@coffre/core 0.15.0 → 0.16.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/dist/{access-CgQTlUMz.js → access-CF8UG59J.js} +70 -95
- package/dist/{access-DqLJjnLM.d.ts → access-ERdGGHG7.d.ts} +45 -64
- package/dist/access.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/access.js +2 -2
- package/dist/envelope.d.ts +28 -9
- package/dist/envelope.js +25 -8
- package/dist/identity.d.ts +3 -1018
- package/dist/identity.js +885 -623
- package/dist/index-DuG9p3GH.d.ts +1233 -0
- package/dist/kek.d.ts +10 -16
- package/dist/kek.js +26 -41
- package/dist/log.d.ts +114 -0
- package/dist/log.js +291 -0
- package/dist/mcp.d.ts +27 -4
- package/dist/mcp.js +31 -10
- package/dist/recipe-BgJpmJum.d.ts +128 -0
- package/dist/recipe.d.ts +2 -127
- package/dist/{registry-D7X-x202.d.ts → registry-B7_LUDsJ.d.ts} +30 -5
- package/dist/schemas.d.ts +14 -12
- package/dist/schemas.js +16 -14
- package/dist/{types-Cp3lB_-W.js → types-DwTO_b4H.js} +17 -5
- package/dist/vault.d.ts +1771 -1419
- package/dist/vault.js +96 -302
- package/dist/{workloads-D049JH0M.d.ts → workloads-CW2dK4AW.d.ts} +1 -9
- package/dist/workloads.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/workloads.js +1 -9
- package/package.json +7 -7
- package/src/access.ts +63 -95
- package/src/changes/access.ts +140 -0
- package/src/changes/freezes.ts +40 -0
- package/src/changes/mcp.ts +150 -0
- package/src/changes/places.ts +219 -0
- package/src/changes/secrets.ts +235 -0
- package/src/changes/signin.ts +197 -0
- package/src/changes/workloads.ts +166 -0
- package/src/context.ts +18 -2
- package/src/envelope.ts +35 -12
- package/src/identity/auth.ts +11 -3
- package/src/identity/aws.ts +62 -0
- package/src/identity/github-app.ts +45 -24
- package/src/identity/index.ts +3 -2
- package/src/identity/{profile-rules.ts → profiles.ts} +1 -9
- package/src/identity/proofs.ts +306 -0
- package/src/identity/signin/config.ts +1 -1
- package/src/identity/tokens.ts +10 -3
- package/src/identity/verifier.ts +73 -14
- package/src/identity/workload-token.ts +4 -0
- package/src/identity/workloads.ts +0 -11
- package/src/kek/aws-kms.ts +18 -13
- package/src/kek/check.ts +16 -46
- package/src/kek/index.ts +2 -2
- package/src/kek/types.ts +15 -3
- package/src/log/index.ts +7 -0
- package/src/{audit → log}/tiles.ts +18 -49
- package/src/{audit → log}/tree.ts +2 -2
- package/src/mcp.ts +36 -9
- package/src/schemas.ts +15 -12
- package/src/vault.ts +251 -1150
- package/dist/merkle.d.ts +0 -456
- package/dist/merkle.js +0 -964
- package/src/answers.ts +0 -209
- package/src/audit/leaf.ts +0 -81
- package/src/audit/merkle.ts +0 -13
- package/src/audit/note.ts +0 -187
- package/src/audit/pair.ts +0 -86
- package/src/audit/verify.ts +0 -393
- package/src/audit/witness.ts +0 -50
- package/src/checkpoint.ts +0 -22
- package/src/identity/run-proof.ts +0 -159
package/dist/identity.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import { BEARER_PROFILES, BindingInvalid, CREDENTIAL_NAME, EVENT_EXPOSURE,
|
|
1
|
+
import { BEARER_PROFILES, BindingInvalid, CREDENTIAL_NAME, EVENT_EXPOSURE, GITHUB_EVENTS, GITHUB_ISSUER, GITLAB_ISSUER, GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, GOOGLE_ISSUER, KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, MAX_BINDINGS, MAX_CLAIMS, MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, MAX_READ_KEYS, MAX_READ_PLACES, MAX_SOURCES, OIDC_PROFILES, POLICY_DEFAULTS, POLICY_FIELDS, PROFILE_URNS, REPEATING_PROFILES, REQUIRED_CLAIMS, WORKLOAD_PROFILES, addressWithin, canonicalClaims, checkBinding, checkFetchUrl, checkPolicy, claimAt, claimValues, defaultIssuer, differingClaims, freezeTarget, fullRef, githubEventsAt, githubReusable, githubWorkflow, gitlabProject, isBearerProfile, parseAddress, parseCidr, policyText, workflowRef } from "./workloads.js";
|
|
2
2
|
import { createCipheriv, createDecipheriv, createHash, hkdfSync, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
|
|
3
3
|
import * as oauth from "oauth4webapi";
|
|
4
|
+
import { compactVerify, createLocalJWKSet, decodeProtectedHeader, errors, importJWK, jwtVerify } from "jose";
|
|
4
5
|
import { MAX_PROOF_LENGTH, MAX_PROOF_LENGTH as MAX_PROOF_LENGTH$1, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS as MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS$1, METHOD_TOKEN, UNSIGNED_HEADERS, canonicalHtu, canonicalHtu as canonicalHtu$1, canonicalRequest, fetchMethod, fetchMethod as fetchMethod$1, fromBase64url, requestDigest, sentTarget, sentTarget as sentTarget$1, thumbprint, thumbprint as thumbprint$1, tokenDigest } from "@coffre/client/dpop";
|
|
5
|
-
import { createLocalJWKSet, createRemoteJWKSet, errors, importJWK, jwtVerify } from "jose";
|
|
6
6
|
//#region src/identity/github-app.ts
|
|
7
7
|
/** GitHub could not be asked, or refused the app: the message says which, for a person, and carries no credential. */
|
|
8
8
|
var GitHubAppUnavailable = class extends Error {
|
|
@@ -49,18 +49,28 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
49
49
|
clientSecret: this.#clientSecret
|
|
50
50
|
};
|
|
51
51
|
}
|
|
52
|
-
/**
|
|
53
|
-
|
|
52
|
+
/**
|
|
53
|
+
* Every repository of every account the app is installed on, as many as
|
|
54
|
+
* `MAX_LISTING_REQUESTS` reach. `signal` ends every request still going
|
|
55
|
+
* when it aborts, and the listing with `GitHubAppUnavailable`: the caller's
|
|
56
|
+
* deadline for the whole of it, beside each request's own.
|
|
57
|
+
*/
|
|
58
|
+
async repositories(options = {}) {
|
|
59
|
+
const failed = new AbortController();
|
|
60
|
+
const signal = options.signal === void 0 ? failed.signal : AbortSignal.any([options.signal, failed.signal]);
|
|
54
61
|
const budget = { left: 40 };
|
|
55
|
-
this.#app ??= await this.#appInfo(budget);
|
|
56
|
-
const { installations, more } = await this.#installations(budget);
|
|
62
|
+
this.#app ??= await this.#appInfo(budget, signal);
|
|
63
|
+
const { installations, more } = await this.#installations(budget, signal);
|
|
57
64
|
let truncated = more;
|
|
58
65
|
/** An installation's repositories, its first page paid from `own`, and the rest from what the listing has left. */
|
|
59
66
|
const list = async (installation, own) => {
|
|
60
67
|
const repositories = [];
|
|
61
68
|
try {
|
|
62
69
|
for (let page = 1;; page++) {
|
|
63
|
-
const body = record(await this.#asInstallation(installation.id, `/installation/repositories?per_page=${PAGE}&page=${page}`, {
|
|
70
|
+
const body = record(await this.#asInstallation(installation.id, `/installation/repositories?per_page=${PAGE}&page=${page}`, {
|
|
71
|
+
budget: own,
|
|
72
|
+
signal
|
|
73
|
+
}));
|
|
64
74
|
const items = Array.isArray(body.repositories) ? body.repositories : [];
|
|
65
75
|
repositories.push(...items.flatMap((item) => repository(item) ?? []));
|
|
66
76
|
const total = typeof body.total_count === "number" ? body.total_count : 0;
|
|
@@ -92,7 +102,14 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
92
102
|
break;
|
|
93
103
|
}
|
|
94
104
|
rest = rest.slice(wave.length);
|
|
95
|
-
|
|
105
|
+
const failures = [];
|
|
106
|
+
const pages = await Promise.all(wave.map(({ installation, own }) => list(installation, own).catch((error) => {
|
|
107
|
+
failures.push(error);
|
|
108
|
+
failed.abort();
|
|
109
|
+
return [];
|
|
110
|
+
})));
|
|
111
|
+
if (failures.length > 0) throw failures[0];
|
|
112
|
+
listed.push(...pages);
|
|
96
113
|
for (const { own } of wave) budget.left += own.left;
|
|
97
114
|
}
|
|
98
115
|
const byId = new Map(listed.flat().map((each) => [each.repositoryId, each]));
|
|
@@ -103,14 +120,24 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
103
120
|
truncated
|
|
104
121
|
};
|
|
105
122
|
}
|
|
106
|
-
/** `owner/name`'s IDs, when the app is installed on it; null when it is not, its installation is suspended, or GitHub knows no such repository. */
|
|
107
|
-
async repository(fullName) {
|
|
108
|
-
const {
|
|
123
|
+
/** `owner/name`'s IDs, when the app is installed on it; null when it is not, its installation is suspended, or GitHub knows no such repository. `signal` as for `repositories`. */
|
|
124
|
+
async repository(fullName, options = {}) {
|
|
125
|
+
const { signal } = options;
|
|
126
|
+
const { id, suspended_at: suspended } = record(await this.#asApp(`/repos/${fullName}/installation`, {
|
|
127
|
+
missing: true,
|
|
128
|
+
signal
|
|
129
|
+
}));
|
|
109
130
|
if (typeof id !== "number" || suspended !== null && suspended !== void 0) return null;
|
|
110
|
-
return repository(await this.#asInstallation(id, `/repos/${fullName}`, {
|
|
131
|
+
return repository(await this.#asInstallation(id, `/repos/${fullName}`, {
|
|
132
|
+
missing: true,
|
|
133
|
+
signal
|
|
134
|
+
}));
|
|
111
135
|
}
|
|
112
|
-
async #appInfo(budget) {
|
|
113
|
-
const app = record(await this.#asApp("/app", {
|
|
136
|
+
async #appInfo(budget, signal) {
|
|
137
|
+
const app = record(await this.#asApp("/app", {
|
|
138
|
+
budget,
|
|
139
|
+
signal
|
|
140
|
+
}));
|
|
114
141
|
if (typeof app.name !== "string" || typeof app.html_url !== "string") throw new GitHubAppUnavailable("GitHub answered /app without the app");
|
|
115
142
|
return {
|
|
116
143
|
name: app.name,
|
|
@@ -118,8 +145,11 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
118
145
|
};
|
|
119
146
|
}
|
|
120
147
|
/** The installations not suspended, of the first page: `more` when there may be others. */
|
|
121
|
-
async #installations(budget) {
|
|
122
|
-
const answer = await this.#asApp(`/app/installations?per_page=${PAGE}`, {
|
|
148
|
+
async #installations(budget, signal) {
|
|
149
|
+
const answer = await this.#asApp(`/app/installations?per_page=${PAGE}`, {
|
|
150
|
+
budget,
|
|
151
|
+
signal
|
|
152
|
+
});
|
|
123
153
|
const items = Array.isArray(answer) ? answer : [];
|
|
124
154
|
return {
|
|
125
155
|
installations: items.flatMap((item) => {
|
|
@@ -144,7 +174,7 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
144
174
|
async #asInstallation(id, path, options = {}) {
|
|
145
175
|
const kept = this.#kept(id);
|
|
146
176
|
const fresh = kept === null;
|
|
147
|
-
const token = kept ?? await this.#issueToken(id, options
|
|
177
|
+
const token = kept ?? await this.#issueToken(id, options);
|
|
148
178
|
const answer = await this.#call(path, {
|
|
149
179
|
method: "GET",
|
|
150
180
|
token,
|
|
@@ -154,7 +184,7 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
154
184
|
if (answer !== REFUSED) return answer;
|
|
155
185
|
return this.#call(path, {
|
|
156
186
|
method: "GET",
|
|
157
|
-
token: await this.#issueToken(id, options
|
|
187
|
+
token: await this.#issueToken(id, options),
|
|
158
188
|
...options
|
|
159
189
|
});
|
|
160
190
|
}
|
|
@@ -164,12 +194,13 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
164
194
|
return kept !== void 0 && kept.expiresAt - 3e5 > this.#now() ? kept.token : null;
|
|
165
195
|
}
|
|
166
196
|
/** https://docs.github.com/en/rest/apps/apps#create-an-installation-access-token-for-an-app */
|
|
167
|
-
async #issueToken(id, budget) {
|
|
197
|
+
async #issueToken(id, { budget, signal }) {
|
|
168
198
|
this.#tokens.delete(id);
|
|
169
199
|
const answer = record(await this.#call(`/app/installations/${id}/access_tokens`, {
|
|
170
200
|
method: "POST",
|
|
171
201
|
token: await this.#jwt(),
|
|
172
|
-
budget
|
|
202
|
+
budget,
|
|
203
|
+
signal
|
|
173
204
|
}));
|
|
174
205
|
const expiresAt = typeof answer.expires_at === "string" ? Date.parse(answer.expires_at) : NaN;
|
|
175
206
|
if (typeof answer.token !== "string" || !Number.isFinite(expiresAt)) throw new GitHubAppUnavailable("GitHub issued no installation token");
|
|
@@ -203,7 +234,8 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
203
234
|
* `SPENT` when none is left. A 404 is null where `missing` allows it; a
|
|
204
235
|
* 401 is `REFUSED` where `refused` asks, for a token to be issued again;
|
|
205
236
|
* any other answer than a 2xx says GitHub's status and the path, and a
|
|
206
|
-
* redirect is never followed.
|
|
237
|
+
* redirect is never followed. It ends at its own deadline, or at the
|
|
238
|
+
* caller's `signal`, whichever comes first.
|
|
207
239
|
*/
|
|
208
240
|
async #call(path, request) {
|
|
209
241
|
if (request.budget !== void 0 && !spend(request.budget)) throw SPENT;
|
|
@@ -212,7 +244,7 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
212
244
|
response = await this.#fetch(`${this.apiUrl}${path}`, {
|
|
213
245
|
method: request.method,
|
|
214
246
|
redirect: "manual",
|
|
215
|
-
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(DEADLINE_MS),
|
|
247
|
+
signal: request.signal === void 0 ? AbortSignal.timeout(DEADLINE_MS) : AbortSignal.any([AbortSignal.timeout(DEADLINE_MS), request.signal]),
|
|
216
248
|
headers: {
|
|
217
249
|
accept: "application/vnd.github+json",
|
|
218
250
|
authorization: `Bearer ${request.token}`,
|
|
@@ -221,7 +253,7 @@ var GitHubApp = class {
|
|
|
221
253
|
}
|
|
222
254
|
});
|
|
223
255
|
} catch (cause) {
|
|
224
|
-
throw new GitHubAppUnavailable("GitHub could not be reached", { cause });
|
|
256
|
+
throw new GitHubAppUnavailable(request.signal?.aborted === true ? "GitHub did not answer in time" : "GitHub could not be reached", { cause });
|
|
225
257
|
}
|
|
226
258
|
if (response.ok) try {
|
|
227
259
|
return await response.json();
|
|
@@ -892,9 +924,14 @@ function checkAudience(audience) {
|
|
|
892
924
|
/**
|
|
893
925
|
* Cloudflare Access in front of coffre: every request carries Access's
|
|
894
926
|
* signed assertion, checked against the team's keys and the application's
|
|
895
|
-
* AUD tag.
