@conarium-ai/core 0.2.12 → 0.2.14
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +170 -1
- package/LICENSE +21 -21
- package/LIMITATIONS.md +23 -2
- package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md +13 -2
- package/bin/conarium-coverage.mjs +89 -6
- package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs +44 -0
- package/bin/conarium-verify.mjs +110 -51
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/anchor.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/anchor.js +27 -0
- package/dist/anchor.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/audit.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit.js +126 -30
- package/dist/audit.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.js +35 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts +14 -1
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js +78 -5
- package/dist/connectors/openapi.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/connectors/postgres.js +8 -8
- package/dist/console-receipts.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/console-receipts.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console-receipts.js +14 -2
- package/dist/console-receipts.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console-shortcut.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console-shortcut.js +5 -1
- package/dist/console-shortcut.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/console.js +15 -4
- package/dist/console.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts +17 -1
- package/dist/coverage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/coverage.js +30 -3
- package/dist/coverage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/digit_pii.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/digit_pii.js +64 -12
- package/dist/digit_pii.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/governance.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/governance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/governance.js +23 -8
- package/dist/governance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/http.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http.js +87 -7
- package/dist/http.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/iban.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/iban.js +6 -3
- package/dist/iban.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/keys.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/keys.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/keys.js +22 -7
- package/dist/keys.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/mask-text.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/mask-text.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mask-text.js +42 -0
- package/dist/mask-text.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/receipt-view.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/receipt-view.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/receipt-view.js +28 -5
- package/dist/receipt-view.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/server.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/server.js +31 -15
- package/dist/server.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/mssql.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/mssql.js +36 -2
- package/dist/sql-gate/mssql.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/oracle.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/oracle.js +24 -3
- package/dist/sql-gate/oracle.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.d.ts +19 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.js +116 -7
- package/dist/sql-gate/rules.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/docs/API-STABILITY.md +2 -2
- package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md +42 -42
- package/docs/RECEIPT-SPEC.md +17 -11
- package/docs/plans/2026-07-02-redteam-harness.md +416 -416
- package/docs/specs/2026-07-02-redteam-harness-design.md +90 -90
- package/docs/superpowers/TODO-gate1-f4.md +23 -23
- package/docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-plan.md +200 -200
- package/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-29-conarium-receipt-design.md +202 -202
- package/examples/claude-desktop-config.json +9 -9
- package/examples/cursor-mcp-settings.json +10 -10
- package/examples/proof-service/README.md +50 -0
- package/package.json +9 -2
- package/public/app.js +378 -378
- package/public/index.html +160 -160
- package/public/style.css +504 -504
- package/scripts/conarium_sabah_brief.mjs +107 -107
- package/scripts/start-mcp-c1.mjs +93 -93
- package/test-vectors/sql-gate/LAST-RUN.json +1 -2
- package/test-vectors/sql-gate/README.md +3 -1
- package/test-vectors/sql-gate/vectors.json +28 -0
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts +0 -6
- package/dist/openapi_connector.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js +0 -145
- package/dist/openapi_connector.js.map +0 -1
- package/docs/audit/2026-08-14-security-scan.md +0 -48
- package/docs/audit/2026-08-14-surface-sync.md +0 -34
package/CHANGELOG.md
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# Changelog
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##
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## 0.2.14 — 2026-08-15
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Follow-up to the 0.2.13 hardening: the detector rule that 0.2.13 half-fixed,
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plus the findings CodeQL raised on the new code.
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- **Behavior change:** what a digit run proves now decides whether letters
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around it can hide it, instead of how long the tail is. A Luhn card, a
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checksum-valid TCKN and a TR mobile number are masked under any letter tail
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(`4111…xyz`, `0532…xyz`). A run that is merely ten or eleven digits keeps the
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bounded rule, because relaxing that one would mask the digits inside a token
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and leave `ghp_[MASKED_PII]abcd` where the secret detector can no longer
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recognise it. Vector values that fail the TCKN checksum on purpose are
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unchanged.
