@codyswann/lisa 4.13.0 → 4.13.2

package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-sonarcloud-access/SKILL.md

@@ -62,9 +62,38 @@ not the only one:
 read_sonar_secret() {
   local name="$1"
   [ -n "${!name:-}" ] && { echo "${!name}"; return; }
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get "$name" 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -72,6 +101,13 @@ read_sonar_secret() {
       break
     fi
   done
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve $name through lisa-secrets-access." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
   return 1
 }
 
@@ -81,11 +117,17 @@ SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN=$(read_sonar_secret SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN) && export SONARQUBE
 SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG=$(read_sonar_secret SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG) && export SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG
 ```
 
-`sonar-secrets.sh` runs the same resolution with a longer search path (it also
-probes `.codex/skills/…` and `node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/…`,
-because a hook fires in checkouts that never installed an agent plugin) and with
-a timeout, because it sits in front of every prompt. Use its search order
-verbatim when this skill runs inside a hook.
+`sonar-secrets.sh` runs the same resolution with two differences that belong to
+a hook rather than to a skill: it anchors every candidate at `$repo_root` (a
+hook fires from whatever directory the agent happens to be in) and it wraps the
+`resolve-secret.mjs` call in a timeout, because it sits in front of every
+prompt. Use its search order verbatim when this skill runs inside a hook.
+
+This paragraph used to claim the hook searched a *longer* path than the ladder
+above. It did — the ladder above stopped after `.agents/`, so in a checkout
+that vendored neither leading path it reached no resolver at all and returned
+without a word. The two now cover the same layouts, and the fix that closed
+that gap is guarded by `credential-resolver-ladder`.
 
 Wiring is performed once by `/lisa:setup:sonar` (which drives `sonar integrate
 <agent>`); this access layer assumes the MCP is already wired. This is distinct

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific Lisa plugin.",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "4.13.0",
+  "version": "4.13.2",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh

@@ -752,7 +752,13 @@ while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
   # arm A). Unquoted and run-leading invocations get the whole statement back,
   # so this is a no-op for every real delete.
   rm_assignment_stmt="$rm_stmt"
-  rm_walk_text="$(rm_scan_scope "$rm_stmt")"
+  rm_walk_status=0
+  rm_walk_text="$(rm_scan_scope "$rm_stmt")" || rm_walk_status=$?
+  if [ "$rm_walk_status" -ne 0 ]; then
+    # The substitution above runs in a subshell. A denial inside it cannot stop
+    # this parent hook, so carry the failure out explicitly and deny here.
+    scan_failed "$rm_walk_status"
+  fi
   while IFS= read -r rm_scope; do
     set -f
     seen_rm=0

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/eager/falsifiable-checks.md

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ Each has been observed in real runs; each reported success while asserting nothi
   This form is preferred over the alternatives because it is the only one that both survives `sh` and keeps the full output, which is what you need the moment the status says the gate failed. `set -o pipefail` is correct where it exists but is **not POSIX `sh`** — dash has no such option, and this repository runs hooks under `sh`. `${PIPESTATUS[0]}` is **bash-only** (zsh spells it `$pipestatus[1]`, 1-indexed) and is overwritten by the very next command, so it must be read immediately. Never report a gate as green from a status read through `| tail`, `| head`, or `| tee`.
 - **Falsify before reporting.** No clean result is reportable until the check has been shown to fail on a deliberate break. **"Mentally reverting" does not count** — reasoning that the assertion *would* fail is precisely the step that lets a non-functional guard ship, because the author already believes it is load-bearing. Run the break.
 - **Mutation-prove the guard, then read the cardinality.** Neuter the protection **in production code**, run the **whole suite**, count the failures and **read their names**, then revert. **Zero** ⇒ the guard is inert (one pinning a single field shipped with all 50 tests green while the regression walked through). **Many, unrelated** ⇒ over-broad; its next failure will not name the cause. **Exactly one, or several all named for the same regression** ⇒ load-bearing and correctly scoped. A **zero is robust to contention** — load only ever adds failures — so only the non-zero counts need a quiet machine.
-- **The automated mutation gate is language-scoped; the manual probe above is not.** Stryker instruments the JS/TS family and nothing else — there is **no shell parser**, so a guard whose logic lives in `.sh` yields no mutants under **any** `mutate` list. Adding one does not measure it: it aborts the whole run (`No parser registered for .sh!` — measured, not inferred) and takes every other guard's score with it. So a mutation gate that stays grey or green on a shell-guard change **measured nothing about that guard**, and reading it as coverage is the fifth failure mode above wearing a config file. Shell guards are covered by **driving tests only**: execute the script against a payload table and assert the blocked/allowed verdict, with a control on **both** sides — a refusal case *and* an allowed case. A shell guard nothing executes has no bite evidence at all, whatever the gate printed.