|
|
927
|
+
* AUD tag. A browser's first request signs its person in to a session of
|
|
928
|
+
* coffre's, which every later one shows beside the assertion; the CLI and
|
|
929
|
+
* machines are not served behind Access yet.
|
|
896
930
|
*
|
|
897
931
|
* cloudflareAccess({ teamDomain: 'acme.cloudflareaccess.com', audience: env.ACCESS_AUD })
|
|
932
|
+
*
|
|
933
|
+
* `browserSessionHours`: the longest that session lasts, 12 hours unless
|
|
934
|
+
* set, at most a week. Access's own session is the one people see.
|
|
898
935
|
*/
|
|
899
936
|
function cloudflareAccess(options) {
|
|
900
937
|
const domain = options.teamDomain.trim();
|
|
@@ -907,7 +944,8 @@ function cloudflareAccess(options) {
|
|
|
907
944
|
issuer,
|
|
908
945
|
jwksUrl: `${issuer}/cdn-cgi/access/certs`,
|
|
909
946
|
audience: checkAudience(options.audience.trim())
|
|
910
|
-
}
|
|
947
|
+
},
|
|
948
|
+
browserSessionHours: lifetime(options.browserSessionHours, "browserSessionHours", 12, 168)
|
|
911
949
|
};
|
|
912
950
|
return { resolve: () => config };
|
|
913
951
|
}
|
|
@@ -943,473 +981,161 @@ function toSignin(options) {
|
|
|
943
981
|
};
|
|
944
982
|
}
|
|
945
983
|
//#endregion
|
|
946
|
-
//#region src/identity/
|
|
984
|
+
//#region src/identity/profiles.ts
|
|
985
|
+
const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
|
|
986
|
+
/** A Kubernetes namespace (a DNS label) and service account (a DNS subdomain), as its tokens' `sub` names them. */
|
|
987
|
+
const SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB = /^system:serviceaccount:([a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?):([a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9.]{0,251}[a-z0-9])?)$/;
|
|
988
|
+
/** A Google service account's unique ID: digits, 21 of them today. */
|
|
989
|
+
const GOOGLE_ID = /^[1-9]\d{0,31}$/;
|
|
990
|
+
const AZURE_V1 = /^https:\/\/sts\.windows\.net\/([0-9a-f-]{36})\/$/;
|
|
991
|
+
const AZURE_V2 = /^https:\/\/login\.microsoftonline\.com\/([0-9a-f-]{36})\/v2\.0$/;
|
|
992
|
+
const FLY_ISSUER = /^https:\/\/oidc\.fly\.io\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/;
|
|
947
993
|
/**
|
|
948
|
-
*
|
|
949
|
-
*
|
|
950
|
-
*
|
|
951
|
-
* it asked and what its parent holds, computed when it is made and stored
|
|
952
|
-
* under its row's MAC, and every operation it asks for is checked against
|
|
953
|
-
* them by `constraintsAllow`, on the URL the proxy is about to send.
|
|
954
|
-
*
|
|
955
|
-
* parent { credentials: ['stripe', 'openai'] } child asks { credentials: ['stripe'], paths: ['/v1/refunds'] }
|
|
956
|
-
* child { credentials: ['stripe'], paths: ['/v1/refunds'] }
|
|
957
|
-
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds/re_1 allowed
|
|
958
|
-
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds/%2e%2e/charges refused: it is /v1/charges once parsed
|
|
959
|
-
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refundsX refused: a prefix matches whole segments
|
|
994
|
+
* Fly's IDs are digits in its documentation's tokens, unchecked live: kept
|
|
995
|
+
* loose, which fails closed, since a token's `org_id` and `app_id` are IDs
|
|
996
|
+
* and a binding naming a name matches none.
|
|
960
997
|
*/
|
|
961
|
-
|
|
962
|
-
const
|
|
963
|
-
|
|
964
|
-
|
|
965
|
-
|
|
966
|
-
|
|
967
|
-
|
|
998
|
+
const FLY_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;
|
|
999
|
+
const VERCEL_ISSUER = /^https:\/\/oidc\.vercel\.com(\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62})?$/;
|
|
1000
|
+
const VERCEL_OWNER = /^(team_)?[A-Za-z0-9]{8,64}$/;
|
|
1001
|
+
const VERCEL_PROJECT = /^prj_[A-Za-z0-9]{8,64}$/;
|
|
1002
|
+
/** `production`, `preview`, `development`, or a custom environment's slug. */
|
|
1003
|
+
const VERCEL_ENVIRONMENT = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/;
|
|
1004
|
+
const AWS_ACCOUNT = /^\d{12}$/;
|
|
1005
|
+
/** A role's unique ID: `AROA`, then its own characters. */
|
|
1006
|
+
const AWS_ROLE_ID = /^AROA[A-Z0-9]{8,124}$/;
|
|
1007
|
+
function shaped(claims, name, pattern, what) {
|
|
1008
|
+
if (!pattern.test(claims[name])) throw new BindingInvalid(`${name} is ${what}`);
|
|
1009
|
+
}
|
|
1010
|
+
const none = () => null;
|
|
1011
|
+
const PROFILE_RULES = {
|
|
1012
|
+
kubernetes: {
|
|
1013
|
+
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1014
|
+
const sub = SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB.exec(claims.sub);
|
|
1015
|
+
if (sub === null) throw new BindingInvalid("sub is the service account's, system:serviceaccount:<namespace>:<name>");
|
|
1016
|
+
shaped(claims, "kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.uid", UUID, "the service account's UID, which a service account made again under the same name does not keep: kubectl get serviceaccount <name> -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}'");
|
|
1017
|
+
for (const [name, value] of [["kubernetes.io.namespace", sub[1]], ["kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.name", sub[3]]]) if (claims[name] !== void 0 && claims[name] !== value) throw new BindingInvalid(`${name} is ${value}, as its sub says`);
|
|
1018
|
+
},
|
|
1019
|
+
token(claims) {
|
|
1020
|
+
const sub = SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB.exec(String(claims.sub));
|
|
1021
|
+
if (sub === null) return "the token's sub is no service account's";
|
|
1022
|
+
const namespace = claimAt(claims, "kubernetes.io.namespace");
|
|
1023
|
+
const name = claimAt(claims, "kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.name");
|
|
1024
|
+
return namespace === sub[1] && name === sub[3] ? null : "the token names another service account under kubernetes.io than its sub";
|
|
1025
|
+
}
|
|
1026
|
+
},
|
|
1027
|
+
gcp: {
|
|
1028
|
+
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1029
|
+
shaped(claims, "sub", GOOGLE_ID, "the service account's unique ID, its digits, which a service account made again under the same email does not keep: gcloud iam service-accounts describe <email> --format='value(uniqueId)'");
|
|
1030
|
+
},
|
|
1031
|
+
token: none
|
|
1032
|
+
},
|
|
1033
|
+
azure: {
|
|
1034
|
+
binding({ issuer, claims }, policy) {
|
|
1035
|
+
const tenant = AZURE_V1.exec(issuer)?.[1] ?? AZURE_V2.exec(issuer)?.[1];
|
|
1036
|
+
if (tenant === void 0 || !UUID.test(tenant)) throw new BindingInvalid("an azure binding's issuer is https://sts.windows.net/<tenant>/ (v1 tokens) or https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant>/v2.0 (v2), by the tenant's ID");
|
|
1037
|
+
shaped(claims, "tid", UUID, "the tenant's ID");
|
|
1038
|
+
if (claims.tid !== tenant) throw new BindingInvalid("tid is the tenant its issuer names");
|
|
1039
|
+
shaped(claims, "oid", UUID, "the managed identity's object ID (its principal ID): az identity show --query principalId");
|
|
1040
|
+
if (AZURE_V2.test(issuer) && !UUID.test(policy.audience ?? "")) throw new BindingInvalid("a v2 token's audience is the API's application (client) ID, a GUID, never its App ID URI: Entra puts no other in a v2 token");
|
|
1041
|
+
},
|
|
1042
|
+
token(claims, binding) {
|
|
1043
|
+
const version = AZURE_V1.test(binding.issuer) ? "1.0" : "2.0";
|
|
1044
|
+
return claims.ver === version ? null : `the token is of version ${JSON.stringify(claims.ver ?? null)}, and its binding's issuer issues ${version}`;
|
|
1045
|
+
}
|
|
1046
|
+
},
|
|
1047
|
+
fly: {
|
|
1048
|
+
binding({ issuer, claims }) {
|
|
1049
|
+
if (!FLY_ISSUER.test(issuer)) throw new BindingInvalid("a fly binding's issuer is https://oidc.fly.io/<organization>, by its slug");
|
|
1050
|
+
shaped(claims, "org_id", FLY_ID, "the organization's ID, as its tokens' org_id says it");
|
|
1051
|
+
shaped(claims, "app_id", FLY_ID, "the app's ID, as its tokens' app_id says it");
|
|
1052
|
+
},
|
|
1053
|
+
token: none
|
|
1054
|
+
},
|
|
1055
|
+
vercel: {
|
|
1056
|
+
binding({ issuer, claims }) {
|
|
1057
|
+
if (!VERCEL_ISSUER.test(issuer)) throw new BindingInvalid("a vercel binding's issuer is https://oidc.vercel.com/<team> (team mode) or https://oidc.vercel.com (global mode)");
|
|
1058
|
+
shaped(claims, "owner_id", VERCEL_OWNER, "the team's ID, team_…, as .vercel/project.json's orgId says it");
|
|
1059
|
+
shaped(claims, "project_id", VERCEL_PROJECT, "the project's ID, prj_…, as .vercel/project.json's projectId says it");
|
|
1060
|
+
shaped(claims, "environment", VERCEL_ENVIRONMENT, "production, preview, development or a custom environment's slug");
|
|
1061
|
+
},
|
|
1062
|
+
token: none
|
|
1063
|
+
},
|
|
1064
|
+
aws: {
|
|
1065
|
+
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1066
|
+
const extra = Object.keys(claims).filter((name) => name !== "account" && name !== "role_id");
|
|
1067
|
+
if (extra.length > 0) throw new BindingInvalid(`an aws binding names its role's account and role_id alone, not ${extra.join(", ")}`);
|
|
1068
|
+
shaped(claims, "account", AWS_ACCOUNT, "the account's 12 digits");
|
|
1069
|
+
shaped(claims, "role_id", AWS_ROLE_ID, "the role's unique ID, AROA…, which a role made again under the same name does not keep: aws iam get-role --role-name <name> --query Role.RoleId");
|
|
1070
|
+
},
|
|
1071
|
+
token: none
|
|
968
1072
|
}
|
|
969
1073
|
};
|
|
970
|
-
const PLACE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(@me)?$/;
|
|
971
|
-
/** A path segment as a constraint names one: no escape, no `;`, no dot segment. */
|
|
972
|
-
const SEGMENT = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-_~!$&'()*+,=:@.]+$/;
|
|
973
|
-
/**
|
|
974
|
-
* What a path may not hold for a constrained session, since an upstream
|
|
975
|
-
* might read a segment otherwise than coffre: an escaped `.`, `/` or `\`,
|
|
976
|
-
* a `%25` (double encoding), or a `;`, raw or escaped
|
|
977
|
-
* (`/v1/refunds/..;/charges` and `/v1/refunds/..%3b/charges` are
|
|
978
|
-
* `/v1/charges` to Tomcat).
|
|
979
|
-
*/
|
|
980
|
-
const AMBIGUOUS = /%2e|%2f|%5c|%25|%3b|;/i;
|
|
981
|
-
function list(value, what, valid) {
|
|
982
|
-
if (value === void 0) return void 0;
|
|
983
|
-
if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length > 32 || value.some((item) => typeof item !== "string" || !valid(item))) throw new ConstraintsInvalid(`${what} lists at most 32 of them`);
|
|
984
|
-
return [...new Set(value)].sort();
|
|
985
|
-
}
|
|
986
|
-
function isPrefix(path) {
|
|
987
|
-
if (path === "/") return true;
|
|
988
|
-
if (!path.startsWith("/") || path.endsWith("/")) return false;
|
|
989
|
-
return path.slice(1).split("/").every((segment) => SEGMENT.test(segment) && segment !== "." && segment !== "..");
|
|
990
|
-
}
|
|
991
|
-
/** Whether `path` is `prefix` or below it, by whole segments. */
|
|
992
|
-
function under(path, prefix) {
|
|
993
|
-
return prefix === "/" || path === prefix || path.startsWith(`${prefix}/`);
|
|
994
|
-
}
|
|
995
1074
|
/**
|
|
996
|
-
*
|
|
997
|
-
*
|
|
998
|
-
*
|
|
999
|
-
*
|
|
1075
|
+
* The audiences a token of a binding may name, the first the one its SDK
|
|
1076
|
+
* asks for: the session's key, `<publicUrl>#jkt=<thumbprint>`, for the
|
|
1077
|
+
* platforms whose caller picks the audience, and `?jkt=` for one that
|
|
1078
|
+
* refuses a `#` in it (section 4.2); the exact audience of a platform that
|
|
1079
|
+
* fixes it; this instance's URL for every other.
|
|
1000
1080
|
*/
|
|
1001
|
-
function
|
|
1002
|
-
if (
|
|
1003
|
-
|
|
1004
|
-
if (Object.keys(rest).length > 0) throw new ConstraintsInvalid(`constraints hold places, credentials, methods and paths, not ${Object.keys(rest).join(", ")}`);
|
|
1005
|
-
const checked = {};
|
|
1006
|
-
const placeList = list(places, "places", (place) => PLACE.test(place));
|
|
1007
|
-
const credentialList = list(credentials, "credentials", (name) => CREDENTIAL_NAME.test(name));
|
|
1008
|
-
const methodList = list(Array.isArray(methods) ? methods.map((method) => typeof method === "string" && METHOD_TOKEN.test(method) ? fetchMethod$1(method) : method) : methods, "methods", (method) => METHOD_TOKEN.test(method));
|
|
1009
|
-
const pathList = list(paths, "paths", isPrefix);
|
|
1010
|
-
if (placeList !== void 0) checked.places = placeList;
|
|
1011
|
-
if (credentialList !== void 0) checked.credentials = credentialList;
|
|
1012
|
-
if (methodList !== void 0) checked.methods = methodList;
|
|
1013
|
-
if (pathList !== void 0) checked.paths = outermost(pathList);
|
|
1014
|
-
return checked;
|
|
1015
|
-
}
|
|
1016
|
-
/** The prefixes no other one is above. */
|
|
1017
|
-
function outermost(paths) {
|
|
1018
|
-
return paths.filter((path) => !paths.some((other) => other !== path && under(path, other)));
|
|
1019
|
-
}
|
|
1020
|
-
function both(a, b) {
|
|
1021
|
-
if (a === void 0) return b;
|
|
1022
|
-
if (b === void 0) return a;
|
|
1023
|
-
return a.filter((item) => b.includes(item));
|
|
1081
|
+
function expectedAudiences(profile, policy, expected) {
|
|
1082
|
+
if (KEY_NAMING_PROFILES.includes(profile) || policy.keyAudience === true) return [`${expected.publicUrl}#jkt=${expected.jkt}`, `${expected.publicUrl}?jkt=${expected.jkt}`];
|
|
1083
|
+
return [policy.audience ?? expected.publicUrl];
|
|
1024
1084
|
}
|
|
1085
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
1086
|
+
//#region src/identity/workload-token.ts
|
|
1025
1087
|
/**
|
|
1026
|
-
*
|
|
1027
|
-
*
|
|
1028
|
-
*
|
|
1029
|
-
* wider than either: whatever `intersect(a, b)` allows, `a` and `b` allow.
