@codyswann/lisa 4.45.3 → 4.45.5

package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-blind-automerge.sh

@@ -55,7 +55,71 @@
 # on evidence CI already surfaces. The suite pins the boundary with a case, so a
 # later reader can see it was decided rather than missed.
 #
-# SCOPE: `--auto` ONLY
+# THE SECOND VECTOR: A BASE REF NO RULESET COVERS
+#
+# The paragraphs above answer "is a review verdict blocking this merge?". They
+# assume the merge has gates at all. On this repository that assumption is FALSE
+# for every ref but four.
+#
+# Read live from the API, the `base` and `quality checks` rulesets both scope
+# `conditions.ref_name.include` to exactly `~DEFAULT_BRANCH`, `refs/heads/dev`,
+# `refs/heads/staging`, `refs/heads/main`, with no exclusions. A pull request
+# based on ANY other ref — a `stack/**` batching branch, a feature branch —
+# therefore has ZERO required checks. Every gate still runs; none of them can
+# block. `gh api repos/<o>/<r>/rules/branches/main` returns fifteen required
+# contexts; the same call for a stack ref returns `[]`.
+#
+# Two ordinary, permission-free acts turn that into a merged pull request that
+# nobody approved and no gate passed. Both are intercepted here.
+#
+# 1. ARMING on an uncovered base. `gh pr merge <pr> --auto` on a stack base is
+#    a claim that CI will decide, made where CI decides nothing. The merge lands
+#    the moment the PR becomes mergeable, with no reader in the path.
+# 2. RE-TARGETING a red pull request onto an uncovered base. `gh pr edit <pr>
+#    --base stack/x` is a metadata edit any contributor or agent can make. It
+#    requires no elevated permission, no `--force`, and no code change.
+#    CodySwannGT/lisa#3922 records it executed by accident, by an agent
+#    following an approved plan: a pull request BLOCKED by two genuinely failing
+#    required checks was re-targeted, both blockers ceased to apply because they
+#    were no longer required, the already-armed auto-merge fired, and the head
+#    branch was auto-deleted leaving the work reachable from one ref.
+#
+# WHY THE CONFIGURATION CANNOT ANSWER THIS AND THE API MUST
+#
+# The resolved Lisa config reads `policy.protect: force_push=true`, which any
+# reader takes for "force-push is blocked here". It is not a global switch — it
+# configures a ruleset whose ref scope is those four refs. **A policy flag names
+# an intent; only the ruleset's ref scope says where it applies.** So coverage
+# is read from `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/rules/branches/{ref}`, which answers
+# for the ONE ref in question and folds in org rulesets, repository rulesets and
+# their exclusions. Nothing here reads `.lisa.config.json`.
+#
+# WHY RE-TARGETING READS CHECKS WHEN ARMING DOES NOT
+#
+# The section above says this guard reads no check conclusions, and for the
+# review question that is right — `CHANGES_REQUESTED` shows zero failing checks,
+# so a check-derived signal is the defect rather than the detector. The
+# re-target question is the opposite shape: "does this edit remove a live
+# blocker?" and a blocker there IS a check by construction. Reading them is not
+# re-deriving a gate; it is asking whether one is currently biting.
+#
+# The condition is deliberately narrow, because re-targeting onto a stack base
+# is a SANCTIONED batching workflow and a guard that refused it outright would
+# be switched off within a day. A red pull request is refused; a green one is
+# announced and allowed. The property protected is "a pull request something is
+# currently failing must not be moved onto a base where nothing can block it",
+# which holds whatever base it came from — so the current base is not consulted.
+#
+# WHAT THE REFUSAL ASKS FOR INSTEAD
+#
+# There is no env-var escape hatch here either, and none is needed: the
+# acknowledgement the arming refusal asks for is dropping `--auto`. That is not
+# ceremony. `gh pr merge <pr> --merge` on a stack base performs the merge at a
+# moment when the advisory results exist and something can read them, which is
+# exactly the mitigation #3922 shows is unreachable while auto-merge is armed —
+# "the merge lands before any reader exists".
+#
+# SCOPE: ARMING AND RE-TARGETING, NOT MERGING
 #
 # A direct `gh pr merge` against a blocked PR fails loudly and immediately, so
 # it is not the invisible failure this exists to close — and refusing it would
@@ -93,7 +157,7 @@
 # The line below is what lets `lisa apply` tell a downstream copy of this guard
 # that is BEHIND from one that is AHEAD. Add a name here in the same commit that
 # closes a vector.
-# lisa-guard-capabilities: automerge-arm-review-decision, automerge-arm-graphql
+# lisa-guard-capabilities: automerge-arm-review-decision, automerge-arm-graphql, automerge-arm-uncovered-base, retarget-uncovered-base, retarget-graphql
 set -euo pipefail
 
