@compr/opscontext-mcp 2.8.3 → 2.9.0

package/dist/secret-shapes.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+export interface SecretShape {
+    id: string;
+    re: RegExp;
+    /** Group 1 is context to keep (a flag, a key name, `scheme://user:`); the rest is replaced. */
+    keepPrefix?: boolean;
+    /** Return true to leave a match alone (a function call, a type name). */
+    skip?: (value: string, after: string) => boolean;
+}
+export declare const SECRET_SHAPES: SecretShape[];
+/**
+ * Keyed fingerprint of a text: HMAC-SHA-256 with a key that never leaves this machine, first 16
+ * hex characters. Two identical prompts get the same fingerprint, so exact repeats stay
+ * detectable; without the key a short prompt ("yes", "go on") cannot be guessed back from it.
+ */
+export declare function textFingerprint(text: string): string;
+export interface RedactionResult {
+    text: string;
+    counts: Record<string, number>;
+}
+/** Replace every credential shape in `input`. Returns the new text and the count per shape. */
+export declare function redactSecrets(input: string): RedactionResult;
+/** Redact every string inside a JSON-like value, returning a copy and the merged counts. */
+export declare function redactPayload<T>(value: T): {
+    value: T;
+    counts: Record<string, number>;
+    changed: boolean;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=secret-shapes.d.ts.map