|
|
1088
|
+
* An ID token a CI platform signed for a run, as the exchange checks it
|
|
1089
|
+
* (docs/design/oidc.md, section 3). The checks run in this order; each
|
|
1090
|
+
* refusal says which, as a reason a CI user can act on.
|
|
1030
1091
|
*/
|
|
1031
|
-
|
|
1032
|
-
|
|
1033
|
-
|
|
1034
|
-
|
|
1035
|
-
|
|
1036
|
-
|
|
1037
|
-
|
|
1038
|
-
|
|
1039
|
-
|
|
1040
|
-
|
|
1041
|
-
|
|
1042
|
-
|
|
1043
|
-
|
|
1044
|
-
|
|
1045
|
-
result.paths = outermost([...new Set(kept)].sort());
|
|
1092
|
+
/** A compact JWS is three base64url parts; the whole token at most this long. */
|
|
1093
|
+
const MAX_TOKEN_BYTES = 8192;
|
|
1094
|
+
/** Each side of every time check. */
|
|
1095
|
+
const CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 30;
|
|
1096
|
+
/** The oldest token accepted, by its `iat`: tokens handed to a job at its start fit, day-old ones do not. */
|
|
1097
|
+
const MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS = 3600;
|
|
1098
|
+
/** RS256 and ES256 (P-256), as for Access assertions: never `none`, never HS*. */
|
|
1099
|
+
const WORKLOAD_ALGORITHMS = ["RS256", "ES256"];
|
|
1100
|
+
var WorkloadTokenRefused = class extends Error {
|
|
1101
|
+
reason;
|
|
1102
|
+
constructor(reason, message) {
|
|
1103
|
+
super(message);
|
|
1104
|
+
this.name = "WorkloadTokenRefused";
|
|
1105
|
+
this.reason = reason;
|
|
1046
1106
|
}
|
|
1047
|
-
|
|
1048
|
-
|
|
1049
|
-
/**
|
|
1050
|
-
function
|
|
1051
|
-
const
|
|
1052
|
-
|
|
1053
|
-
|
|
1054
|
-
|
|
1055
|
-
|
|
1056
|
-
|
|
1057
|
-
|
|
1058
|
-
|
|
1059
|
-
|
|
1060
|
-
|
|
1061
|
-
|
|
1062
|
-
|
|
1063
|
-
|
|
1064
|
-
|
|
1065
|
-
|
|
1066
|
-
|
|
1067
|
-
|
|
1068
|
-
|
|
1069
|
-
|
|
1070
|
-
|
|
1071
|
-
|
|
1072
|
-
if (
|
|
1073
|
-
if (
|
|
1074
|
-
|
|
1075
|
-
|
|
1076
|
-
|
|
1077
|
-
|
|
1078
|
-
}
|
|
1079
|
-
return false;
|
|
1080
|
-
}
|
|
1081
|
-
if (AMBIGUOUS.test(path)) return false;
|
|
1082
|
-
return constraints.paths.some((prefix) => under(path, prefix));
|
|
1083
|
-
}
|
|
1084
|
-
//#endregion
|
|
1085
|
-
//#region src/identity/dpop.ts
|
|
1086
|
-
/**
|
|
1087
|
-
* Checking a workload's proof (docs/design/workload-access.md, section
|
|
1088
|
-
* 5.1): the verifying half of `@coffre/client/dpop`, whose canonicalization
|
|
1089
|
-
* it runs, so both sides agree on every byte. Cheapest first:
|
|
1090
|
-
*
|
|
1091
|
-
* 1. shape at most 2 KiB, `typ` exactly `dpop+jwt`, `alg` exactly `ES256`
|
|
1092
|
-
* 2. the key `jwk` exactly `kty`, `crv`, `x` and `y`, a point on P-256
|
|
1093
|
-
* 3. claims `jti` 16 bytes, `iat` an integer, `hdr` at most 32 names, none unsigned
|
|
1094
|
-
* (`parseProof`, no I/O)
|
|
1095
|
-
* 4. the session row, from the token's hash: the server's, between the two
|
|
1096
|
-
* 5. key and signature the thumbprint is the row's `jkt`, then ES256
|
|
1097
|
-
* 6. what was signed `htm`, `htu`, `ath`, `req`, then `iat` within ±300 s
|
|
1098
|
-
* (`verifyProof`)
|
|
1099
|
-
* 7. the gate's nonce and `jti`: the server's again (`Gate`)
|
|
1100
|
-
*
|
|
1101
|
-
* Each claim the caller expects (`ath` with a token, `hdr` and `req` with a
|
|
1102
|
-
* request's content) must be there, and one it does not expect must not.
|
|
1103
|
-
* Two signatures of one payload, `(r, s)` and `(r, n − s)`, both verify:
|
|
1104
|
-
* they carry one `jti`, which the gate takes once.
|
|
1105
|
-
*/
|
|
1106
|
-
/** How far a proof's `iat` may be from now: the nonce, not the clock, is what makes a proof fresh. */
|
|
1107
|
-
const PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
|
|
1108
|
-
const refuse = (reason, message) => ({
|
|
1109
|
-
ok: false,
|
|
1110
|
-
reason,
|
|
1111
|
-
message
|
|
1112
|
-
});
|
|
1113
|
-
const DECODER = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true });
|
|
1114
|
-
const ENCODER = new TextEncoder();
|
|
1115
|
-
const HEADER_NAME = /^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9a-z-]+$/;
|
|
1116
|
-
const CLAIMS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
1117
|
-
"jti",
|
|
1118
|
-
"htm",
|
|
1119
|
-
"htu",
|
|
1120
|
-
"iat",
|
|
1121
|
-
"ath",
|
|
1122
|
-
"nonce",
|
|
1123
|
-
"hdr",
|
|
1124
|
-
"req"
|
|
1125
|
-
]);
|
|
1126
|
-
/** A part of the proof as a JSON object, or null for anything else. */
|
|
1127
|
-
function jsonPart(part) {
|
|
1128
|
-
const bytes = fromBase64url(part);
|
|
1129
|
-
if (bytes === null) return null;
|
|
1130
|
-
try {
|
|
1131
|
-
const value = JSON.parse(DECODER.decode(bytes));
|
|
1132
|
-
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? value : null;
|
|
1133
|
-
} catch {
|
|
1134
|
-
return null;
|
|
1135
|
-
}
|
|
1136
|
-
}
|
|
1137
|
-
function exactly(value, keys) {
|
|
1138
|
-
return Object.keys(value).length === keys.length && keys.every((key) => Object.hasOwn(value, key));
|
|
1139
|
-
}
|
|
1140
|
-
const isDigest = (value) => typeof value === "string" && fromBase64url(value)?.length === 32;
|
|
1141
|
-
/** Steps 1 to 3: the proof's shape, its key's and its claims', with no I/O. */
|
|
1142
|
-
function parseProof(proof) {
|
|
1143
|
-
if (proof.length > MAX_PROOF_LENGTH$1) return refuse("malformed", `a proof is at most ${MAX_PROOF_LENGTH$1} characters`);
|
|
1144
|
-
const parts = proof.split(".");
|
|
1145
|
-
if (parts.length !== 3) return refuse("malformed", "a proof is a compact JWS: three parts");
|
|
1146
|
-
const [headerPart, payloadPart, signaturePart] = parts;
|
|
1147
|
-
const header = jsonPart(headerPart);
|
|
1148
|
-
if (header === null || !exactly(header, [
|
|
1149
|
-
"typ",
|
|
1150
|
-
"alg",
|
|
1151
|
-
"jwk"
|
|
1152
|
-
]) || header.typ !== "dpop+jwt" || header.alg !== "ES256") return refuse("malformed", "a proof's header is exactly { typ: \"dpop+jwt\", alg: \"ES256\", jwk }");
|
|
1153
|
-
const jwk = header.jwk;
|
|
1154
|
-
if (typeof jwk !== "object" || jwk === null || Array.isArray(jwk) || !exactly(jwk, [
|
|
1155
|
-
"kty",
|
|
1156
|
-
"crv",
|
|
1157
|
-
"x",
|
|
1158
|
-
"y"
|
|
1159
|
-
]) || jwk.kty !== "EC" || jwk.crv !== "P-256" || !isCoordinate(jwk.x) || !isCoordinate(jwk.y)) return refuse("key", "a proof's key is a P-256 public key: exactly kty, crv, x and y");
|
|
1160
|
-
const signature = fromBase64url(signaturePart);
|
|
1161
|
-
if (signature === null || signature.length !== 64) return refuse("malformed", "an ES256 signature is 64 bytes, r then s");
|
|
1162
|
-
const claims = jsonPart(payloadPart);
|
|
1163
|
-
if (claims === null || Object.keys(claims).some((name) => !CLAIMS.has(name))) return refuse("malformed", "a proof's claims are jti, htm, htu, iat, and ath, nonce, hdr, req where they apply");
|
|
1164
|
-
if (typeof claims.jti !== "string" || fromBase64url(claims.jti)?.length !== 16) return refuse("malformed", "jti is 16 random bytes, in base64url");
|
|
1165
|
-
if (typeof claims.htm !== "string" || !METHOD_TOKEN.test(claims.htm)) return refuse("malformed", "htm is the request's method");
|
|
1166
|
-
if (typeof claims.htu !== "string") return refuse("malformed", "htu is the request's URL");
|
|
1167
|
-
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(claims.iat)) return refuse("malformed", "iat is an integer, in seconds");
|
|
1168
|
-
if (claims.ath !== void 0 && !isDigest(claims.ath)) return refuse("malformed", "ath is a SHA-256, in base64url");
|
|
1169
|
-
if (claims.nonce !== void 0 && (typeof claims.nonce !== "string" || !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,128}$/.test(claims.nonce))) return refuse("malformed", "nonce is the one coffre gave");
|
|
1170
|
-
if (claims.hdr === void 0 !== (claims.req === void 0)) return refuse("malformed", "hdr and req come together");
|
|
1171
|
-
let hdr = null;
|
|
1172
|
-
if (claims.hdr !== void 0) {
|
|
1173
|
-
if (typeof claims.hdr !== "string" || !isDigest(claims.req)) return refuse("malformed", "hdr names headers, and req is a SHA-256");
|
|
1174
|
-
hdr = claims.hdr === "" ? [] : claims.hdr.split(" ");
|
|
1175
|
-
if (hdr.length > MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS$1) return refuse("malformed", `a proof signs at most ${MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS$1} headers`);
|
|
1176
|
-
if (hdr.some((name) => !HEADER_NAME.test(name) || UNSIGNED_HEADERS.has(name)) || new Set(hdr).size !== hdr.length) return refuse("malformed", "hdr names each header once, in lower case, and none the transport or the request to coffre owns");
|
|
1177
|
-
}
|
|
1178
|
-
return {
|
|
1179
|
-
ok: true,
|
|
1180
|
-
jwk,
|
|
1181
|
-
claims,
|
|
1182
|
-
hdr,
|
|
1183
|
-
signingInput: `${headerPart}.${payloadPart}`,
|
|
1184
|
-
signature
|
|
1185
|
-
};
|
|
1186
|
-
}
|
|
1187
|
-
function isCoordinate(value) {
|
|
1188
|
-
return typeof value === "string" && fromBase64url(value)?.length === 32;
|
|
1189
|
-
}
|
|
1190
|
-
/**
|
|
1191
|
-
* Steps 5 and 6: the proof against its request, `parseProof`'s first when
|
|
1192
|
-
* given a string. Nothing here reads a store, so the gate (step 7) still
|
|
1193
|
-
* decides whether this `jti` was seen.
|
|
1194
|
-
*/
|
|
1195
|
-
async function verifyProof(proof, expect) {
|
|
1196
|
-
const parsed = typeof proof === "string" ? parseProof(proof) : proof;
|
|
1197
|
-
if (!parsed.ok) return parsed;
|
|
1198
|
-
const { jwk, claims, hdr } = parsed;
|
|
1199
|
-
const jkt = await thumbprint$1(jwk);
|
|
1200
|
-
if (expect.jkt !== void 0 && jkt !== expect.jkt) return refuse("jkt", "the proof is signed by another key than the session's");
|
|
1201
|
-
let key;
|
|
1202
|
-
try {
|
|
1203
|
-
key = await crypto.subtle.importKey("jwk", {
|
|
1204
|
-
kty: jwk.kty,
|
|
1205
|
-
crv: jwk.crv,
|
|
1206
|
-
x: jwk.x,
|
|
1207
|
-
y: jwk.y
|
|
1208
|
-
}, {
|
|
1209
|
-
name: "ECDSA",
|
|
1210
|
-
namedCurve: "P-256"
|
|
1211
|
-
}, false, ["verify"]);
|
|
1212
|
-
} catch {
|
|
1213
|
-
return refuse("key", "the proof's key is no point on P-256");
|
|
1214
|
-
}
|
|
1215
|
-
if (!await crypto.subtle.verify({
|
|
1216
|
-
name: "ECDSA",
|
|
1217
|
-
hash: "SHA-256"
|
|
1218
|
-
}, key, parsed.signature, ENCODER.encode(parsed.signingInput))) return refuse("signature", "the proof's signature does not verify");
|
|
1219
|
-
if (claims.htm !== fetchMethod$1(expect.method)) return refuse("htm", "the proof signs another method");
|
|
1220
|
-
let htu;
|
|
1221
|
-
try {
|
|
1222
|
-
htu = canonicalHtu$1(expect.url);
|
|
1223
|
-
} catch {
|
|
1224
|
-
return refuse("htu", "the request's URL cannot be signed");
|
|
1225
|
-
}
|
|
1226
|
-
if (claims.htu !== htu) return refuse("htu", "the proof signs another URL");
|
|
1227
|
-
if (expect.token === void 0 !== (claims.ath === void 0)) return refuse("ath", expect.token === void 0 ? "this proof signs no token" : "the proof signs no token: ath");
|
|
1228
|
-
if (expect.token !== void 0 && claims.ath !== await tokenDigest(expect.token)) return refuse("ath", "the proof signs another token");
|
|
1229
|
-
if (expect.content === void 0 !== (hdr === null)) return refuse("req", expect.content === void 0 ? "this proof signs no request content" : "the proof signs no request content: hdr and req");
|
|
1230
|
-
if (expect.content !== void 0) {
|
|
1231
|
-
const headers = [];
|
|
1232
|
-
for (const name of hdr) {
|
|
1233
|
-
const value = expect.content.headers.get(name);
|
|
1234
|
-
if (value === null) return refuse("req", `the proof signs a header the request lacks: ${name}`);
|
|
1235
|
-
headers.push([name, value]);
|
|
1236
|
-
}
|
|
1237
|
-
let digest;
|
|
1238
|
-
try {
|
|
1239
|
-
digest = await requestDigest({
|
|
1240
|
-
...sentTarget$1(expect.url),
|
|
1241
|
-
headers,
|
|
1242
|
-
body: expect.content.body
|
|
1243
|
-
});
|
|
1244
|
-
} catch {
|
|
1245
|
-
return refuse("req", "the request cannot be signed: a line break in its path, query or headers");
|
|
1246
|
-
}
|
|
1247
|
-
if (claims.req !== digest) return refuse("req", "the proof signs another path as sent, query, header or body");
|
|
1248
|
-
}
|
|
1249
|
-
const skew = expect.skewSeconds ?? 300;
|
|
1250
|
-
const now = Math.floor((expect.now ?? Date.now()) / 1e3);
|
|
1251
|
-
if (Math.abs(now - claims.iat) > skew) return refuse("iat", `the proof was made more than ${skew} seconds from now`);
|
|
1252
|
-
return {
|
|
1253
|
-
ok: true,
|
|
1254
|
-
jkt,
|
|
1255
|
-
jti: claims.jti,
|
|
1256
|
-
nonce: claims.nonce ?? null,
|
|
1257
|
-
iat: claims.iat,
|
|
1258
|
-
hdr
|
|
1259
|
-
};
|
|
1260
|
-
}
|
|
1261
|
-
//#endregion
|
|
1262
|
-
//#region src/identity/profile-rules.ts
|
|
1263
|
-
const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/;
|
|
1264
|
-
/** A Kubernetes namespace (a DNS label) and service account (a DNS subdomain), as its tokens' `sub` names them. */
|
|
1265
|
-
const SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB = /^system:serviceaccount:([a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9]{0,61}[a-z0-9])?):([a-z0-9]([-a-z0-9.]{0,251}[a-z0-9])?)$/;
|
|
1266
|
-
/** A Google service account's unique ID: digits, 21 of them today. */
|
|
1267
|
-
const GOOGLE_ID = /^[1-9]\d{0,31}$/;
|
|
1268
|
-
const AZURE_V1 = /^https:\/\/sts\.windows\.net\/([0-9a-f-]{36})\/$/;
|
|
1269
|
-
const AZURE_V2 = /^https:\/\/login\.microsoftonline\.com\/([0-9a-f-]{36})\/v2\.0$/;
|
|
1270
|
-
const FLY_ISSUER = /^https:\/\/oidc\.fly\.io\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$/;
|
|
1271
|
-
/**
|
|
1272
|
-
* Fly's IDs are digits in its documentation's tokens, unchecked live: kept
|
|
1273
|
-
* loose, which fails closed, since a token's `org_id` and `app_id` are IDs
|
|
1274
|
-
* and a binding naming a name matches none.
