@coffre/core 0.14.5 → 0.15.0

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@@ -610,12 +610,39 @@ function delegableRoles(policy = DEFAULT_POLICY) {
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  }
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  /** The roles a personal token's scope may name, as they ship. */
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  const DELEGABLE_ROLES = delegableRoles();
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+ /** What a handle reads and uses, and no more: it writes nothing. */
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+ const HANDLE_HOLDS = {
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+ name: "Handle",
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+ description: "Read and use, as its person does.",
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+ permissions: ["secret.read", "secret.use"],
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+ protected: ["secret.read", "secret.use"]
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+ };
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+ /**
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+ * The roles a handle's scope is issued under (the server's `issueHandle`; the vault holds a handle's columns to them, T149): each place
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+ * keeps what its person holds there, in each column, of reading and using
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+ * (`issuedGrant`, capped by `heldColumns`), whatever an Owner made of the
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+ * roles. `viewer` names a place its person reads, `contributor` one they
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+ * only use.
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+ *
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+ * an Owner, at a protected prod read, use / read, use
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+ * a Developer, at the same read, use / use
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+ */
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+ const HANDLE_POLICY = {
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+ ...DEFAULT_POLICY,
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+ roles: {
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+ ...ROLES,
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+ viewer: HANDLE_HOLDS,
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+ contributor: HANDLE_HOLDS
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+ }
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+ };
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  /**
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  * The longest a personal token lasts: a week. It is for an afternoon's
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  * script or agent, and whoever needs it longer makes another, as a person,
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  * rather than keep one around.
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  */
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  const MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES = 10080;
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+ /** The longest a service account's token lives, in days. The vault holds an issue to it (T149). */
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+ const MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS = 366;
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  /**
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  * How long a `coffre login` code waits to be approved. The server expires it
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  * then, and the CLI's sign-in hint says so before it has asked for one.
@@ -798,6 +825,66 @@ function scopeWithReads(scope, reads, projectOf) {
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  return result;
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  }
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  /**
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+ * A scope as a token's or binding's row stores it, under its MAC: its
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+ * grants as JSON, by place, each with what its role held when it was
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+ * issued (`issuedGrant`), so that a role widened later widens no credential,
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+ * and, a service's, whether it reads the sensitive values there.
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+ */
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+ function storedScope(scope, { reads = false } = {}) {
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+ const key = (grant) => `${grant.projectId}/${grant.environmentId ?? ""}`;
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+ return JSON.stringify([...scope].sort((a, b) => key(a) < key(b) ? -1 : key(a) > key(b) ? 1 : 0).map((grant) => {
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+ const { permissions, protected: guarded } = scopeDefinition(grant);
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+ return {
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+ projectId: grant.projectId,
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+ environmentId: grant.environmentId,
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+ role: grant.role,
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+ permissions: {
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+ normal: [...permissions],
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+ protected: [...guarded]
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+ },
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+ ...grant.sensitive === void 0 ? {} : { sensitive: grant.sensitive },
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+ ...!reads || grant.reads === void 0 ? {} : { reads: grant.reads }
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+ };
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+ }));
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * The scope a row stores: null for one 0.4 made, not sealed yet, which
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+ * reaches all its account holds, as then. One its MAC checked but that
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+ * does not read as a scope reaches nothing.
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+ */
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+ function readScope(stored) {
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+ if (stored === null) return null;
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+ let parsed = null;
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+ try {
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+ parsed = JSON.parse(stored);
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+ } catch {}
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+ return isCredentialScope(parsed) ? parsed : [];
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * What a session reaches, as its caller holds it: its row's scope, an
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+ * enrollment code's, or else its binding's, never null, with its binding's
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+ * `reads` on the grants of the environments they list (`scopeWithReads`).
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+ * Binding creation gives each such environment a grant of its own, so the
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+ * scope itself says each one's project, with nothing to look up. A grant
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+ * without `reads` is use-only, there.
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+ */
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+ function sessionScope(row, binding, policy) {
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+ const scope = readScope(row.scope ?? binding.scope) ?? [];
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+ const projectOf = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
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+ for (const { projectId, environmentId } of scope) if (environmentId != null && projectId !== null) projectOf.set(environmentId, projectId);
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+ return scopeWithReads(scope, policy.reads, projectOf);
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+ }
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+ /**
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+ * A workload session's scope as its row stores it with 0.15's log: what its
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+ * uses hold (`sessionScope`), its binding's per-key reads included, so that
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+ * its object, all a 0.15 use decides on, is no wider than what 0.14 decides
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+ * on from its binding. The vault makes it from the binding's columns too,
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+ * for the session it signs in (T149).
