@codyswann/lisa 4.57.4 → 4.57.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/all/copy-overwrite/scripts/lisa-hooks/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/dist/codex/scripts/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.js +6 -0
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/nightly-e2e-guard-behavior-certificate.js +2 -2
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js +4 -3
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/opencode/plugin-templates/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/package.json +4 -4
- package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +93 -4
- package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +93 -4
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
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# Add a name here in the same commit that closes a vector. A hardening that
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# forgets to is invisible to refresh, and shows up as an unexplained diff at
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# review time instead of a named capability.
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-
# lisa-guard-capabilities: no-verify-abbrev, husky-env, hookspath-allowlist, config-env, env-split-string, git-config-key, git-config-parameters, git-config-parameters-append, git-config-parameters-expansion, heredoc-shell-word, herestring-aware, no-verify-short, nested-shell-no-verify, nested-shell-long-options, env-split-string-abbrev, command-wrapper-normalization, executed-script-reach, source-builtin-reach, stdin-redirect-reach, wrapper-positional-operand, dispatcher-exec-position, tilde-script-reach, shell-option-stdin-reach
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+
# lisa-guard-capabilities: no-verify-abbrev, husky-env, hookspath-allowlist, config-env, env-split-string, git-config-key, git-config-parameters, git-config-parameters-append, git-config-parameters-expansion, heredoc-shell-word, herestring-aware, no-verify-short, nested-shell-no-verify, nested-shell-long-options, env-split-string-abbrev, command-wrapper-normalization, executed-script-reach, source-builtin-reach, stdin-redirect-reach, wrapper-positional-operand, dispatcher-exec-position, tilde-script-reach, shell-option-stdin-reach, eval-payload
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#
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# Shell-token matching avoids false positives from issue bodies, heredocs, and
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# commit-message prose while still catching quoted real argv values such as
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@@ -652,6 +652,15 @@ def shell_starts_command(tokens, index):
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return status == "ok" and not remainder
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def printed_argument(tokens, index):
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"""Whether a token is data passed to an ordinary echo or printf command."""
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start = index - 1
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while start >= 0 and tokens[start] not in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
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start -= 1
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program, _, opaque = command_word(tokens[start + 1:index])
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return not opaque and program in {"echo", "printf"}
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def env_uses_split_string(tokens, index):
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"""Whether a command-position env invocation uses split-string parsing.
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@@ -1249,6 +1258,8 @@ def git_skips_verification(text, depth=0):
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# (`HUSKY=1 git commit -n`) simply sits in an earlier token.
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if token != "git" and not token.endswith("/git"):
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continue
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if printed_argument(scoped_tokens, index):
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continue
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# The LONG flag, scoped to this invocation's argv rather than matched
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# anywhere on the line. This replaces the unscoped token match that used
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# to live in the flat loop below.
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@@ -1276,8 +1287,8 @@ def git_skips_verification(text, depth=0):
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def token_bypass(tokens):
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"""Whether any token disables hooks by environment or by git config.
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-
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-
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Printed echo/printf arguments are filtered before this scan. Assignments
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otherwise stay unscoped, unlike the `--no-verify` argv check. What matters is
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where it appears: `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath=` are assignments that
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configure whatever git runs next, so they legitimately sit before the
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invocation and often on a different line of a script. `--no-verify` is an
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@@ -1387,11 +1398,47 @@ def flat_tokens(text):
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The token list, or None.
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"""
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try:
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-
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tokens = shell_tokens(text)
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return [
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token.strip("();|&")
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for index, token in enumerate(tokens)
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if not printed_argument(tokens, index)
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]
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def eval_payloads(scoped_tokens):
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"""Command strings an `eval` in command position would execute.
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`eval` takes no options: it concatenates its arguments and runs the result,
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so the payload is every token up to the next separator, joined by a space.
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Quoting is already gone by the time `shell_tokens` hands them over, which is
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exactly why the payload is invisible to every other scan here — the argv
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scan sees one opaque token and the git scan sees no `git` token at all.