 input="$(cat)"
@@ -129,6 +193,7 @@ import re
 import shlex
 import subprocess
 import sys
+from urllib.parse import quote
 
 command = os.environ.get("BLOCK_BLIND_AUTOMERGE_COMMAND", "")
 
@@ -181,7 +246,7 @@ NODE_ID_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_=-]+$")
 # The probe that resolves a node id to the same fields `gh pr view` returns.
 NODE_QUERY = (
     "query($id:ID!){node(id:$id){... on PullRequest"
-    "{number url reviewDecision state}}}"
+    "{number url reviewDecision state baseRefName}}}"
 )
 
 # What a probe spec asks for. `view` and `node` differ only in how the PR is
@@ -190,6 +255,51 @@ PROBE_VIEW = "view"
 PROBE_NODE = "node"
 PROBE_UNREADABLE = "unreadable"
 
+# What a probe needs to know, per act. The review question and the base-coverage
+# question want different fields, and the arming path asks for the second set
+# only when the first has already been answered "not blocked" — so a refusal
+# still costs exactly one call.
+ARM_FIELDS = "number,reviewDecision,state,url,baseRefName"
+RETARGET_FIELDS = "number,state,url,baseRefName,statusCheckRollup"
+
+# The two acts this guard intercepts.
+ACT_ARM = "arm"
+ACT_RETARGET = "retarget"
+
+# The rule type that makes a check able to block a merge. A ref with no rule of
+# this type has zero required checks, whatever runs against it.
+REQUIRED_STATUS_CHECKS_RULE = "required_status_checks"
+
+# The GraphQL mutation that re-targets a pull request. Same act as
+# `gh pr edit --base`, reached through the API instead of the porcelain.
+RETARGET_MUTATION = "updatePullRequest"
+
+# How a re-target names its new base, whether inline or as a variable.
+BASE_REF_NAME_PATTERN = re.compile(
+    r"baseRefName\s*:\s*(?:\"([^\"]+)\"|'([^']+)'|\$([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*))"
+)
+
+# `gh pr edit` options taking a SEPARATE value, so a value is never mistaken for
+# the PR selector: `gh pr edit --title "fix 12" --base main` must not read
+# `fix 12` as the PR.
+EDIT_SEPARATE_VALUE = {
+    "--add-assignee", "--add-label", "--add-project", "--add-reviewer",
+    "-b", "--body", "-F", "--body-file", "-m", "--milestone",
+    "--remove-assignee", "--remove-label", "--remove-project",
+    "--remove-reviewer", "-t", "--title",
+}
+
+# Both spellings of the re-target flag, as `gh pr edit --help` lists them.
+BASE_FLAGS = {"-B", "--base"}
+
+# Check outcomes that mean something is currently failing. Read from either
+# shape `statusCheckRollup` returns: a CheckRun carries `conclusion`, a
+# commit StatusContext carries `state`.
+FAILING_CHECK_OUTCOMES = {
+    "FAILURE", "TIMED_OUT", "CANCELLED", "ACTION_REQUIRED", "STARTUP_FAILURE",
+    "ERROR",
+}
+
 
 def strip_heredocs(text):
     """Drop heredoc bodies, which are data rather than commands.
@@ -271,15 +381,16 @@ def is_gh(token):
     return token == "gh" or token.endswith("/gh")
 
 
-def merge_argv_after_gh(tokens, start):
-    """Find a `pr merge` invocation's argv within one gh command.
+def subcommand_argv_after_gh(tokens, start, verb):
+    """Find a `pr <verb>` invocation's argv within one gh command.
 