|
|
1275
|
-
*/
|
|
1276
|
-
const FLY_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;
|
|
1277
|
-
const VERCEL_ISSUER = /^https:\/\/oidc\.vercel\.com(\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62})?$/;
|
|
1278
|
-
const VERCEL_OWNER = /^(team_)?[A-Za-z0-9]{8,64}$/;
|
|
1279
|
-
const VERCEL_PROJECT = /^prj_[A-Za-z0-9]{8,64}$/;
|
|
1280
|
-
/** `production`, `preview`, `development`, or a custom environment's slug. */
|
|
1281
|
-
const VERCEL_ENVIRONMENT = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,63}$/;
|
|
1282
|
-
const AWS_ACCOUNT = /^\d{12}$/;
|
|
1283
|
-
/** A role's unique ID: `AROA`, then its own characters. */
|
|
1284
|
-
const AWS_ROLE_ID = /^AROA[A-Z0-9]{8,124}$/;
|
|
1285
|
-
function shaped(claims, name, pattern, what) {
|
|
1286
|
-
if (!pattern.test(claims[name])) throw new BindingInvalid(`${name} is ${what}`);
|
|
1287
|
-
}
|
|
1288
|
-
const none = () => null;
|
|
1289
|
-
const PROFILE_RULES = {
|
|
1290
|
-
kubernetes: {
|
|
1291
|
-
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1292
|
-
const sub = SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB.exec(claims.sub);
|
|
1293
|
-
if (sub === null) throw new BindingInvalid("sub is the service account's, system:serviceaccount:<namespace>:<name>");
|
|
1294
|
-
shaped(claims, "kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.uid", UUID, "the service account's UID, which a service account made again under the same name does not keep: kubectl get serviceaccount <name> -o jsonpath='{.metadata.uid}'");
|
|
1295
|
-
for (const [name, value] of [["kubernetes.io.namespace", sub[1]], ["kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.name", sub[3]]]) if (claims[name] !== void 0 && claims[name] !== value) throw new BindingInvalid(`${name} is ${value}, as its sub says`);
|
|
1296
|
-
},
|
|
1297
|
-
token(claims) {
|
|
1298
|
-
const sub = SERVICE_ACCOUNT_SUB.exec(String(claims.sub));
|
|
1299
|
-
if (sub === null) return "the token's sub is no service account's";
|
|
1300
|
-
const namespace = claimAt(claims, "kubernetes.io.namespace");
|
|
1301
|
-
const name = claimAt(claims, "kubernetes.io.serviceaccount.name");
|
|
1302
|
-
return namespace === sub[1] && name === sub[3] ? null : "the token names another service account under kubernetes.io than its sub";
|
|
1303
|
-
}
|
|
1304
|
-
},
|
|
1305
|
-
gcp: {
|
|
1306
|
-
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1307
|
-
shaped(claims, "sub", GOOGLE_ID, "the service account's unique ID, its digits, which a service account made again under the same email does not keep: gcloud iam service-accounts describe <email> --format='value(uniqueId)'");
|
|
1308
|
-
},
|
|
1309
|
-
token: none
|
|
1310
|
-
},
|
|
1311
|
-
azure: {
|
|
1312
|
-
binding({ issuer, claims }, policy) {
|
|
1313
|
-
const tenant = AZURE_V1.exec(issuer)?.[1] ?? AZURE_V2.exec(issuer)?.[1];
|
|
1314
|
-
if (tenant === void 0 || !UUID.test(tenant)) throw new BindingInvalid("an azure binding's issuer is https://sts.windows.net/<tenant>/ (v1 tokens) or https://login.microsoftonline.com/<tenant>/v2.0 (v2), by the tenant's ID");
|
|
1315
|
-
shaped(claims, "tid", UUID, "the tenant's ID");
|
|
1316
|
-
if (claims.tid !== tenant) throw new BindingInvalid("tid is the tenant its issuer names");
|
|
1317
|
-
shaped(claims, "oid", UUID, "the managed identity's object ID (its principal ID): az identity show --query principalId");
|
|
1318
|
-
if (AZURE_V2.test(issuer) && !UUID.test(policy.audience ?? "")) throw new BindingInvalid("a v2 token's audience is the API's application (client) ID, a GUID, never its App ID URI: Entra puts no other in a v2 token");
|
|
1319
|
-
},
|
|
1320
|
-
token(claims, binding) {
|
|
1321
|
-
const version = AZURE_V1.test(binding.issuer) ? "1.0" : "2.0";
|
|
1322
|
-
return claims.ver === version ? null : `the token is of version ${JSON.stringify(claims.ver ?? null)}, and its binding's issuer issues ${version}`;
|
|
1323
|
-
}
|
|
1324
|
-
},
|
|
1325
|
-
fly: {
|
|
1326
|
-
binding({ issuer, claims }) {
|
|
1327
|
-
if (!FLY_ISSUER.test(issuer)) throw new BindingInvalid("a fly binding's issuer is https://oidc.fly.io/<organization>, by its slug");
|
|
1328
|
-
shaped(claims, "org_id", FLY_ID, "the organization's ID, as its tokens' org_id says it");
|
|
1329
|
-
shaped(claims, "app_id", FLY_ID, "the app's ID, as its tokens' app_id says it");
|
|
1330
|
-
},
|
|
1331
|
-
token: none
|
|
1332
|
-
},
|
|
1333
|
-
vercel: {
|
|
1334
|
-
binding({ issuer, claims }) {
|
|
1335
|
-
if (!VERCEL_ISSUER.test(issuer)) throw new BindingInvalid("a vercel binding's issuer is https://oidc.vercel.com/<team> (team mode) or https://oidc.vercel.com (global mode)");
|
|
1336
|
-
shaped(claims, "owner_id", VERCEL_OWNER, "the team's ID, team_…, as .vercel/project.json's orgId says it");
|
|
1337
|
-
shaped(claims, "project_id", VERCEL_PROJECT, "the project's ID, prj_…, as .vercel/project.json's projectId says it");
|
|
1338
|
-
shaped(claims, "environment", VERCEL_ENVIRONMENT, "production, preview, development or a custom environment's slug");
|
|
1339
|
-
},
|
|
1340
|
-
token: none
|
|
1341
|
-
},
|
|
1342
|
-
aws: {
|
|
1343
|
-
binding({ claims }) {
|
|
1344
|
-
const extra = Object.keys(claims).filter((name) => name !== "account" && name !== "role_id");
|
|
1345
|
-
if (extra.length > 0) throw new BindingInvalid(`an aws binding names its role's account and role_id alone, not ${extra.join(", ")}`);
|
|
1346
|
-
shaped(claims, "account", AWS_ACCOUNT, "the account's 12 digits");
|
|
1347
|
-
shaped(claims, "role_id", AWS_ROLE_ID, "the role's unique ID, AROA…, which a role made again under the same name does not keep: aws iam get-role --role-name <name> --query Role.RoleId");
|
|
1348
|
-
},
|
|
1349
|
-
token: none
|
|
1350
|
-
}
|
|
1351
|
-
};
|
|
1352
|
-
/**
|
|
1353
|
-
* The audiences a token of a binding may name, the first the one its SDK
|
|
1354
|
-
* asks for: the session's key, `<publicUrl>#jkt=<thumbprint>`, for the
|
|
1355
|
-
* platforms whose caller picks the audience, and `?jkt=` for one that
|
|
1356
|
-
* refuses a `#` in it (section 4.2); the exact audience of a platform that
|
|
1357
|
-
* fixes it; this instance's URL for every other.
|
|
1358
|
-
*/
|
|
1359
|
-
function expectedAudiences(profile, policy, expected) {
|
|
1360
|
-
if (KEY_NAMING_PROFILES.includes(profile) || policy.keyAudience === true) return [`${expected.publicUrl}#jkt=${expected.jkt}`, `${expected.publicUrl}?jkt=${expected.jkt}`];
|
|
1361
|
-
return [policy.audience ?? expected.publicUrl];
|
|
1362
|
-
}
|
|
1363
|
-
//#endregion
|
|
1364
|
-
//#region src/identity/workload-token.ts
|
|
1365
|
-
/**
|
|
1366
|
-
* An ID token a CI platform signed for a run, as the exchange checks it
|
|
1367
|
-
* (docs/design/oidc.md, section 3). The checks run in this order; each
|
|
1368
|
-
* refusal says which, as a reason a CI user can act on.
|
|
1369
|
-
*/
|
|
1370
|
-
/** A compact JWS is three base64url parts; the whole token at most this long. */
|
|
1371
|
-
const MAX_TOKEN_BYTES = 8192;
|
|
1372
|
-
/** Each side of every time check. */
|
|
1373
|
-
const CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS = 30;
|
|
1374
|
-
/** The oldest token accepted, by its `iat`: tokens handed to a job at its start fit, day-old ones do not. */
|
|
1375
|
-
const MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS = 3600;
|
|
1376
|
-
/** RS256 and ES256 (P-256), as for Access assertions: never `none`, never HS*. */
|
|
1377
|
-
const WORKLOAD_ALGORITHMS = ["RS256", "ES256"];
|
|
1378
|
-
var WorkloadTokenRefused = class extends Error {
|
|
1379
|
-
reason;
|
|
1380
|
-
constructor(reason, message) {
|
|
1381
|
-
super(message);
|
|
1382
|
-
this.name = "WorkloadTokenRefused";
|
|
1383
|
-
this.reason = reason;
|
|
1384
|
-
}
|
|
1385
|
-
};
|
|
1386
|
-
const PART = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
|
|
1387
|
-
/** A token's parts and claims, checked for shape and types only. Throws `WorkloadTokenRefused('malformed')`. */
|
|
1388
|
-
function decodeWorkloadToken(token) {
|
|
1389
|
-
const malformed = (why) => new WorkloadTokenRefused("malformed", `the token ${why}`);
|
|
1390
|
-
if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) throw malformed("is empty");
|
|
1391
|
-
if (token.length > 8192) throw malformed(`is longer than ${MAX_TOKEN_BYTES} bytes`);
|
|
1392
|
-
const parts = token.split(".");
|
|
1393
|
-
if (parts.length !== 3 || !parts.every((part) => PART.test(part))) throw malformed("is not a compact JWS");
|
|
1394
|
-
const json = (part) => {
|
|
1395
|
-
let value;
|
|
1396
|
-
try {
|
|
1397
|
-
value = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
|
|
1398
|
-
} catch {
|
|
1399
|
-
throw malformed("has a part that is not JSON");
|
|
1400
|
-
}
|
|
1401
|
-
if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw malformed("has a part that is not an object");
|
|
1402
|
-
return value;
|
|
1403
|
-
};
|
|
1404
|
-
const [header, claims] = [json(parts[0]), json(parts[1])];
|
|
1405
|
-
for (const name of ["iss", "sub"]) if (typeof claims[name] !== "string" || claims[name] === "") throw malformed(`has no ${name}, as a nonempty string`);
|
|
1406
|
-
for (const name of ["exp", "iat"]) if (typeof claims[name] !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(claims[name])) throw malformed(`has no ${name}, as a finite number`);
|
|
1407
|
-
if (claims.nbf !== void 0 && (typeof claims.nbf !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(claims.nbf))) throw malformed("has an nbf that is not a finite number");
|
|
1408
|
-
return {
|
|
1409
|
-
header,
|
|
1410
|
-
claims,
|
|
1411
|
-
signingInputHash: createHash("sha256").update(`${parts[0]}.${parts[1]}`, "ascii").digest()
|
|
1412
|
-
};
|
|
1107
|
+
};
|
|
1108
|
+
const PART = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/;
|
|
1109
|
+
/** A token's parts and claims, checked for shape and types only. Throws `WorkloadTokenRefused('malformed')`. */
|
|
1110
|
+
function decodeWorkloadToken(token) {
|
|
1111
|
+
const malformed = (why) => new WorkloadTokenRefused("malformed", `the token ${why}`);
|
|
1112
|
+
if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) throw malformed("is empty");
|
|
1113
|
+
if (token.length > 8192) throw malformed(`is longer than ${MAX_TOKEN_BYTES} bytes`);
|
|
1114
|
+
const parts = token.split(".");
|
|
1115
|
+
if (parts.length !== 3 || !parts.every((part) => PART.test(part))) throw malformed("is not a compact JWS");
|
|
1116
|
+
const json = (part) => {
|
|
1117
|
+
let value;
|
|
1118
|
+
try {
|
|
1119
|
+
value = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(part, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
|
|
1120
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1121
|
+
throw malformed("has a part that is not JSON");
|
|
1122
|
+
}
|
|
1123
|
+
if (typeof value !== "object" || value === null || Array.isArray(value)) throw malformed("has a part that is not an object");
|
|
1124
|
+
return value;
|
|
1125
|
+
};
|
|
1126
|
+
const [header, claims] = [json(parts[0]), json(parts[1])];
|
|
1127
|
+
if (header.crit !== void 0) throw malformed("names a critical header extension");
|
|
1128
|
+
for (const name of ["iss", "sub"]) {
|
|
1129
|
+
if (typeof claims[name] !== "string" || claims[name] === "") throw malformed(`has no ${name}, as a nonempty string`);
|
|
1130
|
+
if (/[\0\p{Cs}]/u.test(claims[name])) throw malformed(`has an ${name} with a NUL or a lone surrogate`);
|
|
1131
|
+
}
|
|
1132
|
+
for (const name of ["exp", "iat"]) if (typeof claims[name] !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(claims[name])) throw malformed(`has no ${name}, as a finite number`);
|
|
1133
|
+
if (claims.nbf !== void 0 && (typeof claims.nbf !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(claims.nbf))) throw malformed("has an nbf that is not a finite number");
|
|
1134
|
+
return {
|
|
1135
|
+
header,
|
|
1136
|
+
claims,
|
|
1137
|
+
signingInputHash: createHash("sha256").update(`${parts[0]}.${parts[1]}`, "ascii").digest()
|
|
1138
|
+
};
|
|
1413
1139
|
}
|
|
1414
1140
|
/**
|
|
1415
1141
|
* Verify a token under an issuer's keys: the signature by jose, with the
|
|
@@ -1620,152 +1346,629 @@ function kidAndUse(jwk) {
|
|
|
1620
1346
|
};
|
|
1621
1347
|
}
|
|
1622
1348
|
//#endregion
|
|
1623
|
-
//#region src/identity/
|
|
1349
|
+
//#region src/identity/proofs.ts
|
|
1350
|
+
/** A binding's `jwks_uri` when it carries its issuer's keys: the SHA-256 of those keys, where a fetched set's URL would be. */
|
|
1351
|
+
const CARRIED = "sha256:";
|
|
1352
|
+
/** A token's claims and the hash of what was signed, or `malformed`. */
|
|
1353
|
+
function readIdToken(token) {
|
|
1354
|
+
try {
|
|
1355
|
+
return decodeWorkloadToken(token);
|
|
1356
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
1357
|
+
if (error instanceof WorkloadTokenRefused) return { refused: "malformed" };
|
|
1358
|
+
throw error;
|
|
1359
|
+
}
|
|
1360
|
+
}
|
|
1361
|
+
/** A binding's policy as its row holds it: null for none, undefined for one that does not read as a policy, which takes nothing. */
|
|
1362
|
+
function policyOf(binding) {
|
|
1363
|
+
if (binding.policy === null) return null;
|
|
1364
|
+
try {
|
|
1365
|
+
const policy = JSON.parse(binding.policy);
|
|
1366
|
+
return typeof policy === "object" && policy !== null && !Array.isArray(policy) ? policy : void 0;
|
|
1367
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1368
|
+
return;
|
|
1369
|
+
}
|
|
1370
|
+
}
|
|
1371
|
+
/** Whether a binding issues what a proof is traded for: a CI run's token from a bearer profile with no policy, a session from an ID-token profile with one. */
|
|
1372
|
+
function issues(binding, wanted) {
|
|
1373
|
+
return (wanted === "run" ? BEARER_PROFILES : OIDC_PROFILES).includes(binding.profile) && (wanted === "run" ? binding.policy === null : policyOf(binding) != null);
|
|
1374
|
+
}
|
|
1375
|
+
/** The audience a token names, alone; null for none, or several. */
|
|
1376
|
+
function soleAudience(aud) {
|
|
1377
|
+
if (typeof aud === "string") return aud;
|
|
1378
|
+
return Array.isArray(aud) && aud.length === 1 && typeof aud[0] === "string" ? aud[0] : null;
|
|
1379
|
+
}
|
|
1380
|
+
/**
|
|
1381
|
+
* The audiences a binding takes: this instance's URL for a CI run's; for a
|
|
1382
|
+
* session's, its policy's, the session's key or its profile's
|
|
1383
|
+
* (`expectedAudiences`). None for one whose policy does not read.