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- **Launcher paths are quoted for sh.** The macOS launcher wrapped both paths
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in double quotes and escaped only `"`, so `$(…)`, backticks and `\` in a path
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this code does not choose stayed live shell. Single quotes with the `'\''`
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idiom make a path a path.
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- **The audit sink lock is 0600.** It was written with the default mode, next
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to data that is not world-readable. `wx` already refused a planted symlink.
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- **CodeQL scope excludes tests** (`.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml`). A ReDoS
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pattern the loader must reject and a hostile URL the verifier must refuse are
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fixtures, not defects; reporting them buried the product findings. `src/` and
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`api/` are unchanged in scope.
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- **Docs:** `examples/proof-service/` said the `/proof` service existed only on
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the box and invited someone to copy it here. Its sources are versioned in the
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site repo; the page now records the one thing that matters to this package —
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the service resolves the receipt view from `CONARIUM_ROOT` but keeps its own
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copies of `governance.js` and `audit-hash.js`, so a masking or audit-hash
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change does not reach `/proof` until those are recopied and it restarts.
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- **Behavior change (A1):** A single trailing letter no longer hides a
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card or TR phone (`4111…x`, `0532…x`). A longer alphanumeric tail
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(`ghp_1234…abcd`) stays a token so the secret detector still fires.
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- **A2:** Dev-only `vitest` 2.1.9 → 4.1.10 (closes the vite/esbuild
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Dependabot chain). Production dependencies unchanged.
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- **A3:** `LAST-RUN.json` no longer carries a `when` timestamp, so a
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green generator run does not dirty the tree.
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- **A4:** `examples/proof-service/README.md` is the repo seat for the
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box-only `/proof` process. `.gitignore` now covers `*.bak-*`.
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## 0.2.13 — 2026-08-15
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Security hardening release. Two independent external reviews and one code
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audit produced the findings below; each was reproduced against running code
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before it was fixed. Several defaults change — the entries marked
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**Behavior change** are the ones to read before upgrading.
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- **Dialect scalar functions.** The function allow-list carries Postgres
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names, so routing the MSSQL and Oracle gates through it denied ordinary
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calls (`GETDATE`, `ISNULL`, `DATEADD`, `NVL`, `TO_CHAR`). Safe scalars are
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now listed per dialect and consulted only for an unqualified name, so
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`app.pkg.nvl` stays a user package. One dialect's list never applies to
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another's gate, and row-collapsing, `DBMS_*` and `UTL_*` families remain
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denied.
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- **npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC).** The publish workflow no longer expects a
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long-lived `NPM_TOKEN`; npmjs.com recognises the repository and workflow as
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the authorised publisher and provenance is attached to the release. No
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publish token lives in the repository. See `docs/security/NPM-PROVENANCE.md`.
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- **G20:** Write-token scan ignores SQL string literals
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(`SELECT 'DELETE ' FROM t` is a read). OpenAPI fetch caps the body at
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50KB before `JSON.parse`. Audit sink hash stays `JSON.stringify`
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(JCS would break existing files — LIMITATIONS).
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- **G12:** `conarium-doctor` warns when HTTP is on and
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`CONARIUM_MCP_RATE_PER_MIN` is 0; a positive limit is an info line.
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The default remains 0 (production profile fills 60).
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- **G11:** Unpinned `conarium-verify` still exits 0, but stderr says the
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tail was not seen and `--json` carries `tailPinned`. `--strict` requires
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a tail pin (exit 11) and pins seq from 1. The console verify command
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embeds `--expect-count` and `--expect-last-hash` for the current chain.
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- **Behavior change (G10):** OpenAPI fetch uses `redirect: manual` and
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re-checks every hop (max 5). The approved DNS address is pinned via
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an undici Agent lookup; TLS SNI stays the original hostname. undici
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is not added to package.json.
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- **Behavior change (G9):** Private key files that are not 0600 fail
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boot. Escape hatch `CONARIUM_ALLOW_LOOSE_KEY_PERMS=1` restores the
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old warning. win32 skips the check (POSIX mode is meaningless).
