@codyswann/lisa 2.334.0 → 2.335.0

package/package.json

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
     "brace-expansion": ">=5.0.9"
   },
   "name": "@codyswann/lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "exports": {

package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Universal governance: agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects.",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/skills/lisa-setup-sonar/SKILL.md

@@ -80,6 +80,51 @@ MCP config so it launches `sonar run mcp`, authenticated from the same env token
 
 Skip any agent whose CLI is not installed; never wire Kiro or Gemini.
 
+## 4a. Patch the generated shims — required, not optional
+
+Each integrate writes a five-line shim that pipes the hook payload to `sonar hook
+<event>` and passes the verdict through unchanged. That makes an
+**unauthenticated CLI refuse every prompt and every file read**, with a reason
+string that reads exactly like a real finding:
+
+```text
+SonarQube secret scanning is inactive: not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'.
+```
+
+The operator most likely to hit it is the one who just installed the CLI and has
+not logged in — so their very first prompt is rejected, before the session can
+say anything useful. Repoint every generated shim at Lisa's wrapper, which keeps
+real findings blocking, resolves `SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN` through
+`lisa-secrets-access` when the CLI reports it has none, and degrades the
+still-unauthenticated case to a warning:
+
+```bash
+if ! command -v sonar &> /dev/null; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
+exec bash "${here}/<relative-path>/scripts/lisa-hooks/sonar-secrets.sh" <vendor-event>
+```
+
+One wrapper serves every surface — it takes the vendor event name as its only
+argument. Known shim locations and their events:
+
+| Agent | Shim | Event |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `claude-prompt-submit` |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `claude-pre-tool-use` |
+| Codex | `.codex/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `codex-prompt-submit` |
+| Copilot | `.github/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `copilot-pre-tool-use` |
+| Antigravity | `.agents/sonar/hooks/pretool-secrets.sh` | `antigravity-pre-tool-use` |
+
+Compute the relative path from each shim's own directory rather than assuming a
+depth — Antigravity's is three levels up, the rest are four.
+
+**Re-running an integrate overwrites the shim with the vendor's original**, so
+re-apply this patch whenever you re-run step 4, and say so in the summary. Leave
+a comment at the top of each patched shim naming the wrapper, so the next reader
+does not mistake the delegation for drift.
+
 ## 5. Write non-secret policy config
 