|
|
1384
|
+
*/
|
|
1385
|
+
function audiencesOf(binding, publicUrl, wanted) {
|
|
1386
|
+
const policy = policyOf(binding);
|
|
1387
|
+
if (wanted.kind === "run") return policy === null ? [publicUrl] : [];
|
|
1388
|
+
return policy == null ? [] : expectedAudiences(binding.profile, policy, {
|
|
1389
|
+
publicUrl,
|
|
1390
|
+
jkt: wanted.jkt
|
|
1391
|
+
});
|
|
1392
|
+
}
|
|
1393
|
+
/**
|
|
1394
|
+
* Which audience a token is held to, and the bindings that take it: the
|
|
1395
|
+
* token's own if some binding takes it, otherwise the instance's, 0.14's
|
|
1396
|
+
* rule. A token none takes is refused `audience` once its times are checked.
|
|
1397
|
+
*/
|
|
1398
|
+
function audienceTried(aud, bindings, publicUrl, wanted) {
|
|
1399
|
+
const named = soleAudience(aud);
|
|
1400
|
+
const audience = named !== null && bindings.some((binding) => audiencesOf(binding, publicUrl, wanted).includes(named)) ? named : publicUrl;
|
|
1401
|
+
return {
|
|
1402
|
+
audience,
|
|
1403
|
+
taking: bindings.filter((binding) => audiencesOf(binding, publicUrl, wanted).includes(audience))
|
|
1404
|
+
};
|
|
1405
|
+
}
|
|
1406
|
+
/**
|
|
1407
|
+
* A token's times on the vault's clock, `now` in milliseconds, each within
|
|
1408
|
+
* the clock tolerance, as 0.14 held them: not before its `nbf`, to jose's
|
|
1409
|
+
* whole second; before its `exp`, to the millisecond, as 0.14's exchange
|
|
1410
|
+
* checked it again; issued `maxAge` seconds ago at most (an hour,
|
|
1411
|
+
* or any age for a token its platform hands out again), and, where a binding
|
|
1412
|
+
* carries its keys, living `maxLifetime` seconds at most.
|
|
1413
|
+
*/
|
|
1414
|
+
function timesRefusal(claims, now, { maxAge = MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS, maxLifetime = null } = {}) {
|
|
1415
|
+
const seconds = Math.floor(now / 1e3);
|
|
1416
|
+
if (typeof claims.nbf === "number" && claims.nbf > seconds + 30) return "too_old";
|
|
1417
|
+
if (claims.exp <= now / 1e3 - 30) return "expired";
|
|
1418
|
+
if (issuedRefusal(claims.iat, now / 1e3, maxAge ?? Infinity) !== null) return "too_old";
|
|
1419
|
+
if (maxLifetime !== null && claims.exp - claims.iat > maxLifetime) return "too_old";
|
|
1420
|
+
return null;
|
|
1421
|
+
}
|
|
1422
|
+
/** The oldest of `bindings` whose every claim the token carries (`differingClaims`), in the order the bindings' index reads them. */
|
|
1423
|
+
function oldestMatching(bindings, claims) {
|
|
1424
|
+
return [...bindings].sort((a, b) => a.createdAt.getTime() - b.createdAt.getTime() || (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0)).find((binding) => {
|
|
1425
|
+
let expected;
|
|
1426
|
+
try {
|
|
1427
|
+
expected = JSON.parse(binding.claims);
|
|
1428
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1429
|
+
return false;
|
|
1430
|
+
}
|
|
1431
|
+
return typeof expected === "object" && expected !== null && !Array.isArray(expected) && differingClaims(binding.profile, expected, claims).length === 0;
|
|
1432
|
+
}) ?? null;
|
|
1433
|
+
}
|
|
1434
|
+
/** Why a token its binding matched still breaks its profile's own rule (`PROFILE_RULES`: Azure's version, Kubernetes' subject), or null. */
|
|
1435
|
+
function profileRefusal(binding, policy, claims) {
|
|
1436
|
+
const rule = PROFILE_RULES[binding.profile];
|
|
1437
|
+
if (rule === void 0) return null;
|
|
1438
|
+
return rule.token(claims, {
|
|
1439
|
+
issuer: binding.issuer,
|
|
1440
|
+
claims: JSON.parse(binding.claims),
|
|
1441
|
+
policy
|
|
1442
|
+
}) === null ? null : "malformed";
|
|
1443
|
+
}
|
|
1444
|
+
/**
|
|
1445
|
+
* Whether a proof is spent once it is traded, by the SHA-256 of what was
|
|
1446
|
+
* signed: a CI run's token always; a session's token unless it names the
|
|
1447
|
+
* session's key, which works for no other, or its platform hands the same
|
|
1448
|
+
* one out again (`REPEATING_PROFILES`), which spending would refuse.
|
|
1449
|
+
*/
|
|
1450
|
+
function spends(binding, policy, wanted) {
|
|
1451
|
+
if (wanted === "run") return true;
|
|
1452
|
+
return policy?.keyAudience !== true && !REPEATING_PROFILES.includes(binding.profile);
|
|
1453
|
+
}
|
|
1454
|
+
/**
|
|
1455
|
+
* A session's hard end, in milliseconds: the earliest of its binding's
|
|
1456
|
+
* `sessionHours` after `at`, where its profile has them (24 unless said),
|
|
1457
|
+
* and, unless the token names the session's key, the token's own `exp`, so
|
|
1458
|
+
* that a copy of it buys no more than the platform's lifetime. `exp` is in
|
|
1459
|
+
* seconds, null for a proof that is no token. A session whose end is not
|
|
1460
|
+
* after `at` is refused `expired`.
|
|
1461
|
+
*/
|
|
1462
|
+
function hardEnd(binding, policy, at, exp) {
|
|
1463
|
+
const hours = (POLICY_FIELDS[binding.profile] ?? []).includes("sessionHours") ? policy.sessionHours ?? POLICY_DEFAULTS.sessionHours : null;
|
|
1464
|
+
const ends = [hours === null ? null : at + hours * 36e5, policy.keyAudience === true || exp === null ? null : exp * 1e3].filter((end) => end !== null);
|
|
1465
|
+
return Math.min(...ends.length === 0 ? [at + POLICY_DEFAULTS.sessionHours * 36e5] : ends);
|
|
1466
|
+
}
|
|
1467
|
+
/**
|
|
1468
|
+
* Why a session is refused at its sign-in, from its binding's policy and the
|
|
1469
|
+
* request's address: the deployment lets no binding list reads (`noReads`)
|
|
1470
|
+
* and this one does, or it names its sources and the request came from
|
|
1471
|
+
* outside them, or from nowhere the app could tell. Both are `no_match`, as
|
|
1472
|
+
* the design's refusals have it; 0.14 answered the second `source`.
|
|
1473
|
+
*/
|
|
1474
|
+
function sessionRefusal(policy, ip, { noReads }) {
|
|
1475
|
+
if (noReads && policy.reads !== void 0) return "no_match";
|
|
1476
|
+
if (policy.sources !== void 0 && (ip === null || !addressWithin(ip, policy.sources))) return "no_match";
|
|
1477
|
+
return null;
|
|
1478
|
+
}
|
|
1479
|
+
/**
|
|
1480
|
+
* An ID token whose signature verified under `under`, held to the
|
|
1481
|
+
* service's live bindings, in 0.14's order:
|
|
1482
|
+
*
|
|
1483
|
+
* 1. of the bindings that issue what it is traded for (`issues`), those
|
|
1484
|
+
* on its issuer under the keys it was verified under;
|
|
1485
|
+
* 2. the audience tried, and the bindings that take it (`audienceTried`);
|
|
1486
|
+
* 3. its times (`timesRefusal`): any age for a token its platform hands
|
|
1487
|
+
* out again, where a binding that takes it is of such a platform, and
|
|
1488
|
+
* an hour's lifetime at most under keys a binding carries;
|
|
1489
|
+
* 4. that audience, the token's own, alone;
|
|
1490
|
+
* 5. the oldest whose claims match (`oldestMatching`);
|
|
1491
|
+
* 6. an hour's age after all, if the binding that matched is of a
|
|
1492
|
+
* platform that hands out no token twice;
|
|
1493
|
+
* 7. its profile's own rule (`profileRefusal`).
|
|
1494
|
+
*
|
|
1495
|
+
* `bindings` are the sealed rows the read found: a decision that picks the
|
|
1496
|
+
* oldest of several refuses before this if any row it read is not the
|
|
1497
|
+
* vault's, since one passed over would let a later one answer.
|
|
1498
|
+
*/
|
|
1499
|
+
function matchIdToken(token, bindings, { under, publicUrl, wanted, now }) {
|
|
1500
|
+
const { claims } = token;
|
|
1501
|
+
const candidates = bindings.filter((binding) => issues(binding, wanted.kind) && binding.issuer === under.issuer && binding.jwksUri === under.jwksUri && claims.iss === under.issuer);
|
|
1502
|
+
if (candidates.length === 0) return { refused: "no_match" };
|
|
1503
|
+
const { audience, taking } = audienceTried(claims.aud, candidates, publicUrl, wanted);
|
|
1504
|
+
const repeats = taking.some((binding) => REPEATING_PROFILES.includes(binding.profile));
|
|
1505
|
+
const times = timesRefusal(claims, now, {
|
|
1506
|
+
maxAge: repeats ? null : MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS,
|
|
1507
|
+
maxLifetime: under.jwksUri.startsWith("sha256:") ? MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS : null
|
|
1508
|
+
});
|
|
1509
|
+
if (times !== null) return { refused: times };
|
|
1510
|
+
if (soleAudience(claims.aud) !== audience || taking.length === 0) return { refused: "audience" };
|
|
1511
|
+
const binding = oldestMatching(taking, claims);
|
|
1512
|
+
if (binding === null) return { refused: "no_match" };
|
|
1513
|
+
const policy = policyOf(binding);
|
|
1514
|
+
if (repeats && !REPEATING_PROFILES.includes(binding.profile) && issuedRefusal(claims.iat, now / 1e3) !== null) return { refused: "too_old" };
|
|
1515
|
+
if (policy !== null && profileRefusal(binding, policy, claims) !== null) return { refused: "malformed" };
|
|
1516
|
+
return {
|
|
1517
|
+
binding,
|
|
1518
|
+
policy,
|
|
1519
|
+
claims,
|
|
1520
|
+
spends: spends(binding, policy, wanted.kind) ? token.signingInputHash : null
|
|
1521
|
+
};
|
|
1522
|
+
}
|
|
1523
|
+
/**
|
|
1524
|
+
* Whether a token's signature verifies under keys a binding carries, a JWKS
|
|
1525
|
+
* as its row holds it: null if it does, `unknown_signer` when the set lacks
|
|
1526
|
+
* the key the token names, and `malformed` for any other failure, a
|
|
1527
|
+
* signature that does not verify under it included. The algorithms are
|
|
1528
|
+
* fixed, and nothing is taken from the header but `alg` and `kid`; a set
|
|
1529
|
+
* with several keys the header could name tries each. A token that does
|
|
1530
|
+
* not read as one (`readIdToken`), an unencoded payload's included, is
|
|
1531
|
+
* `malformed` before any key is tried. It checks no claim: the times and
|
|
1532
|
+
* the audience are `matchIdToken`'s.