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- **Behavior change (G6):** HTTP sessions idle out after
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`CONARIUM_SESSION_IDLE_MS` (default 30 minutes; 0 = off). Owner-binding
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is unchanged. Sweeper uses `unref()`.
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- **Behavior change (G7):** `CONARIUM_MAX_SESSIONS` defaults to 100
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(0 = unlimited). A new initialize at the cap is JSON-RPC rejected.
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- **G8:** Token file reloads on mtime change. Broken JSON keeps the
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previous store and logs; it does not fall back to an empty map.
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- **G5:** Audit sink takes an advisory `<sink>.lock` (`wx`, PID + start).
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A second OS process is rejected; a stale lock (dead PID) is stolen.
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Same-process re-entry stays allowed (console / validateChain boot).
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The lock does not stop a writer outside Conarium.
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- **G4:** `profile: "production"` (or `CONARIUM_PROFILE=production`) refuses
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boot without Ed25519 AND HMAC, turns G3 strict signatures and OpenTimestamps
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anchoring on, and defaults HTTP rate-limit to 60/min unless explicitly 0.
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`conarium-doctor` reports the profile as one block.
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- **Behavior change (G21):** `conarium-coverage --receipts` re-verifies each
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receipt Ed25519 signature; a broken sig is not COMPLETE and names the
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receipt. The declaration carries `windowStartPinned` — an unpinned
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prefix-truncated window is no longer a silent complete. Output says
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"access NOT RECORDED", never "no access occurred". `--expect-seq-from`
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pins the window start.
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- **Behavior change (G17):** Receipt HTML never prints raw `anchor.state`
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as a trust signal — forged `state: bitcoin` renders as `doğrulanmadı`
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until the OTS sidecar verifies. `--anchor-check` skips `anchor:null`
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(periodic anchoring) and fails only on a claimed-but-unverified
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anchor; the run ends with `N/M anchored, head anchored: yes/no`.
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`--require-head-anchor` exits 14 when the chain head is unanchored.
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- **G3:** `CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` is opt-in strict boot — any
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unsigned line is rejected when a signing key is configured. Default
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unchanged (legacy unsigned chains still open).
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- **Behavior change (G18):** Flat query rows apply the same column-name
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secret/PII heuristic as nested JSON (`api_key` / `password` →
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`[MASKED_SECRET]`). One function, two call sites.
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- **Behavior change (G19):** Console `/api/config` redacts `key`,
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`anonKey`, `headers`, and `authorization`, and also redacts JWT /
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`sk-` / `AKIA` shaped values under innocent names.
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- **Behavior change (G16):** Audit `reason`, `target`, and `governance`
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go through the same mask pipeline as `args`. A DB error that carries
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a cell value can no longer land unmasked on the signed sink.
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- **Audit chain atomicity (G1):** `lastHash` and `sinkSize` advance
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only after a successful sink append — same order as `writeReceipt()`.
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A failed write no longer orphans the in-memory chain.
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- **Audit self-heal (G2):** After a failed append, the next successful
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`log()` chains from the last hash that is actually on disk. A fresh
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`Audit({sink})` boot `validateChain` stays clean. `failClosed=true`
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also leaves state unmoved.
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- **Behavior change (G15):** Content detectors treat `.` / `/` as group
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separators and use token boundaries (a glued letter or `_` no longer
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hides a card/phone/IBAN). Zero-padded `@` emails are masked.
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Hyphenated US SSN is masked; bare 9-digit SSN stays a documented
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limitation.
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- **Behavior change (G14):** MSSQL and Oracle gates use the same function
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allow-list as Postgres (`isSafeBuiltinFunction` / `isBlockedDumpFunction`).
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`STRING_AGG` / `LISTAGG` and user/package functions are denied. MSSQL
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locking hints (`WITH (UPDLOCK)` and kin) are denied. Oracle row-cap
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wrapper strips comments so a trailing `--` cannot swallow `FETCH FIRST`.