     Args:
         tokens: The operator-aware token list.
         start: Index just past the `gh` token.
+        verb: The `pr` subcommand to look for, `merge` or `edit`.
 
     Returns:
-        The argv following `merge`, or None when this gh call is not a merge.
+        The argv following `verb`, or None when this gh call is not that verb.
     """
     words = []
     index = start
@@ -294,7 +405,7 @@ def merge_argv_after_gh(tokens, start):
         words.append((token, index))
         index += 1
     for position, entry in enumerate(words):
-        if entry[0] == "merge" and position > 0 and words[position - 1][0] == "pr":
+        if entry[0] == verb and position > 0 and words[position - 1][0] == "pr":
             return tokens[entry[1] + 1:]
     return None
 
@@ -321,15 +432,17 @@ def arms_auto_merge(argv):
     return False
 
 
-def pr_selector(argv):
-    """The PR the arming command names, as gh itself would read it.
+def pr_selector(argv, separate_value=MERGE_SEPARATE_VALUE):
+    """The PR the command names, as gh itself would read it.
 
     Returned verbatim so it can be handed straight back to `gh pr view`, which
     accepts the same number, URL, or branch. When the command names none, gh
     resolves the current branch and so does the probe.
 
     Args:
-        argv: Tokens following the `merge` subcommand.
+        argv: Tokens following the `merge` or `edit` subcommand.
+        separate_value: Options of that subcommand taking a separate value,
+            whose VALUE must never be read as the selector.
 
     Returns:
         The selector token, or None when the command relies on the branch.
@@ -340,7 +453,7 @@ def pr_selector(argv):
         index += 1
         if token in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
             return None
-        if token in MERGE_SEPARATE_VALUE:
+        if token in separate_value or token in BASE_FLAGS:
             index += 1
             continue
         if not token.startswith("-"):
@@ -348,6 +461,30 @@ def pr_selector(argv):
     return None
 
 
+def retarget_target(argv):
+    """The base ref a `gh pr edit` invocation moves the pull request to.
+
+    Args:
+        argv: Tokens following the `edit` subcommand.
+
+    Returns:
+        The new base ref, or None when this edit changes no base.
+    """
+    index = 0
+    while index < len(argv):
+        token = argv[index]
+        index += 1
+        if token in COMMAND_SEPARATORS:
+            return None
+        if token in BASE_FLAGS and index < len(argv):
+            return argv[index]
+        if token.startswith("--base="):
+            return token.split("=", 1)[1]
+        if token in EDIT_SEPARATE_VALUE:
+            index += 1
+    return None
+
+
 def repo_flag(tokens, start):
     """The `--repo` value a gh invocation carries, in either spelling.
 