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+ */
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+ function sealedSessionScope(scope, binding, policy) {
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+ return storedScope(sessionScope({ scope }, binding, policy), { reads: true });
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+ }
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+ /**
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  * Whether the actor may give or take grants at this place: with
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  * `grant.manage` there, from a project grant or an instance role whose
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  * scope takes it in. A grant on a project reaches all its environments, so
@@ -910,4 +997,4 @@ function makesProjects(holder) {
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  return holder.credentialScope == null && administers(holder.role) && environments === "all" && (projects === "all" || "except" in projects);
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  }
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  //#endregion
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- export { roleGrants as $, guarded as A, issuedGrant as B, credentialScopeInWords as C, delegableRoles as D, delegable as E, isBuiltinRole as F, normalDefinition as G, makesProjects as H, isCredentialScope as I, ownsProject as J, normalScope as K, isInstanceRole as L, holds as M, inScope as N, givesService as O, instanceRoleGrants as P, readsWholeLog as Q, isRole as R, covers as S, definitionProblem as T, managesService as U, issuesCredential as V, mayManageAccess as W, protects as X, protectedWithin as Y, readsSensitive as Z, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS as _, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT as a, unscoped as at, allows as b, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES as c, convertEveryProjectGrants as ct, NOTHING as d, runsInstance as et, PERMISSIONS as f, ROLE_NAMES as g, ROLE_ID as h, EVERYWHERE as i, setsUpServices as it, heldColumns as j, grantKind as k, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES as l, ROLES as m, DELEGABLE_ROLES as n, scopeInWords as nt, FIXED_ROLES as o, useOnly as ot, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS as p, ownsInstance as q, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS as r, scopeWithReads as rt, INSTANCE_ROLES as s, withinCredential as st, DEFAULT_POLICY as t, scopeDefinition as tt, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES as u, administers as v, definitionOf as w, assignableToEnvironment as x, admits as y, isScope as z };
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+ export { protects as $, delegableRoles as A, isInstanceRole as B, allows as C, definitionOf as D, credentialScopeInWords as E, holds as F, makesProjects as G, isScope as H, inScope as I, normalDefinition as J, managesService as K, instanceRoleGrants as L, grantKind as M, guarded as N, definitionProblem as O, heldColumns as P, protectedWithin as Q, isBuiltinRole as R, admits as S, covers as T, issuedGrant as U, isRole as V, issuesCredential as W, ownsInstance as X, normalScope as Y, ownsProject as Z, ROLES as _, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT as a, scopeDefinition as at, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS as b, HANDLE_POLICY as c, sealedSessionScope as ct, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES as d, storedScope as dt, readScope as et, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES as f, unscoped as ft, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS as g, PERMISSIONS as h, convertEveryProjectGrants as ht, EVERYWHERE as i, runsInstance as it, givesService as j, delegable as k, INSTANCE_ROLES as l, sessionScope as lt, NOTHING as m, withinCredential as mt, DELEGABLE_ROLES as n, readsWholeLog as nt, FIXED_ROLES as o, scopeInWords as ot, MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS as p, useOnly as pt, mayManageAccess as q, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS as r, roleGrants as rt, HANDLE_HOLDS as s, scopeWithReads as st, DEFAULT_POLICY as t, readsSensitive as tt, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES as u, setsUpServices as ut, ROLE_ID as v, assignableToEnvironment as w, administers as x, ROLE_NAMES as y, isCredentialScope as z };
@@ -497,12 +497,27 @@ declare function delegable(role: Role, policy?: Policy): boolean;
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  declare function delegableRoles(policy?: Policy): Role[];
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  /** The roles a personal token's scope may name, as they ship. */
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  declare const DELEGABLE_ROLES: readonly Role[];
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+ /** What a handle reads and uses, and no more: it writes nothing. */
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+ declare const HANDLE_HOLDS: RoleDefinition;
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+ /**
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+ * The roles a handle's scope is issued under (the server's `issueHandle`; the vault holds a handle's columns to them, T149): each place
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+ * keeps what its person holds there, in each column, of reading and using
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+ * (`issuedGrant`, capped by `heldColumns`), whatever an Owner made of the
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+ * roles. `viewer` names a place its person reads, `contributor` one they
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+ * only use.
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+ *
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+ * an Owner, at a protected prod read, use / read, use
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+ * a Developer, at the same read, use / use
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+ */
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+ declare const HANDLE_POLICY: Policy;
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  /**
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  * The longest a personal token lasts: a week. It is for an afternoon's
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  * script or agent, and whoever needs it longer makes another, as a person,
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  * rather than keep one around.
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  */
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  declare const MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES: number;
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+ /** The longest a service account's token lives, in days. The vault holds an issue to it (T149). */
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+ declare const MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS = 366;
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  /**
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  * How long a `coffre login` code waits to be approved. The server expires it
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  * then, and the CLI's sign-in hint says so before it has asked for one.
@@ -641,6 +656,52 @@ declare function useOnly(holder: Holdings, key: HeldKey): boolean;
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  declare function scopeWithReads(scope: CredentialScope, reads: Readonly<Record<string, {
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  readonly keys?: readonly string[] | '*';
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  }>> | undefined, projectOf: ReadonlyMap<string, string>): CredentialScope;
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+ /**
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+ * A scope as a token's or binding's row stores it, under its MAC: its
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+ * grants as JSON, by place, each with what its role held when it was
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+ * issued (`issuedGrant`), so that a role widened later widens no credential,
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+ * and, a service's, whether it reads the sensitive values there.
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+ */
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+ declare function storedScope(scope: CredentialScope, { reads }?: {
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+ reads?: boolean;
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+ }): string;
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+ /**
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+ * The scope a row stores: null for one 0.4 made, not sealed yet, which
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+ * reaches all its account holds, as then. One its MAC checked but that
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+ * does not read as a scope reaches nothing.