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- **Behavior change (G13):** Connector/DB error text is masked before it
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reaches the model. Failed `query` / `search` / `describe_table` paths
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that previously skipped the audit trail now write a `denied` line.
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Already-logged denies (policy, missing table, 50KB) are not written twice.
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## 0.2.8 – 0.2.12 — 2026-08-14
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These shipped across 0.2.8, 0.2.9, 0.2.10, 0.2.11 and 0.2.12 and were kept in
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one list at the time; the tags are the authority on which release carries which.
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- **Table existence oracle closed.** Assistant `describe_table` / `search` /
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`query` errors no longer distinguish denied from missing. The audit log
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package/LICENSE
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Emek Can Doğru (Conarium)
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2026 Emek Can Doğru (Conarium)
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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+
in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
|
|
8
|
+
to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
|
|
9
|
+
copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
|
|
10
|
+
furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
|
|
11
|
+
|
|
12
|
+
The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
|
|
13
|
+
copies or substantial portions of the Software.
|
|
14
|
+
|
|
15
|
+
THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
|
|
16
|
+
IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
|
|
17
|
+
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
|
|
18
|
+
AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
|
|
19
|
+
LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
|
|
20
|
+
OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
|
|
21
|
+
SOFTWARE.
|
package/LIMITATIONS.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ Oracle does not resolve synonyms: an allow-listed name is the name the parser se
|
|
|
19
19
|
There is no MSSQL or Oracle connector. An operator can attach their own executor (`connectors[].type: custom-sql`) that receives only gated SQL. That path requires an explicit `policy.dialect` — the omitted-dialect postgres default does not apply. The gate speaks three dialects; the connection is the operator's.
|
|
20
20
|
Parsers: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
|
|
21
21
|
|
|
22
|
+
## Bare 9-digit US SSN is not a content detector
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
`XXX-XX-XXXX` (hyphenated) is masked. A bare 9-digit run is not: it
|
|
25
|
+
collides with order IDs and other identifiers. This is a measured
|
|
26
|
+
limitation, not an oversight.
|
|
27
|
+
|
|
22
28
|
## Names in free text are not guaranteed
|
|
23
29
|
|
|
24
30
|
Structured columns: deterministic (`maskColumns`).
|
|
@@ -49,8 +55,23 @@ of this gateway.
|
|
|
49
55
|
## Two processes, one audit file
|
|
50
56
|
|
|
51
57
|
`Audit.log()` is synchronous. One process can write many concurrent queries
|
|
52
|
-
without breaking `prevHash`.
|
|
53
|
-
|
|
58
|
+
without breaking `prevHash`. A second OS process that opens the same sink
|
|
59
|
+
is rejected (`<sink>.lock`, advisory `wx`). The lock does not stop a writer
|
|
60
|
+
outside Conarium that ignores the lock file.
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
## Strict signature mode is opt-in
|
|
63
|
+
|
|
64
|
+
`CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` refuses boot if a signing key is set and
|
|
65
|
+
any audit line is unsigned. The default still accepts a fully unsigned
|
|
66
|
+
legacy chain when an HMAC key is later added (08-05 compatibility).
|
|
67
|
+
|
|
68
|
+
## Audit sink hash is not JCS
|
|
69
|
+
|
|
70
|
+
Receipts hash with RFC 8785 JCS (`canonicalize`). The audit JSONL hasher
|
|
71
|
+
(`src/audit-hash.ts`) uses `JSON.stringify` of insertion order. The two
|
|
72
|
+
disagree when keys are unsorted (`{"b":1,"a":2}` vs `{"a":2,"b":1}`).
|
|
73
|
+
Switching the sink to JCS would invalidate every existing audit file.
|
|
74
|
+
Independent re-hash of an old sink must use `JSON.stringify`, not JCS.