+- **The automated mutation gate is language-scoped; the manual probe above is not.** Stryker instruments the JavaScript and TypeScript family plus Vue, HTML and Svelte — there is **no shell parser**, so a guard whose logic lives in `.sh` yields no mutants under **any** `mutate` list. Adding one does not measure it: it aborts the whole run (`No parser registered for .sh!` — measured, not inferred) and takes every other guard's score with it. So a mutation gate that stays grey or green on a shell-guard change **measured nothing about that guard**, and reading it as coverage is the fifth failure mode above wearing a config file. Shell guards are covered by **driving tests only**: execute the script against a payload table and assert the blocked/allowed verdict, with a control on **both** sides — a refusal case *and* an allowed case. A shell guard nothing executes has no bite evidence at all, whatever the gate printed.
 - **Never scope the probe by filename, and never infer absent coverage from a grep.** Suites split at the line cap, so a protection's tests often sit in a sibling file: a filename-scoped probe reported cardinality 0 on a live security fix that a whole-suite run showed failing 4 tests, every one named for it.
 - **Assert that no copy is wrong, not that some copy is right.** An existential assertion over duplicated content is satisfied by the correct copy and cannot see the broken one — rewriting one suite's assertions to universal negatives took the same mutation from **0 to 18** failures. Enumerate the property (*every* marker uses an em-dash), never the one known-bad spelling.
 - **Reconstruct a red state; never narrate one you did not run.** Evidence describing a failing or dirty state must come from a run you actually observed — an evidence file once claimed "working tree clean" while listing two untracked scripts in the same file. To observe a state that no longer exists, check that commit out in a **throwaway detached-HEAD worktree** and run it there. Writing down what the output would have said is fabrication, however confident the reasoning.

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/reference/config-resolution.md

@@ -871,9 +871,34 @@ read_notion_token() {
   # Preferred path: the single secrets chokepoint, which owns the one-store rule
   # and the surface ladder. An agent following this reference must try it before
   # any keychain — a second reader is how one credential ends up in two places.
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used. The plugin rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships
+  # beside the skill, so a rung pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the
+  # plugin itself is installed. Without one, a consumer repository that vendors
+  # none of the leading paths never reaches a resolver at all — and an agent
+  # copying a two-rung ladder out of THIS reference reproduces that.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get NOTION_API_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -884,16 +909,17 @@ read_notion_token() {
   # Legacy fallback: the OS keychain written by the guided setup flow, for
   # projects with no credentials provider. Reached only when the chokepoint is
   # absent or has no entry.
+  local from_keychain=""
   case "$(uname -s)" in
-    Darwin)  security find-generic-password -s lisa-notion -a "$workspace" -w 2>/dev/null ;;
+    Darwin)  from_keychain=$(security find-generic-password -s lisa-notion -a "$workspace" -w 2>/dev/null) ;;
     Linux)   command -v secret-tool >/dev/null && \
-             secret-tool lookup service lisa-notion account "$workspace" 2>/dev/null ;;
+             from_keychain=$(secret-tool lookup service lisa-notion account "$workspace" 2>/dev/null) ;;
     MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
       # `cmdkey /generic ... /pass:` stores the secret in Windows Credential Manager, but
       # `cmdkey /list` never prints stored passwords (by design). Read the CredentialBlob
       # back via the Win32 CredRead API through PowerShell; pass the target name via an env
       # var to dodge nested quoting, and strip the CRLF powershell.exe appends.
-      LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-notion-${workspace}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
+      from_keychain=$(LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-notion-${workspace}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
 Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
 using System;
 using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
@@ -919,8 +945,19 @@ public static class LisaCred {
   }
 }
 "@
-[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' ;;
+[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r') ;;
   esac
+  [ -n "$from_keychain" ] && { echo "$from_keychain"; return; }
+
+  # Name every path. A bare empty return sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve NOTION_API_TOKEN through lisa-secrets-access or the legacy keychain." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
+  echo "  <OS keychain> service=lisa-notion account=$workspace" >&2
+  return 1
 }
 ```
 

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/reference/falsifiable-checks.md

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ Practical consequence: an inert-guard finding is safe to report from a busy mach
 
 Everything above is a *manual* probe, and it is language-agnostic: neuter a shell guard, run the suite, read the names, and the yardstick works exactly as it does for TypeScript.
 
