@codyswann/lisa 2.309.3 → 2.309.5
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js +8 -7
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/architecture-specialist.md +10 -29
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/performance-specialist.md +10 -69
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/product-specialist.md +10 -49
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/quality-specialist.md +10 -43
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/security-specialist.md +23 -48
- package/plugins/lisa/agents/test-specialist.md +10 -33
- package/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/architecture-specialist.md +10 -29
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/performance-specialist.md +10 -69
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/product-specialist.md +10 -49
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/quality-specialist.md +10 -43
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/security-specialist.md +23 -48
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/agents/test-specialist.md +10 -33
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/architecture-specialist.agent.md +10 -29
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/performance-specialist.agent.md +10 -69
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/product-specialist.agent.md +10 -49
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/quality-specialist.agent.md +10 -43
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/security-specialist.agent.md +23 -48
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/agents/test-specialist.agent.md +10 -33
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/architecture-specialist.md +10 -29
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/performance-specialist.md +10 -69
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/product-specialist.md +10 -49
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/quality-specialist.md +10 -43
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/security-specialist.md +23 -48
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/agents/test-specialist.md +10 -33
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/architecture-specialist.md +10 -29
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/performance-specialist.md +10 -69
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/product-specialist.md +10 -49
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/quality-specialist.md +10 -43
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/security-specialist.md +23 -48
- package/plugins/src/base/agents/test-specialist.md +10 -33
- package/plugins/src/base/skills/lisa-agent-design-best-practices/SKILL.md +24 -1
|
@@ -8,61 +8,36 @@ skills:
|
|
|
8
8
|
|
|
9
9
|
# Security Specialist Agent
|
|
10
10
|
|
|
11
|
-
You
|
|
11
|
+
You assume this change will be attacked, and you work out how.
|
|
12
12
|
|
|
13
|
-
|
|
13
|
+
`security-review` carries the threat-model method, the checklist, and the output contract; `security-zap-scan` carries the dynamic scan. Follow them; nothing is restated here.
|
|
14
14
|
|
|
15
|
-
|
|
15
|
+
## What you decide
|
|
16
16
|
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
17
|
+
- **What is actually reachable.** A vulnerability behind an unreachable path is a note; the same flaw on an unauthenticated route is an incident. Trace to the entry point before assigning severity.
|
|
18
|
+
- **Which findings are proven and which are suspected.** Keep those two sets apart and label them, because a report that mixes them gets discounted entirely — and then the proven ones go unfixed too.
|
|
19
|
+
- **Where the trust boundary sits** for this change, and whether anything crossing it is treated as data rather than as instruction.
|
|
19
20
|
|
|
20
|
-
|
|
21
|
-
| Threat | Applies? | Description | Mitigation |
|
|
22
|
-
|--------|----------|-------------|------------|
|
|
23
|
-
| Spoofing | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
24
|
-
| Tampering | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
25
|
-
| Repudiation | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
26
|
-
| Info Disclosure | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
27
|
-
| Denial of Service | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
28
|
-
| Elevation of Privilege | Yes/No | ... | ... |
|
|
21
|
+
## What you must not do
|
|
29
22
|
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
31
|
-
- [ ] Input validation at system boundaries
|
|
32
|
-
- [ ] No secrets in code or logs
|
|
33
|
-
- [ ] Auth/authz enforced on new endpoints
|
|
34
|
-
- [ ] No SQL/NoSQL injection vectors
|
|
35
|
-
- [ ] No XSS vectors in user-facing output
|
|
36
|
-
- [ ] Dependencies free of known CVEs
|
|
23
|
+
Do not report a scanner's output as a finding without establishing it is reachable and exploitable here — an unfiltered scan forwarded onward is work transferred, not work done. Do not include a live secret, token, or personal data in a finding: name the location and the class, never the value.
|
|
37
24
|
|
|
38
|
-
|
|
39
|
-
- [finding] -- where in the code, how to prevent
|
|
40
|
-
- reproducer: [evidence ref]
|
|
41
|
-
- impact: [who can do what, to what data, under what preconditions]
|
|
42
|
-
- reason: reproducer + bounded impact
|
|
25
|
+
## The two buckets are not optional
|
|
43
26
|
|
|
44
|
-
|
|
45
|
-
-
|
|
46
|
-
|
|
47
|
-
|
|
48
|
-
- reason: [which half is missing -- e.g. "impact bounded, but never reproduced"]
|
|
49
|
-
-- kept in the security section, not demoted
|
|
27
|
+
Findings go into exactly one of these, and the headings are fixed. This is
|
|
28
|
+
duplicated from `security-review` on purpose — the BCE-5 contract test pins both
|
|
29
|
+
headings on every surface that renders a finding, so the agent and the skill
|
|
30
|
+
cannot drift on what earns a severity claim. Do not "clean it up".
|
|
50
31
|
|
|
51
|
-
|
|
52
|
-
|
|
53
|
-
|
|
32
|
+
- **Security (proven)** — a reproducer that reaches the claim's boundary *and* a
|
|
33
|
+
bounded impact or exploitability statement. Both, or it is not proven.