@@ -413,6 +550,51 @@ def field_values(argv):
     return values
 
 
+def graphql_mutation(argv, mutation):
+    """The text and fields of one `gh api graphql` call naming a mutation.
+
+    Args:
+        argv: One gh invocation's tokens, `api` included.
+        mutation: The mutation name to look for.
+
+    Returns:
+        A pair (query_text, fields). `query_text` is empty when this call is
+        not a graphql invocation running that mutation.
+    """
+    words = [token for token in argv if not token.startswith("-")]
+    if len(words) < 2 or words[0] != "api" or words[1] != "graphql":
+        return ("", {})
+    fields = field_values(argv)
+    query = " ".join(
+        value for name, value in fields.items() if mutation in value
+    )
+    return (query, fields)
+
+
+def resolved_literal(match, fields, pattern):
+    """A mutation argument's value, whether written inline or as a variable.
+
+    Args:
+        match: The regex match over the mutation text, or None.
+        fields: The gh field payloads the same invocation sets.
+        pattern: A compiled pattern the value must satisfy, or None for any.
+
+    Returns:
+        The value, or None when it cannot be resolved — which is a refusal
+        rather than a pass, because an act whose subject nobody can read is
+        this guard's own defect in a new place.
+    """
+    if match is None:
+        return None
+    inline = match.group(1) or match.group(2)
+    candidate = inline if inline else fields.get(match.group(3))
+    if not candidate:
+        return None
+    if pattern is not None and not pattern.match(candidate):
+        return None
+    return candidate
+
+
 def graphql_arming_id(argv):
     """The PR node id a `gh api graphql` auto-merge mutation names.
 
@@ -424,37 +606,57 @@ def graphql_arming_id(argv):
         auto-merge but names its subject in a way this cannot resolve — which
         is a refusal, not a pass.
     """
-    words = [token for token in argv if not token.startswith("-")]
-    if len(words) < 2 or words[0] != "api" or words[1] != "graphql":
+    query, fields = graphql_mutation(argv, AUTO_MERGE_MUTATION)
+    if not query:
         return (False, None)
-    fields = field_values(argv)
-    query = " ".join(
-        value for name, value in fields.items() if AUTO_MERGE_MUTATION in value
+    return (
+        True,
+        resolved_literal(
+            PULL_REQUEST_ID_PATTERN.search(query), fields, NODE_ID_PATTERN
+        ),
     )
+
+
+def graphql_retarget(argv):
+    """The subject and new base a `gh api graphql` re-target mutation names.
+
+    `updatePullRequest` also edits titles, bodies and labels, none of which
+    move a pull request out from under its gates. Only a mutation that carries
+    `baseRefName` is a re-target, so the others are left alone entirely.
+
+    Args:
+        argv: One gh invocation's tokens, `api` included.
+
+    Returns:
+        A triple (is_retarget, node_id, base_ref). Either of the last two is
+        None when the mutation re-targets but names that part in a way this
+        cannot resolve.
+    """
+    query, fields = graphql_mutation(argv, RETARGET_MUTATION)
     if not query:
-        return (False, None)
-    match = PULL_REQUEST_ID_PATTERN.search(query)
-    if match is None:
-        return (True, None)
-    inline = match.group(1) or match.group(2)
-    if inline:
-        return (True, inline if NODE_ID_PATTERN.match(inline) else None)
-    # `pullRequestId: $prId` — the id arrives as a separate variable field.
-    variable = fields.get(match.group(3))
-    if variable and NODE_ID_PATTERN.match(variable):
-        return (True, variable)
-    return (True, None)
+        return (False, None, None)
+    base_match = BASE_REF_NAME_PATTERN.search(query)
+    if base_match is None:
+        return (False, None, None)
+    return (
+        True,
+        resolved_literal(
+            PULL_REQUEST_ID_PATTERN.search(query), fields, NODE_ID_PATTERN
+        ),
+        resolved_literal(base_match, fields, None),
+    )
 
 
-def arming_invocations(text, depth=0):
-    """Every auto-merge arming this command line performs.
+def guarded_invocations(text, depth=0):
+    """Every arming and every re-target this command line performs.
 
     Args:
         text: The command line, heredoc payloads already stripped.
         depth: Recursion depth, bounding the `bash -c` unwrap to one level.
 
