@codyswann/lisa 2.297.2 → 2.297.4
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/core/learnings-document.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/learnings-document.js +4 -0
- package/dist/core/learnings-document.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/learnings-writer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/learnings-writer.js +53 -5
- package/dist/core/learnings-writer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js +3 -2
- package/dist/core/upstream-evidence-manifest.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/opencode/plugin-templates/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-agy/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/plugins/lisa-copilot/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/plugins/lisa-cursor/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-phaser-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/hooks/parity-safety-net.sh +65 -7
- package/plugins/src/base/skills/lisa-parity-safety-net-rules/SKILL.md +6 -1
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@@ -48,8 +48,13 @@
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# Known accepted false-positive class: this is a text scan, not a shell engine,
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# so display commands quoting a destructive string (`echo "docs about rm -rf /"`)
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# can match. Upstream exempts those via an engine-only DISPLAY_COMMANDS list a
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# grep hook cannot replicate.
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#
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# grep hook cannot replicate. The same text-scan limit means the rm guard treats
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# a substitution-wrapped catastrophic delete as verdict-neutral (issue #1982): an
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# executable `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` is blocked, but so are inert twins the shell
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# would never expand — a single-quoted `echo '$(rm -rf /)'` or an escaped
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# `echo "\$(rm -rf /)"` — because the scan has no quote-context awareness. That
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# over-block stays inside this accepted class. Workaround: quote-break the string
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# or use the gh-writer heredoc form, whose payload is stripped before the guards run.
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#
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# Operators extend the built-in rules with a project-local rule file — one
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# extended-regex (ERE) per line, blank lines and `#` comments ignored — managed
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@@ -206,7 +211,17 @@ readonly RM_RF_SPLIT="$RM_CMD"'(([[:space:]][^;&|]*)?[[:space:]](-[[:alnum:]]*r[
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# review S1): a harmless `/` in a LATER statement (`rm -rf build && cd /`)
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# is never attributed to the rm in an earlier one.
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qc="'\""
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-
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# Path/home targets also accept the command-substitution closers `)` and backtick
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# as a trailing boundary (issue #1982): in `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` the target `/` is
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# followed by `)`, not a space or quote, so without them an executable
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# substitution-wrapped `rm -rf <root>` slips past this gate. Leading boundary is
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# unchanged — the target is always space-separated from the recursive+force flag.
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tc="'\"\`)"
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# The bare-`*` wildcard deliberately KEEPS the narrow (space/quote/end) boundary:
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# admitting `)` there would misread a shell `case … in *)` default arm as a
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# catastrophic `rm -rf *` (T4b F1). A genuinely substitution-wrapped bare `*`
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# (`echo "$(rm -rf *)"`) is instead caught by the token-walk (guard 1b) below.
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readonly RM_CATASTROPHIC_TARGET='([[:space:]='"$qc"'])((/|/\*|/\.\*?|~|~/\*?|\$HOME\b|\$\{HOME\})([[:space:]'"$tc"']|/?\*?['"$tc"']?$)|\*([[:space:]'"$qc"']|/?\*?['"$qc"']?$))'
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# 1b. rm target hardening (issue #1960). For every statement that invokes rm
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# with recursive+force flags, additionally block when:
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@@ -224,6 +239,45 @@ project_dir="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$PWD}"
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tmp_dir_allow="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
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tmp_dir_allow="${tmp_dir_allow%/}"
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[ -n "$tmp_dir_allow" ] || tmp_dir_allow="/tmp"
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# Peel command-substitution wrappers off a token so an rm nested in `$(…)`,
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# backticks, `<(…)`/`>(…)`, a `"…"`/`'…'` quote, or a leading `\` alias-bypass
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# (`\rm`) is recognized and its target classified as if the token were unwrapped
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# (issue #1982) — substitution-wrapping is verdict-neutral for the rm guard.
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# Leading wrappers (\ $( ` ( <( >( and quotes) and trailing closers () ` and
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# quotes) are stripped in runs, so `"$(\rm` → `rm` and `/etc)"` → `/etc`. `$((`
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# is ARITHMETIC, never command substitution: the LEADING peel stops at it (its
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# case is ordered first), so the inner expression is never exposed as a command
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# or a target. The trailing loop may still trim a closing `))`, but that is
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# harmless — an arithmetic token like `$((10/2))` still keeps its `$` for the
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# variable-target guard and can never be mis-normalized into an rm or a `/`-target.