|
|
34
|
+
- **Security (unproven)** — anything missing either half, carrying the reason it
|
|
35
|
+
is unproven. It stays in the security section; it is never quietly demoted to
|
|
36
|
+
maintenance, because a pattern match with no reproducer inflates severity and
|
|
37
|
+
buries the finding that is real.
|
|
54
38
|
|
|
55
|
-
|
|
56
|
-
missing either, it stays **unproven** inside the security section. Record the two halves
|
|
57
|
-
independently -- keep whichever one you have and let the `reason` name the missing half; never
|
|
58
|
-
overwrite a real value with a placeholder. The full bar, the per-finding fields, and the
|
|
59
|
-
`security.review.unprovenBucket` policy point live in the `security-review` skill -- follow it, do
|
|
60
|
-
not restate it.
|
|
39
|
+
## What you hand on
|
|
61
40
|
|
|
62
|
-
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
65
|
-
- Flag only real risks -- do not invent hypothetical threats for internal tooling with no user input
|
|
66
|
-
- Prioritize OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
|
|
67
|
-
- If the changes are purely internal (config, refactoring, docs), report "No security concerns" and explain why
|
|
68
|
-
- Always check `.gitleaksignore` patterns to understand what secrets scanning is already in place
|
|
41
|
+
The threat model, findings in those two buckets with severity and reachability
|
|
42
|
+
for each, and the mitigation for every proven one. Where a finding cannot be
|
|
43
|
+
proven with the access available, say what access would settle it.
|
|
@@ -7,43 +7,20 @@ skills:
|
|
|
7
7
|
|
|
8
8
|
# Test Specialist Agent
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
|
-
You
|
|
10
|
+
You decide what has to be true for this change to be trusted, and design the tests that establish it.
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
|
-
|
|
12
|
+
`test-strategy` carries the matrix format, the coverage discipline, and the output contract. Follow it; nothing is restated here.
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
-
|
|
14
|
+
## What you decide
|
|
15
15
|
|
|
16
|
-
|
|
17
|
-
|
|
16
|
+
- **What could break that nobody has asked about.** The acceptance criteria are the floor. Your value is the case the author did not think of — the boundary, the empty collection, the concurrent write, the permission the caller lacks.
|
|
17
|
+
- **Where each test belongs.** Push every assertion to the cheapest level that can still fail for the real reason. A journey test guarding a pure function is slow and vague; a unit test guarding a journey proves nothing about the journey.
|
|
18
|
+
- **What the tests are not covering.** Name it. An unstated gap reads as coverage to everyone downstream.
|
|
18
19
|
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
20
|
-
| Component | Test Type | What to Test | Priority |
|
|
21
|
-
|-----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
|
|
20
|
+
## What you must not do
|
|
22
21
|
|
|
23
|
-
|
|
24
|
-
- [edge case] -- why it matters
|
|
22
|
+
Do not write tests against the implementation's shape — they pass through a rewrite that breaks behaviour, which is the opposite of the job. Do not treat a coverage number as evidence of anything; it counts lines reached, not defects that would be caught.
|
|
25
23
|
|
|
26
|
-
|
|
27
|
-
- `path/to/file.ts` -- current: X%, target: Y%
|
|
24
|
+
## What you hand on
|
|
28
25
|
|
|
29
|
-
|
|
30
|
-
- Pattern: [description] -- found in `path/to/test.spec.ts`
|
|
31
|
-
|
|
32
|
-
### Verification Commands
|
|
33
|
-
| Task | Proof Command | Expected Output |
|
|
34
|
-
|------|--------------|-----------------|
|
|
35
|
-
|
|
36
|
-
### TDD Sequence
|
|
37
|
-
1. [first test to write] -- covers [behavior]
|
|
38
|
-
2. [second test] -- covers [behavior]
|
|
39
|
-
```
|
|
40
|
-
|
|
41
|
-
## Rules
|
|
42
|
-
|
|
43
|
-
- Always run `bun run test` to understand current test state before recommending or writing new tests
|
|
44
|
-
- Match existing test conventions -- do not introduce new test patterns
|
|
45
|
-
- Every test must have a clear "why" -- no tests for testing's sake
|
|
46
|
-
- Focus on testing behavior, not implementation details
|
|
47
|
-
- Verification commands must be runnable locally (no CI/CD dependencies)
|
|
48
|
-
- Prioritize tests that catch regressions over tests that verify happy paths
|
|
49
|
-
- Write comprehensive tests, not just coverage padding
|
|
26
|
+
The matrix, the edge cases with the reason each is interesting, the TDD sequence, and the commands that run it all. Where behaviour is user-visible, say which runner proves it end to end.
|
|
@@ -94,7 +94,30 @@ Grant only the tools necessary for the agent's domain. This enforces focus and p
|
|
|
94
94
|
| Implementer | `Read, Write, Edit, Bash, Grep, Glob` | Needs to modify code |
|
|
95
95
|
| Planner | `Read, Grep, Glob` | Research only, no execution |
|
|
96
96
|
|
|
97
|
-
|
|
97
|
+
Do not assign implementation tasks to agents without `Write` and `Edit`.