     Returns:
-        A list of (kind, subject, repo_args) probe specs, one per arming.
+        A list of (act, kind, subject, repo_args, target_ref) probe specs, one
+        per intercepted act. `target_ref` is meaningful only for a re-target.
     """
     try:
         tokens = shell_tokens(text)
@@ -465,31 +667,54 @@ def arming_invocations(text, depth=0):
         if depth == 0 and token.split("/")[-1] in SHELL_WRAPPERS:
             # `bash -c '<command>'` hides the whole invocation inside one token.
             if index + 2 < len(tokens) and tokens[index + 1] == "-c":
-                found.extend(arming_invocations(tokens[index + 2], depth + 1))
+                found.extend(guarded_invocations(tokens[index + 2], depth + 1))
             continue
         if not is_gh(token):
             continue
         repo_args = repo_flag(tokens, index + 1)
-        argv = merge_argv_after_gh(tokens, index + 1)
-        if argv is not None and arms_auto_merge(argv):
-            found.append((PROBE_VIEW, pr_selector(argv), repo_args))
+        merge_argv = subcommand_argv_after_gh(tokens, index + 1, "merge")
+        if merge_argv is not None and arms_auto_merge(merge_argv):
+            found.append(
+                (ACT_ARM, PROBE_VIEW, pr_selector(merge_argv), repo_args, None)
+            )
             continue
-        is_arming, node_id = graphql_arming_id(
-            gh_invocation_tokens(tokens, index + 1)
-        )
+        edit_argv = subcommand_argv_after_gh(tokens, index + 1, "edit")
+        if edit_argv is not None:
+            target = retarget_target(edit_argv)
+            if target is not None:
+                found.append(
+                    (
+                        ACT_RETARGET,
+                        PROBE_VIEW,
+                        pr_selector(edit_argv, EDIT_SEPARATE_VALUE),
+                        repo_args,
+                        target,
+                    )
+                )
+                continue
+        invocation = gh_invocation_tokens(tokens, index + 1)
+        is_arming, node_id = graphql_arming_id(invocation)
         if is_arming:
             kind = PROBE_NODE if node_id else PROBE_UNREADABLE
-            found.append((kind, node_id, repo_args))
+            found.append((ACT_ARM, kind, node_id, repo_args, None))
+            continue
+        is_retarget, node_id, target = graphql_retarget(invocation)
+        if is_retarget:
+            kind = (
+                PROBE_NODE if node_id and target is not None else PROBE_UNREADABLE
+            )
+            found.append((ACT_RETARGET, kind, node_id, repo_args, target))
     return found
 
 
-def probe_args(kind, subject, repo_args):
-    """The gh command that answers the review question for one arming.
+def probe_args(kind, subject, repo_args, fields):
+    """The gh command that answers this guard's questions about one PR.
 
     Args:
         kind: PROBE_VIEW or PROBE_NODE.
         subject: A PR selector, a node id, or None for the current branch.
         repo_args: gh arguments naming the repository, possibly empty.
+        fields: The `--json` field list the act needs.
 
     Returns:
         The full gh argv.
@@ -506,24 +731,22 @@ def probe_args(kind, subject, repo_args):
     if subject is not None:
         args.append(subject)
     args.extend(repo_args)
-    args.extend(["--json", "number,reviewDecision,state,url"])
+    args.extend(["--json", fields])
     return args
 
 
-def pull_request_state(kind, subject, repo_args):
-    """Ask GitHub for the fields that decide whether a merge can happen.
+def gh_json(args):
+    """Run a gh command and decode its JSON, without throwing.
 
     Args:
-        kind: PROBE_VIEW or PROBE_NODE.
-        subject: A PR selector, a node id, or None for the current branch.
-        repo_args: gh arguments naming the repository, possibly empty.
+        args: The full gh argv.
 