 Merge only non-secret identifiers into committed `.lisa.config.json`, preserving

package/plugins/lisa/hooks/sonar-secrets.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Shared wrapper around `sonar hook <event>` for every agent surface.
+#
+# `sonar integrate <agent>` generates a five-line shim per surface: if `sonar` is
+# on PATH, pipe the hook payload to it and let whatever comes back stand. That is
+# correct for the thing the scanner exists to do — refusing a prompt or a file
+# read that genuinely contains a credential — and wrong for the thing it also
+# does, which is refusing *everything* when the CLI has no token yet:
+#
+#   {"decision":"block","reason":"SonarQube secret scanning is inactive:
+#    not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'."}
+#
+# At the shim level that reply is indistinguishable from a real finding, so a
+# workstation that had simply never run the browser login could not submit a
+# prompt at all. Two things are wrong with that, and this wrapper fixes both.
+#
+# 1. The credential is usually already provisioned. A project that declares
+#    SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN under `secrets.require` has it in its configured
+#    provider — and the CLI reads only the environment and the OS keychain, so on
+#    a local surface (which deliberately materializes nothing to disk) the value
+#    is present and unreachable at the same time. We resolve it through
+#    lisa-secrets-access, the one sanctioned reader, and only when the CLI says
+#    it needs it.
+#
+# 2. An unauthenticated scanner is a degraded gate, not a breach. This hook is
+#    one of several overlapping layers: secret scanning at commit time and in CI
+#    does not depend on it. Blocking every prompt to protect a redundant layer
+#    trades a certain outage for a hypothetical leak — and the outage lands on
+#    exactly the person least able to diagnose it, since the block fires before
+#    their first prompt is ever seen.
+#
+# A real finding still blocks. Only the "inactive" reply is downgraded, and the
+# distinction is drawn on the reason text the vendor emits, so a detection that
+# arrives while unauthenticated is impossible by construction — in that state the
+# scanner does not scan at all.
+#
+# Usage: sonar-secrets.sh <vendor-event-name>   # hook payload on stdin
+set -uo pipefail
+
+event="${1:-}"
+[ -n "$event" ] || exit 0
+
+# Nothing installed, nothing to enforce. Matches the vendor shim's own guard.
+command -v sonar >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
+
+# An explicit off switch, for bisecting a session that is misbehaving. There is
+# deliberately no way to turn the *blocking* back on from the environment: the
+# decision that a missing token must not stop work belongs in this file, where it
+# is reviewable, not in whatever shell happened to launch the agent.
+[ "${LISA_SONAR_HOOK:-on}" = "off" ] && exit 0
+
+payload="$(cat)"
+
+# The vendor signals its verdict as JSON on stdout and always exits 0, so the
+# exit code carries no information and the reason text is the only channel.
+inactive_marker='secret scanning is inactive'
+
+run_scanner() {
+  printf '%s' "$payload" | sonar hook "$event" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+is_inactive() {
+  case "$1" in
+    *"$inactive_marker"*) return 0 ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# Run the resolver with a ceiling, because the provider call crosses the network
+# and this sits in front of every prompt and every file read. `timeout` is not
+# present on a stock macOS, so this is the portable equivalent: start it, poll,
+# give up. Giving up is safe — the caller treats an empty value as "the provider
+# had nothing", which lands on the warn path rather than a block.
+resolve_secret() {
+  local resolver="$1" name="$2" out pid waited=0
+  out="$(mktemp)" || return 0
+  node "$resolver" get "$name" >"$out" 2>/dev/null &
+  pid=$!
+  while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; do
+    [ "$waited" -ge 10 ] && { kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; break; }
+    sleep 1
+    waited=$((waited + 1))
+  done
+  wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null
+  cat "$out"
+  rm -f "$out"
+}
+
+out="$(run_scanner)"
+
+if is_inactive "$out"; then
+  # Where lisa-secrets-access lives depends on how the project receives Lisa.
+  # Claude and Codex get it as an installed plugin, which is not part of a clone;
+  # the agent skill directories and node_modules are what a fresh checkout
+  # actually has. Same search order as the remote-env setup script, including the
+  # `plugins/` rung that exists only in the Lisa monorepo itself.
+  repo_root="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)}"
+  resolver=""
+  for candidate in \
+    "$repo_root/.claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/.agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/.codex/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs"; do
+    if [ -f "$candidate" ]; then
+      resolver="$candidate"
+      break
+    fi
+  done
+
+  if [ -n "$resolver" ] && command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    token="$(resolve_secret "$resolver" SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN)"
+    if [ -n "$token" ]; then
+      # Exported into this process only. Writing it anywhere durable would create
+      # a second live copy of a credential whose single store is the provider —
+      # see the one-store rule in lisa-secrets-access.
+      export SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN="$token"
+      org="$(resolve_secret "$resolver" SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG)"
+      [ -n "$org" ] && export SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG="$org"
+      out="$(run_scanner)"
+    fi
+    unset token org
+  fi
+fi
+
+if is_inactive "$out"; then
+  # stderr on a zero exit is advisory in every agent's hook protocol: the user
+  # sees it, the operation proceeds.
+  echo "sonar: local secret scanning is inactive (no token in the environment," >&2
+  echo "  the OS keychain, or the configured secrets provider). Continuing —" >&2
+  echo "  commit-time and CI secret scanning still gate this repository." >&2
+  echo "  To restore it: 'sonar auth login', or store SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN in" >&2
+  echo "  the project's secrets provider." >&2
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+[ -n "$out" ] && printf '%s' "$out"
+exit 0

package/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-setup-sonar/SKILL.md

@@ -80,6 +80,51 @@ MCP config so it launches `sonar run mcp`, authenticated from the same env token
 
 Skip any agent whose CLI is not installed; never wire Kiro or Gemini.
 