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+ */
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+ declare function readScope(stored: string | null): CredentialScope | null;
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+ /** What a workload binding's policy lists of reads, by environment id (`BindingPolicy['reads']`). */
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+ type ListedReads = Readonly<Record<string, {
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+ readonly keys?: readonly string[] | '*';
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+ }>>;
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+ /**
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+ * What a session reaches, as its caller holds it: its row's scope, an
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+ * enrollment code's, or else its binding's, never null, with its binding's
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+ * `reads` on the grants of the environments they list (`scopeWithReads`).
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+ * Binding creation gives each such environment a grant of its own, so the
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+ * scope itself says each one's project, with nothing to look up. A grant
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+ * without `reads` is use-only, there.
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+ */
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+ declare function sessionScope(row: {
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+ scope: string | null;
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+ }, binding: {
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+ scope: string | null;
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+ }, policy: {
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+ reads?: ListedReads;
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+ }): CredentialScope;
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+ /**
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+ * A workload session's scope as its row stores it with 0.15's log: what its
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+ * uses hold (`sessionScope`), its binding's per-key reads included, so that
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+ * its object, all a 0.15 use decides on, is no wider than what 0.14 decides
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+ * on from its binding. The vault makes it from the binding's columns too,
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+ * for the session it signs in (T149).
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+ */
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+ declare function sealedSessionScope(scope: string | null, binding: {
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+ scope: string | null;
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+ }, policy: {
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+ reads?: ListedReads;
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+ }): string;
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  /**
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  * Whether the actor may give or take grants at this place: with
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  * `grant.manage` there, from a project grant or an instance role whose
@@ -736,4 +797,4 @@ declare function readsWholeLog(holder: Holdings): boolean;
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  */
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  declare function makesProjects(holder: Holdings): boolean;
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  //#endregion
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- export { isBuiltinRole as $, RoleDefinition as A, Narrowed as At, covers as B, Permission as C, unscoped as Ct, ROLE_ID as D, ConversionInput as Dt, ROLES as E, Conversion as Et, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS as F, delegableRoles as G, definitionOf as H, administers as I, guarded as J, givesService as K, admits as L, ScopeGrant as M, ServiceAccount as N, ROLE_NAMES as O, ConvertedGrant as Ot, ServiceSetting as P, instanceRoleGrants as Q, allows as R, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS as S, setsUpServices as St, Policy as T, withinCredential as Tt, definitionProblem as U, credentialScopeInWords as V, delegable as W, holds as X, heldColumns as Y, inScope as Z, InstanceRole as _, roleGrants as _t, DEFAULT_POLICY as a, issuesCredential as at, NOTHING as b, scopeInWords as bt, EVERYWHERE as c, mayManageAccess as ct, Filter as d, ownsInstance as dt, isCredentialScope as et, GrantPlace as f, ownsProject as ft, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES as g, readsWholeLog as gt, INSTANCE_ROLES as h, readsSensitive as ht, CredentialScope as i, issuedGrant as it, Scope as j, convertEveryProjectGrants as jt, Role as k, EveryProjectGrant as kt, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT as l, normalDefinition as lt, Holdings as m, protects as mt, CallerKind as n, isRole as nt, DELEGABLE_ROLES as o, makesProjects as ot, HeldKey as p, protectedWithin as pt, grantKind as q, Columns as r, isScope as rt, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS as s, managesService as st, BuiltinRole as t, isInstanceRole as tt, FIXED_ROLES as u, normalScope as ut, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES as v, runsInstance as vt, Place as w, useOnly as wt, PERMISSIONS as x, scopeWithReads as xt, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES as y, scopeDefinition as yt, assignableToEnvironment as z };