-The **automated** mutation gate is not language-agnostic, and the difference is easy to miss because both end in a green result. Stryker's instrumenter is per-language — the JS/TS family, plus HTML and Svelte, which delegate to it. There is **no shell parser**. So:
+The **automated** mutation gate is not language-agnostic, and the difference is easy to miss because both end in a green result. Stryker's instrumenter is per-language — the JavaScript and TypeScript family, plus Vue, HTML and Svelte, which delegate to it. There is **no shell parser**. So:
 
 - A guard whose logic lives in `.sh` produces **no mutants under any `mutate` list**. It is outside the gate by construction, not by a selection decision, and widening the patterns cannot bring it in.
 - Adding a `.sh` path to `mutate` does not measure it and does not quietly no-op. Stryker throws out of instrumentation — `Unable to parse …. No parser registered for .sh!` — and the run aborts before a single mutant is tried, so **one such entry destroys the score of every other guard in the list.** Measured, not inferred.

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-atlassian-access/SKILL.md

@@ -56,9 +56,38 @@ read_atlassian_token() {
   # and the surface ladder, so anything it can answer must not be read out of an
   # OS keychain here — a second reader is how the same credential ends up living
   # in two places and drifting.
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -76,15 +105,17 @@ read_atlassian_token() {
   # surface can reach, so a project resting on it has no working tier 1 in cron,
   # CI, or a cloud session. Re-run /lisa:setup:atlassian before that date to
   # store ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN through the chokepoint instead.
+  local from_keychain=""
   case "$(uname -s)" in
-    Darwin)  security find-generic-password -s lisa-atlassian -a "$email" -w 2>/dev/null ;;
-    Linux)   command -v secret-tool >/dev/null && secret-tool lookup service lisa-atlassian account "$email" 2>/dev/null ;;
+    Darwin)  from_keychain=$(security find-generic-password -s lisa-atlassian -a "$email" -w 2>/dev/null) ;;
+    Linux)   command -v secret-tool >/dev/null && \
+             from_keychain=$(secret-tool lookup service lisa-atlassian account "$email" 2>/dev/null) ;;
     MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
       # `cmdkey /generic ... /pass:` stores the secret in Windows Credential Manager, but
       # `cmdkey /list` never prints stored passwords (by design). Read the CredentialBlob
       # back via the Win32 CredRead API through PowerShell; pass the target name via an env
       # var to dodge nested quoting, and strip the CRLF powershell.exe appends.
-      LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-atlassian-${email}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
+      from_keychain=$(LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-atlassian-${email}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
 Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
 using System;
 using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
@@ -110,8 +141,19 @@ public static class LisaCred {
   }
 }
 "@
-[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' ;;
+[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r') ;;
   esac
+  [ -n "$from_keychain" ] && { echo "$from_keychain"; return; }
+
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve ATLASSIAN_API_TOKEN through lisa-secrets-access or the legacy keychain." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
+  echo "  <OS keychain> service=lisa-atlassian account=$email" >&2
+  return 1
 }
 TOKEN=$(read_atlassian_token "$EMAIL")
 if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-jam-access/SKILL.md

@@ -47,9 +47,38 @@ export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
 # divergence `credential-substrate-precedence` exists to remove.
 read_jam_pat() {
   [ -n "${JAM_PAT:-}" ] && { echo "$JAM_PAT"; return; }
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get JAM_PAT 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -57,6 +86,13 @@ read_jam_pat() {
       break
     fi
   done
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve JAM_PAT through lisa-secrets-access." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
   return 1
 }
 