+## 4a. Patch the generated shims — required, not optional
+
+Each integrate writes a five-line shim that pipes the hook payload to `sonar hook
+<event>` and passes the verdict through unchanged. That makes an
+**unauthenticated CLI refuse every prompt and every file read**, with a reason
+string that reads exactly like a real finding:
+
+```text
+SonarQube secret scanning is inactive: not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'.
+```
+
+The operator most likely to hit it is the one who just installed the CLI and has
+not logged in — so their very first prompt is rejected, before the session can
+say anything useful. Repoint every generated shim at Lisa's wrapper, which keeps
+real findings blocking, resolves `SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN` through
+`lisa-secrets-access` when the CLI reports it has none, and degrades the
+still-unauthenticated case to a warning:
+
+```bash
+if ! command -v sonar &> /dev/null; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
+exec bash "${here}/<relative-path>/scripts/lisa-hooks/sonar-secrets.sh" <vendor-event>
+```
+
+One wrapper serves every surface — it takes the vendor event name as its only
+argument. Known shim locations and their events:
+
+| Agent | Shim | Event |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `claude-prompt-submit` |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `claude-pre-tool-use` |
+| Codex | `.codex/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `codex-prompt-submit` |
+| Copilot | `.github/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `copilot-pre-tool-use` |
+| Antigravity | `.agents/sonar/hooks/pretool-secrets.sh` | `antigravity-pre-tool-use` |
+
+Compute the relative path from each shim's own directory rather than assuming a
+depth — Antigravity's is three levels up, the rest are four.
+
+**Re-running an integrate overwrites the shim with the vendor's original**, so
+re-apply this patch whenever you re-run step 4, and say so in the summary. Leave
+a comment at the top of each patched shim naming the wrapper, so the next reader
+does not mistake the delegation for drift.
+
 ## 5. Write non-secret policy config
 
 Merge only non-secret identifiers into committed `.lisa.config.json`, preserving

package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-setup-sonar/SKILL.md

@@ -80,6 +80,51 @@ MCP config so it launches `sonar run mcp`, authenticated from the same env token
 
 Skip any agent whose CLI is not installed; never wire Kiro or Gemini.
 
+## 4a. Patch the generated shims — required, not optional
+
+Each integrate writes a five-line shim that pipes the hook payload to `sonar hook
+<event>` and passes the verdict through unchanged. That makes an
+**unauthenticated CLI refuse every prompt and every file read**, with a reason
+string that reads exactly like a real finding:
+
+```text
+SonarQube secret scanning is inactive: not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'.
+```
+
+The operator most likely to hit it is the one who just installed the CLI and has
+not logged in — so their very first prompt is rejected, before the session can
+say anything useful. Repoint every generated shim at Lisa's wrapper, which keeps
+real findings blocking, resolves `SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN` through
+`lisa-secrets-access` when the CLI reports it has none, and degrades the
+still-unauthenticated case to a warning:
+
+```bash
+if ! command -v sonar &> /dev/null; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
+exec bash "${here}/<relative-path>/scripts/lisa-hooks/sonar-secrets.sh" <vendor-event>
+```
+
+One wrapper serves every surface — it takes the vendor event name as its only
+argument. Known shim locations and their events:
+
+| Agent | Shim | Event |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `claude-prompt-submit` |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `claude-pre-tool-use` |
+| Codex | `.codex/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `codex-prompt-submit` |
+| Copilot | `.github/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `copilot-pre-tool-use` |
+| Antigravity | `.agents/sonar/hooks/pretool-secrets.sh` | `antigravity-pre-tool-use` |
+
+Compute the relative path from each shim's own directory rather than assuming a
+depth — Antigravity's is three levels up, the rest are four.
+
+**Re-running an integrate overwrites the shim with the vendor's original**, so
+re-apply this patch whenever you re-run step 4, and say so in the summary. Leave
+a comment at the top of each patched shim naming the wrapper, so the next reader
+does not mistake the delegation for drift.
+
 ## 5. Write non-secret policy config
 