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+ export { holds as $, ROLE_ID as A, unscoped as At, admits as B, NOTHING as C, scopeDefinition as Ct, Place as D, sessionScope as Dt, Permission as E, sealedSessionScope as Et, ScopeGrant as F, ConvertedGrant as Ft, definitionOf as G, assignableToEnvironment as H, ServiceAccount as I, EveryProjectGrant as It, delegableRoles as J, definitionProblem as K, ServiceSetting as L, Narrowed as Lt, Role as M, withinCredential as Mt, RoleDefinition as N, Conversion as Nt, Policy as O, setsUpServices as Ot, Scope as P, ConversionInput as Pt, heldColumns as Q, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS as R, convertEveryProjectGrants as Rt, MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS as S, runsInstance as St, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS as T, scopeWithReads as Tt, covers as U, allows as V, credentialScopeInWords as W, grantKind as X, givesService as Y, guarded as Z, INSTANCE_ROLES as _, protects as _t, DEFAULT_POLICY as a, isRole as at, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES as b, readsWholeLog as bt, EVERYWHERE as c, issuesCredential as ct, Filter as d, mayManageAccess as dt, inScope as et, GrantPlace as f, normalDefinition as ft, Holdings as g, protectedWithin as gt, HeldKey as h, ownsProject as ht, CredentialScope as i, isInstanceRole as it, ROLE_NAMES as j, useOnly as jt, ROLES as k, storedScope as kt, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT as l, makesProjects as lt, HANDLE_POLICY as m, ownsInstance as mt, CallerKind as n, isBuiltinRole as nt, DELEGABLE_ROLES as o, isScope as ot, HANDLE_HOLDS as p, normalScope as pt, delegable as q, Columns as r, isCredentialScope as rt, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS as s, issuedGrant as st, BuiltinRole as t, instanceRoleGrants as tt, FIXED_ROLES as u, managesService as ut, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES as v, readScope as vt, PERMISSIONS as w, scopeInWords as wt, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES as x, roleGrants as xt, InstanceRole as y, readsSensitive as yt, administers as z };
package/dist/access.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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- import { $ as isBuiltinRole, A as RoleDefinition, At as Narrowed, B as covers, C as Permission, Ct as unscoped, D as ROLE_ID, Dt as ConversionInput, E as ROLES, Et as Conversion, F as UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, G as delegableRoles, H as definitionOf, I as administers, J as guarded, K as givesService, L as admits, M as ScopeGrant, N as ServiceAccount, O as ROLE_NAMES, Ot as ConvertedGrant, P as ServiceSetting, Q as instanceRoleGrants, R as allows, S as PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, St as setsUpServices, T as Policy, Tt as withinCredential, U as definitionProblem, V as credentialScopeInWords, W as delegable, X as holds, Y as heldColumns, Z as inScope, _ as InstanceRole, _t as roleGrants, a as DEFAULT_POLICY, at as issuesCredential, b as NOTHING, bt as scopeInWords, c as EVERYWHERE, ct as mayManageAccess, d as Filter, dt as ownsInstance, et as isCredentialScope, f as GrantPlace, ft as ownsProject, g as INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, gt as readsWholeLog, h as INSTANCE_ROLES, ht as readsSensitive, i as CredentialScope, it as issuedGrant, j as Scope, jt as convertEveryProjectGrants, k as Role, kt as EveryProjectGrant, l as EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, lt as normalDefinition, m as Holdings, mt as protects, n as CallerKind, nt as isRole, o as DELEGABLE_ROLES, ot as makesProjects, p as HeldKey, pt as protectedWithin, q as grantKind, r as Columns, rt as isScope, s as DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, st as managesService, t as BuiltinRole, tt as isInstanceRole, u as FIXED_ROLES, ut as normalScope, v as MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, vt as runsInstance, w as Place, wt as useOnly, x as PERMISSIONS, xt as scopeWithReads, y as MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, yt as scopeDefinition, z as assignableToEnvironment } from "./access-qkMZa-6Z.js";
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- export { BuiltinRole, CallerKind, Columns, type Conversion, type ConversionInput, type ConvertedGrant, CredentialScope, DEFAULT_POLICY, DELEGABLE_ROLES, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, EVERYWHERE, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, type EveryProjectGrant, FIXED_ROLES, Filter, GrantPlace, HeldKey, Holdings, INSTANCE_ROLES, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, InstanceRole, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, NOTHING, type Narrowed, PERMISSIONS, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, Permission, Place, Policy, ROLES, ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAMES, Role, RoleDefinition, Scope, ScopeGrant, ServiceAccount, ServiceSetting, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, administers, admits, allows, assignableToEnvironment, convertEveryProjectGrants, covers, credentialScopeInWords, definitionOf, definitionProblem, delegable, delegableRoles, givesService, grantKind, guarded, heldColumns, holds, inScope, instanceRoleGrants, isBuiltinRole, isCredentialScope, isInstanceRole, isRole, isScope, issuedGrant, issuesCredential, makesProjects, managesService, mayManageAccess, normalDefinition, normalScope, ownsInstance, ownsProject, protectedWithin, protects, readsSensitive, readsWholeLog, roleGrants, runsInstance, scopeDefinition, scopeInWords, scopeWithReads, setsUpServices, unscoped, useOnly, withinCredential };
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+ import { $ as holds, A as ROLE_ID, At as unscoped, B as admits, C as NOTHING, Ct as scopeDefinition, D as Place, Dt as sessionScope, E as Permission, Et as sealedSessionScope, F as ScopeGrant, Ft as ConvertedGrant, G as definitionOf, H as assignableToEnvironment, I as ServiceAccount, It as EveryProjectGrant, J as delegableRoles, K as definitionProblem, L as ServiceSetting, Lt as Narrowed, M as Role, Mt as withinCredential, N as RoleDefinition, Nt as Conversion, O as Policy, Ot as setsUpServices, P as Scope, Pt as ConversionInput, Q as heldColumns, R as UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, Rt as convertEveryProjectGrants, S as MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS, St as runsInstance, T as PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, Tt as scopeWithReads, U as covers, V as allows, W as credentialScopeInWords, X as grantKind, Y as givesService, Z