@conarium-ai/core 0.2.23 → 0.2.24

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package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
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  # Changelog
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+ ## 0.2.24 — 2026-08-17
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+
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+ Documentation that shipped with 0.2.23 still carried claims this project had
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+ already retracted, and the reason it could is now checked rather than remembered.
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+
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+ - **The published claims match the repository's.** 0.2.23 went to npm, and README,
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+ SECURITY, LIMITATIONS and the architecture note were corrected afterwards on the
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+ same version number. Anyone installing 0.2.23 received the corrected code with
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+ the uncorrected wording: "Immutable Audit Ledger", "never sees your secrets",
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+ "without exposing a single secret", "every access is logged". This release
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+ carries the corrections. `README` now says what the mechanism establishes —
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+ the ledger is tamper-evident rather than immutable, because a hash chain makes
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+ alteration and mid-chain removal detectable and does not make the file
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+ impossible to delete; masking hides a value and does not make it unlearnable,
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+ which is what `protectedColumns` narrows and `LIMITATIONS` states.
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+
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+ - **A version number is a claim, so it is checked.** `test/version_claim.mjs`
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+ fails when a release tag exists for the version in package.json and any file npm
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+ would ship differs from that tag. The file list comes from `npm pack --dry-run`
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+ rather than a second copy of the `files` array, because a restated list is one
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+ more hand-written claim that can drift. This is the check that would have caught
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+ both 0.2.21 and 0.2.23 the same day instead of a day later.
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+
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+ - **`engines` is Node >=20, and every major it covers is exercised.** It said >=18,
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+ which was wrong rather than unverified: the MCP SDK's HTTP transport uses the
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+ global `crypto`, available without a flag only from Node 19, so on Node 18 the
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+ gateway failed at `initialize`. CI now runs the suite on 20, 22 and 24, plus the
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+ documented first-run path on each. Node 18 and Node 20 are both past end-of-life;
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+ 20 is kept because it is verified to work, and LIMITATIONS says so and names 22+.
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+
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+ - **SECURITY.md no longer contradicts LIMITATIONS** about whether a
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+ Conarium-operated countersigning endpoint exists. It has since 2026-08-15; one
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+ document was updated and the other was not, and `test/claim_discipline.mjs` now
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+ fails on that specific pair of statements.
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+
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  ## 0.2.23 — 2026-08-17
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  A property run found the first item at random; the second is a gap this project
package/LIMITATIONS.md CHANGED
@@ -10,6 +10,21 @@ No SOC 2. No ISO. No independent penetration test. On the roadmap.
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  Version is 0.2.x. The API can break.
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+ ## Node 20 is the floor, and Node 20 is past end-of-life
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+
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+ `engines` requires Node >=20 and CI runs the full suite on 20, 22 and 24. It said
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+ >=18 until 2026-08-17, and that was wrong rather than merely unverified: the MCP
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+ SDK's HTTP transport uses the global `crypto`, which is available without a flag
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+ only from Node 19, so on Node 18 the gateway fails at `initialize` with
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+ `ReferenceError: crypto is not defined`.
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+
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+ Both Node 18 (2025-04-30) and Node 20 (2026-04-30) are past end-of-life in the
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+ nodejs/Release schedule, so a Node 20 install is running a runtime that no longer
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+ receives security patches. Node 20 is kept as the floor because it is verified to
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+ work and removing it would break installations for a reason their operators did not
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+ ask for. Node 22 or later is the version to run; if you are on 20, that choice is
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+ yours to make with this stated rather than hidden.
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+
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  ## SQL is Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server, and Oracle
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  MySQL is not implemented.
package/README.md CHANGED
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  <div align="center">
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  <h1>Conarium</h1>
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  <p><strong>The Third Eye for Your Company's Data.</strong></p>
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- <p>A self-hosted, governed gateway that lets AI coding assistants (Cursor, Copilot, Claude) touch your real data—without exposing a single secret—and hands you a signed, independently verifiable receipt of every access.</p>
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+ <p>A self-hosted, governed gateway that lets AI coding assistants (Cursor, Copilot, Claude) touch your real data under a policy you write—protected values masked before they leave—and hands you a signed, independently verifiable receipt of every access it mediates.</p>
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  <p>
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  <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/@conarium-ai/core"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@conarium-ai/core?style=for-the-badge" alt="npm" /></a>
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  Conarium acts as a high-performance **MCP (Model Context Protocol) Proxy**. It sits directly between the AI Assistant and your databases, evaluating policies in milliseconds to enforce row limits and mask PII (Personally Identifiable Information) on the wire.