     Returns:
-        A pair (payload, failure). Exactly one is non-None: `payload` is the
-        decoded pull request object, `failure` is a human-readable reason the
-        question could not be answered.
+        A pair (payload, failure). Exactly one is non-None; `failure` names WHY
+        the question could not be answered, because "the box was busy" and "gh
+        said no" have different remedies and a killed child returns empty
+        streams that read like a clean refusal.
     """
-    args = probe_args(kind, subject, repo_args)
     try:
         result = subprocess.run(
             args, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=GH_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
@@ -537,14 +760,134 @@ def pull_request_state(kind, subject, repo_args):
     if result.returncode != 0:
         return (None, "gh exited %d" % result.returncode)
     try:
-        payload = json.loads(result.stdout or "{}")
+        return (json.loads(result.stdout or "{}"), None)
     except ValueError:
         return (None, "gh returned unreadable JSON")
+
+
+def pull_request_state(kind, subject, repo_args, fields=ARM_FIELDS):
+    """Ask GitHub for the fields that decide whether a merge can happen.
+
+    Args:
+        kind: PROBE_VIEW or PROBE_NODE.
+        subject: A PR selector, a node id, or None for the current branch.
+        repo_args: gh arguments naming the repository, possibly empty.
+
+    Returns:
+        A pair (payload, failure). Exactly one is non-None: `payload` is the
+        decoded pull request object, `failure` is a human-readable reason the
+        question could not be answered.
+    """
+    payload, failure = gh_json(probe_args(kind, subject, repo_args, fields))
+    if failure is not None:
+        return (None, failure)
     if not isinstance(payload, dict):
         return (None, "gh returned unreadable JSON")
     return (payload, None)
 
 
+def repo_slug(payload, repo_args):
+    """The `owner/name` the pull request belongs to.
+
+    Read from the PR's own URL first, because that is the repository GitHub
+    says the PR is in — a `--repo` flag is what the caller CLAIMED, and the two
+    can differ. The flag is the fallback for a payload with no URL.
+
+    Args:
+        payload: The decoded pull request object.
+        repo_args: gh arguments naming the repository, possibly empty.
+
+    Returns:
+        The slug, or None when neither source names one.
+    """
+    url = str(payload.get("url") or "")
+    parts = url.split("://", 1)[-1].split("/")
+    # host / owner / name / "pull" / number
+    if len(parts) >= 4 and parts[3] == "pull" and parts[1] and parts[2]:
+        return "%s/%s" % (parts[1], parts[2])
+    if len(repo_args) == 2 and repo_args[1].count("/") == 1:
+        return repo_args[1]
+    return None
+
+
+def branch_rules(repo, ref):
+    """Every branch rule GitHub says applies to one ref, read live.
+
+    This is the whole reason the guard asks the API rather than the checked-in
+    policy: a `policy.protect` flag names an INTENT, and only the ruleset's ref
+    scope says where it applies. This endpoint answers for the one ref in
+    question and folds in organisation rulesets, repository rulesets, and every
+    exclusion — none of which a config file states.
+
+    Args:
+        repo: `owner/name`.
+        ref: The branch name, unencoded.
+
+    Returns:
+        A pair (rules, failure). Exactly one is non-None.
+    """
+    payload, failure = gh_json(
+        ["gh", "api", "repos/%s/rules/branches/%s" % (repo, quote(ref, safe=""))]
+    )
+    if failure is not None:
+        return (None, failure)
+    if not isinstance(payload, list):
+        return (None, "gh returned unreadable JSON")
+    return (payload, None)
+
+
+def required_context_count(rules):
+    """How many status checks can actually block a merge on that ref.
+
+    A `required_status_checks` rule carrying an empty context list enforces
+    nothing, so rules are counted by their CONTEXTS rather than by their
+    presence. Counting rules would report a vacuous rule as protection.
+
+    Args:
+        rules: The rule objects the API returned for one ref.
+
+    Returns:
+        The number of distinct required contexts.
+    """
+    contexts = set()
+    for rule in rules:
+        if not isinstance(rule, dict):
+            continue
+        if rule.get("type") != REQUIRED_STATUS_CHECKS_RULE:
+            continue
+        parameters = rule.get("parameters")
+        listed = (parameters or {}).get(REQUIRED_STATUS_CHECKS_RULE) or []
+        for entry in listed:
+            if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("context"):
+                contexts.add(entry["context"])
+    return len(contexts)
+
+
+def failing_check_names(payload):
+    """Every check on the pull request that is currently reporting failure.
+
+    Both shapes `statusCheckRollup` returns are read: a CheckRun carries
+    `conclusion` and `name`, a commit status carries `state` and `context`. A
+    guard that read one of them would report a clean pull request whenever the
+    blocker arrived on the other substrate.
+
+    Args:
+        payload: The decoded pull request object.
+
+    Returns:
+        The names of the failing checks, in the order GitHub listed them.
+    """
+    rollup = payload.get("statusCheckRollup")
+    names = []
+    for entry in rollup if isinstance(rollup, list) else []:
+        if not isinstance(entry, dict):
+            continue
+        outcome = str(entry.get("conclusion") or entry.get("state") or "").upper()
+        if outcome in FAILING_CHECK_OUTCOMES:
+            names.append(str(entry.get("name") or entry.get("context") or "?"))
+    return names
+
+
 def pr_name(payload):
     """The most identifying name available for the PR in a refusal message.
 