package/dist/secret-shapes.js

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// [LOCKED] [CAPTURE-IS-REDACTED-AT-THE-DOOR] - 2026-09-25
+// [NEVER] write captured text (prompts, commands, tool input, errors) to the audit log without
+//         passing it through redactPayload(), and never narrow these shapes without replaying
+//         them against a real log first.
+// WHY: until 2.8.4 the Claude Code hook sent the first 4,000 characters of every prompt and
+//      the first 200 of every command straight into audit.log; only the browser extension
+//      filtered. A scan on 2026-09-24 found credentials that had sat there for three months:
+//      a Stripe live key, production database passwords inside connection URLs, SSH passwords
+//      after `sshpass -p`, API tokens after `Bearer`. The log is hash-chained and archived for
+//      good, so a secret written once stays forever unless a redaction is acknowledged.
+// FIX: every capture event goes through one door, POST /events in src/http-server.ts, and that
+//      door redacts every string of the payload with the shapes below before the append. The
+//      same shapes drive `contextengine audit-scrub`, which cleans records written before this.
+//      The hook's cut at 200 characters can split a secret; a fragment under a shape's minimum
+//      length is not caught. A password written in plain words is not caught either.
+//
+import { createHmac, randomBytes } from "crypto";
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
+import { join } from "path";
+import { homedir } from "os";
+const QUOTED_OR_BARE = String.raw `(?:'[^']*'|"[^"]*"|[^\s'"]+)`;
+export const SECRET_SHAPES = [
+    { id: "private_key", re: /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)/g },
+    { id: "aws_access_key", re: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/g },
+    { id: "aws_secret_key", re: /(aws_secret_access_key["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?)[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}/gi, keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "stripe_key", re: /\b(?:sk|rk)_(?:live|test)_[0-9A-Za-z]{16,}/g },
+    { id: "stripe_webhook_secret", re: /\bwhsec_[0-9A-Za-z]{16,}/g },
+    { id: "github_token", re: /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr)_[0-9A-Za-z]{30,}|\bgithub_pat_[0-9A-Za-z_]{40,}/g },
+    { id: "anthropic_key", re: /\bsk-ant-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/g },
+    { id: "openai_key", re: /\bsk-(?!ant-)(?:proj-|svcacct-|admin-)?[0-9A-Za-z_-]{32,}/g },
+    { id: "slack_token", re: /\bxox[abposr]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}/g },
+    { id: "slack_webhook", re: /https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/[A-Za-z0-9/_-]+/g },
+    { id: "google_api_key", re: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g },
+    { id: "npm_token", re: /\bnpm_[0-9A-Za-z]{36}\b/g },
+    { id: "sendgrid_key", re: /\bSG\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{16,}\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{16,}/g },
+    { id: "telegram_bot_token", re: /\b\d{8,10}:AA[0-9A-Za-z_-]{33}\b/g },
+    { id: "jwt", re: /\beyJ[0-9A-Za-z_-]{10,}\.eyJ[0-9A-Za-z_-]{10,}\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{10,}/g },
+    // scheme://user:SECRET@host, the shape of every database URL found on 2026-09-24.
+    { id: "url_password", re: /(\b[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/[^\s:/@'"`]+:)[^\s@/'"`]+(?=@)/gi, keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "sshpass_password", re: new RegExp(String.raw `(\bsshpass\s+-p\s*)${QUOTED_OR_BARE}`, "g"), keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "sshpass_env", re: new RegExp(String.raw `(\bSSHPASS=)${QUOTED_OR_BARE}`, "g"), keepPrefix: true },
+    // mysql -pSECRET (the value is glued to the flag; a bare -p prompts and is left alone).
+    { id: "mysql_password", re: new RegExp(String.raw `(\bmysql(?:dump|admin)?\b[^\n]*?\s-p)(?=[^\s-])${QUOTED_OR_BARE}`, "g"), keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "password_flag", re: new RegExp(String.raw `(--password[=\s]\s*)${QUOTED_OR_BARE}`, "gi"), keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "bearer_token", re: /(\bbearer\s+)(?=[0-9A-Za-z._~+/-]{20,})[0-9A-Za-z._~+/-]+=*/gi, keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "basic_auth", re: /(\bauthorization:\s*basic\s+)[A-Za-z0-9+/]{8,}=*/gi, keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "curl_user_password", re: /(\bcurl\b[^\n]*?\s(?:-u|--user)\s*['"]?[^\s:'"]+:)[^\s'"]+/g, keepPrefix: true },
+    { id: "api_key_header", re: /(\bx-api-key:\s*)[^\s'"]{8,}/gi, keepPrefix: true },
+    // name = value, the long tail. Skips variables, env lookups, paths, placeholders already
+    // redacted, type names and function calls.
+    {
+        id: "credential_assignment",
+        // A backtick opens a value too: "password: `...`" in Markdown, found in the real log.
+        re: /(\b[\w.-]*(?:password|passwd|pwd|secret|token|api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|private[_-]?key|client[_-]?secret)["'`]?\s*[:=]\s*["'`]?)(?![$<{*/~.[]|process\.env|os\.environ|getenv)[^\s'"`,;)}\]]{6,}/gi,
+        keepPrefix: true,
+        skip: (value, after) => after.startsWith("(") ||
+            (/^[A-Za-z_$][\w$.]*\(/.test(value) && after.startsWith(")")) || // getToken(user), not a value
+            /^(?:string|number|boolean|null|undefined|true|false|none|str|int|bool|any|object|required|optional)$/i.test(value),
+    },
+];
+/**
+ * Keyed fingerprint of a text: HMAC-SHA-256 with a key that never leaves this machine, first 16
+ * hex characters. Two identical prompts get the same fingerprint, so exact repeats stay
+ * detectable; without the key a short prompt ("yes", "go on") cannot be guessed back from it.
+ */
+export function textFingerprint(text) {
+    return createHmac("sha256", fingerprintKey()).update(text).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
+}
+let cachedKey = null;
+function fingerprintKey() {
+    const dir = join(process.env.CONTEXTENGINE_HOME || join(homedir(), ".contextengine"), "keys");
+    const path = join(dir, "fingerprint.key");
+    if (cachedKey?.path === path)
+        return cachedKey.key;
+    if (!existsSync(path)) {
+        mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+        try {
+            writeFileSync(path, randomBytes(32).toString("hex"), { mode: 0o600, flag: "wx" });
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* another process created it first: read theirs */
+        }
+    }
+    cachedKey = { path, key: Buffer.from(readFileSync(path, "utf-8").trim(), "hex") };
+    return cachedKey.key;
+}
+/** Replace every credential shape in `input`. Returns the new text and the count per shape. */
+export function redactSecrets(input) {
+    const counts = {};
+    let text = input;
+    for (const shape of SECRET_SHAPES) {
+        shape.re.lastIndex = 0;
+        text = text.replace(shape.re, (...args) => {
+            const match = args[0];
+            const offset = args[args.length - 2];
+            const whole = args[args.length - 1];
+            const prefix = shape.keepPrefix ? String(args[1] ?? "") : "";
+            const value = match.slice(prefix.length);
+            if (value.startsWith("[REDACTED:"))
+                return match; // already done: keeps a second pass a no-op
+            if (shape.skip?.(value, whole.slice(offset + match.length)))
+                return match;
+            counts[shape.id] = (counts[shape.id] ?? 0) + 1;
+            return `${prefix}[REDACTED:${shape.id}]`;
+        });
+    }
+    return { text, counts };
+}
+/** Redact every string inside a JSON-like value, returning a copy and the merged counts. */
+export function redactPayload(value) {
+    const counts = {};
+    const walk = (v) => {
+        if (typeof v === "string") {
+            const r = redactSecrets(v);
+            for (const [k, n] of Object.entries(r.counts))
+                counts[k] = (counts[k] ?? 0) + n;
+            return r.text;
+        }
+        if (Array.isArray(v))
+            return v.map(walk);
+        if (v && typeof v === "object") {
+            const out = {};
+            for (const [k, x] of Object.entries(v))
+                out[k] = walk(x);
+            return out;
+        }
+        return v;
+    };
+    const out = walk(value);
+    return { value: out, counts, changed: Object.keys(counts).length > 0 };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=secret-shapes.js.map