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- The AI gets the context it needs to write code, but never sees your secrets.
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+ The AI gets the context it needs to write code; the values your policy protects are masked before they reach it. Masking hides a value — it does not make it unlearnable, and where a request language allows predicates over a protected column, an allowed query can still answer questions about one. `protectedColumns` is the narrower answer to that, and the limit is stated in [LIMITATIONS.md](LIMITATIONS.md) rather than left for you to discover.
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  ### Key Features
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  - **Inline PII Masking:** Emails, IDs, cards, and secrets are redacted in the response stream (`[MASKED_PII]` / `[MASKED_SECRET]`) before the model sees a single character.
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  - **Allow / Deny Lists:** Whitelist what AI can access. Your `secrets` and `financials` tables stay invisible.
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  - **Row Caps:** Hard per-query limits. Prevent the silent exfiltration of millions of rows.
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- - **Immutable Audit Ledger:** Every access is logged (who, what, when, rows, decision). Hash-chained and PII-safe — no raw PII ever written to the logs.
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+ - **Tamper-Evident Audit Ledger:** Every access *through Conarium* is logged (who, what, when, rows, decision). Hash-chained, which makes alteration and mid-chain removal detectable — not impossible: a file on disk can still be deleted or truncated, and catching truncation needs a pin from outside the file (see Coverage & Reconciliation below). PII-safe: no raw PII is written to the logs.
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  - **Verifiable Receipts:** Ed25519-signed, independently verifiable receipts — see below.
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  - **Per-person masking profiles:** what to mask for an AI agent is not what to mask for the data controller. A named profile relaxes masking for one identified person, and the receipt records which profile applied — see below.
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  - **Coverage & Reconciliation:** a signed coverage declaration over the receipt chain (`conarium-coverage`), plus two-sided reconciliation against the database's own query counters (`conarium-reconcile`) — DB-recorded activity that no receipt covers is surfaced instead of staying invisible.
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- - **100% Self-Hosted:** Runs entirely on your infrastructure. Your data never crosses your perimeter. The gateway makes exactly one outbound request that is not yours: at startup it asks the public npm registry whether a newer version exists, and prints one line to stderr if so. It sends nothing about you — no identifier, no config, no counts — and a remote gateway nobody looks at for weeks is the reason it exists at all. Disable it with `CONARIUM_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1`, or point it at your internal mirror with `CONARIUM_NPM_REGISTRY`. It has a 2-second timeout and never blocks or fails startup. We list it here because a governance product that makes an undisclosed outbound connection has already lost the argument.
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+ - **100% Self-Hosted:** Runs entirely on your infrastructure. Nothing we ship transmits your data anywhere: raw protected values stay inside your perimeter, and what reaches your AI client is the policy-approved disclosure — whose exact bytes the receipt records (`disclosure.hash`). Saying your data never leaves at all would be the wrong claim: releasing a governed disclosure to an assistant is the job. The gateway makes exactly one outbound request that is not yours: at startup it asks the public npm registry whether a newer version exists, and prints one line to stderr if so. It sends nothing about you — no identifier, no config, no counts — and a remote gateway nobody looks at for weeks is the reason it exists at all. Disable it with `CONARIUM_NO_UPDATE_CHECK=1`, or point it at your internal mirror with `CONARIUM_NPM_REGISTRY`. It has a 2-second timeout and never blocks or fails startup. We list it here because a governance product that makes an undisclosed outbound connection has already lost the argument.
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  - **MCP-Native:** Works out of the box with **Cursor**, **GitHub Copilot**, **Claude Code**, and **Codex**.
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  ### Verifiable Receipts
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  1. **The Gateway:** A proxy that speaks fluently to LLM assistants.
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  2. **The Engine:** Evaluates JSON policies, regex scans, and row caps in milliseconds.