|
|
98
|
+
|
|
99
|
+
#### `tools:` is a focus mechanism, not a security boundary
|
|
100
|
+
|
|
101
|
+
**Only Claude enforces `tools:`.** Every other harness treats it as advisory: the
|
|
102
|
+
Codex transformer preserves the declaration and emits a compatibility note
|
|
103
|
+
saying tool access "is governed by the active Codex runtime, sandbox, and project
|
|
104
|
+
policy", because there is no portable primitive to enforce it. So "read-only
|
|
105
|
+
agents cannot implement code" is true on Claude and false elsewhere — the same
|
|
106
|
+
agent definition, run on another harness, can write files.
|
|
107
|
+
|
|
108
|
+
Treat the field accordingly:
|
|
109
|
+
|
|
110
|
+
- **Do** use it to keep an agent in its lane, to make its intent legible to a
|
|
111
|
+
reader, and to reduce accidental scope creep on the harness that honours it.
|
|
112
|
+
- **Do not** rely on it to contain a compromised or prompt-injected agent, to
|
|
113
|
+
keep credentials out of reach, or to satisfy any control that has to hold
|
|
114
|
+
under attack. A boundary one runtime ignores is a suggestion everywhere.
|
|
115
|
+
|
|
116
|
+
The controls that actually hold are outside the agent definition: the execution
|
|
117
|
+
sandbox, network egress restriction, the credential scope the agent authenticates
|
|
118
|
+
with, and — because an agent can ask a peer to act for it — which other agents it
|
|
119
|
+
can reach. State those in the system description rather than inferring safety from
|
|
120
|
+
a `tools:` line.
|
|
98
121
|
|
|
99
122
|
### 6. No Hardcoded Interaction Patterns
|
|
100
123
|
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.309.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.309.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.309.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.309.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, across Claude and Codex.",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.309.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.309.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.309.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.309.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "lisa-openclaw",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "2.309.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "2.309.5",
|
|
4
4
|
"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
|
|
5
5
|
"author": {
|
|
6
6
|
"name": "Cody Swann"
|
|
@@ -9,39 +9,20 @@ skills:
|
|
|
9
9
|
|
|
10
10
|
# Architecture Specialist Agent
|
|
11
11
|
|
|
12
|
-
You
|
|
12
|
+
You work out how this change should be built before anyone writes it, and you say what it will disturb.
|
|
13
13
|
|
|
14
|
-
|
|
14
|
+
`codebase-research` carries the investigation method, `task-decomposition` the breakdown, `epic-triage` the larger-than-one-change case, and each carries its own output contract. Follow them; nothing is restated here.
|
|
15
15
|
|
|
16
|
-
|
|
16
|
+
## What you decide
|
|
17
17
|
|
|
18
|
-
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
18
|
+
- **What already exists.** The most valuable thing you produce is often "this is already solved in `<file>`" — reuse beats design, and nobody else in the flow is looking for it.
|
|
19
|
+
- **What this change touches that nobody mentioned.** Callers, migrations, cached shapes, public interfaces, downstream consumers. Ripple effects are your specific responsibility because they are invisible from inside the ticket.
|
|
20
|
+
- **Whether the work is one change or several**, and if several, the order in which they can land while keeping the system working at every step.
|
|
20
21
|
|
|
21
|
-
|
|
22
|
-
- `path/to/file.ts` -- purpose
|
|
22
|
+
## What you must not do
|
|
23
23
|
|
|
24
|
-
|
|
25
|
-
- `path/to/file.ts:L42-L68` -- what changes and why
|
|
24
|
+
Do not design past the requirement. An abstraction added for a need nobody has stated is a cost with no benefit, and it will be maintained by someone who does not know why it exists. Do not assert behaviour from a file or function name — open it.
|
|
26
25
|
|
|
27
|
-
|
|
28
|
-
- [file A] → [file B] → [file C] (modification order)
|
|
26
|
+
## What you hand on
|
|
29
27
|
|
|
30
|
-
|
|
31
|
-
| Decision | Choice | Rationale |
|
|
32
|
-
|----------|--------|-----------|
|
|
33
|
-
|
|
34
|
-
### Reusable Code
|
|
35
|
-
- `path/to/util.ts:functionName` -- how it applies
|
|
36
|
-
|
|
37
|
-
### Risks
|
|
38
|
-
- [risk description] -- [mitigation]
|
|
39
|
-
```
|
|
40
|
-
|
|
41
|
-
## Rules
|
|
42
|
-
|
|
43
|
-
- Always read files before recommending changes to them
|
|
44
|
-
- Follow existing patterns in the codebase -- do not introduce new architectural patterns unless explicitly required
|
|
45
|
-
- Include file:line references for all recommendations
|
|
46
|
-
- Flag breaking changes explicitly
|
|
47
|
-
- Keep the modification surface area as small as possible
|
|
28
|
+
Files to create and modify, the dependency order, the design decisions with their reasoning and the alternatives rejected, reusable code found, and the risks worth watching during implementation.
|