|
|
54
75
|
|
|
55
76
|
## Cryptography is not independently audited
|
|
56
77
|
|
package/LIMITATIONS.tr.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ Oracle synonym hedefini çözmez: allow-list’teki ad, parser’ın gördüğü
|
|
|
19
19
|
MSSQL veya Oracle konnektörü yok. Operatör kendi çalıştırıcısını takabilir (`connectors[].type: custom-sql`); çalıştırıcıya yalnız kapıdan geçmiş SQL gider. Bu yolda `policy.dialect` zorunludur — yoksa postgres varsayılanı uygulanmaz. Kapı üç lehçeyi yönetir; bağlantıyı operatör getirir.
|
|
20
20
|
Ayrıştırıcılar: Postgres `pgsql-ast-parser` · MSSQL `node-sql-parser` (transactsql) · Oracle `@guanmingchiu/sqlparser-ts`.
|
|
21
21
|
|
|
22
|
+
## Çıplak 9 haneli ABD SSN içerik dedektörü değil
|
|
23
|
+
|
|
24
|
+
`XXX-XX-XXXX` (tireli) maskelenir. Çıplak 9 haneli koşu maskelenmez:
|
|
25
|
+
sipariş numarası ve benzeri kimliklerle çakışır. Ölçülmüş sınır, unutkanlık değil.
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
22
27
|
## Serbest metinde isim garantisi yok
|
|
23
28
|
|
|
24
29
|
Yapılandırılmış kolonlar: deterministik (`maskColumns`).
|
|
@@ -48,8 +53,14 @@ atlayabilir. Operatörün kendi süreci bu kapının denetim konusu değildir.
|
|
|
48
53
|
## İki süreç, tek denetim dosyası
|
|
49
54
|
|
|
50
55
|
`Audit.log()` senkrondur. Tek süreçte eşzamanlı sorgular `prevHash` kırmadan
|
|
51
|
-
yazar.
|
|
52
|
-
|
|
56
|
+
yazar. Aynı sink’i açan ikinci OS süreci reddedilir (`<sink>.lock`,
|
|
57
|
+
advisory `wx`). Kilit, Conarium dışından dosyaya yazan süreci durdurmaz.
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
## Sıkı imza kipi opt-in
|
|
60
|
+
|
|
61
|
+
`CONARIUM_AUDIT_REQUIRE_SIG=1` imza anahtarı varken imzasız tek satırda
|
|
62
|
+
boot'u reddeder. Varsayılan, HMAC sonradan eklenince tamamen imzasız
|
|
63
|
+
eski zinciri hâlâ açar (08-05 uyumu).
|
|
53
64
|
|
|
54
65
|
## Denetlenmemiş kriptografi
|
|
55
66
|
|
|
@@ -64,6 +64,20 @@ function coverageHash(d) {
|
|
|
64
64
|
return `sha256:${digest}`
|
|
65
65
|
}
|
|
66
66
|
|
|
67
|
+
function receiptHash(r) {
|
|
68
|
+
const copy = { ...r }
|
|
69
|
+
delete copy.hash
|
|
70
|
+
delete copy.sig
|
|
71
|
+
delete copy.anchor
|
|
72
|
+
if (copy.chain && typeof copy.chain === 'object') {
|
|
73
|
+
const chain = { ...copy.chain }
|
|
74
|
+
delete chain.hash
|
|
75
|
+
copy.chain = chain
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
const digest = createHash('sha256').update(canonicalize(copy)).digest('hex')
|
|
78
|
+
return `sha256:${digest}`
|
|
79
|
+
}
|
|
80
|
+
|
|
67
81
|
// Exported for cross-check tests (dynamic import of this file).
