@codyswann/lisa 2.339.0 → 2.340.0

package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/bootstrap-store.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/**
+ * Store the one credential that unlocks the provider, on the machine that needs
+ * it.
+ *
+ * Reading it already existed; writing it did not, so every operator ran a
+ * platform-specific `security add-generic-password` copied from documentation.
+ * That is a command with a credential in it, typed by hand, on the one value
+ * whose compromise costs every other secret.
+ *
+ * **Two stores, because there is no third option.** macOS has a keychain that
+ * is encrypted at rest and unlocked with the login session. Linux has no
+ * equivalent that can be assumed present — libsecret needs a running daemon and
+ * a desktop session, which a server or a container does not have. So the
+ * fallback is a `0600` file under `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, which is the same
+ * protection the materialized secrets file already relies on. It is weaker than
+ * a keychain and it is stated as such, rather than pretending the two are equal.
+ * @module bootstrap-store
+ */
+
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import {
+  chmodSync,
+  existsSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  renameSync,
+  rmSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+
+/**
+ * Where a file-backed bootstrap lives, for platforms with no keychain.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [env] Environment to read.
+ * @returns {string} Absolute path.
+ */
+export function bootstrapFile(key, env = process.env) {
+  const root = env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(env.HOME || homedir(), ".config");
+  return join(root, "lisa", "bootstrap", assertKey(key));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reject a key that is not exactly one safe path segment.
+ *
+ * The key is joined onto a directory, and every entry point — store, clear and
+ * read — routes through that join. A `/` or a `..` in it escapes the bootstrap
+ * directory, so an unvalidated key can write, delete, or read an arbitrary file
+ * as the operator. Validating in `bootstrapFile` covers all three at once
+ * rather than trusting each caller to remember.
+ *
+ * Same guard `assertNamespace` applies to the namespace, and for the same
+ * reason. The character set is what a variable name can hold anyway, so nothing
+ * legitimate is refused.
+ * @param {string} key Candidate bootstrap variable name.
+ * @returns {string} The key, unchanged, when valid.
+ */
+export function assertKey(key) {
+  if (
+    typeof key !== "string" ||
+    !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/.test(key) ||
+    key === ".."
+  ) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `bootstrap key must be one safe path segment, got ${JSON.stringify(key)}`
+    );
+  }
+  return key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Quote a word for `security -i`, which tokenizes its stdin like a shell.
+ *
+ * A token is usually base64-ish and needs no quoting, but "usually" is not a
+ * property to rely on for a credential: an unquoted value containing a space
+ * would be parsed as two arguments and silently store only the first part.
+ * A newline is refused outright rather than escaped, because it terminates the
+ * command line and there is no quoting that survives it.
+ * @param {string} word Value to quote.
+ * @returns {string} A single quoted token.
+ */
+function quote(word) {
+  if (/[\n\r]/.test(word)) {
+    throw new Error("bootstrap value must not contain a newline");
+  }
+  return `"${String(word).replace(/(["\\])/g, "\\$1")}"`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Which store this platform uses.
+ * @param {string} [platform] Platform name, injectable for tests.
+ * @returns {"keychain"|"file"} The store.
+ */
+export function storeKind(platform = process.platform) {
+  return platform === "darwin" ? "keychain" : "file";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the bootstrap where this machine's sessions will look for it.
+ *
+ * The value never reaches a command line on either path. The keychain path
+ * feeds `security -i` a command stream on **stdin**, because an argument is
+ * visible in `ps` to every process running as this user for as long as the call
+ * lasts. The file path writes and chmods a temporary before renaming, so the
+ * credential is never briefly world-readable on a filesystem where the default
+ * umask would have made it so.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {string} value The token.
+ * @param {object} [deps] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {{kind: string, where: string}} Where it went.
+ */
+export function storeBootstrap(key, value, deps = {}) {
+  const kind = deps.kind ?? storeKind();
+  const env = deps.env ?? process.env;
+
+  if (kind === "keychain") {
+    const run = deps.run ?? execFileSync;
+    assertKey(key);
+    // `security -i` reads a COMMAND STREAM on stdin, which is what keeps the
+    // value out of `argv` — where `ps` would show it to every process running
+    // as this user for as long as the call lasts.
+    //
+    // The obvious `-w` with no argument does NOT read the password from stdin.
