@collective-intelligence/external-apps-server-sdk 0.2.3 → 0.2.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +120 -76
- package/dist/admin.d.ts +85 -98
- package/dist/admin.js +2 -2
- package/dist/auth/better-auth.d.ts +15 -6
- package/dist/auth/federated.d.ts +70 -22
- package/dist/auth/federated.js +1 -1
- package/dist/auth.d.ts +7 -5
- package/dist/chunks/{index-48qvvmm0.js → index-sc1m7s5d.js} +4 -4
- package/dist/effect.d.ts +1378 -171
- package/dist/effect.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1361 -184
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/next.d.ts +24 -13
- package/dist/next.js +1 -1
- package/dist/persistence/drizzle.d.ts +6 -5
- package/dist/resources.d.ts +7 -5
- package/dist/resources.js +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime/nestjs.d.ts +6 -6
- package/dist/runtime/web.d.ts +24 -13
- package/dist/runtime/web.js +1 -1
- package/package.json +4 -4
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ error } }`.
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throws `TypeError`.
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- `defineCiEntityResource` keeps each failure as a value of its
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`ResourceResult`, with `transport_error` and its `outcome`.
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- A refusal of `ci.access` rejects with `ServerAccessError`, a
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`Schema.TaggedError` with the HTTP `status` and CI's error `body`.
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- `GatewayEffectRuntimeError` is a `Schema.TaggedError`; `new
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GatewayEffectRuntimeError(cause)` keeps its positional form.
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@@ -169,7 +171,9 @@ path, query, or fragment. Mount `createExternalApplicationBff` (or
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`createExternalApplicationBffNextHandlers`) once for federated auth, Resource
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proxy, and dedicated Capability forwarding. Pass `ciResources` to bind one
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Resource proxy mount per entity contract by `schemaFqn`; the BFF authorizes
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those mounts with `authorizeWithUserAuth
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those mounts with `authorizeWithUserAuth`, whose `read` and `write` Access
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Requirements are checked against the app's slice of the user's access
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(default: `core.platform.knowledge` for both; CI decides each record again). Dedicated Capability forwarding sends
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the signed-in user's delegated token and the caller's `x-organization-id` by
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default. For an application without federated CI users, pass
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`capabilities: { authentication: { mode: "service", credentials },
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@@ -184,10 +188,15 @@ so the backend runs only the Agent's own bindings and never the application's
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service authority. An Audit subject with `mappedUserId` is refused with `401`
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for a visitor caller. Forwarding covers `context`, `knowledge`, `agents`,
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`conversations` (continue and history), `skills`, `workflows`, and `runs/*`.
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In user-token mode, and for each `ciResources` mount, the BFF passes CI's
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answer to `auth.observeCiResponse`: a `401` or a changed `x-access-version`
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drops the identity that lookups of that Access token reuse, so the next
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lookup reads CI again at once.
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Reconstruct the public origin from
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`x-forwarded-host` / `x-forwarded-proto`. Compose a Fixed workflow route with
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`createFixedWorkflowRoute`: it rewrites that public origin, authorizes
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`getEntityContext` plus
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`getEntityContext` plus an optional `requirement` (an Access Requirement on
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the app's slice of the user's access), stamps `x-organization-id` from the
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session, POSTs `/application/v1/workflows/:id/runs`, and returns `{ runId }`.