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Args:
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scoped_tokens: Tokens of one command line.
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Returns:
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A list of payload strings, one per `eval` found in command position.
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"""
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payloads = []
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for index, token in enumerate(scoped_tokens):
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if token.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] != "eval":
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continue
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if not shell_starts_command(scoped_tokens, index):
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continue
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collected = []
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for follow in scoped_tokens[index + 1 :]:
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if follow in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
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break
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collected.append(follow)
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if collected:
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payloads.append(" ".join(collected))
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return payloads
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def verdict(text, depth=0, followed=None):
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"""Whether this text, or a script it runs, bypasses verification.
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@@ -1405,6 +1452,48 @@ def verdict(text, depth=0, followed=None):
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"""
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if git_skips_verification(text):
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return True
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# RECURSION, NOT A TWELFTH SPELLING (#3531). `eval` is the builtin that takes
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# a command string, and it was absent from both recursion sets: it is not a
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# SHELL_PROGRAM (no `-c` payload) and, unlike `builtin`, not a prefix wrapper
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# whose argv carries through. So every vector this guard blocks was restored
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# by writing it inside `eval "..."` — measured on origin/main, nine of them,
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# including `git push --no-verify`, `core.hooksPath`, `HUSKY=0`, one behind a
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# separator and one behind a `command` wrapper.
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#
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# Enumerating spelling twelve is how spelling thirteen appears, and this
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# repository has twice declined an arms race of that shape. Recursing through
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# `verdict` instead gives the payload the IDENTICAL analysis, so anything
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# covered outside is covered inside — including checks the reporter's own
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# suggested patch would have missed, because it recursed into the git half
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# only and `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath` live in `token_bypass`.
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#
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# Bounded by the same budget as a followed script: unbounded recursion on
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# adversarial input is itself a denial of the guard, and a Python traceback
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# exits non-zero, which the wrapper turns into a spurious block.
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if depth < FOLLOW_MAX_DEPTH:
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try:
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eval_scoped = shell_tokens(text)
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except ValueError:
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eval_scoped = []
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for payload in eval_payloads(eval_scoped):
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if verdict(payload, depth + 1, followed):
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return True
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# AND INSIDE A NESTED SHELL. `git_skips_verification` already recurses
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# into a `bash -c` payload, but only into ITSELF — so it carries the git
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# half down and leaves `eval`, `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath` behind.
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# `bash -c 'eval "git commit --no-verify -m x"'` survived round one for
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# exactly that reason, and it was found by running the adversarial round
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# rather than by reasoning about it. Recursing the payload through
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# `verdict` gives every level the whole analysis.
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for index, token in enumerate(eval_scoped):
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if token.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] not in SHELL_PROGRAMS:
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continue
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if not shell_starts_command(eval_scoped, index):
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continue
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nested = nested_shell_payload(eval_scoped, index)
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if isinstance(nested, str) and verdict(nested, depth + 1, followed):
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return True
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tokens = flat_tokens(text)
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if tokens is not None and token_bypass(tokens):
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return True
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@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
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# Add a name here in the same commit that closes a vector. A hardening that
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# forgets to is invisible to refresh, and shows up as an unexplained diff at
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# review time instead of a named capability.
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-
# lisa-guard-capabilities: no-verify-abbrev, husky-env, hookspath-allowlist, config-env, env-split-string, git-config-key, git-config-parameters, git-config-parameters-append, git-config-parameters-expansion, heredoc-shell-word, herestring-aware, no-verify-short, nested-shell-no-verify, nested-shell-long-options, env-split-string-abbrev, command-wrapper-normalization, executed-script-reach, source-builtin-reach, stdin-redirect-reach, wrapper-positional-operand, dispatcher-exec-position, tilde-script-reach, shell-option-stdin-reach
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# lisa-guard-capabilities: no-verify-abbrev, husky-env, hookspath-allowlist, config-env, env-split-string, git-config-key, git-config-parameters, git-config-parameters-append, git-config-parameters-expansion, heredoc-shell-word, herestring-aware, no-verify-short, nested-shell-no-verify, nested-shell-long-options, env-split-string-abbrev, command-wrapper-normalization, executed-script-reach, source-builtin-reach, stdin-redirect-reach, wrapper-positional-operand, dispatcher-exec-position, tilde-script-reach, shell-option-stdin-reach, eval-payload
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#
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# Shell-token matching avoids false positives from issue bodies, heredocs, and
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# commit-message prose while still catching quoted real argv values such as
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@@ -652,6 +652,15 @@ def shell_starts_command(tokens, index):
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return status == "ok" and not remainder
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def printed_argument(tokens, index):
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"""Whether a token is data passed to an ordinary echo or printf command."""
