@codyswann/lisa 4.34.13 → 4.34.15
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/all/copy-overwrite/scripts/check-npm-publish-landed.mjs +250 -0
- package/all/copy-overwrite/scripts/lisa-hooks/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/all/copy-overwrite/scripts/lisa-work-item.mjs +37 -1
- package/dist/codex/scripts/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.js +16 -0
- package/dist/core/lisa-owned-hash-ledger.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/nightly-e2e-guard-behavior-certificate.js +2 -2
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js +15 -6
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/opencode/plugin-templates/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +31 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +31 -1
- package/scripts/check-npm-publish-landed.mjs +30 -0
- package/scripts/two-channel-couplings.json +17 -4
- package/typescript/copy-overwrite/.prettierignore +1 -0
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@@ -265,8 +265,38 @@ ENV_LONG_SEPARATE_VALUE = {"--argv0", "--chdir", "--split-string", "--unset"}
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
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# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
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# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
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# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
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# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
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# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
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# command it prefixes.
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#
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# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
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# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
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#
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# allowed -0 -i -v -u NAME -C DIR already covered
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# BLOCKED -P altpath the defect, and the ONLY one
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# BLOCKED -S string correct: split-string reparses
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# an opaque payload, so what it
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# runs cannot be proven here
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# BLOCKED -Z -Q correct: unknown stays suspicious
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#
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# So the population is one letter, not a class. The two platforms' short
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# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
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# choose a table" would be machinery for a single character — and would fail
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# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
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# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
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#
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# Adding a letter here is a WEAKENING, so it needs the same evidence as any
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# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
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# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
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# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
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# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
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ENV_SHORT_NO_VALUE = frozenset("i0v")
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("uCaSP")
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# Builtins and wrappers that run whatever FOLLOWS them without changing what
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# it is: `command env -S ...` runs exactly the `env` that `env -S ...` runs,
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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"zod-validation-error": "^4.0.0"
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},
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"name": "@codyswann/lisa",
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"version": "4.34.
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"version": "4.34.15",
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"description": "Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects",
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"main": "dist/index.js",
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"exports": {
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"vitest": "^4.1.9"
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},
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"devDependencies": {
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"@codyswann/lisa": "^
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"@codyswann/lisa": "^4.33.1",
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"@playwright/test": "^1.61.1",
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"@stryker-mutator/api": "^9.0.0",
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"@stryker-mutator/core": "^9.0.0",
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"test": "tests"
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},
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"types": "./dist/index.d.ts",
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"lisaReleaseCommit": "
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"gitHead": "
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"lisaReleaseTag": "v4.34.
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"lisaReleaseCommit": "5f12a6b3a9f4d8a9f00db9f0000361a4838c6b78",
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"gitHead": "5f12a6b3a9f4d8a9f00db9f0000361a4838c6b78",
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"lisaReleaseTag": "v4.34.15"
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}
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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# options or the option's value.
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#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
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# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
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# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
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# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
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# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
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# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
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# command it prefixes.
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#
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# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
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# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
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#
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# allowed -0 -i -v -u NAME -C DIR already covered
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# BLOCKED -P altpath the defect, and the ONLY one
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# BLOCKED -S string correct: split-string reparses
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# an opaque payload, so what it
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# runs cannot be proven here
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# BLOCKED -Z -Q correct: unknown stays suspicious
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#
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# So the population is one letter, not a class. The two platforms' short
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# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
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# choose a table" would be machinery for a single character — and would fail
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# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
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# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
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#
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# Adding a letter here is a WEAKENING, so it needs the same evidence as any
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# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
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+
# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
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# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
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# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
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ENV_SHORT_NO_VALUE = frozenset("i0v")
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("uCaSP")
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# Builtins and wrappers that run whatever FOLLOWS them without changing what
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# it is: `command env -S ...` runs exactly the `env` that `env -S ...` runs,
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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# options or the option's value.
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#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
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# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
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# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
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+
# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
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+
# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
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+
# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
|
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+
# command it prefixes.
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+
#
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+
# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
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+
# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
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+
#
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+
# allowed -0 -i -v -u NAME -C DIR already covered
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+
# BLOCKED -P altpath the defect, and the ONLY one
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+
# BLOCKED -S string correct: split-string reparses
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283
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+
# an opaque payload, so what it
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# runs cannot be proven here
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285
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+
# BLOCKED -Z -Q correct: unknown stays suspicious
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+
#
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287
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+
# So the population is one letter, not a class. The two platforms' short
|
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288
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+
# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
|
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+
# choose a table" would be machinery for a single character — and would fail
|
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+
# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
|
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291
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+
# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
|
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+
#
|
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293
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+
# Adding a letter here is a WEAKENING, so it needs the same evidence as any
|
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294
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+
# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
|
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295
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+
# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
|
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296
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+
# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
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+
# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
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ENV_SHORT_NO_VALUE = frozenset("i0v")
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-
ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("uCaSP")
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# Builtins and wrappers that run whatever FOLLOWS them without changing what
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# it is: `command env -S ...` runs exactly the `env` that `env -S ...` runs,
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@@ -195,8 +195,38 @@ ENV_LONG_SEPARATE_VALUE = {"--argv0", "--chdir", "--split-string", "--unset"}
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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# options or the option's value.