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Configure exactly one server-owned target: `workflowId` for a workflow UUID or
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`workflowFqn` for its stable fully qualified name. The route rejects either
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@@ -214,7 +223,6 @@ import {
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const { accessToken, expiresAt } = await exchangeMemberSession({
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credentials: { clientId, clientSecret },
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organizationId,
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scopes: ["context:read", "knowledge:write"],
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sessionToken: member.ciSessionToken,
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tenantUrl: "https://ci.example.com"
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})
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@@ -228,8 +236,9 @@ await ci.context.get({ organizationId })
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Only a confidential application can exchange, with its client secret. CI
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applies the same checks as the browser login: the session is live, the member
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is not banned and belongs to the Organization, the application is enabled and
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allowed in that Organization, and the
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-
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allowed in that Organization, and the member enters the app: one of its grants
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holds the app gate. The token acts as the member (`detached_user`), cut to the
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app's Max Privileges,
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lasts 300 seconds, has no refresh token, and stops working when the member's
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CI session ends. `expiresAt` is counted from before the request and set 30
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seconds early, so exchange again once it passes; never send either token to
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A refusal throws `MemberSessionExchangeError`. `code` is CI's OAuth error:
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`invalid_grant` means the CI session ended or the member cannot act in the
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Organization, so sign the member in again. `invalid_client`,
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`unauthorized_client
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-
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`unauthorized_client` and `invalid_target` point at the application's
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credentials, type or allowed Organizations.
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`temporarily_unavailable` is retryable. On the wire this is the RFC 8693 grant
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`urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange` on `POST /oauth/token`, with
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`subject_token_type`
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`urn:collective-intelligence:params:oauth:token-type:session_token
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-
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`urn:collective-intelligence:params:oauth:token-type:session_token` and
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`organization_id`; an external app sends no `scope`.
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## Reuse Nest operations and local AI tools
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retried message replay the same turn instead of adding one. Use each key for
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one message only; reusing it for a different message or conversation returns
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`conflict`.
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-
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- `core.platform.conversations` in the caller's grants gates conversations.
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- The Agent's current audience gates every turn and every `history` read. When
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an administrator removes the caller from the audience, the same caller gets
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`not_found` for its own conversations too.
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@@ -511,14 +520,14 @@ succeeded before the new turn started count. A turn is
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visitor's `auditSubject` (no `mappedUserId`). Only a declared Agent with
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`audience: { anonymous: true }` that lists this application admits it. The
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visitor's turns run with the Agent's own bindings under an anonymous visitor
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subject, never with the application's
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subject, never with the application's grants. Visitors are separate owners:
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one visitor never reads another visitor's conversation.
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## Messages
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`messages.send` sends one message through a messaging connection of the
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Organization, for example a Telegram bot or a WhatsApp Business Account. The
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-
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caller needs `core.platform.messaging` in its grants, and an administrator must grant
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the connection to the application on its administration page.
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```ts
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reached its rate limit; it is retryable, and the client repeats it with the
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same key.
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##
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## Members, guests, grants and Groups (`ci.access`)
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`ci.access` manages the access of one Organization from your server. Call it
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with the app's server credentials (`mode: "service"`), which act with the
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grants an administrator gave the app's server, or with a service principal's
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API key as the delegated token. CI authorizes each call with the caller's
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Tuples: members and invitations need `admin.users`, guests `admin.guests`,
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grants `admin.grants`, Groups `admin.groups`, and the read-only model
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`admin.profiles`. A refused call rejects with `ServerAccessError` (`status`
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and CI's error `body`); a request that does not reach CI rejects with
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`CiTransportError`. Calls are not retried. In `/effect`, the same methods
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are `access` of `ServerClient` and fail with `ServerAccessError` or
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`CiTransportError` ([Effect authoring](#effect-authoring)).
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```ts
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const created = await ci.
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email: "
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const created = await ci.access.members.create({
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email: "ada@example.test",
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grants: [{ profile: "clinic.profiles.patient" }],
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kind: "guest",
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mode: "direct",
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organizationId
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})
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const result = await ci.access.grants.sync({
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grants: [
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{
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fqn: "clinic.patients.ada",
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grantee: { user: { email: "ada@example.test" } },
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profile: "clinic.profiles.patient"
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}
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],
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namespace: "clinic.patients",
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organizationId
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})
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//
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// kind is "member" or "external_app_user".
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// result = { created, updated, deleted, unchanged }: Access Grant FQNs.