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- 3. **The Ledger:** An immutable audit log recording every query and decision.
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+ 3. **The Ledger:** A tamper-evident audit log recording every query and decision it mediates.
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  ---
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@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ Conarium is **early access** — and honest about what's real:
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  **Shipping now:** governed MCP gateway (stdio + HTTP) · deterministic PII masking,
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  including labelled names in free text · allow/deny + row caps · per-person masking
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- profiles · immutable hash-chained audit ledger · Ed25519-signed receipt per access
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+ profiles · tamper-evident hash-chained audit ledger · Ed25519-signed receipt per access
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  with an offline verifier · signed coverage declarations · two-sided reconciliation
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  against the database's own counters · OpenTimestamps anchoring and an optional
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  anchoring service · conformance vectors · SQL gate: Postgres, Microsoft SQL Server, Oracle
package/SECURITY.md CHANGED
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  What the key protects is the whole product: a leaked signing key makes every
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  countersignature it ever produced worthless, including past ones. Custody,
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  rotation, and what a compromise costs are in
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- [`docs/COUNTERSIGN.md`](docs/COUNTERSIGN.md). Conarium does not operate a
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- public countersigning endpoint yet.
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+ [`docs/COUNTERSIGN.md`](docs/COUNTERSIGN.md). Since 2026-08-15 a
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+ Conarium-operated endpoint does exist (`demo.conarium.dev/anchor`, keyId
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+ `verax-cs-20260815`), on one server with the key on disk and no HSM; it is not
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+ open to customers. The limits are in [`LIMITATIONS.md`](LIMITATIONS.md).
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  The tester pack is [`docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md`](docs/security/THREAT-MODEL.md)
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  and [`docs/security/PENTEST-SCOPE.md`](docs/security/PENTEST-SCOPE.md).
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ MCP made "connect an AI assistant to your data" a commodity. The durable value i
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  1. **Ingestion** of messy internal sources (schemas today; docs, ADRs, APIs next).
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  2. **Governance + audit** — what the AI may see, and a record of what it saw.
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- 3. **Self-hosting** — data never leaves the customer's network.
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+ 3. **Self-hosting** — the gateway runs in the customer's network and transmits nothing outward on its own. Raw protected values stay there; the policy-approved disclosure is what reaches the customer's AI client, and `disclosure.hash` binds exactly which bytes those were.
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  4. **Freshness** — incremental re-index so context never goes stale.
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  Conarium owns this layer and stays **tool-agnostic**: it speaks MCP, so it plugs into Cursor, Copilot, Claude Code, Windsurf, Continue.dev — whatever wins.
package/package.json CHANGED
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  {
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  "name": "@conarium-ai/core",
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- "version": "0.2.23",
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+ "version": "0.2.24",
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  "mcpName": "io.github.dogrucanemek-alt/conarium",
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  "//files-artefakt": "examples/ altindaki uretilmis dosyalar (ozel anahtar, makbuz/denetim JSONL) ELENIR. .gitignore npm'i baglamaz: izin listesinde 'examples' oldugu icin demoyu kosturmus bir makinede 'npm publish' _keys/audit-ed25519.pem'i (OZEL ANAHTAR) ve makbuzlari yayinliyordu. test/pack_artefakt.mjs bunu kilitler. Elemeler examples/ ile SINIRLI: test-vectors/ altindaki receipts.jsonl ve .pub.pem YAYINLANMAK ZORUNDA, yoksa ucuncu taraf konformans vektorlerini kosturamaz.",
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  "//files": "Pakete NE gireceginin izin listesi. Liste olmadan npm her seyi gonderiyordu: 296 dosya / 1.5 MB — CI workflowlari, gitleaks ayari, 137 KB pazarlama gorseli, sitenin api/chat.js dosyasi. Bir bankanin guvenlik ekibi tarball'i acip bunlari gorur. scripts/ BILEREK var: conarium-reconcile calisirken scripts/pg-snapshot.sql'e atif yapiyor, olmazsa kullanici destek maili yazar.",
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  "vitest": "^4.1.10"
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  },
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  "engines": {
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- "node": ">=18"
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+ "node": ">=20"
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  }
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  }