.** It audits organisations that hold customer data, and the
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+ data Conarium governs — your database and your customers' records — never
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+ reaches us. This is about our certification, not yours: the signed receipts
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+ and coverage declarations are yours to show your own auditor, and whether they
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+ satisfy a given audit is between you and that auditor. If your data ever does
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+ reach us, this line changes first.
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  Known gaps: [LIMITATIONS.md](LIMITATIONS.md), the README above,
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  [`docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md`](docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md),
package/SECURITY.md CHANGED
@@ -104,7 +104,8 @@ eight digits" pattern is not shipped.
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  **We do not have** SOC 2, an external penetration test, or a formal security
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  certification. We are one person. That is not a footnote we would rather you missed;
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  it is the reason the code is MIT-licensed and runs entirely inside your own
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- infrastructure. No data reaches us, so there is no vendor to certify.
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+ infrastructure. The data Conarium governs never reaches us, so there is no
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+ vendor holding your records to certify.
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  ## Audit of 2026-08-12 — what we found and fixed
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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+ {
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+ "_comment": "Single source for claim_discipline.mjs in this repo and in nexus. test/ is not published; docs/ is. Do not copy this list into another file.",
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+ "rules": [
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+ {
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+ "id": "immutable",
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+ "re": "\\bimmutable\\b",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "a hash chain is tamper-evident, not immutable: the file can still be deleted or truncated",
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+ "use": "tamper-evident"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "never-sees-secrets",
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+ "re": "never sees your secrets",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "masking hides a value; a predicate over a protected column can still answer questions about it",
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+ "use": "the values your policy protects are masked before they reach it"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "without-exposing-secret",
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+ "re": "without exposing a single secret",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "absolute, and contradicted by the inference channel this project documents itself",
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+ "use": "protected values masked before they leave"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "every-access-logged",
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+ "re": "every access is logged",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "only access through the gateway is logged — the reason conarium-reconcile exists at all",
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+ "use": "every access through Conarium is logged"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "never-crosses-perimeter",
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+ "re": "(?<!raw )(?:data|it) never (?:leaves|crosses) (?:your|the) perimeter",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "releasing a policy-approved disclosure to an AI client is what the product does",
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+ "use": "raw values stay in your perimeter — only policy-approved disclosure leaves"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "covered-by-receipts",
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+ "re": "covered by receipts",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "one receipt naming an object clears further statements against it: that is object attribution",
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+ "use": "attributable to receipt(s) for the same table"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "proof-of-applied-transformation",
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+ "re": "proof of applied transformation",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "the payload is a signed assertion by the issuer, not proof the transformation ran",
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+ "use": "a signed assertion by the Issuer that the transformation was applied"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "soc2",
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+ "re": "SOC\\s?2",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "there is no SOC 2 audit; LIMITATIONS says so, and readiness is not ours to assert",
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+ "use": "name what exists — no SOC 2 audit, no independent penetration test",
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+ "allow": "(?:(?:no|not|without)\\s+soc\\s?2|soc\\s?2\\s+yok|do(?:es)?\\s+not\\s+have\\s+soc\\s?2|has\\s+no\\s+soc\\s?2|is\\s+not\\s+soc\\s?2|kein\\s+soc\\s?2|pas\\s+de\\s+soc\\s?2|sin\\s+soc\\s?2|nessun\\s+soc\\s?2|нет\\s+soc\\s?2|无\\s*soc\\s?2|soc\\s?2\\s+नहीं|no\\s+third-party\\s+security\\s+certification\\s*\\(\\s*soc\\s?2|<(?:th|td)[^>]*>\\s*soc\\s?2\\s*<|soc\\s?2\\s+type\\s+ii[\\s\\S]{0,220}(?:we never receive|has no soc|class=\"(?:us )?no\")|[\"']SOC\\s?2\\s+Type\\s+II[\"'])",
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+ "allowFlags": "i"
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "id": "never-see-your-data",
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+ "re": "never (?:receive,? see,? or store|see) your data",
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+ "flags": "i",
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+ "why": "the website stores a waitlist email, forwards chat to a third-party model, and keeps host logs",
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+ "use": "scope it in the sentence — the data Conarium governs never reaches us"
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+ }
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+ ]
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+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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+ # Claims review — 0.2.26
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+
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+ - base: v0.2.25
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+ - head: 9ad4096
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+ - surface: sha256:3d282917e33db272d6e8178bd38f780904c45acbb9d3cbf0951de10658f6f2b8
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+ - verdict: pass
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+ - reviewer: Claude (release review before publish)
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+
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+ The release changed one line of claim surface — the README entry for SOC 2 —
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+ and both findings are about that line and the documents it disagreed with. Both
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+ were corrected in `d728039` before this record was set to pass. The review was
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+ blocked while the first one was open, because its answer was a fact about the
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+ product and not a choice of wording.