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```
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- `
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`
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- `members`: `create` (directly or by invitation, with at least one grant;
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Grant Authority decides each grant), `get`, `list` (`after`, `email`,
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`limit`), `findByEmail`, `suspend`, `resume` and `remove`. An app server
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creates, reads and changes only its own guests.
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- `invitations`: `list` (`status`, `page`, `limit`) and `revoke`. Only a
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service principal invites, so an app server is refused.
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- `grants`: `create`, `get`, `update` and `delete` by `grantId` or `fqn`,
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`list` by `userId`, `groupId` or `namespace`, and `sync` of a namespace.
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A grant names its grantee as `{ user: { email } }`,
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`{ group: { fqn }, coverage }`, `{ servicePrincipal: "<fqn>" }`, or an
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app's `{ applicationServer: "<app fqn>" }` (a `server` profile) or
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`{ applicationVisitors: "<app fqn>" }` (an `anonymous` profile). Every
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grant has an Access Grant FQN; a Group without an FQN gets grants only in
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the Dashboard.
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- `groups`: `create`, `get`, `list` (`page`, `limit`), `update`, `delete`,
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`addMember` and `removeMember` by `userId`. A member change of a Group
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that a holders-only grant reaches also needs Grant Authority over that
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grant. An app server reads Groups but writes none.
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- `profiles.list`, `profiles.get`, `catalog.list`, `axes.list`,
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`maxPrivileges.list`, `maxPrivileges.get`, `knowledgePolicies.list` and
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`knowledgePolicies.forSchema({ organizationId, schemaFqn })` read the
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declared model; the core and packages stay its source of truth.
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`forSchema` answers the policies that decide the reads and the writes of
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the schema, as CI fills its Policy Slots.
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- A paged list answers `{ items, next }`: pass `next` back as `after`
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(members) or `page` (Groups, invitations) to read the page after it.
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- `snapshot({ organizationId, userId })` reads a user's Access Snapshot;
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`explain` tells why a principal may use a capability or act on a record.
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- There is no `ci.users` or `ci.roles`: app users became guests, and roles
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became Access Grants of profiles.
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## Durable files
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public URL, and another Organization cannot read it.
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- `attachments.upload` is different: its file belongs to one run and expires
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after 24 hours.
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- It needs
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- It needs `core.platform.attachments` in the app server's grants. Only service credentials may call it: a
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delegated user token or an anonymous visitor gets `operation_not_allowed`.
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### Entity File fields
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records (see the [Knowledge User fields](../../../docs/reference/knowledge-user-fields.md)
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reference). CI stores no other link between a user and a record, and offers no
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operation that lists or changes one: write the accounts field as an
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administrator
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and the caller as `subject` path `["user", "id"]`.
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administrator or with the workflow account step. A Knowledge Data Condition
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reads it with `isMe("accounts")` or `includesMe("accounts")`.
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- A delegated user's `/application/v1/resources` and `knowledge_*` calls, and
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the Agents, Skills and workflows the user runs, decide under the user's
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@@ -1034,7 +1069,11 @@ request)` keeps the CI error envelope as a value; `execute` fails with
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`records.get`, `records.search` ([Record reads](#record-reads)) and
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`records.create`, `records.update`, `records.delete`
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([Record writes](#record-writes)) fail with `CiError`; `recordsResult`
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has the same methods and keeps the refusal of CI as a value.
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has the same methods and keeps the refusal of CI as a value. `access`
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has the methods of `ci.access`
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([Members, guests, grants and Groups](#members-guests-grants-and-groups-ciaccess));
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each fails with `ServerAccessError` or `CiTransportError` and is not
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retried.