@@ -579,39 +922,149 @@ Do not report the PR as armed-and-merging until this reads anything other than
 CHANGES_REQUESTED.
 """
 
-UNREADABLE_REFUSAL = """Blocked: this command arms auto-merge through a GraphQL mutation whose
-pullRequestId cannot be read, so whether the PR is blocked on review is
-unknowable at the moment the claim "this will merge" is made.
+UNREADABLE_REFUSAL = """Blocked: this command acts on a pull request through a GraphQL mutation whose
+pullRequestId cannot be read, so what it does is unknowable at the moment the
+claim "this will merge" is made.
 
-Arm through `gh pr merge <pr> --auto` instead, or pass the node id as a literal
-or as a field this command also sets. An arming nobody can inspect is the
-failure this guard exists to close, one substrate over.
+Use `gh pr merge <pr> --auto` or `gh pr edit <pr> --base <ref>` instead, or pass
+the node id as a literal or as a field this command also sets. An act nobody can
+inspect is the failure this guard exists to close, one substrate over.
 """
 
-armings = arming_invocations(strip_heredocs(command))
-if not armings:
+UNCOVERED_ARM_REFUSAL = """Blocked: arming auto-merge on %s would merge it with NO required checks.
+
+Its base branch is "%s", and GitHub reports ZERO required status checks on that
+ref. Every gate still RUNS against this PR; none of them can block the merge.
+Auto-merge therefore lands the moment the PR is mergeable, before any advisory
+result has a reader — which is exactly how a PR blocked by two failing required
+checks reached a merged state without either being fixed or waived
+(CodySwannGT/lisa#3922).
+
+This is not the checks being red. It is the checks being unable to say no.
+
+Merge it deliberately instead, at a moment when the results exist:
+  - read them — `gh pr checks %s` — and merge only if you accept every one;
+  - `gh pr merge %s --merge` performs the merge now, with you as the reader
+    auto-merge would have removed from the path;
+  - or re-target onto a covered base — the default branch, or any ref the
+    rulesets name — and arm there, where the ruleset enforces the gates for you.
+"""
+
+UNCOVERED_RETARGET_REFUSAL = """Blocked: re-targeting %s onto "%s" would evaporate its failing checks.
+
+GitHub reports ZERO required status checks on that ref, and this PR is
+currently failing:
+%s
+
+Those failures would not be fixed and would not be waived — they would simply
+stop being required, and an armed auto-merge would then fire. That is a
+permission-free bypass of every gate: no --force, no --admin, no code change,
+one metadata edit (CodySwannGT/lisa#3922).
+
+Do one of these instead:
+  - fix the failing checks, then re-target; a green PR may be batched freely;
+  - leave the PR on its covered base and merge it there.
+"""
+
+UNCOVERED_RETARGET_NOTICE = (
+    "block-blind-automerge: %s is being re-targeted onto \"%s\", a ref with ZERO "
+    "required status checks; its gates will run but cannot block a merge\n"
+)
+
+
+def degraded(question, failure):
+    """Announce that the guard could not measure, rather than passing silently.
+
+    Args:
+        question: What could not be read.
+        failure: Why not.
+    """
+    sys.stderr.write(
+        "block-blind-automerge: could not read %s (%s); auto-merge protection "
+        "is NOT active for this command\n" % (question, failure)
+    )
+
+
+def base_is_uncovered(payload, repo_args, base_ref):
+    """Whether a ref has zero required status checks, read live from GitHub.
+
+    Args:
+        payload: The decoded pull request object.
+        repo_args: gh arguments naming the repository, possibly empty.
+        base_ref: The ref to ask about.
+
+    Returns:
+        True only when GitHub answered and the answer was zero. Every
+        unanswerable case returns False and announces itself, because a guard
+        that is silently absent reads exactly like a guard that is passing.
+    """
+    if not base_ref:
+        degraded("the base branch", "the PR payload named none")
+        return False
+    repo = repo_slug(payload, repo_args)
+    if repo is None:
+        degraded("the repository", "neither the PR URL nor --repo named one")
+        return False
+    rules, failure = branch_rules(repo, base_ref)
+    if failure is not None:
+        degraded("the branch rules for %s" % base_ref, failure)
+        return False
+    return required_context_count(rules) == 0
+
+
+acts = guarded_invocations(strip_heredocs(command))
+if not acts:
     sys.exit(0)
 