|
|
68
82
|
export { canonicalize, coverageHash }
|
|
69
83
|
|
|
@@ -72,12 +86,12 @@ export { canonicalize, coverageHash }
|
|
|
72
86
|
function usage(msg) {
|
|
73
87
|
if (msg) console.error(msg)
|
|
74
88
|
console.error(
|
|
75
|
-
'Usage: conarium-coverage <declaration.json> --pubkey <path> [--receipts <receipts.jsonl>] [--allow-gaps] [--json]',
|
|
89
|
+
'Usage: conarium-coverage <declaration.json> --pubkey <path> [--receipts <receipts.jsonl>] [--expect-seq-from N] [--allow-gaps] [--json]',
|
|
76
90
|
)
|
|
77
91
|
}
|
|
78
92
|
|
|
79
93
|
function parseArgs(argv) {
|
|
80
|
-
const out = { target: null, pubkeys: [], receiptsPath: null, json: false, allowGaps: false }
|
|
94
|
+
const out = { target: null, pubkeys: [], receiptsPath: null, json: false, allowGaps: false, expectSeqFrom: null }
|
|
81
95
|
const args = [...argv]
|
|
82
96
|
while (args.length) {
|
|
83
97
|
const a = args.shift()
|
|
@@ -93,6 +107,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv) {
|
|
|
93
107
|
out.json = true
|
|
94
108
|
} else if (a === '--allow-gaps') {
|
|
95
109
|
out.allowGaps = true
|
|
110
|
+
} else if (a === '--expect-seq-from') {
|
|
111
|
+
const n = args.shift()
|
|
112
|
+
if (n === undefined || !/^\d+$/.test(n)) throw new Error('--expect-seq-from requires an integer')
|
|
113
|
+
out.expectSeqFrom = Number(n)
|
|
96
114
|
} else if (a === '--help' || a === '-h') {
|
|
97
115
|
usage()
|
|
98
116
|
process.exit(0)
|
|
@@ -206,6 +224,30 @@ function schemaOk(d) {
|
|
|
206
224
|
return null
|
|
207
225
|
}
|
|
208
226
|
|
|
227
|
+
function verifyReceiptSig(keys, receipt) {
|
|
228
|
+
const id = receipt.id || `seq:${receipt.chain?.seq}`
|
|
229
|
+
if (!receipt.sig || typeof receipt.sig !== 'object') {
|
|
230
|
+
return { id, error: 'missing sig' }
|
|
231
|
+
}
|
|
232
|
+
if (receipt.sig.alg !== 'Ed25519') return { id, error: `unsupported sig.alg ${receipt.sig.alg}` }
|
|
233
|
+
const pk = keys.get(receipt.sig.keyId)
|
|
234
|
+
if (!pk) return { id, error: `unknown keyId ${receipt.sig.keyId}` }
|
|
235
|
+
try {
|
|
236
|
+
if (receipt.chain?.hash && receiptHash(receipt) !== receipt.chain.hash) {
|
|
237
|
+
return { id, error: 'hash mismatch' }
|
|
238
|
+
}
|
|
239
|
+
const ok = cryptoVerify(
|
|
240
|
+
null,
|
|
241
|
+
Buffer.from(receipt.chain.hash, 'utf-8'),
|
|
242
|
+
pk,
|
|
243
|
+
Buffer.from(receipt.sig.value, 'base64'),
|
|
244
|
+
)
|
|
245
|
+
return ok ? null : { id, error: 'signature cryptographically invalid' }
|
|
246
|
+
} catch (err) {
|
|
247
|
+
return { id, error: `signature verify error: ${err.message}` }
|
|
248
|
+
}
|
|
249
|
+
}
|
|
250
|
+
|
|
209
251
|
function verifySig(keys, d) {
|
|
210
252
|
const pk = keys.get(d.sig.keyId)
|
|
211
253
|
if (!pk) return `unknown keyId ${d.sig.keyId}`
|
|
@@ -370,10 +412,32 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
370
412
|
if (recResult.error) {
|
|
371
413
|
fail(recResult.code, recResult.error, opts.json)