package/dist/server-registry.d.ts

@@ -25,7 +25,17 @@ export interface ServerReport {
 }
 /** More concurrent servers than this and every doc change costs that many re-embeds. */
 export declare const SERVER_COUNT_WARN = 3;
-/** Short content hash of the script a server loaded; the build identity. */
+/**
+ * Short content hash of the build a server loaded: every `.js` file next to its entry script.
+ *
+ * [LOCKED] [BUILD-HASH-COVERS-EVERY-MODULE] - 2026-09-25
+ * [NEVER] fingerprint a build by its entry file alone.
+ * WHY: the hash used to cover dist/index.js only. The 2026-09-24 audit fix changed audit.js and
+ *      cli.js, index.js stayed byte-identical, and `contextengine servers` reported "0 on an old
+ *      build" for 29 servers that were still running the code that had erased archived history.
+ * FIX: hash the name and content of every .js file in the entry's folder, in name order. A
+ *      script outside such a folder falls back to its own content.
+ */
 export declare function buildHashOf(scriptPath: string): string | null;
 export declare function isAlive(pid: number): boolean;
 /**

package/dist/server-registry.js

@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
 //      goes on exit, and a lister removes records whose pid is dead. `contextengine servers`
 //      and the end-session checklist compare each record's build hash with the file on disk
 //      now, and warn when more than SERVER_COUNT_WARN servers run at once.
-import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
-import { join } from "path";
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync, unlinkSync, writeFileSync } from "fs";
+import { basename, dirname, join } from "path";
 import { homedir } from "os";
 import { createHash } from "crypto";
 import { execFileSync } from "child_process";
@@ -23,15 +23,40 @@ const HEARTBEAT_MS = 60_000;
 function registryDir() {
     return join(process.env.CONTEXTENGINE_HOME || join(homedir(), ".contextengine"), "servers");
 }
-/** Short content hash of the script a server loaded; the build identity. */
+/**
+ * Short content hash of the build a server loaded: every `.js` file next to its entry script.
+ *
+ * [LOCKED] [BUILD-HASH-COVERS-EVERY-MODULE] - 2026-09-25
+ * [NEVER] fingerprint a build by its entry file alone.
+ * WHY: the hash used to cover dist/index.js only. The 2026-09-24 audit fix changed audit.js and
+ *      cli.js, index.js stayed byte-identical, and `contextengine servers` reported "0 on an old
+ *      build" for 29 servers that were still running the code that had erased archived history.
+ * FIX: hash the name and content of every .js file in the entry's folder, in name order. A
+ *      script outside such a folder falls back to its own content.
+ */
 export function buildHashOf(scriptPath) {
     try {
-        return createHash("sha256").update(readFileSync(scriptPath)).digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
+        const dir = dirname(scriptPath);
+        const files = readdirSync(dir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".js")).sort();
+        if (!files.includes(basename(scriptPath))) {
+            return createHash("sha256").update(readFileSync(scriptPath)).digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
+        }
+        const signature = files.map((f) => { const s = statSync(join(dir, f)); return `${f}:${s.size}:${s.mtimeMs}`; }).join("|");
+        const cached = buildHashCache.get(dir);
+        if (cached && cached.signature === signature)
+            return cached.hash;
+        const h = createHash("sha256");
+        for (const f of files)
+            h.update(f).update("\0").update(readFileSync(join(dir, f))).update("\0");
+        const hash = h.digest("hex").slice(0, 12);
+        buildHashCache.set(dir, { signature, hash });
+        return hash;
     }
     catch {
         return null;
     }
 }
+const buildHashCache = new Map();
 function parentName(ppid) {
     try {
         // Hardcoded argv, no shell: the only variable is a number.

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@compr/opscontext-mcp",
-  "version": "2.8.3",
+  "version": "2.9.0",
   "description": "OpsContext for AI Agents — read-only fleet visibility (PM2/nginx/Docker/git/cron) + tamper-evident audit log + policy-as-code hooks. The ops + compliance layer Claude Code can't grow natively.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -47,12 +47,12 @@
   "author": {
     "name": "PROD LLC (operating brand of CSS LLC, Swiss, est. 2005)",
     "email": "yannick@compr.ch",
-    "url": "https://github.com/FASTPROD/ContextEngine/blob/main/docs/about.md"
+    "url": "https://github.com/FASTPROD/opscontext-mcp/blob/main/docs/about.md"
   },
   "license": "BSL-1.1",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/FASTPROD/ContextEngine.git"
+    "url": "https://github.com/FASTPROD/opscontext-mcp.git"
   },
   "homepage": "https://compr.fr",
   "bugs": {
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
     "!dist/test*",
     "!dist/**/*.map",
     "defaults/",
+    "!defaults/__pycache__",
     "skills/",
     "examples/",
     "LICENSE",