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+
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+ ## Findings
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+
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+ ### 1. README.md:672 — SOC 2 listed as deliberately not planned while LIMITATIONS.md said it was on the roadmap
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+
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+ - Claim: README.md:665 opens its list with "**Deliberately not planned**, so nobody waits for it:" and the entry read "**No SOC 2.** It audits organisations that hold customer data."
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+ - Mechanism: LIMITATIONS.md is the document that states what has not been done. LIMITATIONS.md:7 read "No SOC 2. No ISO. No independent penetration test. On the roadmap."
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+ - Why it falls short: the two published documents answered the same buyer question in opposite directions — one said do not wait for it, the other said it was coming. Neither was derived from the other, so both could be current and disagree. This release sharpened it rather than creating it: the entry had been the topic label "**SOC 2.**" and became an assertion under "not planned", an edit made to satisfy the new language-independent SOC 2 rule. Satisfying the guard moved the sentence into a contradiction the guard cannot see.
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+ - Disposition: resolved in `d728039`, and the basis is in the history rather than in anyone's memory: `git log -S "No independent penetration test. On the roadmap" -- LIMITATIONS.md` returns the commit that created the file, on one line with ISO and the penetration test. The roadmap claim was drafting, not a decision. Not planned is the answer, and SECURITY.md already carried the reason: the audit certifies organisations that hold customer data, and the data Conarium governs does not reach us. An independent penetration test is a separate, achievable thing and stays on the roadmap. A follow-on ambiguity was closed in `9ad4096`: the entry sat under "Deliberately not planned" without saying whose certification was absent, which a compliance reader could take as the product being useless for their own audit.
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+
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+ ### 2. README.md:672 and SECURITY.md:107 — the absolute "no data reaches us" form the website retracted the same day
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+
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+ - Claim: README.md "We never receive yours." · SECURITY.md "No data reaches us, so there is no vendor to certify."
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+ - Mechanism: the product is self-hosted, so the database and its records stay in the operator's infrastructure. That is what both sentences are about.
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+ - Why it falls short: on 2026-08-17 the identical absolute form was retracted from privacy.html and terms.html, because the website stores a waitlist email, forwards Concierge chat to a third-party model, and keeps host logs. The correction was not to delete the claim but to scope it inside the sentence: "The data Conarium governs — your database and your customers' records — never reaches us." That scoping landed on the two website surfaces and not on the two npm ships. Rule 9 matches "never receive, see, or store your data" and neither sentence is written that way, so no guard would have found it.
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+ - Disposition: resolved in `d728039`, carrying the wording from privacy.html:33 verbatim into both.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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- "version": "0.2.24",
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+ "version": "0.2.26",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
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  "//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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  "//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
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  "conarium-coverage": "bin/conarium-coverage.mjs",
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  "conarium-reconcile": "bin/conarium-reconcile.mjs",
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  "conarium-stamp": "bin/conarium-stamp.mjs",
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+ "conarium-anchor-service": "bin/conarium-anchor-service.mjs",
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  "conarium-anchor-upgrade": "bin/conarium-anchor-upgrade.mjs",
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  "conarium-console": "bin/conarium-console.mjs",
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  "conarium-suggest-policy": "bin/conarium-suggest-policy.mjs"