+    // It opens an interactive prompt on the terminal, and with stdin piped it
+    // stores an EMPTY value and exits 0 — verified against the real binary,
+    // which is how this shipped broken the first time: unit tests injected the
+    // runner and never executed it.
+    //
+    // `-U` updates in place; without it a second run fails with "already
+    // exists", making rotation — the common case — the broken one.
+    run("security", ["-i"], {
+      input: `add-generic-password -U -s ${quote(key)} -a ${quote(
+        env.USER ?? ""
+      )} -w ${quote(value)}\n`,
+      stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"],
+    });
+    return { kind, where: `keychain (service ${key})` };
+  }
+
+  const path = deps.path ?? bootstrapFile(key, env);
+  const write = deps.write ?? writeFileSync;
+  const chmod = deps.chmod ?? chmodSync;
+  const rename = deps.rename ?? renameSync;
+  const makeDir = deps.mkdir ?? mkdirSync;
+
+  makeDir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const temporary = `${path}.tmp`;
+  // mode on write applies only when the file is CREATED, so an existing
+  // temporary from a crashed run would keep its old permissions. chmod after
+  // writing is what makes 0600 true rather than usually true.
+  write(temporary, `${value}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+  chmod(temporary, 0o600);
+  rename(temporary, path);
+  return { kind, where: path };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove a stored bootstrap, so a rotation can be proven rather than assumed.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {object} [deps] Injected seams, for tests.
+ */
+export function clearBootstrap(key, deps = {}) {
+  const kind = deps.kind ?? storeKind();
+  const env = deps.env ?? process.env;
+
+  if (kind === "keychain") {
+    const run = deps.run ?? execFileSync;
+    try {
+      run(
+        "security",
+        ["delete-generic-password", "-s", key, "-a", env.USER ?? ""],
+        {
+          stdio: "ignore",
+        }
+      );
+    } catch {
+      // Absent is the desired state, and `security` exits non-zero for it.
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  const remove = deps.remove ?? rmSync;
+  remove(deps.path ?? bootstrapFile(key, env), { force: true });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a file-backed bootstrap, treating absence as empty.
+ *
+ * The keychain reader lives beside the other provider concerns in
+ * `providers.mjs`; this is its counterpart for platforms without one.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [env] Environment to read.
+ * @returns {string} The value, or an empty string.
+ */
+export function readBootstrapFile(key, env = process.env) {
+  const path = bootstrapFile(key, env);
+  if (!existsSync(path)) return "";
+  return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
+}

package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/prompt-secret.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/**
+ * Ask an operator for a credential, without it appearing anywhere.
+ *
+ * The obvious alternatives all leave a copy behind:
+ *
+ * - **A command-line argument** is visible in `ps` to every process on the
+ *   machine for as long as the call runs, and a shell records it in history.
+ * - **The clipboard** is worse than it looks. Raycast, Alfred, Maccy and every
+ *   other clipboard manager persist history in plaintext, searchable, long
+ *   after the paste — so a bootstrap routed through it outlives the operation
+ *   in a database nobody thinks about. Reading it silently also takes whatever
+ *   happens to be there, which is the wrong thing whenever the operator copied
+ *   something else in between.
+ * - **Echoed input** puts it in the terminal scrollback, which is frequently
+ *   logged.
+ *
+ * So: read from the tty with echo off, and never touch anything else.
+ * @module prompt-secret
+ */
+
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, writeSync } from "node:fs";
+
+/**
+ * Whether a human can actually answer.
+ *
+ * Checked so an automated caller SKIPS the prompt rather than hanging on a
+ * read that will never return. A setup script blocked forever is worse than one
+ * that says what it could not do — the first looks like a slow install.
+ * @param {object} [io] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {boolean} True when stdin is a terminal.
+ */
+export function canPrompt(io = {}) {
+  return Boolean(io.isTTY ?? process.stdin.isTTY);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Prompt for a secret with terminal echo disabled.
+ *
+ * Echo is turned off with `stty` and restored in a `finally`, because a caller
+ * that throws mid-read would otherwise leave the operator's terminal silently
+ * not echoing anything they type afterwards.
+ * @param {string} message Prompt to display.
+ * @param {object} [io] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {string} What was typed, trimmed.