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strip_subst_wrappers() {
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local t="$1" prev=""
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while [ "$t" != "$prev" ]; do
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prev="$t"
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case "$t" in
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'$(('*) break ;;
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'\'*) t="${t#\\}" ;;
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'$('*) t="${t#'$('}" ;;
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'<('*) t="${t#'<('}" ;;
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'>('*) t="${t#'>('}" ;;
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'"'*) t="${t#'"'}" ;;
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"'"*) t="${t#\'}" ;;
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'`'*) t="${t#'`'}" ;;
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'('*) t="${t#(}" ;;
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esac
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done
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prev=""
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while [ "$t" != "$prev" ]; do
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prev="$t"
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case "$t" in
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*')') t="${t%)}" ;;
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*'`') t="${t%'`'}" ;;
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*'"') t="${t%'"'}" ;;
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*"'") t="${t%\'}" ;;
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esac
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done
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printf '%s' "$t"
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}
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while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
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if ! printf '%s' "$rm_stmt" | grep -Eiq -- "$RM_RF_CLUSTER" \
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&& ! printf '%s' "$rm_stmt" | grep -Eiq -- "$RM_RF_SPLIT"; then
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@@ -242,10 +296,7 @@ while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
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set -f
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seen_rm=0
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for raw_token in $rm_stmt; do
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token="$
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token="${token#\'}"
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token="${token%\"}"
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token="${token%\'}"
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token="$(strip_subst_wrappers "$raw_token")"
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if [ "$seen_rm" -eq 0 ]; then
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# Path-prefixed spellings (`/bin/rm`, `./rm`) are still rm (F2).
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case "$token" in
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;;
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esac
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;;
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'*')
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# Bare top-level wildcard expands to every entry in the cwd. Guard 1a no
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# longer bounds `*)` (T4b F1), so a substitution-wrapped `rm -rf *` is
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# caught here after the trailing-closer strip peels `*)"` down to `*`.
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set +f
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block "recursive forced delete of a top-level wildcard (rm -rf *)"
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;;
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*'$'*)
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case "$token" in
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'$TMPDIR' | '$TMPDIR'/* | '${TMPDIR}' | '${TMPDIR}'/*) : ;;
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@@ -98,7 +98,12 @@ is screened the same as `git <destructive>`.
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Malformed hook input fails **closed** (exit 2 denies the command). A text-scan
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hook cannot exempt display commands, so prose like
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`echo "docs about rm -rf /"` can false-positive — quote-break the string or use
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the gh-writer heredoc form (payload is stripped before the guards run).
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the gh-writer heredoc form (payload is stripped before the guards run). For the
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same reason the rm guard treats substitution-wrapping as verdict-neutral (issue
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#1982): an executable `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` is blocked, and so are inert twins the
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shell would never expand — a single-quoted `echo '$(rm -rf /)'` or an escaped
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`echo "\$(rm -rf /)"` — since the scan has no quote-context awareness. The same
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quote-break or heredoc workaround applies.
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## View the current rules
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{
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"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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"version": "2.297.
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"version": "2.297.4",
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"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
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"author": {
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"name": "Cody Swann"
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{
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"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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"version": "2.297.
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"version": "2.297.4",
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"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, across Claude and Codex.",
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"author": {
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"name": "Cody Swann"
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{
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"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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"version": "2.297.4",
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"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
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"author": {
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"name": "Cody Swann"
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{
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"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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"version": "2.297.
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"version": "2.297.4",
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"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
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"author": {
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"name": "Cody Swann"
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{
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"name": "lisa-openclaw",
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"version": "2.297.4",
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"description": "Connect staff roles to Telegram or Slack via OpenClaw — facilitator/specialist hub-and-spoke routing and repo-coding topics, for Claude Code and Codex",
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"author": {
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"name": "Cody Swann"
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@@ -48,8 +48,13 @@
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# Known accepted false-positive class: this is a text scan, not a shell engine,
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49
49
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# so display commands quoting a destructive string (`echo "docs about rm -rf /"`)
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50
50
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# can match. Upstream exempts those via an engine-only DISPLAY_COMMANDS list a
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51
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-
# grep hook cannot replicate.
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52
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-
#
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51
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# grep hook cannot replicate. The same text-scan limit means the rm guard treats
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52
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+
# a substitution-wrapped catastrophic delete as verdict-neutral (issue #1982): an
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53
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# executable `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` is blocked, but so are inert twins the shell
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54
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+
# would never expand — a single-quoted `echo '$(rm -rf /)'` or an escaped
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55
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# `echo "\$(rm -rf /)"` — because the scan has no quote-context awareness. That
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# over-block stays inside this accepted class. Workaround: quote-break the string
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# or use the gh-writer heredoc form, whose payload is stripped before the guards run.