as guarded, _ as INSTANCE_ROLES, _t as protects, a as DEFAULT_POLICY, at as isRole, b as MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, bt as readsWholeLog, c as EVERYWHERE, ct as issuesCredential, d as Filter, dt as mayManageAccess, et as inScope, f as GrantPlace, ft as normalDefinition, g as Holdings, gt as protectedWithin, h as HeldKey, ht as ownsProject, i as CredentialScope, it as isInstanceRole, j as ROLE_NAMES, jt as useOnly, k as ROLES, kt as storedScope, l as EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, lt as makesProjects, m as HANDLE_POLICY, mt as ownsInstance, n as CallerKind, nt as isBuiltinRole, o as DELEGABLE_ROLES, ot as isScope, p as HANDLE_HOLDS, pt as normalScope, q as delegable, r as Columns, rt as isCredentialScope, s as DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, st as issuedGrant, t as BuiltinRole, tt as instanceRoleGrants, u as FIXED_ROLES, ut as managesService, v as INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, vt as readScope, w as PERMISSIONS, wt as scopeInWords, x as MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, xt as roleGrants, y as InstanceRole, yt as readsSensitive, z as administers } from "./access-DqLJjnLM.js";
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+ export { BuiltinRole, CallerKind, Columns, type Conversion, type ConversionInput, type ConvertedGrant, CredentialScope, DEFAULT_POLICY, DELEGABLE_ROLES, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, EVERYWHERE, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, type EveryProjectGrant, FIXED_ROLES, Filter, GrantPlace, HANDLE_HOLDS, HANDLE_POLICY, HeldKey, Holdings, INSTANCE_ROLES, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, InstanceRole, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS, NOTHING, type Narrowed, PERMISSIONS, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, Permission, Place, Policy, ROLES, ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAMES, Role, RoleDefinition, Scope, ScopeGrant, ServiceAccount, ServiceSetting, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, administers, admits, allows, assignableToEnvironment, convertEveryProjectGrants, covers, credentialScopeInWords, definitionOf, definitionProblem, delegable, delegableRoles, givesService, grantKind, guarded, heldColumns, holds, inScope, instanceRoleGrants, isBuiltinRole, isCredentialScope, isInstanceRole, isRole, isScope, issuedGrant, issuesCredential, makesProjects, managesService, mayManageAccess, normalDefinition, normalScope, ownsInstance, ownsProject, protectedWithin, protects, readScope, readsSensitive, readsWholeLog, roleGrants, runsInstance, scopeDefinition, scopeInWords, scopeWithReads, sealedSessionScope, sessionScope, setsUpServices, storedScope, unscoped, useOnly, withinCredential };
package/dist/access.js CHANGED
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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- import { $ as roleGrants, A as guarded, B as issuedGrant, C as credentialScopeInWords, D as delegableRoles, E as delegable, F as isBuiltinRole, G as normalDefinition, H as makesProjects, I as isCredentialScope, J as ownsProject, K as normalScope, L as isInstanceRole, M as holds, N as inScope, O as givesService, P as instanceRoleGrants, Q as readsWholeLog, R as isRole, S as covers, T as definitionProblem, U as managesService, V as issuesCredential, W as mayManageAccess, X as protects, Y as protectedWithin, Z as readsSensitive, _ as UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, a as EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, at as unscoped, b as allows, c as INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, ct as convertEveryProjectGrants, d as NOTHING, et as runsInstance, f as PERMISSIONS, g as ROLE_NAMES, h as ROLE_ID, i as EVERYWHERE, it as setsUpServices, j as heldColumns, k as grantKind, l as MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, m as ROLES, n as DELEGABLE_ROLES, nt as scopeInWords, o as FIXED_ROLES, ot as useOnly, p as PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, q as ownsInstance, r as DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, rt as scopeWithReads, s as INSTANCE_ROLES, st as withinCredential, t as DEFAULT_POLICY, tt as scopeDefinition, u as MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, v as administers, w as definitionOf, x as assignableToEnvironment, y as admits, z as isScope } from "./access-BrdZKp1d.js";
2
- export { DEFAULT_POLICY, DELEGABLE_ROLES, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, EVERYWHERE, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, FIXED_ROLES, INSTANCE_ROLES, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, NOTHING, PERMISSIONS, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, ROLES, ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAMES, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, administers, admits, allows, assignableToEnvironment, convertEveryProjectGrants, covers, credentialScopeInWords, definitionOf, definitionProblem, delegable, delegableRoles, givesService, grantKind, guarded, heldColumns, holds, inScope, instanceRoleGrants, isBuiltinRole, isCredentialScope, isInstanceRole, isRole, isScope, issuedGrant, issuesCredential, makesProjects, managesService, mayManageAccess, normalDefinition, normalScope, ownsInstance, ownsProject, protectedWithin, protects, readsSensitive, readsWholeLog, roleGrants, runsInstance, scopeDefinition, scopeInWords, scopeWithReads, setsUpServices, unscoped, useOnly, withinCredential };
1