|
|
1533
|
+
*/
|
|
1534
|
+
async function signatureRefusal(token, jwks) {
|
|
1535
|
+
if ("refused" in readIdToken(token)) return "malformed";
|
|
1536
|
+
let keys;
|
|
1537
|
+
try {
|
|
1538
|
+
keys = JSON.parse(jwks);
|
|
1539
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1540
|
+
return "malformed";
|
|
1541
|
+
}
|
|
1542
|
+
const options = { algorithms: [...WORKLOAD_ALGORITHMS] };
|
|
1543
|
+
try {
|
|
1544
|
+
await compactVerify(token, createLocalJWKSet(keys), options);
|
|
1545
|
+
return null;
|
|
1546
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
1547
|
+
if (error instanceof errors.JWKSNoMatchingKey) return "unknown_signer";
|
|
1548
|
+
if (!(error instanceof errors.JWKSMultipleMatchingKeys)) return "malformed";
|
|
1549
|
+
for await (const key of error) try {
|
|
1550
|
+
await compactVerify(token, key, options);
|
|
1551
|
+
return null;
|
|
1552
|
+
} catch {}
|
|
1553
|
+
return "malformed";
|
|
1554
|
+
}
|
|
1555
|
+
}
|
|
1556
|
+
/**
|
|
1557
|
+
* The claims of the run a credential was issued for, as its issuer stated
|
|
1558
|
+
* them: those that say which run, each bounded, in the exchange's entry and
|
|
1559
|
+
* the credential's row, so that a read leads back to its run. What the
|
|
1560
|
+
* issuer says, not proof of which run sent the request.
|
|
1561
|
+
*/
|
|
1562
|
+
const RUN_CLAIMS = [
|
|
1563
|
+
"sub",
|
|
1564
|
+
"jti",
|
|
1565
|
+
"actor",
|
|
1566
|
+
"event_name",
|
|
1567
|
+
"ref",
|
|
1568
|
+
"base_ref",
|
|
1569
|
+
"head_ref",
|
|
1570
|
+
"sha",
|
|
1571
|
+
"repository",
|
|
1572
|
+
"repository_id",
|
|
1573
|
+
"run_id",
|
|
1574
|
+
"run_attempt",
|
|
1575
|
+
"workflow_ref",
|
|
1576
|
+
"job_workflow_ref",
|
|
1577
|
+
"job_workflow_sha",
|
|
1578
|
+
"environment",
|
|
1579
|
+
"project_path",
|
|
1580
|
+
"project_id",
|
|
1581
|
+
"namespace_id",
|
|
1582
|
+
"pipeline_id",
|
|
1583
|
+
"pipeline_source",
|
|
1584
|
+
"job_id",
|
|
1585
|
+
"kubernetes.io.pod.name"
|
|
1586
|
+
];
|
|
1587
|
+
const MAX_RUN_CLAIM = 256;
|
|
1588
|
+
/** The run's claims, as the issuer stated them: each a string of 256 characters at most, or a finite number. */
|
|
1589
|
+
function runClaims(claims) {
|
|
1590
|
+
const run = {};
|
|
1591
|
+
for (const name of RUN_CLAIMS) {
|
|
1592
|
+
const value = claimAt(claims, name);
|
|
1593
|
+
if (typeof value === "string") run[name] = value.slice(0, 256);
|
|
1594
|
+
else if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isFinite(value)) run[name] = value;
|
|
1595
|
+
}
|
|
1596
|
+
return run;
|
|
1597
|
+
}
|
|
1598
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
1599
|
+
//#region src/identity/aws.ts
|
|
1600
|
+
const ACCOUNT = /^\d{12}$/;
|
|
1601
|
+
const ASSUMED_ROLE = /^arn:aws:sts::(\d{12}):assumed-role\/([\w+=,.@-]{1,64})\/([\w+=,.@-]{2,64})$/;
|
|
1602
|
+
const ROLE_SESSION = /^(AROA[A-Z0-9]{8,124}):([\w+=,.@-]{2,64})$/;
|
|
1603
|
+
/**
|
|
1604
|
+
* The role a caller's identity is a session of, or why none: an account's
|
|
1605
|
+
* root, a federated user and an IAM user are `no_match`, since each means a
|
|
1606
|
+
* long-lived key on disk, which a workload does not hold, and so is any
|
|
1607
|
+
* other partition than `aws`. An answer whose account, ARN and user ID
|
|
1608
|
+
* disagree is no answer STS gives: `malformed` (0.14's server took it as
|
|
1609
|
+
* STS unavailable).
|
|
1610
|
+
*/
|
|
1611
|
+
function assumedRole(identity) {
|
|
1612
|
+
if (!ACCOUNT.test(identity.account)) return { refused: "malformed" };
|
|
1613
|
+
const role = ASSUMED_ROLE.exec(identity.arn);
|
|
1614
|
+
const session = ROLE_SESSION.exec(identity.userId);
|
|
1615
|
+
if (role === null || session === null) return { refused: "no_match" };
|
|
1616
|
+
if (role[1] !== identity.account || session[2] !== role[3]) return { refused: "malformed" };
|
|
1617
|
+
return {
|
|
1618
|
+
account: identity.account,
|
|
1619
|
+
roleId: session[1],
|
|
1620
|
+
arn: identity.arn,
|
|
1621
|
+
role: role[2],
|
|
1622
|
+
session: role[3]
|
|
1623
|
+
};
|
|
1624
|
+
}
|
|
1625
|
+
/** The claims an `aws` binding matches, as the proof makes them. */
|
|
1626
|
+
function awsClaims(identity) {
|
|
1627
|
+
return {
|
|
1628
|
+
account: identity.account,
|
|
1629
|
+
role_id: identity.roleId
|
|
1630
|
+
};
|
|
1631
|
+
}
|
|
1632
|
+
/**
|
|
1633
|
+
* STS's answer held to a service's bindings: the oldest `aws` binding with
|
|
1634
|
+
* a policy that names its role's account and unique ID, and the claims the
|
|
1635
|
+
* session's entry gives, the role's ARN and session name with them. The
|
|
1636
|
+
* request named the session's key and this instance under its signature,
|
|
1637
|
+
* so nothing is spent, and nothing but its binding's hours ends the
|
|
1638
|
+
* session early.
|
|
1639
|
+
*/
|
|
1640
|
+
function matchAwsAnswer(answer, bindings) {
|
|
1641
|
+
const candidates = bindings.filter((binding) => binding.profile === "aws" && binding.issuer === PROFILE_URNS.aws && policyOf(binding) != null);
|
|
1642
|
+
if (candidates.length === 0) return { refused: "no_match" };
|
|
1643
|
+
const identity = assumedRole(answer);
|
|
1644
|
+
if ("refused" in identity) return identity;
|
|
1645
|
+
const binding = oldestMatching(candidates, awsClaims(identity));
|
|
1646
|
+
if (binding === null) return { refused: "no_match" };
|
|
1647
|
+
return {
|
|
1648
|
+
binding,
|
|
1649
|
+
claims: {
|
|
1650
|
+
...awsClaims(identity),
|
|
1651
|
+
arn: identity.arn,
|
|
1652
|
+
session: identity.session
|
|
1653
|
+
}
|
|
1654
|
+
};
|
|
1655
|
+
}
|
|
1656
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
1657
|
+
//#region src/identity/constraints.ts
|
|
1658
|
+
/**
|
|
1659
|
+
* A `narrow` child's limits (docs/design/workload-access.md, section 8.4):
|
|
1660
|
+
* the places, credentials, methods and path prefixes it may reach, each
|
|
1661
|
+
* left out for no limit of its own. A child holds the intersection of what
|
|
1662
|
+
* it asked and what its parent holds, computed when it is made and stored
|
|
1663
|
+
* under its row's MAC, and every operation it asks for is checked against
|
|
1664
|
+
* them by `constraintsAllow`, on the URL the proxy is about to send.
|
|
1665
|
+
*
|
|
1666
|
+
* parent { credentials: ['stripe', 'openai'] } child asks { credentials: ['stripe'], paths: ['/v1/refunds'] }
|
|
1667
|
+
* child { credentials: ['stripe'], paths: ['/v1/refunds'] }
|
|
1668
|
+
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds/re_1 allowed
|
|
1669
|
+
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refunds/%2e%2e/charges refused: it is /v1/charges once parsed
|
|
1670
|
+
* POST https://api.stripe.com/v1/refundsX refused: a prefix matches whole segments
|
|
1671
|
+
*/
|
|
1672
|
+
/** The most entries in each list. */
|
|
1673
|
+
const MAX_CONSTRAINTS = 32;
|
|
1674
|
+
/** A constraint that does not parse, said so the caller can fix it. */
|
|
1675
|
+
var ConstraintsInvalid = class extends Error {
|
|
1676
|
+
constructor(message) {
|
|
1677
|
+
super(message);
|
|
1678
|
+
this.name = "ConstraintsInvalid";
|
|
1679
|
+
}
|
|
1680
|
+
};
|
|
1681
|
+
const PLACE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}\/[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,62}(@me)?$/;
|
|
1682
|
+
/** A path segment as a constraint names one: no escape, no `;`, no dot segment. */
|
|
1683
|
+
const SEGMENT = /^[A-Za-z0-9\-_~!$&'()*+,=:@.]+$/;
|
|
1684
|
+
/**
|
|
1685
|
+
* What a path may not hold for a constrained session, since an upstream
|
|
1686
|
+
* might read a segment otherwise than coffre: an escaped `.`, `/` or `\`,
|
|
1687
|
+
* a `%25` (double encoding), or a `;`, raw or escaped
|
|
1688
|
+
* (`/v1/refunds/..;/charges` and `/v1/refunds/..%3b/charges` are
|
|
1689
|
+
* `/v1/charges` to Tomcat).
|
|
1690
|
+
*/
|
|
1691
|
+
const AMBIGUOUS = /%2e|%2f|%5c|%25|%3b|;/i;
|
|
1692
|
+
function list(value, what, valid) {
|
|
1693
|
+
if (value === void 0) return void 0;
|
|
1694
|
+
if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length > 32 || value.some((item) => typeof item !== "string" || !valid(item))) throw new ConstraintsInvalid(`${what} lists at most 32 of them`);
|
|
1695
|
+
return [...new Set(value)].sort();
|
|
1696
|
+
}
|
|
1697
|
+
function isPrefix(path) {
|
|
1698
|
+
if (path === "/") return true;
|
|
1699
|
+
if (!path.startsWith("/") || path.endsWith("/")) return false;
|
|
1700
|
+
return path.slice(1).split("/").every((segment) => SEGMENT.test(segment) && segment !== "." && segment !== "..");
|
|
1701
|
+
}
|
|
1702
|
+
/** Whether `path` is `prefix` or below it, by whole segments. */
|
|
1703
|
+
function under(path, prefix) {
|
|
1704
|
+
return prefix === "/" || path === prefix || path.startsWith(`${prefix}/`);
|
|
1705
|
+
}
|
|
1706
|
+
/**
|
|
1707
|
+
* Constraints as a child asks for them, checked and canonical: each list
|
|
1708
|
+
* sorted, without duplicates; methods as Fetch sends them; prefixes absolute,
|
|
1709
|
+
* with no trailing slash, escape, `;` or dot segment, and none under
|
|
1710
|
+
* another, which it would add nothing to. Throws `ConstraintsInvalid`.
|
|
1711
|
+
*/
|
|
1712
|
+
function checkConstraints(input) {
|
|
1713
|
+
if (typeof input !== "object" || input === null || Array.isArray(input)) throw new ConstraintsInvalid("constraints are an object");
|
|
1714
|
+
const { places, credentials, methods, paths, ...rest } = input;
|
|
1715
|
+
if (Object.keys(rest).length > 0) throw new ConstraintsInvalid(`constraints hold places, credentials, methods and paths, not ${Object.keys(rest).join(", ")}`);
|
|
1716
|
+
const checked = {};
|
|
1717
|
+
const placeList = list(places, "places", (place) => PLACE.test(place));
|
|
1718
|
+
const credentialList = list(credentials, "credentials", (name) => CREDENTIAL_NAME.test(name));
|
|
1719
|
+
const methodList = list(Array.isArray(methods) ? methods.map((method) => typeof method === "string" && METHOD_TOKEN.test(method) ? fetchMethod$1(method) : method) : methods, "methods", (method) => METHOD_TOKEN.test(method));
|
|
1720
|
+
const pathList = list(paths, "paths", isPrefix);
|
|
1721
|
+
if (placeList !== void 0) checked.places = placeList;
|
|
1722
|
+
if (credentialList !== void 0) checked.credentials = credentialList;
|
|
1723
|
+
if (methodList !== void 0) checked.methods = methodList;
|
|
1724
|
+
if (pathList !== void 0) checked.paths = outermost(pathList);
|
|
1725
|
+
return checked;
|
|
1726
|
+
}
|
|
1727
|
+
/** The prefixes no other one is above. */
|
|
1728
|
+
function outermost(paths) {
|
|
1729
|
+
return paths.filter((path) => !paths.some((other) => other !== path && under(path, other)));
|
|
1730
|
+
}
|
|
1731
|
+
function both(a, b) {
|
|
1732
|
+
if (a === void 0) return b;
|
|
1733
|
+
if (b === void 0) return a;
|
|
1734
|
+
return a.filter((item) => b.includes(item));
|
|
1735
|
+
}
|
|
1736
|
+
/**
|
|
1737
|
+
* What a child holds: what it asked within what its parent holds, list by
|
|
1738
|
+
* list, and for paths each prefix of one side that is under one of the
|
|
1739
|
+
* other's. A parent with none is a root, which only its scope bounds. Never
|
|
1740
|
+
* wider than either: whatever `intersect(a, b)` allows, `a` and `b` allow.
|
|
1741
|
+
*/
|
|
1742
|
+
function intersect(parent, child) {
|
|
1743
|
+
if (parent === null) return child;
|
|
1744
|
+
const result = {};
|
|
1745
|
+
const places = both(parent.places, child.places);
|
|
1746
|
+
const credentials = both(parent.credentials, child.credentials);
|
|
1747
|
+
const methods = both(parent.methods, child.methods);
|
|
1748
|
+
if (places !== void 0) result.places = places;
|
|
1749
|
+
if (credentials !== void 0) result.credentials = credentials;
|
|
1750
|
+
if (methods !== void 0) result.methods = methods;
|
|
1751
|
+
if (parent.paths === void 0 || child.paths === void 0) {
|
|
1752
|
+
const paths = parent.paths ?? child.paths;
|
|
1753
|
+
if (paths !== void 0) result.paths = paths;
|
|
1754
|
+
} else {
|
|
1755
|
+
const kept = [...child.paths.filter((path) => parent.paths.some((prefix) => under(path, prefix))), ...parent.paths.filter((path) => child.paths.some((prefix) => under(path, prefix)))];
|
|
1756
|
+
result.paths = outermost([...new Set(kept)].sort());
|
|
1757
|
+
}
|
|
1758
|
+
return result;
|
|
1759
|
+
}
|
|
1760
|
+
/** The constraints as a row's `constraints` column and its MAC hold them: `checkConstraints`'s keys in order. */
|
|
1761
|
+
function constraintsText(constraints) {
|
|
1762
|
+
const { places, credentials, methods, paths } = constraints;
|
|
1763
|
+
return JSON.stringify({
|
|
1764
|
+
places,
|
|
1765
|
+
credentials,
|
|
1766
|
+
methods,
|
|
1767
|
+
paths
|
|
1768
|
+
});
|
|
1769
|
+
}
|
|
1770
|
+
/**
|
|
1771
|
+
* Whether one operation is within the constraints: its place and credential
|
|
1772
|
+
* named, and, for one that sends a request upstream, its method and the
|
|
1773
|
+
* path of the URL it is about to send, as the WHATWG parser resolved it.
|
|
1774
|
+
* An operation with no request to check (`sign`, `verify`, `mint`, the
|
|
1775
|
+
* tunnel) is refused wherever methods or paths are limited: a constraint
|
|
1776
|
+
* that cannot be checked refuses.