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start = index - 1
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while start >= 0 and tokens[start] not in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
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start -= 1
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program, _, opaque = command_word(tokens[start + 1:index])
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return not opaque and program in {"echo", "printf"}
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def env_uses_split_string(tokens, index):
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"""Whether a command-position env invocation uses split-string parsing.
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@@ -1249,6 +1258,8 @@ def git_skips_verification(text, depth=0):
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# (`HUSKY=1 git commit -n`) simply sits in an earlier token.
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if token != "git" and not token.endswith("/git"):
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continue
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if printed_argument(scoped_tokens, index):
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continue
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# The LONG flag, scoped to this invocation's argv rather than matched
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# anywhere on the line. This replaces the unscoped token match that used
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# to live in the flat loop below.
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@@ -1276,8 +1287,8 @@ def git_skips_verification(text, depth=0):
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def token_bypass(tokens):
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"""Whether any token disables hooks by environment or by git config.
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-
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-
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Printed echo/printf arguments are filtered before this scan. Assignments
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otherwise stay unscoped, unlike the `--no-verify` argv check. What matters is
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1281
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where it appears: `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath=` are assignments that
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1282
1293
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configure whatever git runs next, so they legitimately sit before the
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1283
1294
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invocation and often on a different line of a script. `--no-verify` is an
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@@ -1387,11 +1398,47 @@ def flat_tokens(text):
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The token list, or None.
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"""
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try:
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-
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tokens = shell_tokens(text)
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return [
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token.strip("();|&")
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for index, token in enumerate(tokens)
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if not printed_argument(tokens, index)
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]
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except ValueError:
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return None
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def eval_payloads(scoped_tokens):
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"""Command strings an `eval` in command position would execute.
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1413
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`eval` takes no options: it concatenates its arguments and runs the result,
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so the payload is every token up to the next separator, joined by a space.
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1416
|
+
Quoting is already gone by the time `shell_tokens` hands them over, which is
|
|
1417
|
+
exactly why the payload is invisible to every other scan here — the argv
|
|
1418
|
+
scan sees one opaque token and the git scan sees no `git` token at all.
|
|
1419
|
+
|
|
1420
|
+
Args:
|
|
1421
|
+
scoped_tokens: Tokens of one command line.
|
|
1422
|
+
|
|
1423
|
+
Returns:
|
|
1424
|
+
A list of payload strings, one per `eval` found in command position.
|
|
1425
|
+
"""
|
|
1426
|
+
payloads = []
|
|
1427
|
+
for index, token in enumerate(scoped_tokens):
|
|
1428
|
+
if token.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] != "eval":
|
|
1429
|
+
continue
|
|
1430
|
+
if not shell_starts_command(scoped_tokens, index):
|
|
1431
|
+
continue
|
|
1432
|
+
collected = []
|
|
1433
|
+
for follow in scoped_tokens[index + 1 :]:
|
|
1434
|
+
if follow in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
|
|
1435
|
+
break
|
|
1436
|
+
collected.append(follow)
|
|
1437
|
+
if collected:
|
|
1438
|
+
payloads.append(" ".join(collected))
|
|
1439
|
+
return payloads
|
|
1440
|
+
|
|
1441
|
+
|
|
1395
1442
|
def verdict(text, depth=0, followed=None):
|
|
1396
1443
|
"""Whether this text, or a script it runs, bypasses verification.