+ import { $ as protects, A as delegableRoles, B as isInstanceRole, C as allows, D as definitionOf, E as credentialScopeInWords, F as holds, G as makesProjects, H as isScope, I as inScope, J as normalDefinition, K as managesService, L as instanceRoleGrants, M as grantKind, N as guarded, O as definitionProblem, P as heldColumns, Q as protectedWithin, R as isBuiltinRole, S as admits, T as covers, U as issuedGrant, V as isRole, W as issuesCredential, X as ownsInstance, Y as normalScope, Z as ownsProject, _ as ROLES, a as EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, at as scopeDefinition, b as UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, c as HANDLE_POLICY, ct as sealedSessionScope, d as MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, dt as storedScope, et as readScope, f as MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, ft as unscoped, g as PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, h as PERMISSIONS, ht as convertEveryProjectGrants, i as EVERYWHERE, it as runsInstance, j as givesService, k as delegable, l as INSTANCE_ROLES, lt as sessionScope, m as NOTHING, mt as withinCredential, n as DELEGABLE_ROLES, nt as readsWholeLog, o as FIXED_ROLES, ot as scopeInWords, p as MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS, pt as useOnly, q as mayManageAccess, r as DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, rt as roleGrants, s as HANDLE_HOLDS, st as scopeWithReads, t as DEFAULT_POLICY, tt as readsSensitive, u as INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, ut as setsUpServices, v as ROLE_ID, w as assignableToEnvironment, x as administers, y as ROLE_NAMES, z as isCredentialScope } from "./access-CgQTlUMz.js";
2
+ export { DEFAULT_POLICY, DELEGABLE_ROLES, DEVICE_TTL_SECONDS, EVERYWHERE, EVERY_ENVIRONMENT, FIXED_ROLES, HANDLE_HOLDS, HANDLE_POLICY, INSTANCE_ROLES, INSTANCE_ROLE_NAMES, MAX_PERSONAL_TOKEN_MINUTES, MAX_SCOPE_PLACES, MAX_SERVICE_TOKEN_DAYS, NOTHING, PERMISSIONS, PROJECT_ONLY_PERMISSIONS, ROLES, ROLE_ID, ROLE_NAMES, UNWRITTEN_FORK_MS, administers, admits, allows, assignableToEnvironment, convertEveryProjectGrants, covers, credentialScopeInWords, definitionOf, definitionProblem, delegable, delegableRoles, givesService, grantKind, guarded, heldColumns, holds, inScope, instanceRoleGrants, isBuiltinRole, isCredentialScope, isInstanceRole, isRole, isScope, issuedGrant, issuesCredential, makesProjects, managesService, mayManageAccess, normalDefinition, normalScope, ownsInstance, ownsProject, protectedWithin, protects, readScope, readsSensitive, readsWholeLog, roleGrants, runsInstance, scopeDefinition, scopeInWords, scopeWithReads, sealedSessionScope, sessionScope, setsUpServices, storedScope, unscoped, useOnly, withinCredential };
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1
- import { $ as parseAddress, A as REPEATING_PROFILES, B as checkFetchUrl, C as MAX_READ_PLACES, D as POLICY_FIELDS, E as POLICY_DEFAULTS, F as WorkloadCaller, G as differingClaims, H as claimAt, I as WorkloadProfile, J as githubEventsAt, K as freezeTarget, L as addressWithin, M as Starts, N as WORKLOAD_PROFILES, O as PROFILE_URNS, P as WorkloadAlert, Q as isBearerProfile, R as canonicalClaims, S as MAX_READ_KEYS, T as OIDC_PROFILES, U as claimValues, V as checkPolicy, W as defaultIssuer, X as githubWorkflow, Y as githubReusable, Z as gitlabProject, _ as KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, a as BindingPolicy, at as MAX_CONSTRAINTS, b as MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, c as CheckedBinding, ct as constraintsText, d as EVENT_EXPOSURE, et as parseCidr, f as GITHUB_EVENTS, g as GOOGLE_ISSUER, h as GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, i as BindingInvalid, it as ConstraintsInvalid, j as REQUIRED_CLAIMS, k as Preset, l as Cidr, lt as intersect, m as GITLAB_ISSUER, n as BearerProfile, nt as workflowRef, o as BindingReads, ot as checkConstraints, p as GITHUB_ISSUER, q as fullRef, r as BindingClaims, rt as Constraints, s as CREDENTIAL_NAME, st as constraintsAllow, t as BEARER_PROFILES, tt as policyText, u as ClaimValue, v as MAX_BINDINGS, w as MAX_SOURCES, x as MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, y as MAX_CLAIMS, z as checkBinding } from "./workloads-CW2dK4AW.js";
1
+ import { $ as githubReusable, A as PROFILE_URNS, B as WorkloadProfile, C as MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, D as OIDC_PROFILES, E as MAX_SOURCES, F as Starts, G as checkPolicy, H as canonicalClaims, I as WORKLOAD_PROFILES, J as defaultIssuer, K as claimAt, L as WORKLOAD_SIGN_IN_PATH, M as REPEATING_PROFILES, N as REQUIRED_CLAIMS, O as POLICY_DEFAULTS, P as SESSION_MS, Q as githubEventsAt, R as WorkloadAlert, S as MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, T as MAX_READ_PLACES, U as checkBinding, V as addressWithin, W as checkFetchUrl, X as freezeTarget, Y as differingClaims, Z as fullRef, _ as GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, a as BindingPolicy, at as policyText, b as MAX_BINDINGS, c as CheckedBinding, ct as ConstraintsInvalid, d as EVENT_EXPOSURE, dt as constraintsAllow, et as githubWorkflow, f as EXCHANGED_CREDENTIAL_MS, ft as constraintsText, g as GITLAB_ISSUER, h as GITHUB_ISSUER, i as BindingInvalid, it as parseCidr, j as Preset, k as POLICY_FIELDS, l as Cidr, lt as MAX_CONSTRAINTS, m as GITHUB_EVENTS, n as BearerProfile, nt as isBearerProfile, o as BindingReads, ot as workflowRef, p as EXCHANGE_SKEW_SECONDS, pt as intersect, q as claimValues, r as BindingClaims, rt as parseAddress, s as CREDENTIAL_NAME, st as Constraints, t as BEARER_PROFILES, tt as gitlabProject, u as ClaimValue, ut as checkConstraints, v as GOOGLE_ISSUER, w as MAX_READ_KEYS, x as MAX_CLAIMS, y as KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, z as WorkloadCaller } from "./workloads-D049JH0M.js";
2
2
  import { MAX_PROOF_LENGTH, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS, ProofClaims, ProofClaims as ProofClaims$1, PublicJwk, PublicJwk as PublicJwk$1, canonicalHtu, canonicalRequest, fetchMethod, sentTarget, thumbprint } from "@coffre/client/dpop";
3
3
  import { JSONWebKeySet, JWTPayload } from "jose";
4
4
  //#region src/identity/github-app.d.ts
@@ -710,6 +710,106 @@ export interface Gate {
710
710
  }): Promise<GateAdmission>;
711
711
  }
712
712
  //#endregion
713
+ //#region src/identity/profile-rules.d.ts
714
+ /**
715
+ * What each platform's binding and tokens must say beyond the claims a
716
+ * binding names (docs/design/workload-access.md, section 4.2). Core holds
717
+ * the rules every profile shares: the required claims, the issuers that
718
+ * force a profile, the policy's fields. These are each platform's own:
719
+ * the shape of the IDs it issues, which issuer goes with which, and what a
720
+ * token of it says that its binding cannot.