|
|
1777
|
+
*/
|
|
1778
|
+
function constraintsAllow(constraints, operation) {
|
|
1779
|
+
if (constraints === null) return true;
|
|
1780
|
+
if (constraints.places !== void 0 && !constraints.places.includes(operation.place)) return false;
|
|
1781
|
+
if (constraints.credentials !== void 0 && !constraints.credentials.includes(operation.credential)) return false;
|
|
1782
|
+
if (constraints.methods === void 0 && constraints.paths === void 0) return true;
|
|
1783
|
+
if (operation.request === void 0) return false;
|
|
1784
|
+
if (constraints.methods !== void 0 && !(METHOD_TOKEN.test(operation.request.method) && constraints.methods.includes(fetchMethod$1(operation.request.method)))) return false;
|
|
1785
|
+
if (constraints.paths === void 0) return true;
|
|
1786
|
+
let path;
|
|
1787
|
+
try {
|
|
1788
|
+
path = new URL(String(operation.request.url)).pathname;
|
|
1789
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1790
|
+
return false;
|
|
1791
|
+
}
|
|
1792
|
+
if (AMBIGUOUS.test(path)) return false;
|
|
1793
|
+
return constraints.paths.some((prefix) => under(path, prefix));
|
|
1794
|
+
}
|
|
1795
|
+
//#endregion
|
|
1796
|
+
//#region src/identity/dpop.ts
|
|
1624
1797
|
/**
|
|
1625
|
-
*
|
|
1626
|
-
*
|
|
1627
|
-
*
|
|
1798
|
+
* Checking a workload's proof (docs/design/workload-access.md, section
|
|
1799
|
+
* 5.1): the verifying half of `@coffre/client/dpop`, whose canonicalization
|
|
1800
|
+
* it runs, so both sides agree on every byte. Cheapest first:
|
|
1801
|
+
*
|
|
1802
|
+
* 1. shape at most 2 KiB, `typ` exactly `dpop+jwt`, `alg` exactly `ES256`
|
|
1803
|
+
* 2. the key `jwk` exactly `kty`, `crv`, `x` and `y`, a point on P-256
|
|
1804
|
+
* 3. claims `jti` 16 bytes, `iat` an integer, `hdr` at most 32 names, none unsigned
|
|
1805
|
+
* (`parseProof`, no I/O)
|
|
1806
|
+
* 4. the session row, from the token's hash: the server's, between the two
|
|
1807
|
+
* 5. key and signature the thumbprint is the row's `jkt`, then ES256
|
|
1808
|
+
* 6. what was signed `htm`, `htu`, `ath`, `req`, then `iat` within ±300 s
|
|
1809
|
+
* (`verifyProof`)
|
|
1810
|
+
* 7. the gate's nonce and `jti`: the server's again (`Gate`)
|
|
1811
|
+
*
|
|
1812
|
+
* Each claim the caller expects (`ath` with a token, `hdr` and `req` with a
|
|
1813
|
+
* request's content) must be there, and one it does not expect must not.
|
|
1814
|
+
* Two signatures of one payload, `(r, s)` and `(r, n − s)`, both verify:
|
|
1815
|
+
* they carry one `jti`, which the gate takes once.
|
|
1628
1816
|
*/
|
|
1629
|
-
|
|
1630
|
-
|
|
1817
|
+
/** How far a proof's `iat` may be from now: the nonce, not the clock, is what makes a proof fresh. */
|
|
1818
|
+
const PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS = 300;
|
|
1819
|
+
const refuse = (reason, message) => ({
|
|
1820
|
+
ok: false,
|
|
1821
|
+
reason,
|
|
1822
|
+
message
|
|
1823
|
+
});
|
|
1824
|
+
const DECODER = new TextDecoder("utf-8", { fatal: true });
|
|
1825
|
+
const ENCODER = new TextEncoder();
|
|
1826
|
+
const HEADER_NAME = /^[!#$%&'*+.^_`|~0-9a-z-]+$/;
|
|
1827
|
+
const CLAIMS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
|
|
1631
1828
|
"jti",
|
|
1632
|
-
"
|
|
1633
|
-
"
|
|
1634
|
-
"
|
|
1635
|
-
"
|
|
1636
|
-
"
|
|
1637
|
-
"
|
|
1638
|
-
"
|
|
1639
|
-
|
|
1640
|
-
|
|
1641
|
-
|
|
1642
|
-
|
|
1643
|
-
|
|
1644
|
-
|
|
1645
|
-
|
|
1646
|
-
|
|
1647
|
-
|
|
1648
|
-
|
|
1649
|
-
"pipeline_id",
|
|
1650
|
-
"pipeline_source",
|
|
1651
|
-
"job_id",
|
|
1652
|
-
"kubernetes.io.pod.name"
|
|
1653
|
-
];
|
|
1654
|
-
const MAX_RUN_CLAIM = 256;
|
|
1655
|
-
/** A binding's `jwks_uri` when it carries its issuer's keys: the SHA-256 of those keys (`UploadedKeys`), where a fetched set's URL would be. */
|
|
1656
|
-
const UPLOADED_KEYS = "sha256:";
|
|
1657
|
-
/** The run's claims, as the issuer stated them: those that say which run, each bounded. */
|
|
1658
|
-
function runClaims(claims) {
|
|
1659
|
-
const run = {};
|
|
1660
|
-
for (const name of RUN_CLAIMS) {
|
|
1661
|
-
const value = claimAt(claims, name);
|
|
1662
|
-
if (typeof value === "string") run[name] = value.slice(0, MAX_RUN_CLAIM);
|
|
1663
|
-
else if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isFinite(value)) run[name] = value;
|
|
1829
|
+
"htm",
|
|
1830
|
+
"htu",
|
|
1831
|
+
"iat",
|
|
1832
|
+
"ath",
|
|
1833
|
+
"nonce",
|
|
1834
|
+
"hdr",
|
|
1835
|
+
"req"
|
|
1836
|
+
]);
|
|
1837
|
+
/** A part of the proof as a JSON object, or null for anything else. */
|
|
1838
|
+
function jsonPart(part) {
|
|
1839
|
+
const bytes = fromBase64url(part);
|
|
1840
|
+
if (bytes === null) return null;
|
|
1841
|
+
try {
|
|
1842
|
+
const value = JSON.parse(DECODER.decode(bytes));
|
|
1843
|
+
return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? value : null;
|
|
1844
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1845
|
+
return null;
|
|
1664
1846
|
}
|
|
1665
|
-
return run;
|
|
1666
1847
|
}
|
|
1667
|
-
|
|
1668
|
-
|
|
1669
|
-
if (typeof aud === "string") return aud;
|
|
1670
|
-
return Array.isArray(aud) && aud.length === 1 && typeof aud[0] === "string" ? aud[0] : null;
|
|
1848
|
+
function exactly(value, keys) {
|
|
1849
|
+
return Object.keys(value).length === keys.length && keys.every((key) => Object.hasOwn(value, key));
|
|
1671
1850
|
}
|
|
1672
|
-
|
|
1673
|
-
|
|
1674
|
-
|
|
1675
|
-
|
|
1676
|
-
|
|
1677
|
-
|
|
1678
|
-
|
|
1679
|
-
|
|
1680
|
-
|
|
1851
|
+
const isDigest = (value) => typeof value === "string" && fromBase64url(value)?.length === 32;
|
|
1852
|
+
/** Steps 1 to 3: the proof's shape, its key's and its claims', with no I/O. */
|
|
1853
|
+
function parseProof(proof) {
|
|
1854
|
+
if (proof.length > MAX_PROOF_LENGTH$1) return refuse("malformed", `a proof is at most ${MAX_PROOF_LENGTH$1} characters`);
|
|
1855
|
+
const parts = proof.split(".");
|
|
1856
|
+
if (parts.length !== 3) return refuse("malformed", "a proof is a compact JWS: three parts");
|
|
1857
|
+
const [headerPart, payloadPart, signaturePart] = parts;
|
|
1858
|
+
const header = jsonPart(headerPart);
|
|
1859
|
+
if (header === null || !exactly(header, [
|
|
1860
|
+
"typ",
|
|
1861
|
+
"alg",
|
|
1862
|
+
"jwk"
|
|
1863
|
+
]) || header.typ !== "dpop+jwt" || header.alg !== "ES256") return refuse("malformed", "a proof's header is exactly { typ: \"dpop+jwt\", alg: \"ES256\", jwk }");
|
|
1864
|
+
const jwk = header.jwk;
|
|
1865
|
+
if (typeof jwk !== "object" || jwk === null || Array.isArray(jwk) || !exactly(jwk, [
|
|
1866
|
+
"kty",
|
|
1867
|
+
"crv",
|
|
1868
|
+
"x",
|
|
1869
|
+
"y"
|
|
1870
|
+
]) || jwk.kty !== "EC" || jwk.crv !== "P-256" || !isCoordinate(jwk.x) || !isCoordinate(jwk.y)) return refuse("key", "a proof's key is a P-256 public key: exactly kty, crv, x and y");
|
|
1871
|
+
const signature = fromBase64url(signaturePart);
|
|
1872
|
+
if (signature === null || signature.length !== 64) return refuse("malformed", "an ES256 signature is 64 bytes, r then s");
|
|
1873
|
+
const claims = jsonPart(payloadPart);
|
|
1874
|
+
if (claims === null || Object.keys(claims).some((name) => !CLAIMS.has(name))) return refuse("malformed", "a proof's claims are jti, htm, htu, iat, and ath, nonce, hdr, req where they apply");
|
|
1875
|
+
if (typeof claims.jti !== "string" || fromBase64url(claims.jti)?.length !== 16) return refuse("malformed", "jti is 16 random bytes, in base64url");
|
|
1876
|
+
if (typeof claims.htm !== "string" || !METHOD_TOKEN.test(claims.htm)) return refuse("malformed", "htm is the request's method");
|
|
1877
|
+
if (typeof claims.htu !== "string") return refuse("malformed", "htu is the request's URL");
|
|
1878
|
+
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(claims.iat)) return refuse("malformed", "iat is an integer, in seconds");
|
|
1879
|
+
if (claims.ath !== void 0 && !isDigest(claims.ath)) return refuse("malformed", "ath is a SHA-256, in base64url");
|
|
1880
|
+
if (claims.nonce !== void 0 && (typeof claims.nonce !== "string" || !/^[\x21-\x7e]{1,128}$/.test(claims.nonce))) return refuse("malformed", "nonce is the one coffre gave");
|
|
1881
|
+
if (claims.hdr === void 0 !== (claims.req === void 0)) return refuse("malformed", "hdr and req come together");
|
|
1882
|
+
let hdr = null;
|
|
1883
|
+
if (claims.hdr !== void 0) {
|
|
1884
|
+
if (typeof claims.hdr !== "string" || !isDigest(claims.req)) return refuse("malformed", "hdr names headers, and req is a SHA-256");
|
|
1885
|
+
hdr = claims.hdr === "" ? [] : claims.hdr.split(" ");
|
|
1886
|
+
if (hdr.length > MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS$1) return refuse("malformed", `a proof signs at most ${MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS$1} headers`);
|
|
1887
|
+
if (hdr.some((name) => !HEADER_NAME.test(name) || UNSIGNED_HEADERS.has(name)) || new Set(hdr).size !== hdr.length) return refuse("malformed", "hdr names each header once, in lower case, and none the transport or the request to coffre owns");
|
|
1681
1888
|
}
|
|
1682
|
-
|
|
1683
|
-
|
|
1684
|
-
|
|
1685
|
-
|
|
1889
|
+
return {
|
|
1890
|
+
ok: true,
|
|
1891
|
+
jwk,
|
|
1892
|
+
claims,
|
|
1893
|
+
hdr,
|
|
1894
|
+
signingInput: `${headerPart}.${payloadPart}`,
|
|
1895
|
+
signature
|
|
1896
|
+
};
|
|
1897
|
+
}
|
|
1898
|
+
function isCoordinate(value) {
|
|
1899
|
+
return typeof value === "string" && fromBase64url(value)?.length === 32;
|
|
1686
1900
|
}
|
|
1687
1901
|
/**
|
|
1688
|
-
*
|
|
1689
|
-
*
|
|
1690
|
-
*
|
|
1691
|
-
* digest its seal covers (a key they lack is refused, never looked for),
|
|
1692
|
-
* its issuer, its audience (the instance it was made on, or, for a
|
|
1693
|
-
* platform whose caller names the session's key, that key: `jkt`, from the
|
|
1694
|
-
* DPoP proof the vault verified, never from the app), the token's times,
|
|
1695
|
-
* the binding's claims and its profile's rules. Throws `RunProofRefused`.
|
|
1902
|
+
* Steps 5 and 6: the proof against its request, `parseProof`'s first when
|
|
1903
|
+
* given a string. Nothing here reads a store, so the gate (step 7) still
|
|
1904
|
+
* decides whether this `jti` was seen.