|
|
372
414
|
}
|
|
415
|
+
for (const receipt of recResult.receipts) {
|
|
416
|
+
const sigFail = verifyReceiptSig(keys, receipt)
|
|
417
|
+
if (sigFail) {
|
|
418
|
+
fail(
|
|
419
|
+
13,
|
|
420
|
+
`receipt signature invalid at ${sigFail.id}: ${sigFail.error} — coverage is not COMPLETE`,
|
|
421
|
+
opts.json,
|
|
422
|
+
{ receiptId: sigFail.id },
|
|
423
|
+
)
|
|
424
|
+
}
|
|
425
|
+
}
|
|
373
426
|
const crossErr = crossCheck(d, recResult.receipts)
|
|
374
427
|
if (crossErr) {
|
|
375
428
|
fail(30, `inconsistent with receipts: ${crossErr}`, opts.json)
|
|
376
429
|
}
|
|
430
|
+
if (opts.expectSeqFrom !== null && recResult.receipts.length) {
|
|
431
|
+
const seqs = recResult.receipts.map((r) => r.chain.seq).sort((a, b) => a - b)
|
|
432
|
+
if (seqs[0] !== opts.expectSeqFrom) {
|
|
433
|
+
fail(
|
|
434
|
+
12,
|
|
435
|
+
`window start mismatch: expected seq ${opts.expectSeqFrom}, receipts start at ${seqs[0]} — coverage is not COMPLETE`,
|
|
436
|
+
opts.json,
|
|
437
|
+
{ expectedFirstSeq: opts.expectSeqFrom, firstSeq: seqs[0] },
|
|
438
|
+
)
|
|
439
|
+
}
|
|
440
|
+
}
|
|
377
441
|
}
|
|
378
442
|
|
|
379
443
|
// Zincir kesintisizliği: CI'da sorulan soru "kapsamam eksiksiz mi?" (b).
|
|
@@ -391,20 +455,39 @@ async function main(argv = process.argv.slice(2)) {
|
|
|
391
455
|
fail(12, msg, opts.json, { gaps: d.chain.gaps })
|
|
392
456
|
}
|
|
393
457
|
|
|
458
|
+
const windowStartPinned = d.chain.windowStartPinned === true || opts.expectSeqFrom !== null
|
|
459
|
+
const complete = d.chain.contiguous === true && windowStartPinned
|
|
460
|
+
const pinNote = windowStartPinned
|
|
461
|
+
? 'window start pinned'
|
|
462
|
+
: 'window start not pinned (başlangıç sabitlenmedi)'
|
|
463
|
+
|
|
394
464
|
if (opts.json) {
|
|
395
|
-
console.log(JSON.stringify({
|
|
465
|
+
console.log(JSON.stringify({
|
|
466
|
+
ok: true,
|
|
467
|
+
code: 0,
|
|
468
|
+
declaration: d.id,
|
|
469
|
+
version: d.v,
|
|
470
|
+
complete,
|
|
471
|
+
windowStartPinned,
|
|
472
|
+
pinNote,
|
|
473
|
+
}))
|
|
396
474
|
} else {
|
|
397
475
|
const unassigned = d.v === COVERAGE_V ? d.coverage.unassignedReceiptCount : 0
|
|
398
476
|
console.log(
|
|
399
477
|
`ok: coverage declaration ${d.id} verified (version ${d.v}, ${d.chain.count} receipts, ` +
|
|
400
|
-
`contiguous=${d.chain.contiguous}, accessed=${d.coverage.accessed}, ` +
|
|
401
|
-
`notRecorded=${d.coverage.notRecorded})`,
|
|
478
|
+
`contiguous=${d.chain.contiguous}, ${pinNote}, accessed=${d.coverage.accessed}, ` +
|
|
479
|
+
`notRecorded=${d.coverage.notRecorded} (access NOT RECORDED))`,
|
|
402
480
|
)
|
|
481
|
+
if (!windowStartPinned) {
|
|
482
|
+
console.warn(
|
|
483
|
+
'warning: window start not pinned — prefix truncation is invisible; pass --expect-seq-from N',
|
|
484
|
+
)
|
|
485
|
+
}
|
|
403
486
|
// Belirsizlik uyarısı: notRecorded listesi ancak unassigned=0 iken "kesin" sayılabilir.