-for kind, subject, repo_args in armings:
+for act, kind, subject, repo_args, target_ref in acts:
     if kind == PROBE_UNREADABLE:
         # Fails CLOSED, unlike every other unanswerable case below. Those are
         # the guard being unable to run; this is the command refusing to say
         # what it acts on, which is a property of the command.
         sys.stderr.write(UNREADABLE_REFUSAL)
         sys.exit(1)
-    payload, failure = pull_request_state(kind, subject, repo_args)
+    fields = ARM_FIELDS if act == ACT_ARM else RETARGET_FIELDS
+    payload, failure = pull_request_state(kind, subject, repo_args, fields)
     if failure is not None:
-        # A guard that is silently absent reads exactly like a guard that is
-        # passing, so say so and let the command through.
-        sys.stderr.write(
-            "block-blind-automerge: could not read reviewDecision (%s); "
-            "auto-merge review-gate protection is NOT active for this command\n"
-            % failure
+        degraded(
+            "reviewDecision" if act == ACT_ARM else "the pull request", failure
         )
         continue
-    if (payload.get("reviewDecision") or "") != BLOCKING_REVIEW_DECISION:
+    if act == ACT_RETARGET:
+        # The current base is deliberately NOT consulted. The property is "a PR
+        # something is currently failing must not be moved onto a ref where
+        # nothing can block it", which holds whatever base it came from.
+        if not base_is_uncovered(payload, repo_args, target_ref):
+            continue
+        failing = failing_check_names(payload)
+        if not failing:
+            # A green PR moving onto a stack base is the sanctioned batching
+            # workflow. Announced, not refused — a guard that refused it would
+            # be switched off within a day.
+            sys.stderr.write(
+                UNCOVERED_RETARGET_NOTICE % (pr_name(payload), target_ref)
+            )
+            continue
+        sys.stderr.write(
+            UNCOVERED_RETARGET_REFUSAL
+            % (
+                pr_name(payload),
+                target_ref,
+                "\n".join("  - %s" % name for name in failing),
+            )
+        )
+        sys.exit(1)
+    if (payload.get("reviewDecision") or "") == BLOCKING_REVIEW_DECISION:
+        sys.stderr.write(REFUSAL % pr_name(payload))
+        sys.exit(1)
+    base_ref = payload.get("baseRefName")
+    if not base_is_uncovered(payload, repo_args, base_ref):
         continue
-    sys.stderr.write(REFUSAL % pr_name(payload))
+    selector = subject if subject is not None else str(payload.get("number") or "")
+    sys.stderr.write(
+        UNCOVERED_ARM_REFUSAL
+        % (pr_name(payload), base_ref, selector, selector)
+    )
     sys.exit(1)
 
 sys.exit(0)