|
|
1696
1905
|
*/
|
|
1697
|
-
async function
|
|
1698
|
-
|
|
1906
|
+
async function verifyProof(proof, expect) {
|
|
1907
|
+
const parsed = typeof proof === "string" ? parseProof(proof) : proof;
|
|
1908
|
+
if (!parsed.ok) return parsed;
|
|
1909
|
+
const { jwk, claims, hdr } = parsed;
|
|
1910
|
+
const jkt = await thumbprint$1(jwk);
|
|
1911
|
+
if (expect.jkt !== void 0 && jkt !== expect.jkt) return refuse("jkt", "the proof is signed by another key than the session's");
|
|
1912
|
+
let key;
|
|
1699
1913
|
try {
|
|
1700
|
-
|
|
1701
|
-
|
|
1702
|
-
|
|
1914
|
+
key = await crypto.subtle.importKey("jwk", {
|
|
1915
|
+
kty: jwk.kty,
|
|
1916
|
+
crv: jwk.crv,
|
|
1917
|
+
x: jwk.x,
|
|
1918
|
+
y: jwk.y
|
|
1919
|
+
}, {
|
|
1920
|
+
name: "ECDSA",
|
|
1921
|
+
namedCurve: "P-256"
|
|
1922
|
+
}, false, ["verify"]);
|
|
1923
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1924
|
+
return refuse("key", "the proof's key is no point on P-256");
|
|
1703
1925
|
}
|
|
1704
|
-
|
|
1705
|
-
|
|
1706
|
-
|
|
1707
|
-
|
|
1708
|
-
|
|
1709
|
-
|
|
1710
|
-
jkt: context.workload.jkt
|
|
1711
|
-
});
|
|
1712
|
-
const named = soleAudience(unverified.aud);
|
|
1713
|
-
const audience = named !== null && accepted.includes(named) ? named : accepted[0];
|
|
1714
|
-
const repeating = context.workload !== null && REPEATING_PROFILES.includes(binding.profile);
|
|
1715
|
-
const expected = {
|
|
1716
|
-
issuer: binding.issuer,
|
|
1717
|
-
audience,
|
|
1718
|
-
now: context.now,
|
|
1719
|
-
...repeating ? { maxAge: null } : {}
|
|
1720
|
-
};
|
|
1721
|
-
let claims;
|
|
1926
|
+
if (!await crypto.subtle.verify({
|
|
1927
|
+
name: "ECDSA",
|
|
1928
|
+
hash: "SHA-256"
|
|
1929
|
+
}, key, parsed.signature, ENCODER.encode(parsed.signingInput))) return refuse("signature", "the proof's signature does not verify");
|
|
1930
|
+
if (claims.htm !== fetchMethod$1(expect.method)) return refuse("htm", "the proof signs another method");
|
|
1931
|
+
let htu;
|
|
1722
1932
|
try {
|
|
1723
|
-
|
|
1724
|
-
|
|
1725
|
-
|
|
1726
|
-
...expected,
|
|
1727
|
-
maxLifetime: MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS
|
|
1728
|
-
});
|
|
1729
|
-
} catch (error) {
|
|
1730
|
-
if (error instanceof RunProofRefused) throw error;
|
|
1731
|
-
if (error instanceof WorkloadTokenRefused && error.reason === "unknown_key") throw new RunProofRefused("unknown_key", error.message, shownKid(header));
|
|
1732
|
-
throw refusedBy(error);
|
|
1733
|
-
}
|
|
1734
|
-
const differ = differingClaims(binding.profile, JSON.parse(binding.claims), claims);
|
|
1735
|
-
if (differ.length > 0) throw new RunProofRefused("no_match", `the binding does not trust these claims: ${differ.join(", ")} differ`);
|
|
1736
|
-
if (context.workload !== null) {
|
|
1737
|
-
const ruled = PROFILE_RULES[binding.profile]?.token(claims, {
|
|
1738
|
-
issuer: binding.issuer,
|
|
1739
|
-
claims: JSON.parse(binding.claims),
|
|
1740
|
-
policy
|
|
1741
|
-
}) ?? null;
|
|
1742
|
-
if (ruled !== null) throw new RunProofRefused("no_match", ruled);
|
|
1933
|
+
htu = canonicalHtu$1(expect.url);
|
|
1934
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1935
|
+
return refuse("htu", "the request's URL cannot be signed");
|
|
1743
1936
|
}
|
|
1744
|
-
|
|
1745
|
-
if (
|
|
1746
|
-
|
|
1747
|
-
|
|
1748
|
-
|
|
1749
|
-
|
|
1750
|
-
|
|
1751
|
-
|
|
1752
|
-
|
|
1753
|
-
|
|
1937
|
+
if (claims.htu !== htu) return refuse("htu", "the proof signs another URL");
|
|
1938
|
+
if (expect.token === void 0 !== (claims.ath === void 0)) return refuse("ath", expect.token === void 0 ? "this proof signs no token" : "the proof signs no token: ath");
|
|
1939
|
+
if (expect.token !== void 0 && claims.ath !== await tokenDigest(expect.token)) return refuse("ath", "the proof signs another token");
|
|
1940
|
+
if (expect.content === void 0 !== (hdr === null)) return refuse("req", expect.content === void 0 ? "this proof signs no request content" : "the proof signs no request content: hdr and req");
|
|
1941
|
+
if (expect.content !== void 0) {
|
|
1942
|
+
const headers = [];
|
|
1943
|
+
for (const name of hdr) {
|
|
1944
|
+
const value = expect.content.headers.get(name);
|
|
1945
|
+
if (value === null) return refuse("req", `the proof signs a header the request lacks: ${name}`);
|
|
1946
|
+
headers.push([name, value]);
|
|
1947
|
+
}
|
|
1948
|
+
let digest;
|
|
1949
|
+
try {
|
|
1950
|
+
digest = await requestDigest({
|
|
1951
|
+
...sentTarget$1(expect.url),
|
|
1952
|
+
headers,
|
|
1953
|
+
body: expect.content.body
|
|
1954
|
+
});
|
|
1955
|
+
} catch {
|
|
1956
|
+
return refuse("req", "the request cannot be signed: a line break in its path, query or headers");
|
|
1957
|
+
}
|
|
1958
|
+
if (claims.req !== digest) return refuse("req", "the proof signs another path as sent, query, header or body");
|
|
1754
1959
|
}
|
|
1755
|
-
const
|
|
1960
|
+
const skew = expect.skewSeconds ?? 300;
|
|
1961
|
+
const now = Math.floor((expect.now ?? Date.now()) / 1e3);
|
|
1962
|
+
if (Math.abs(now - claims.iat) > skew) return refuse("iat", `the proof was made more than ${skew} seconds from now`);
|
|
1756
1963
|
return {
|
|
1757
|
-
|
|
1758
|
-
|
|
1759
|
-
|
|
1760
|
-
|
|
1761
|
-
|
|
1964
|
+
ok: true,
|
|
1965
|
+
jkt,
|
|
1966
|
+
jti: claims.jti,
|
|
1967
|
+
nonce: claims.nonce ?? null,
|
|
1968
|
+
iat: claims.iat,
|
|
1969
|
+
hdr
|
|
1762
1970
|
};
|
|
1763
1971
|
}
|
|
1764
|
-
function refusedBy(error) {
|
|
1765
|
-
if (error instanceof WorkloadTokenRefused) return new RunProofRefused(error.reason, error.message);
|
|
1766
|
-
if (error instanceof RunProofRefused) return error;
|
|
1767
|
-
return new RunProofRefused("malformed", error?.message ?? "the token is not one coffre reads");
|
|
1768
|
-
}
|
|
1769
1972
|
//#endregion
|
|
1770
1973
|
//#region src/identity/signin/sealed.ts
|
|
1771
1974
|
const IV_BYTES = 12;
|
|
@@ -1831,9 +2034,11 @@ const PREFIX = {
|
|
|
1831
2034
|
personal: "coffre_pat_",
|
|
1832
2035
|
handle: "coffre_use_",
|
|
1833
2036
|
workload: "coffre_wl_",
|
|
1834
|
-
enrollment: "coffre_enr_"
|
|
2037
|
+
enrollment: "coffre_enr_",
|
|
2038
|
+
mcp: "coffre_mcp_",
|
|
2039
|
+
"mcp-refresh": "coffre_mcr_"
|
|
1835
2040
|
};
|
|
1836
|
-
const TOKEN = /^coffre_(web|cli|svc|pat|use|wl|enr)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
|
|
2041
|
+
const TOKEN = /^coffre_(web|cli|svc|pat|use|wl|enr|mcp|mcr)_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
|
|
1837
2042
|
function generateToken(kind) {
|
|
1838
2043
|
return PREFIX[kind] + randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
|
|
1839
2044
|
}
|
|
@@ -1874,34 +2079,91 @@ const ACCESS_JWT_HEADER = "cf-access-jwt-assertion";
|
|
|
1874
2079
|
* defaults to permitting whatever the key supports; we do not rely on that.
|
|
1875
2080
|
*/
|
|
1876
2081
|
const ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS = ["RS256", "ES256"];
|
|
2082
|
+
/** How long a key set is used before it is fetched again, and the least time between two fetches an unknown key asks for. */
|
|
2083
|
+
const KEYS_MAX_AGE_MS = 6e5;
|
|
2084
|
+
const REFETCH_COOLDOWN_MS = 3e4;
|
|
1877
2085
|
function asNonEmptyString(value) {
|
|
1878
2086
|
return typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0 ? value : null;
|
|
1879
2087
|
}
|
|
2088
|
+
/** The team's keys could not be fetched, or are no key set: no assertion can be checked, which is not the caller's fault. */
|
|
2089
|
+
var AccessKeysUnavailable = class extends Error {
|
|
2090
|
+
constructor(message, options) {
|
|
2091
|
+
super(message, options);
|
|
2092
|
+
this.name = "AccessKeysUnavailable";
|
|
2093
|
+
}
|
|
2094
|
+
};
|
|
2095
|
+
async function fetchJson(url) {
|
|
2096
|
+
const response = await fetch(url, {
|
|
2097
|
+
redirect: "manual",
|
|
2098
|
+
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5e3),
|
|
2099
|
+
headers: { accept: "application/json" }
|
|
2100
|
+
});
|
|
2101
|
+
if (response.status !== 200) {
|
|
2102
|
+
await response.body?.cancel();
|
|
2103
|
+
throw new Error(`${url.href} answered ${response.status}`);
|
|
2104
|
+
}
|
|
2105
|
+
return response.json();
|
|
2106
|
+
}
|
|
1880
2107
|
/**
|
|
1881
2108
|
* Verifies Cloudflare Access JWTs.
|
|
1882
2109
|
*
|
|
1883
2110
|
* Signature and claim verification of the token Access sends with each
|
|
1884
|
-
* request.
|
|
2111
|
+
* request. The team's keys are fetched when first needed, used for ten
|
|
2112
|
+
* minutes, and fetched again sooner for a key they lack, at most every 30
|
|
2113
|
+
* seconds. The verifier lives as long as its configuration (an isolate's,
|
|
2114
|
+
* on Workers) and keeps settled values only, never a fetch in flight
|
|
2115
|
+
* (AGENTS.md, "What an isolate keeps"): concurrent requests that find no
|
|
2116
|
+
* key set each fetch their own, and the last to land is kept. The 30
|
|
2117
|
+
* seconds count from the last refresh started, landed or not, and are
|
|
2118
|
+
* taken before it starts: of a burst of assertions naming a key the set
|
|
2119
|
+
* lacks, one fetches, and the others are refused as the key unknown.
|
|
1885
2120
|
*/
|
|
1886
2121
|
var AccessIdentityVerifier = class {
|
|
1887
2122
|
#config;
|
|
1888
|
-
#
|
|
1889
|
-
|
|
2123
|
+
#url;
|
|
2124
|
+
#json;
|
|
2125
|
+
#now;
|
|
2126
|
+
#keys = null;
|
|
2127
|
+
/** When a refresh for an unknown key last started: a number, settled the moment it starts. */
|
|
2128
|
+
#refreshed = Number.NEGATIVE_INFINITY;
|
|
2129
|
+
constructor(config, io = {}) {
|
|
1890
2130
|
this.#config = config;
|
|
1891
|
-
this.#
|
|
1892
|
-
|
|
1893
|
-
|
|
1894
|
-
});
|
|
2131
|
+
this.#url = new URL(config.jwksUrl);
|
|
2132
|
+
this.#json = io.json ?? fetchJson;
|
|
2133
|
+
this.#now = io.now ?? Date.now;
|
|
1895
2134
|
}
|
|
1896
2135
|
async verify(token) {
|
|
1897
2136
|
if (typeof token !== "string" || token.length === 0) throw new Error("missing or empty Access token");
|
|
1898
|
-
const {
|
|
2137
|
+
const { alg } = decodeProtectedHeader(token);
|
|
2138
|
+
if (!ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS.includes(alg)) throw new errors.JOSEAlgNotAllowed(`"alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter value not allowed`);
|
|
2139
|
+
const options = {
|
|
1899
2140
|
issuer: this.#config.issuer,
|
|
1900
2141
|
audience: this.#config.audience,
|
|
1901
2142
|
algorithms: [...ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS],
|
|
1902
2143
|
clockTolerance: this.#config.clockToleranceSeconds ?? 0
|
|
1903
|
-
}
|
|
1904
|
-
|
|
2144
|
+
};
|
|
2145
|
+
let keys = this.#keys;
|
|
2146
|
+
if (keys === null || this.#now() - keys.at >= KEYS_MAX_AGE_MS) keys = await this.#fetch();
|
|
2147
|
+
try {
|
|
2148
|
+
return toPrincipal((await jwtVerify(token, keys.set, options)).payload);
|
|
2149
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
2150
|
+
const now = this.#now();
|
|
2151
|
+
if (!(error instanceof errors.JWKSNoMatchingKey) || now - Math.max(keys.at, this.#refreshed) < REFETCH_COOLDOWN_MS) throw error;
|
|
2152
|
+
this.#refreshed = now;
|
|
2153
|
+
}
|
|
2154
|
+
return toPrincipal((await jwtVerify(token, (await this.#fetch()).set, options)).payload);
|
|
2155
|
+
}
|
|
2156
|
+
async #fetch() {
|
|
2157
|
+
let set;
|
|
2158
|
+
try {
|
|
2159
|
+
set = createLocalJWKSet(await this.#json(this.#url));
|
|
2160
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
2161
|
+
throw new AccessKeysUnavailable(`Cloudflare Access's keys could not be fetched from ${this.#url.href}`, { cause: error });
|
|
2162
|
+
}
|
|
2163
|
+
return this.#keys = {
|
|
2164
|
+
set,
|
|
2165
|
+
at: this.#now()
|
|
2166
|
+
};
|
|
1905
2167
|
}
|
|
1906
2168
|
};
|
|
1907
2169
|
/**
|
|
@@ -1934,4 +2196,4 @@ function toPrincipal(claims) {
|
|
|
1934
2196
|
throw new Error("token verified but carries no usable identity: expected common_name (service) or sub+email (user)");
|
|
1935
2197
|
}
|
|
1936
2198
|
//#endregion
|
|
1937
|
-
export { ACCESS_JWT_HEADER, AccessIdentityVerifier, BEARER_PROFILES, BindingInvalid, CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, CREDENTIAL_NAME, ConstraintsInvalid, EVENT_EXPOSURE,
|
|
2199
|
+
export { ACCESS_JWT_HEADER, AccessIdentityVerifier, AccessKeysUnavailable, BEARER_PROFILES, BindingInvalid, CARRIED, CLOCK_TOLERANCE_SECONDS, CREDENTIAL_NAME, ConstraintsInvalid, EVENT_EXPOSURE, GITHUB_EVENTS, GITHUB_ISSUER, GITLAB_ISSUER, GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, GOOGLE_ISSUER, GitHubApp, GitHubAppUnavailable, GitHubSigninProvider, KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, KeysInvalid, MAX_BINDINGS, MAX_CLAIMS, MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, MAX_CONSTRAINTS, MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, MAX_KEYS, MAX_LISTING_REQUESTS, MAX_PROOF_LENGTH, MAX_READ_KEYS, MAX_READ_PLACES, MAX_RUN_CLAIM, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS, MAX_SOURCES, MAX_TOKEN_AGE_SECONDS, MAX_TOKEN_BYTES, OIDC_PROFILES, OidcSigninProvider, POLICY_DEFAULTS, POLICY_FIELDS, PROFILE_RULES, PROFILE_URNS, PROOF_SKEW_SECONDS, REPEATING_PROFILES, REQUIRED_CLAIMS, RUN_CLAIMS, SigninError, TOKEN_MARGIN_MS, WORKLOAD_ALGORITHMS, WORKLOAD_PROFILES, WorkloadTokenRefused, addressWithin, assumedRole, audienceTried, audiencesOf, awsClaims, canonicalClaims, canonicalHtu, canonicalRequest, checkBinding, checkConstraints, checkFetchUrl, checkPolicy, claimAt, claimValues, cloudflareAccess, constraintsAllow, constraintsText, decodeWorkloadToken, defaultIssuer, defineSignin, deriveKey, differingClaims, expectedAudiences, fetchMethod, freezeTarget, fullRef, generateToken, github, githubApp, githubEventsAt, githubReusable, githubWorkflow, gitlabProject, google, hardEnd, hashToken, intersect, isBearerProfile, isCoffreToken, issuedRefusal, issues, keySummaries, lifetime, matchAwsAnswer, matchIdToken, microsoft, oidc, oldestMatching, parseAddress, parseCidr, parseProof, pkcs8Of, policyOf, policyText, profileRefusal, publicOrigin, readIdToken, runClaims, seal, sentTarget, sessionRefusal, signatureRefusal, signin, soleAudience, spends, thumbprint, timesRefusal, toPrincipal, tokenHint, tokenKind, unseal, uploadedKeys, verifyProof, verifyWorkloadToken, workflowRef };
|