+ */
+export function promptSecret(message, io = {}) {
+  const run = io.run ?? execFileSync;
+  const open = io.open ?? openSync;
+  const read = io.read ?? readSync;
+  const close = io.close ?? closeSync;
+  const write = io.write ?? writeSync;
+
+  const tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+");
+  try {
+    write(tty, message);
+    // `stty` must be pointed at the descriptor the credential is READ from, not
+    // at this process's stdin. With "inherit" it configures whatever stdin
+    // happens to be: a pipe, where stty exits non-zero and this throws; or a
+    // different terminal, where echo stays on for the device the operator is
+    // typing into and the credential lands in their scrollback.
+    run("stty", ["-echo"], { stdio: [tty, "ignore", "ignore"] });
+    const buffer = Buffer.alloc(4096);
+    try {
+      const bytes = read(tty, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
+      return buffer.toString("utf8", 0, bytes).trim();
+    } finally {
+      // Zeroed rather than left for the collector: a 4 KiB buffer holding a
+      // bootstrap credential is exactly the page that ends up in a core dump.
+      buffer.fill(0);
+      run("stty", ["echo"], { stdio: [tty, "ignore", "ignore"] });
+      // The newline the operator typed was not echoed, so without this the next
+      // line of output starts halfway across the prompt.
+      write(tty, "\n");
+    }
+  } finally {
+    close(tty);
+  }
+}

package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/providers.mjs

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 
 import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
 
+import { readBootstrapFile } from "./bootstrap-store.mjs";
+
 /**
  * A provider key becomes a shell variable name on materializing surfaces, so
  * only names valid in every POSIX-like shell are accepted. Anything else stays
@@ -129,13 +131,29 @@ export function bootstrapToken(bootstrap) {
 }
 
 /**
- * Read one value from the macOS keychain, treating absence as empty.
- * @param {string} key Keychain service name.
+ * Read one value from this machine's credential store, treating absence as
+ * empty.
+ *
+ * The `keychain` source names a role, not a macOS API: "wherever this machine
+ * keeps its bootstrap". On macOS that is the keychain. Elsewhere there is no
+ * store that can be assumed present — libsecret needs a daemon and a desktop
+ * session, which a server or container does not have — so it is a `0600` file,
+ * the same protection the materialized secrets file already relies on.
+ *
+ * Returning empty on the other platform, as this did before, meant a Linux
+ * machine could store a bootstrap and never read it back.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
  * @returns {string} The value, or an empty string when unavailable.
  */
 function fromKeychain(key) {
-  if (process.platform !== "darwin") return "";
   try {
+    // Inside the `try`, not before it. `readBootstrapFile` uses `readFileSync`,
+    // which throws on a permission error, on EISDIR, and when the file is
+    // removed between the existence check and the read. This function's
+    // contract is to return empty when the value is unavailable, and
+    // `bootstrapToken` has no handler — so a raw filesystem error would
+    // replace the curated "not found in: ..." message with a stack trace.
+    if (process.platform !== "darwin") return readBootstrapFile(key);
     return execFileSync(
       "security",
       ["find-generic-password", "-s", key, "-a", process.env.USER ?? "", "-w"],

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific Lisa plugin.",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.339.0",
+  "version": "2.340.0",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/bootstrap-store.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/**
+ * Store the one credential that unlocks the provider, on the machine that needs
+ * it.
+ *
+ * Reading it already existed; writing it did not, so every operator ran a
+ * platform-specific `security add-generic-password` copied from documentation.
+ * That is a command with a credential in it, typed by hand, on the one value
+ * whose compromise costs every other secret.
+ *
+ * **Two stores, because there is no third option.** macOS has a keychain that
+ * is encrypted at rest and unlocked with the login session. Linux has no
+ * equivalent that can be assumed present — libsecret needs a running daemon and
+ * a desktop session, which a server or a container does not have. So the
+ * fallback is a `0600` file under `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME`, which is the same
+ * protection the materialized secrets file already relies on. It is weaker than
+ * a keychain and it is stated as such, rather than pretending the two are equal.
+ * @module bootstrap-store
+ */
+
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import {
+  chmodSync,
+  existsSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  renameSync,
+  rmSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from "node:fs";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
+
+/**
+ * Where a file-backed bootstrap lives, for platforms with no keychain.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [env] Environment to read.
+ * @returns {string} Absolute path.
+ */
+export function bootstrapFile(key, env = process.env) {
+  const root = env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || join(env.HOME || homedir(), ".config");
+  return join(root, "lisa", "bootstrap", assertKey(key));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reject a key that is not exactly one safe path segment.