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+
#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
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# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
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201
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+
# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
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202
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+
# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
|
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203
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+
# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
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+
# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
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205
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# command it prefixes.
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+
#
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+
# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
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# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
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#
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# allowed -0 -i -v -u NAME -C DIR already covered
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# BLOCKED -P altpath the defect, and the ONLY one
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# BLOCKED -S string correct: split-string reparses
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# an opaque payload, so what it
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# runs cannot be proven here
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# BLOCKED -Z -Q correct: unknown stays suspicious
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#
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# So the population is one letter, not a class. The two platforms' short
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# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
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219
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+
# choose a table" would be machinery for a single character — and would fail
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# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
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# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
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+
#
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223
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# Adding a letter here is a WEAKENING, so it needs the same evidence as any
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224
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+
# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
|
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225
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+
# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
|
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226
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+
# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
|
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227
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+
# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
|
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198
228
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ENV_SHORT_NO_VALUE = frozenset("i0v")
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199
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-
ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("
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+
ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("uCaSP")
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# Builtins and wrappers that run whatever FOLLOWS them without changing what
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232
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# it is: `command env -S ...` runs exactly the `env` that `env -S ...` runs,
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@@ -265,8 +265,38 @@ ENV_LONG_SEPARATE_VALUE = {"--argv0", "--chdir", "--split-string", "--unset"}
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265
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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# options or the option's value.
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#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
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270
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+
# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
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271
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+
# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
|
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272
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+
# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
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273
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+
# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
|
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274
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+
# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
|
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275
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+
# command it prefixes.
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276
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+
#
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277
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+
# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
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278
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+
# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
|
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#
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# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
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# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
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# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
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# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
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# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
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# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
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# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
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# env's single-letter options, by whether the rest of a cluster is more
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# options or the option's value.
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#
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# BOTH PLATFORMS' SETS, not one. These began as GNU's, and an option that is
|
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# in neither set falls through to `ambiguous`, which this guard treats as
|
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# suspicious. That default is correct and stays — an unknown option genuinely
|
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# could take a value and swallow the command name. What is wrong is a
|
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# well-known option being unknown, and on a macOS fleet `env -P` is exactly
|
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# that: BSD's "search altpath for the utility", refused on every ordinary
|
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# command it prefixes.
|
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#
|
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|
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# Measured, one option at a time, against the guard before this change. BSD's
|
|
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|
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# complete short set is `0 i v u C P S`, from the synopsis in env(1):
|
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|
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#
|
|
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|
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# allowed -0 -i -v -u NAME -C DIR already covered
|
|
281
|
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# BLOCKED -P altpath the defect, and the ONLY one
|
|
282
|
+
# BLOCKED -S string correct: split-string reparses
|
|
283
|
+
# an opaque payload, so what it
|
|
284
|
+
# runs cannot be proven here
|
|
285
|
+
# BLOCKED -Z -Q correct: unknown stays suspicious
|
|
286
|
+
#
|
|
287
|
+
# So the population is one letter, not a class. The two platforms' short
|
|
288
|
+
# options coincide everywhere else, which is why "detect the platform and
|
|
289
|
+
# choose a table" would be machinery for a single character — and would fail
|
|
290
|
+
# on a machine running GNU coreutils under a BSD userland, or the reverse.
|
|
291
|
+
# Recognising the union is both smaller and more robust.
|
|
292
|
+
#
|
|
293
|
+
# Adding a letter here is a WEAKENING, so it needs the same evidence as any
|
|
294
|
+
# other: ten bypass shapes routed through `-P` — long flag, attached value,
|
|
295
|
+
# short cluster, abbreviation, an assignment, `HUSKY=0`, a hooksPath disable,
|
|
296
|
+
# a nested `-c` shell, an executed script, and `-P` swallowing the command
|
|
297
|
+
# word — were all refused before this change and are all still refused after.
|
|
268
298
|
ENV_SHORT_NO_VALUE = frozenset("i0v")
|
|
269
|
-
ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("
|
|
299
|
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ENV_SHORT_TAKES_VALUE = frozenset("uCaSP")
|
|
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300
|
|
|
271
301
|
# Builtins and wrappers that run whatever FOLLOWS them without changing what
|
|
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|
# it is: `command env -S ...` runs exactly the `env` that `env -S ...` runs,
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.34.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.34.15",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
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1
1
|
{
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2
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|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
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3
|
-
"version": "4.34.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.34.15",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, across Claude and Codex.",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
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|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.34.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.34.15",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
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5
5
|
"author": {
|
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|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
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1
1
|
{
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|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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|
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"version": "4.34.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.34.15",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
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6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
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|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "4.34.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "4.34.15",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|