|
|
404
487
|
// "erişilmedi"/"not accessed" ifadesi YASAK — kaydın yokluğu belirsizdir, erişim yokluğu değil.
|
|
405
488
|
if (unassigned > 0) {
|
|
406
489
|
console.warn(
|
|
407
|
-
`warning: notRecorded=${d.coverage.notRecorded} (${unassigned} receipt(s) could not be attributed ` +
|
|
490
|
+
`warning: notRecorded=${d.coverage.notRecorded} (access NOT RECORDED; ${unassigned} receipt(s) could not be attributed ` +
|
|
408
491
|
`to a specific object; this list is NOT definitive)`,
|
|
409
492
|
)
|
|
410
493
|
}
|
package/bin/conarium-doctor.mjs
CHANGED
|
@@ -446,6 +446,50 @@ if (config) {
|
|
|
446
446
|
}
|
|
447
447
|
}
|
|
448
448
|
|
|
449
|
+
// 7b. Production proof profile — one block
|
|
450
|
+
{
|
|
451
|
+
const production =
|
|
452
|
+
(process.env.CONARIUM_PROFILE || '').toLowerCase() === 'production' ||
|
|
453
|
+
config?.profile === 'production'
|
|
454
|
+
if (production) {
|
|
455
|
+
const missing = []
|
|
456
|
+
if (!envSet('CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY')) missing.push('Ed25519 (CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY)')
|
|
457
|
+
if (!envSet('CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY')) missing.push('HMAC (CONARIUM_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY)')
|
|
458
|
+
const rateRaw = process.env.CONARIUM_MCP_RATE_PER_MIN
|
|
459
|
+
const rate = rateRaw === undefined || rateRaw === '' ? 60 : Number(rateRaw)
|
|
460
|
+
if (missing.length) {
|
|
461
|
+
fail(
|
|
462
|
+
'Production profile',
|
|
463
|
+
`refuses boot without ${missing.join(' and ')}`,
|
|
464
|
+
'Production requires Ed25519 AND HMAC, G3 strict signatures, and an anchor sink. Rate limit defaults to 60/min unless CONARIUM_MCP_RATE_PER_MIN=0.',
|
|
465
|
+
)
|
|
466
|
+
} else {
|
|
467
|
+
ok(
|
|
468
|
+
'Production profile',
|
|
469
|
+
`Ed25519 + HMAC required; G3 on; anchor on; rate ${Number.isFinite(rate) ? rate : 60}/min`,
|
|
470
|
+
)
|
|
471
|
+
}
|
|
472
|
+
}
|
|
473
|
+
}
|
|
474
|
+
|
|
475
|
+
// 7c. HTTP rate limit — default 0 is intentional; say so when HTTP is on
|
|
476
|
+
{
|
|
477
|
+
const httpMode = Boolean(envSet('CONARIUM_MCP_TOKEN'))
|
|
478
|
+
if (httpMode) {
|
|
479
|
+
const rateRaw = process.env.CONARIUM_MCP_RATE_PER_MIN
|
|
480
|
+
const rate = rateRaw === undefined || rateRaw === '' ? 0 : Number(rateRaw)
|
|
481
|
+
if (!Number.isFinite(rate) || rate === 0) {
|
|
482
|
+
warn(
|
|
483
|
+
'HTTP rate limit',
|
|
484
|
+
'CONARIUM_MCP_RATE_PER_MIN is 0 (off)',
|
|
485
|
+
'Public HTTP should set a limit. Production profile defaults to 60/min unless explicitly 0.',
|
|
486
|
+
)
|
|
487
|
+
} else {
|
|
488
|
+
ok('HTTP rate limit', `${rate}/min`)
|
|
489
|
+
}
|
|
490
|
+
}
|
|
491
|
+
}
|
|
492
|
+
|
|
449
493
|
// 8. Signing key material — never printed, only described
|
|
450
494
|
{
|
|
451
495
|
const keyPath = envSet('CONARIUM_AUDIT_SIGNING_KEY')
|