+ *
+ * The key is joined onto a directory, and every entry point — store, clear and
+ * read — routes through that join. A `/` or a `..` in it escapes the bootstrap
+ * directory, so an unvalidated key can write, delete, or read an arbitrary file
+ * as the operator. Validating in `bootstrapFile` covers all three at once
+ * rather than trusting each caller to remember.
+ *
+ * Same guard `assertNamespace` applies to the namespace, and for the same
+ * reason. The character set is what a variable name can hold anyway, so nothing
+ * legitimate is refused.
+ * @param {string} key Candidate bootstrap variable name.
+ * @returns {string} The key, unchanged, when valid.
+ */
+export function assertKey(key) {
+  if (
+    typeof key !== "string" ||
+    !/^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/.test(key) ||
+    key === ".."
+  ) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `bootstrap key must be one safe path segment, got ${JSON.stringify(key)}`
+    );
+  }
+  return key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Quote a word for `security -i`, which tokenizes its stdin like a shell.
+ *
+ * A token is usually base64-ish and needs no quoting, but "usually" is not a
+ * property to rely on for a credential: an unquoted value containing a space
+ * would be parsed as two arguments and silently store only the first part.
+ * A newline is refused outright rather than escaped, because it terminates the
+ * command line and there is no quoting that survives it.
+ * @param {string} word Value to quote.
+ * @returns {string} A single quoted token.
+ */
+function quote(word) {
+  if (/[\n\r]/.test(word)) {
+    throw new Error("bootstrap value must not contain a newline");
+  }
+  return `"${String(word).replace(/(["\\])/g, "\\$1")}"`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Which store this platform uses.
+ * @param {string} [platform] Platform name, injectable for tests.
+ * @returns {"keychain"|"file"} The store.
+ */
+export function storeKind(platform = process.platform) {
+  return platform === "darwin" ? "keychain" : "file";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the bootstrap where this machine's sessions will look for it.
+ *
+ * The value never reaches a command line on either path. The keychain path
+ * feeds `security -i` a command stream on **stdin**, because an argument is
+ * visible in `ps` to every process running as this user for as long as the call
+ * lasts. The file path writes and chmods a temporary before renaming, so the
+ * credential is never briefly world-readable on a filesystem where the default
+ * umask would have made it so.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {string} value The token.
+ * @param {object} [deps] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {{kind: string, where: string}} Where it went.
+ */
+export function storeBootstrap(key, value, deps = {}) {
+  const kind = deps.kind ?? storeKind();
+  const env = deps.env ?? process.env;
+
+  if (kind === "keychain") {
+    const run = deps.run ?? execFileSync;
+    assertKey(key);
+    // `security -i` reads a COMMAND STREAM on stdin, which is what keeps the
+    // value out of `argv` — where `ps` would show it to every process running
+    // as this user for as long as the call lasts.
+    //
+    // The obvious `-w` with no argument does NOT read the password from stdin.
+    // It opens an interactive prompt on the terminal, and with stdin piped it
+    // stores an EMPTY value and exits 0 — verified against the real binary,
+    // which is how this shipped broken the first time: unit tests injected the
+    // runner and never executed it.
+    //
+    // `-U` updates in place; without it a second run fails with "already
+    // exists", making rotation — the common case — the broken one.
+    run("security", ["-i"], {
+      input: `add-generic-password -U -s ${quote(key)} -a ${quote(
+        env.USER ?? ""
+      )} -w ${quote(value)}\n`,
+      stdio: ["pipe", "ignore", "ignore"],
+    });
+    return { kind, where: `keychain (service ${key})` };
+  }
+
+  const path = deps.path ?? bootstrapFile(key, env);
+  const write = deps.write ?? writeFileSync;
+  const chmod = deps.chmod ?? chmodSync;
+  const rename = deps.rename ?? renameSync;
+  const makeDir = deps.mkdir ?? mkdirSync;
+
+  makeDir(dirname(path), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+  const temporary = `${path}.tmp`;
+  // mode on write applies only when the file is CREATED, so an existing
+  // temporary from a crashed run would keep its old permissions. chmod after
+  // writing is what makes 0600 true rather than usually true.
+  write(temporary, `${value}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
+  chmod(temporary, 0o600);
+  rename(temporary, path);
+  return { kind, where: path };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove a stored bootstrap, so a rotation can be proven rather than assumed.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {object} [deps] Injected seams, for tests.