721
+ *
722
+ * A binding names IDs the platform never reuses, so each is checked for
723
+ * the shape the platform gives it: a name in its place is refused, since a
724
+ * name can be taken again after its owner is gone.
725
+ */
726
+ export type ProfileRules = {
727
+ /** At binding time, after `checkBinding` and `checkPolicy`. Throws `BindingInvalid`. */
728
+ binding(binding: CheckedBinding, policy: BindingPolicy): void;
729
+ /** At the exchange, once the token verified and matched its binding's claims: why it is still refused, or null. */
730
+ token(claims: Record<string, unknown>, binding: {
731
+ issuer: string;
732
+ claims: BindingClaims;
733
+ policy: BindingPolicy;
734
+ }): string | null;
735
+ };
736
+ export declare const PROFILE_RULES: { readonly [P in WorkloadProfile]?: ProfileRules; };
737
+ /**
738
+ * The audiences a token of a binding may name, the first the one its SDK
739
+ * asks for: the session's key, `<publicUrl>#jkt=<thumbprint>`, for the
740
+ * platforms whose caller picks the audience, and `?jkt=` for one that
741
+ * refuses a `#` in it (section 4.2); the exact audience of a platform that
742
+ * fixes it; this instance's URL for every other.
743
+ */
744
+ export declare function expectedAudiences(profile: WorkloadProfile, policy: BindingPolicy, expected: {
745
+ publicUrl: string;
746
+ jkt: string;
747
+ }): string[];
748
+ //#endregion
749
+ //#region src/identity/run-proof.d.ts
750
+ /**
751
+ * The claims of the run a credential was issued for, as the issuer
752
+ * asserted them: in the sign-in's record, so that a read leads back to its
753
+ * run. What the issuer says, not proof of which run sent the request.
754
+ */
755
+ export declare const RUN_CLAIMS: readonly ["sub", "jti", "actor", "event_name", "ref", "base_ref", "head_ref", "sha", "repository", "repository_id", "run_id", "run_attempt", "workflow_ref", "job_workflow_ref", "job_workflow_sha", "environment", "project_path", "project_id", "namespace_id", "pipeline_id", "pipeline_source", "job_id", "kubernetes.io.pod.name"];
756
+ /** A binding's `jwks_uri` when it carries its issuer's keys: the SHA-256 of those keys (`UploadedKeys`), where a fetched set's URL would be. */
757
+ export declare const UPLOADED_KEYS = "sha256:";
758
+ /** The run's claims, as the issuer stated them: those that say which run, each bounded. */
759
+ export declare function runClaims(claims: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, string | number>;
760
+ /** A token's one audience, or null for none or several: a token for several parties is no single party's. */
761
+ export declare function soleAudience(aud: unknown): string | null;
762
+ /**
763
+ * A binding as the vault weighs a sign-in through it (T149, PR 3b): its
764
+ * sealed object's columns, the instance it was made on (`origin`), and the
765
+ * keys uploaded with it as its row keeps them, which must be the ones its
766
+ * `jwksUri` digests. Only such a binding's: the vault fetches nothing, so
767
+ * the tokens of an issuer that publishes its keys are the app's to verify.