|
|
1397
1444
|
|
|
@@ -1405,6 +1452,48 @@ def verdict(text, depth=0, followed=None):
|
|
|
1405
1452
|
"""
|
|
1406
1453
|
if git_skips_verification(text):
|
|
1407
1454
|
return True
|
|
1455
|
+
# RECURSION, NOT A TWELFTH SPELLING (#3531). `eval` is the builtin that takes
|
|
1456
|
+
# a command string, and it was absent from both recursion sets: it is not a
|
|
1457
|
+
# SHELL_PROGRAM (no `-c` payload) and, unlike `builtin`, not a prefix wrapper
|
|
1458
|
+
# whose argv carries through. So every vector this guard blocks was restored
|
|
1459
|
+
# by writing it inside `eval "..."` — measured on origin/main, nine of them,
|
|
1460
|
+
# including `git push --no-verify`, `core.hooksPath`, `HUSKY=0`, one behind a
|
|
1461
|
+
# separator and one behind a `command` wrapper.
|
|
1462
|
+
#
|
|
1463
|
+
# Enumerating spelling twelve is how spelling thirteen appears, and this
|
|
1464
|
+
# repository has twice declined an arms race of that shape. Recursing through
|
|
1465
|
+
# `verdict` instead gives the payload the IDENTICAL analysis, so anything
|
|
1466
|
+
# covered outside is covered inside — including checks the reporter's own
|
|
1467
|
+
# suggested patch would have missed, because it recursed into the git half
|
|
1468
|
+
# only and `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath` live in `token_bypass`.
|
|
1469
|
+
#
|
|
1470
|
+
# Bounded by the same budget as a followed script: unbounded recursion on
|
|
1471
|
+
# adversarial input is itself a denial of the guard, and a Python traceback
|
|
1472
|
+
# exits non-zero, which the wrapper turns into a spurious block.
|
|
1473
|
+
if depth < FOLLOW_MAX_DEPTH:
|
|
1474
|
+
try:
|
|
1475
|
+
eval_scoped = shell_tokens(text)
|
|
1476
|
+
except ValueError:
|
|
1477
|
+
eval_scoped = []
|
|
1478
|
+
for payload in eval_payloads(eval_scoped):
|
|
1479
|
+
if verdict(payload, depth + 1, followed):
|
|
1480
|
+
return True
|
|
1481
|
+
# AND INSIDE A NESTED SHELL. `git_skips_verification` already recurses
|
|
1482
|
+
# into a `bash -c` payload, but only into ITSELF — so it carries the git
|
|
1483
|
+
# half down and leaves `eval`, `HUSKY=0` and `core.hooksPath` behind.
|
|
1484
|
+
# `bash -c 'eval "git commit --no-verify -m x"'` survived round one for
|
|
1485
|
+
# exactly that reason, and it was found by running the adversarial round
|
|
1486
|
+
# rather than by reasoning about it. Recursing the payload through
|
|
1487
|
+
# `verdict` gives every level the whole analysis.
|
|
1488
|
+
for index, token in enumerate(eval_scoped):
|
|
1489
|
+
if token.rsplit("/", 1)[-1] not in SHELL_PROGRAMS:
|
|
1490
|
+
continue
|
|
1491
|
+
if not shell_starts_command(eval_scoped, index):
|
|
1492
|
+
continue
|
|
1493
|
+
nested = nested_shell_payload(eval_scoped, index)
|
|
1494
|
+
if isinstance(nested, str) and verdict(nested, depth + 1, followed):
|
|
1495
|
+
return True
|
|
1496
|
+
|
|
1408
1497
|
tokens = flat_tokens(text)
|
|
1409
1498
|
if tokens is not None and token_bypass(tokens):
|
|
1410
1499
|
return True
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.57.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.57.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.57.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.57.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, across Claude and Codex.",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.57.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.57.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.57.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.57.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.57.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.57.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|