+ */
+export function clearBootstrap(key, deps = {}) {
+  const kind = deps.kind ?? storeKind();
+  const env = deps.env ?? process.env;
+
+  if (kind === "keychain") {
+    const run = deps.run ?? execFileSync;
+    try {
+      run(
+        "security",
+        ["delete-generic-password", "-s", key, "-a", env.USER ?? ""],
+        {
+          stdio: "ignore",
+        }
+      );
+    } catch {
+      // Absent is the desired state, and `security` exits non-zero for it.
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  const remove = deps.remove ?? rmSync;
+  remove(deps.path ?? bootstrapFile(key, env), { force: true });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a file-backed bootstrap, treating absence as empty.
+ *
+ * The keychain reader lives beside the other provider concerns in
+ * `providers.mjs`; this is its counterpart for platforms without one.
+ * @param {string} key Bootstrap variable name.
+ * @param {Record<string, string|undefined>} [env] Environment to read.
+ * @returns {string} The value, or an empty string.
+ */
+export function readBootstrapFile(key, env = process.env) {
+  const path = bootstrapFile(key, env);
+  if (!existsSync(path)) return "";
+  return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
+}

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/prompt-secret.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/**
+ * Ask an operator for a credential, without it appearing anywhere.
+ *
+ * The obvious alternatives all leave a copy behind:
+ *
+ * - **A command-line argument** is visible in `ps` to every process on the
+ *   machine for as long as the call runs, and a shell records it in history.
+ * - **The clipboard** is worse than it looks. Raycast, Alfred, Maccy and every
+ *   other clipboard manager persist history in plaintext, searchable, long
+ *   after the paste — so a bootstrap routed through it outlives the operation
+ *   in a database nobody thinks about. Reading it silently also takes whatever
+ *   happens to be there, which is the wrong thing whenever the operator copied
+ *   something else in between.
+ * - **Echoed input** puts it in the terminal scrollback, which is frequently
+ *   logged.
+ *
+ * So: read from the tty with echo off, and never touch anything else.
+ * @module prompt-secret
+ */
+
+import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { closeSync, openSync, readSync, writeSync } from "node:fs";
+
+/**
+ * Whether a human can actually answer.
+ *
+ * Checked so an automated caller SKIPS the prompt rather than hanging on a
+ * read that will never return. A setup script blocked forever is worse than one
+ * that says what it could not do — the first looks like a slow install.
+ * @param {object} [io] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {boolean} True when stdin is a terminal.
+ */
+export function canPrompt(io = {}) {
+  return Boolean(io.isTTY ?? process.stdin.isTTY);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Prompt for a secret with terminal echo disabled.
+ *
+ * Echo is turned off with `stty` and restored in a `finally`, because a caller
+ * that throws mid-read would otherwise leave the operator's terminal silently
+ * not echoing anything they type afterwards.
+ * @param {string} message Prompt to display.
+ * @param {object} [io] Injected seams, for tests.
+ * @returns {string} What was typed, trimmed.
+ */
+export function promptSecret(message, io = {}) {
+  const run = io.run ?? execFileSync;
+  const open = io.open ?? openSync;
+  const read = io.read ?? readSync;
+  const close = io.close ?? closeSync;
+  const write = io.write ?? writeSync;
+
+  const tty = open("/dev/tty", "r+");
+  try {
+    write(tty, message);
+    // `stty` must be pointed at the descriptor the credential is READ from, not
+    // at this process's stdin. With "inherit" it configures whatever stdin
+    // happens to be: a pipe, where stty exits non-zero and this throws; or a
+    // different terminal, where echo stays on for the device the operator is
+    // typing into and the credential lands in their scrollback.
+    run("stty", ["-echo"], { stdio: [tty, "ignore", "ignore"] });
+    const buffer = Buffer.alloc(4096);
+    try {
+      const bytes = read(tty, buffer, 0, buffer.length, null);
+      return buffer.toString("utf8", 0, bytes).trim();
+    } finally {
+      // Zeroed rather than left for the collector: a 4 KiB buffer holding a
+      // bootstrap credential is exactly the page that ends up in a core dump.
+      buffer.fill(0);
+      run("stty", ["echo"], { stdio: [tty, "ignore", "ignore"] });
+      // The newline the operator typed was not echoed, so without this the next
+      // line of output starts halfway across the prompt.
+      write(tty, "\n");
+    }
+  } finally {
+    close(tty);
+  }
+}