 Merge only non-secret identifiers into committed `.lisa.config.json`, preserving

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific Lisa plugin.",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa-cdk",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/sonar-secrets.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+#
+# Shared wrapper around `sonar hook <event>` for every agent surface.
+#
+# `sonar integrate <agent>` generates a five-line shim per surface: if `sonar` is
+# on PATH, pipe the hook payload to it and let whatever comes back stand. That is
+# correct for the thing the scanner exists to do — refusing a prompt or a file
+# read that genuinely contains a credential — and wrong for the thing it also
+# does, which is refusing *everything* when the CLI has no token yet:
+#
+#   {"decision":"block","reason":"SonarQube secret scanning is inactive:
+#    not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'."}
+#
+# At the shim level that reply is indistinguishable from a real finding, so a
+# workstation that had simply never run the browser login could not submit a
+# prompt at all. Two things are wrong with that, and this wrapper fixes both.
+#
+# 1. The credential is usually already provisioned. A project that declares
+#    SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN under `secrets.require` has it in its configured
+#    provider — and the CLI reads only the environment and the OS keychain, so on
+#    a local surface (which deliberately materializes nothing to disk) the value
+#    is present and unreachable at the same time. We resolve it through
+#    lisa-secrets-access, the one sanctioned reader, and only when the CLI says
+#    it needs it.
+#
+# 2. An unauthenticated scanner is a degraded gate, not a breach. This hook is
+#    one of several overlapping layers: secret scanning at commit time and in CI
+#    does not depend on it. Blocking every prompt to protect a redundant layer
+#    trades a certain outage for a hypothetical leak — and the outage lands on
+#    exactly the person least able to diagnose it, since the block fires before
+#    their first prompt is ever seen.
+#
+# A real finding still blocks. Only the "inactive" reply is downgraded, and the
+# distinction is drawn on the reason text the vendor emits, so a detection that
+# arrives while unauthenticated is impossible by construction — in that state the
+# scanner does not scan at all.
+#
+# Usage: sonar-secrets.sh <vendor-event-name>   # hook payload on stdin
+set -uo pipefail
+
+event="${1:-}"
+[ -n "$event" ] || exit 0
+
+# Nothing installed, nothing to enforce. Matches the vendor shim's own guard.
+command -v sonar >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0
+
+# An explicit off switch, for bisecting a session that is misbehaving. There is
+# deliberately no way to turn the *blocking* back on from the environment: the
+# decision that a missing token must not stop work belongs in this file, where it
+# is reviewable, not in whatever shell happened to launch the agent.
+[ "${LISA_SONAR_HOOK:-on}" = "off" ] && exit 0
+
+payload="$(cat)"
+
+# The vendor signals its verdict as JSON on stdout and always exits 0, so the
+# exit code carries no information and the reason text is the only channel.
+inactive_marker='secret scanning is inactive'
+
+run_scanner() {
+  printf '%s' "$payload" | sonar hook "$event" 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+is_inactive() {
+  case "$1" in
+    *"$inactive_marker"*) return 0 ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+# Run the resolver with a ceiling, because the provider call crosses the network
+# and this sits in front of every prompt and every file read. `timeout` is not
+# present on a stock macOS, so this is the portable equivalent: start it, poll,
+# give up. Giving up is safe — the caller treats an empty value as "the provider
+# had nothing", which lands on the warn path rather than a block.
+resolve_secret() {
+  local resolver="$1" name="$2" out pid waited=0
+  out="$(mktemp)" || return 0
+  node "$resolver" get "$name" >"$out" 2>/dev/null &
+  pid=$!
+  while kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; do
+    [ "$waited" -ge 10 ] && { kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null; break; }
+    sleep 1
+    waited=$((waited + 1))
+  done
+  wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null
+  cat "$out"
+  rm -f "$out"
+}
+
+out="$(run_scanner)"
+
+if is_inactive "$out"; then
+  # Where lisa-secrets-access lives depends on how the project receives Lisa.
+  # Claude and Codex get it as an installed plugin, which is not part of a clone;
+  # the agent skill directories and node_modules are what a fresh checkout
+  # actually has. Same search order as the remote-env setup script, including the
+  # `plugins/` rung that exists only in the Lisa monorepo itself.
+  repo_root="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)}"
+  resolver=""
+  for candidate in \
+    "$repo_root/.claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/.agents/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/.codex/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs" \
+    "$repo_root/node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs"; do
+    if [ -f "$candidate" ]; then
+      resolver="$candidate"
+      break
+    fi
+  done
+
+  if [ -n "$resolver" ] && command -v node >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    token="$(resolve_secret "$resolver" SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN)"
+    if [ -n "$token" ]; then
+      # Exported into this process only. Writing it anywhere durable would create
+      # a second live copy of a credential whose single store is the provider —
+      # see the one-store rule in lisa-secrets-access.
+      export SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN="$token"
+      org="$(resolve_secret "$resolver" SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG)"
+      [ -n "$org" ] && export SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG="$org"
+      out="$(run_scanner)"
+    fi
+    unset token org
+  fi
+fi
+
+if is_inactive "$out"; then
+  # stderr on a zero exit is advisory in every agent's hook protocol: the user
+  # sees it, the operation proceeds.
+  echo "sonar: local secret scanning is inactive (no token in the environment," >&2
+  echo "  the OS keychain, or the configured secrets provider). Continuing —" >&2
+  echo "  commit-time and CI secret scanning still gate this repository." >&2
+  echo "  To restore it: 'sonar auth login', or store SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN in" >&2
+  echo "  the project's secrets provider." >&2
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+[ -n "$out" ] && printf '%s' "$out"
+exit 0