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- `layerDelegatedServerClient(config)`: one app-wide `ServerClient` that
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calls CI as the member of each request. `config` is a client config
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without `authentication`. Each attempt sends the `DelegatedAccessToken` of
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```
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`auth` is the existing `createFederatedAuth(...)` instance. Its server-only
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`getEntityContext` resolves
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`
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`getEntityContext` resolves the CI application, user, organization and the
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app's slice of the user's capabilities (`capabilities`) for the session's
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Access token; CI is asked for that identity once per Access
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token, and again only after an observed CI answer shows a change. CI never sends Group IDs. The browser session JSON at
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`<basePath>/session` carries `expiresAt` and an `identity` with `userId`,
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`organizationId`, `appId`, `kind` (`member`, `guest`, or `null` for a tenant
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user without a membership), `access` (the app's slice of the user's access),
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`email` and `name`; it never carries the Access token. A user that does not
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enter the app (no capability at or below the app gate) has no session and no
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entity access. Local Better Auth sessions do
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not establish CI entity authority. Browser framework adapters require this
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verified context instead of boolean authorization. Machine gateway calls retain
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their separate caller policy.
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@@ -1652,7 +1694,7 @@ pagination, predicates, grouping, aggregates or managed extraction.
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Import `createFederatedAuth` from
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`@collective-intelligence/external-apps-server-sdk/auth/federated`. Supply the
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browser-visible HTTPS application origin, CI issuer, OAuth client, organization,
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audience,
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+
audience, and an application-owned atomic session store. The facade owns
|
|
1656
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|
PKCE login, callback, session inspection and logout under `/api/auth` by default.
|
|
1657
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|
|
|
1658
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|
`applicationOrigin` accepts one HTTPS origin or a list. Use a list when one
|
|
@@ -1665,7 +1707,6 @@ const auth = createFederatedAuth({
|
|
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1707
|
clientId,
|
|
1666
1708
|
issuer,
|
|
1667
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|
organizationId,
|
|
1668
|
-
scopes: ["knowledge:read"],
|
|
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|
session: { kind: "sealed_cookie", secrets }
|
|
1670
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|
})
|
|
1671
1712
|
```
|
|
@@ -1692,9 +1733,12 @@ authorization code to its `redirect_uri`, so an unregistered callback fails at
|
|
|
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|
authorization.
|
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1693
1734
|
|
|
1694
1735
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The store persists only hashed opaque-cookie state, token grants and revisions;
|
|
1695
|
-
the browser receives a `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` host cookie.
|
|
1696
|
-
session lookup
|
|
1697
|
-
|
|
1736
|
+
the browser receives a `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` host cookie. A
|
|
1737
|
+
session lookup reads the CI identity of its Access token once per token and
|
|
1738
|
+
again after a `401` or a changed `x-access-version` that
|
|
1739
|
+
`auth.observeCiResponse` sees. A revocation therefore ends application
|
|
1740
|
+
authorization at the next token renewal (at most 300 seconds) or at once when a
|
|
1741
|
+
forwarded CI answer reports it. A confidential
|
|
1698
1742
|
OAuth client may supply `clientSecret`; a public PKCE client omits it. The
|
|
1699
1743
|
client type decides how long the User session lasts; see
|
|
1700
1744
|
[Session lifetime and renewal](#session-lifetime-and-renewal).
|
|
@@ -1732,8 +1776,9 @@ each `sessionTtlSeconds` value in the range and gives no warning.
|
|
|
1732
1776
|
`getSession`, `getAccessToken`, `getEntityContext` and
|
|
1733
1777
|
`GET <basePath>/session` are the session lookups. With renewal, each lookup
|
|
1734
1778
|
first gets a new Access token when the current one is expired or expires in 30
|
|
1735
|
-
seconds or less. Then it
|
|
1736
|
-
lookup never returns an expired Access
|
|
1779
|
+
seconds or less. Then it reads the identity of that token at
|
|
1780
|
+
`/oauth/identity`, once per token. A lookup never returns an expired Access
|
|
1781
|
+
token. Lookups at the same time share
|
|
1737
1782
|
one renewal request.