768
+ */
769
+ export type RunBinding = {
770
+ profile: WorkloadProfile;
771
+ issuer: string;
772
+ origin: string;
773
+ jwksUri: string;
774
+ jwks: string;
775
+ claims: string;
776
+ policy: string | null;
777
+ };
778
+ /** Why a run's proof buys nothing, as the app's refusals say it (`ExchangeReason`), with the key a refused token named. */
779
+ export declare class RunProofRefused extends Error {
780
+ readonly reason: string;
781
+ readonly kid: string | null;
782
+ constructor(reason: string, message: string, kid?: string | null);
783
+ }
784
+ /** What a run's proof says, verified: what the credential it buys is held to. */
785
+ export type RunProof = {
786
+ claims: Record<string, unknown>;
787
+ /** The run's claims, for the sign-in's record. */
788
+ run: Record<string, string | number>;
789
+ /** The token's signing input's hash, spent once; null for a token its platform hands out again, or one that names the session's key. */
790
+ spent: Buffer | null;
791
+ /** The last instant the token holds by its own times, ms: a CI run's (its `exp`, its `iat`'s hour); null for a workload's session. */
792
+ validUntil: number | null;
793
+ /** A workload's session's hard end by the token, ms (its `exp`); null when the token names the session's key, or for a CI run. */
794
+ notAfter: number | null;
795
+ };
796
+ /**
797
+ * Verify a CI run's or a workload's ID token against one binding, sealed
798
+ * (D148), whose keys were uploaded with it: the vault's own check, which
799
+ * no app can steer, and which asks no one. The binding's keys, held to the
800
+ * digest its seal covers (a key they lack is refused, never looked for),
801
+ * its issuer, its audience (the instance it was made on, or, for a
802
+ * platform whose caller names the session's key, that key: `jkt`, from the
803
+ * DPoP proof the vault verified, never from the app), the token's times,
804
+ * the binding's claims and its profile's rules. Throws `RunProofRefused`.
805
+ */
806
+ export declare function verifyRunToken(token: string, binding: RunBinding, context: {
807
+ now: Date;
808
+ workload: {
809
+ jkt: string;
810
+ } | null;
811
+ }): Promise<RunProof>;
812
+ //#endregion
713
813
  //#region src/identity/signin/sealed.d.ts
714
814
  /**
715
815
  * Derive a purpose-bound key from one of coffre's existing 32-byte secrets.
@@ -915,4 +1015,4 @@ export declare function uploadedKeys(value: unknown): Promise<UploadedKeys>;
915
1015
  /** The keys of a set `uploadedKeys` kept, as an owner sees them. */
916
1016
  export declare function keySummaries(jwks: string): KeySummary[];
917
1017
  //#endregion
918
- export { BEARER_PROFILES, BearerProfile, BindingClaims, BindingInvalid, BindingPolicy, BindingReads, CREDENTIAL_NAME, CheckedBinding, Cidr, ClaimValue, Constraints, ConstraintsInvalid, EVENT_EXPOSURE, GITHUB_EVENTS, GITHUB_ISSUER, GITLAB_ISSUER, GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, GOOGLE_ISSUER, type JSONWebKeySet, KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, MAX_BINDINGS, MAX_CLAIMS, MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, MAX_CONSTRAINTS, MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, MAX_PROOF_LENGTH, MAX_READ_KEYS, MAX_READ_PLACES, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS, MAX_SOURCES, OIDC_PROFILES, POLICY_DEFAULTS, POLICY_FIELDS, PROFILE_URNS, Preset, type ProofClaims, type PublicJwk, REPEATING_PROFILES, REQUIRED_CLAIMS, Starts, WORKLOAD_PROFILES, WorkloadAlert, WorkloadCaller, WorkloadProfile, addressWithin, canonicalClaims, canonicalHtu, canonicalRequest, checkBinding, checkConstraints, checkFetchUrl, checkPolicy, claimAt, claimValues, constraintsAllow, constraintsText, defaultIssuer, differingClaims, fetchMethod, freezeTarget, fullRef, githubEventsAt, githubReusable, githubWorkflow, gitlabProject, intersect, isBearerProfile, parseAddress, parseCidr, policyText, sentTarget, thumbprint, workflowRef };
1018
+ export { BEARER_PROFILES, BearerProfile, BindingClaims, BindingInvalid, BindingPolicy, BindingReads, CREDENTIAL_NAME, CheckedBinding, Cidr, ClaimValue, Constraints, ConstraintsInvalid, EVENT_EXPOSURE, EXCHANGED_CREDENTIAL_MS, EXCHANGE_SKEW_SECONDS, GITHUB_EVENTS, GITHUB_ISSUER, GITLAB_ISSUER, GITLAB_PIPELINE_SOURCES, GOOGLE_ISSUER, type JSONWebKeySet, KEY_NAMING_PROFILES, MAX_BINDINGS, MAX_CLAIMS, MAX_CLAIM_BYTES, MAX_CONSTRAINTS, MAX_ISSUER_BYTES, MAX_PROOF_LENGTH, MAX_READ_KEYS, MAX_READ_PLACES, MAX_SIGNED_HEADERS, MAX_SOURCES, OIDC_PROFILES, POLICY_DEFAULTS, POLICY_FIELDS, PROFILE_URNS, Preset, type ProofClaims, type PublicJwk, REPEATING_PROFILES, REQUIRED_CLAIMS, SESSION_MS, Starts, WORKLOAD_PROFILES, WORKLOAD_SIGN_IN_PATH, WorkloadAlert, WorkloadCaller, WorkloadProfile, addressWithin, canonicalClaims, canonicalHtu, canonicalRequest, checkBinding, checkConstraints, checkFetchUrl, checkPolicy, claimAt, claimValues, constraintsAllow, constraintsText, defaultIssuer, differingClaims, fetchMethod, freezeTarget, fullRef, githubEventsAt, githubReusable, githubWorkflow, gitlabProject, intersect, isBearerProfile, parseAddress, parseCidr, policyText, sentTarget, thumbprint, workflowRef };