package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-setup-sonar/SKILL.md

@@ -80,6 +80,51 @@ MCP config so it launches `sonar run mcp`, authenticated from the same env token
 
 Skip any agent whose CLI is not installed; never wire Kiro or Gemini.
 
+## 4a. Patch the generated shims — required, not optional
+
+Each integrate writes a five-line shim that pipes the hook payload to `sonar hook
+<event>` and passes the verdict through unchanged. That makes an
+**unauthenticated CLI refuse every prompt and every file read**, with a reason
+string that reads exactly like a real finding:
+
+```text
+SonarQube secret scanning is inactive: not authenticated. Run 'sonar auth login'.
+```
+
+The operator most likely to hit it is the one who just installed the CLI and has
+not logged in — so their very first prompt is rejected, before the session can
+say anything useful. Repoint every generated shim at Lisa's wrapper, which keeps
+real findings blocking, resolves `SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN` through
+`lisa-secrets-access` when the CLI reports it has none, and degrades the
+still-unauthenticated case to a warning:
+
+```bash
+if ! command -v sonar &> /dev/null; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+here="$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
+exec bash "${here}/<relative-path>/scripts/lisa-hooks/sonar-secrets.sh" <vendor-event>
+```
+
+One wrapper serves every surface — it takes the vendor event name as its only
+argument. Known shim locations and their events:
+
+| Agent | Shim | Event |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `claude-prompt-submit` |
+| Claude | `.claude/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `claude-pre-tool-use` |
+| Codex | `.codex/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/prompt-secrets.sh` | `codex-prompt-submit` |
+| Copilot | `.github/hooks/sonar-secrets/build-scripts/pretool-secrets.sh` | `copilot-pre-tool-use` |
+| Antigravity | `.agents/sonar/hooks/pretool-secrets.sh` | `antigravity-pre-tool-use` |
+
+Compute the relative path from each shim's own directory rather than assuming a
+depth — Antigravity's is three levels up, the rest are four.
+
+**Re-running an integrate overwrites the shim with the vendor's original**, so
+re-apply this patch whenever you re-run step 4, and say so in the summary. Leave
+a comment at the top of each patched shim naming the wrapper, so the next reader
+does not mistake the delegation for drift.
+
 ## 5. Write non-secret policy config
 
 Merge only non-secret identifiers into committed `.lisa.config.json`, preserving

package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "lisa",
-  "version": "2.334.0",
+  "version": "2.335.0",
   "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
   "author": {
     "name": "Cody Swann"