|
|
1738
1783
|
|
|
1739
1784
|
The SDK writes the cookie or the store record one time, at sign-in. A renewal
|
|
@@ -1772,10 +1817,8 @@ A renewal applies the same admission rule as `/oauth/identity`:
|
|
|
1772
1817
|
|
|
1773
1818
|
- the external Application is enabled;
|
|
1774
1819
|
- the CI session is live;
|
|
1775
|
-
- the user is not banned
|
|
1776
|
-
|
|
1777
|
-
`anonymous` (Direct Role Assignments replace the roles that Groups give);
|
|
1778
|
-
- the scopes of the sign-in are still allowed.
|
|
1820
|
+
- the user is not banned and enters the app: its Tuples hold the app gate
|
|
1821
|
+
or a capability below it.
|
|
1779
1822
|
|
|
1780
1823
|
A refusal ends nothing. When the condition is corrected, the same Renewal
|
|
1781
1824
|
credential renews again. A Federated authorization ends for good only by one
|
|
@@ -1853,10 +1896,10 @@ import {
|
|
|
1853
1896
|
const tokens = createAccessTokenVerifier(readApplicationEnrollment(process.env))
|
|
1854
1897
|
|
|
1855
1898
|
const caller = await tokens.verify(bearerToken)
|
|
1856
|
-
// userId, organizationId, applicationId, clientId,
|
|
1899
|
+
// userId, organizationId, applicationId, clientId, sessionId, expiresAt
|
|
1857
1900
|
|
|
1858
1901
|
const identity = await tokens.identity(bearerToken, { signal: request.signal })
|
|
1859
|
-
// the same fields, and user { id, email, name }, kind,
|
|
1902
|
+
// the same fields, and user { id, email, name }, kind, access
|
|
1860
1903
|
```
|
|
1861
1904
|
|
|
1862
1905
|
- `verify` is offline against the issuer key set: ES256 signature, issuer,
|
|
@@ -1864,10 +1907,10 @@ const identity = await tokens.identity(bearerToken, { signal: request.signal })
|
|
|
1864
1907
|
It does not see a revocation before the token expires.
|
|
1865
1908
|
- `identity` runs `verify`, then reads CI's current identity for the token and
|
|
1866
1909
|
checks that it describes the same grant. Use it when the API needs the
|
|
1867
|
-
|
|
1868
|
-
the token or
|
|
1910
|
+
app's slice of the user's access (`access.capabilities`), or must stop at
|
|
1911
|
+
once when CI revokes the token or the user leaves the app. It
|
|
1869
1912
|
is one CI request for each call, with a 10-second limit; cache the result
|
|
1870
|
-
for as long as
|
|
1913
|
+
for as long as an access change may take to reach your API. Pass the `signal`
|
|
1871
1914
|
of the request you serve: when it aborts, the CI request ends and the call
|
|
1872
1915
|
rejects with the abort reason.
|
|
1873
1916
|
|
|
@@ -1885,7 +1928,8 @@ const resource = defineCiEntityResource({
|
|
|
1885
1928
|
definition: leadDefinition,
|
|
1886
1929
|
tenantUrl: "https://ci.example.com",
|
|
1887
1930
|
organizationId,
|
|
1888
|
-
schemaFqn
|
|
1931
|
+
schemaFqn,
|
|
1932
|
+
observeCiResponse: auth.observeCiResponse
|
|
1889
1933
|
})
|
|
1890
1934
|
```
|
|
1891
1935
|
|
|
@@ -2105,7 +2149,7 @@ CI-backed resources created by `defineCiEntityResource` accept the common client
|
|
|
2105
2149
|
mounts `POST /records/:parentId/relation-members/search` below the resource base
|
|
2106
2150
|
path and forwards `{ field, ...query }` to the bound CI schema route. Existing
|
|
2107
2151
|
verified tenant, organization, resource and user-grant checks still apply;
|
|
2108
|
-
`authorizeWithUserAuth` classifies this operation under `
|
|
2152
|
+
`authorizeWithUserAuth` classifies this operation under its `read` Requirement.
|
|
2109
2153
|
|
|
2110
2154
|
The page envelope and exact totals remain unchanged. Member records are JSON
|
|
2111
2155
|
objects validated independently of the parent schema, as are member query field
|