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-notion-access/SKILL.md

@@ -57,9 +57,38 @@ read_notion_token() {
   # and the surface ladder, so anything it can answer must not be read out of an
   # OS keychain here — a second reader is how the same credential ends up living
   # in two places and drifting.
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get NOTION_API_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -77,16 +106,17 @@ read_notion_token() {
   # surface can reach, so a project resting on it has no working tier 1 in cron,
   # CI, or a cloud session. Re-run /lisa:setup:notion before that date to store
   # NOTION_API_TOKEN through the chokepoint instead.
+  local from_keychain=""
   case "$(uname -s)" in
-    Darwin)  security find-generic-password -s lisa-notion -a "$workspace" -w 2>/dev/null ;;
+    Darwin)  from_keychain=$(security find-generic-password -s lisa-notion -a "$workspace" -w 2>/dev/null) ;;
     Linux)   command -v secret-tool >/dev/null && \
-             secret-tool lookup service lisa-notion account "$workspace" 2>/dev/null ;;
+             from_keychain=$(secret-tool lookup service lisa-notion account "$workspace" 2>/dev/null) ;;
     MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*)
       # `cmdkey /generic ... /pass:` stores the secret in Windows Credential Manager, but
       # `cmdkey /list` never prints stored passwords (by design). Read the CredentialBlob
       # back via the Win32 CredRead API through PowerShell; pass the target name via an env
       # var to dodge nested quoting, and strip the CRLF powershell.exe appends.
-      LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-notion-${workspace}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
+      from_keychain=$(LISA_CRED_TARGET="lisa-notion-${workspace}" powershell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command '
 Add-Type -TypeDefinition @"
 using System;
 using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
@@ -112,8 +142,19 @@ public static class LisaCred {
   }
 }
 "@
-[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r' ;;
+[LisaCred]::Read($env:LISA_CRED_TARGET)' 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r') ;;
   esac
+  [ -n "$from_keychain" ] && { echo "$from_keychain"; return; }
+
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve NOTION_API_TOKEN through lisa-secrets-access or the legacy keychain." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
+  echo "  <OS keychain> service=lisa-notion account=$workspace" >&2
+  return 1
 }
 TOKEN=$(read_notion_token "$WORKSPACE")
 if [ -n "$TOKEN" ]; then

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-posthog-access/SKILL.md

@@ -48,9 +48,38 @@ POSTHOG_HOST=${POSTHOG_HOST:-https://app.posthog.com}
 # MCP — the exact divergence `credential-substrate-precedence` exists to remove.
 read_posthog_key() {
   [ -n "${POSTHOG_PERSONAL_API_KEY:-}" ] && { echo "$POSTHOG_PERSONAL_API_KEY"; return; }
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get POSTHOG_PERSONAL_API_KEY 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -58,6 +87,13 @@ read_posthog_key() {
       break
     fi
   done
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve POSTHOG_PERSONAL_API_KEY through lisa-secrets-access." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
   return 1
 }
 

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-sentry-access/SKILL.md

@@ -47,9 +47,38 @@ interactively and headlessly — which is why it leads. The REST tier uses:
 # Mirrors `linear-access`, `atlassian-access`, and `notion-access`.
 read_sentry_token() {
   [ -n "${SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN:-}" ] && { echo "$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"; return; }
+  #
+  # Ordered repo-first, ending at the plugin's own copy. Repo-relative rungs
+  # lead because a project that vendors the resolver has declared which copy it
+  # wants used, and that decision must survive this change untouched. The plugin
+  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
+  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
+  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
+  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
+  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
+  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
+  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
+  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
+  local candidates=(
+    .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .opencode/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+    .codex/skills/lisa/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs
+  )
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  if [ -n "${PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    candidates+=("$PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
+  fi
+  # Last rung deliberately needs no environment variable: an agent that was
+  # never handed a plugin root still has the installed package to fall back on.
+  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)
+
   local resolver
-  for resolver in .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs \
-                  .agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs; do
+  local tried=()
+  for resolver in "${candidates[@]}"; do
+    tried+=("$resolver")
     if [ -f "$resolver" ]; then
       local via_lisa
       via_lisa=$(node "$resolver" get SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN 2>/dev/null) \
@@ -57,6 +86,13 @@ read_sentry_token() {
       break
     fi
   done
+  # Name every path. A bare `return 1` sends the next reader hunting for a
+  # resolver they cannot see the absence of; the enumeration turns that into a
+  # seconds-long diagnosis. Paths and store coordinates only — never any
+  # resolved value, on any path.
+  echo "Error: could not resolve SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN through lisa-secrets-access." >&2
+  echo "Tried, in order (relative paths are from $PWD):" >&2
+  printf '  %s\n' "${tried[@]}" >&2
   return 1
 }