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#
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# Operators extend the built-in rules with a project-local rule file — one
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55
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# extended-regex (ERE) per line, blank lines and `#` comments ignored — managed
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@@ -206,7 +211,17 @@ readonly RM_RF_SPLIT="$RM_CMD"'(([[:space:]][^;&|]*)?[[:space:]](-[[:alnum:]]*r[
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# review S1): a harmless `/` in a LATER statement (`rm -rf build && cd /`)
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# is never attributed to the rm in an earlier one.
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qc="'\""
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-
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# Path/home targets also accept the command-substitution closers `)` and backtick
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+
# as a trailing boundary (issue #1982): in `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` the target `/` is
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+
# followed by `)`, not a space or quote, so without them an executable
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# substitution-wrapped `rm -rf <root>` slips past this gate. Leading boundary is
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218
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+
# unchanged — the target is always space-separated from the recursive+force flag.
|
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219
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+
tc="'\"\`)"
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220
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+
# The bare-`*` wildcard deliberately KEEPS the narrow (space/quote/end) boundary:
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221
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+
# admitting `)` there would misread a shell `case … in *)` default arm as a
|
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222
|
+
# catastrophic `rm -rf *` (T4b F1). A genuinely substitution-wrapped bare `*`
|
|
223
|
+
# (`echo "$(rm -rf *)"`) is instead caught by the token-walk (guard 1b) below.
|
|
224
|
+
readonly RM_CATASTROPHIC_TARGET='([[:space:]='"$qc"'])((/|/\*|/\.\*?|~|~/\*?|\$HOME\b|\$\{HOME\})([[:space:]'"$tc"']|/?\*?['"$tc"']?$)|\*([[:space:]'"$qc"']|/?\*?['"$qc"']?$))'
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# 1b. rm target hardening (issue #1960). For every statement that invokes rm
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# with recursive+force flags, additionally block when:
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@@ -224,6 +239,45 @@ project_dir="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-$PWD}"
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|
tmp_dir_allow="${TMPDIR:-/tmp}"
|
|
225
240
|
tmp_dir_allow="${tmp_dir_allow%/}"
|
|
226
241
|
[ -n "$tmp_dir_allow" ] || tmp_dir_allow="/tmp"
|
|
242
|
+
# Peel command-substitution wrappers off a token so an rm nested in `$(…)`,
|
|
243
|
+
# backticks, `<(…)`/`>(…)`, a `"…"`/`'…'` quote, or a leading `\` alias-bypass
|
|
244
|
+
# (`\rm`) is recognized and its target classified as if the token were unwrapped
|
|
245
|
+
# (issue #1982) — substitution-wrapping is verdict-neutral for the rm guard.
|
|
246
|
+
# Leading wrappers (\ $( ` ( <( >( and quotes) and trailing closers () ` and
|
|
247
|
+
# quotes) are stripped in runs, so `"$(\rm` → `rm` and `/etc)"` → `/etc`. `$((`
|
|
248
|
+
# is ARITHMETIC, never command substitution: the LEADING peel stops at it (its
|
|
249
|
+
# case is ordered first), so the inner expression is never exposed as a command
|
|
250
|
+
# or a target. The trailing loop may still trim a closing `))`, but that is
|
|
251
|
+
# harmless — an arithmetic token like `$((10/2))` still keeps its `$` for the
|
|
252
|
+
# variable-target guard and can never be mis-normalized into an rm or a `/`-target.
|
|
253
|
+
strip_subst_wrappers() {
|
|
254
|
+
local t="$1" prev=""
|
|
255
|
+
while [ "$t" != "$prev" ]; do
|
|
256
|
+
prev="$t"
|
|
257
|
+
case "$t" in
|
|
258
|
+
'$(('*) break ;;
|
|
259
|
+
'\'*) t="${t#\\}" ;;
|
|
260
|
+
'$('*) t="${t#'$('}" ;;
|
|
261
|
+
'<('*) t="${t#'<('}" ;;
|
|
262
|
+
'>('*) t="${t#'>('}" ;;
|
|
263
|
+
'"'*) t="${t#'"'}" ;;
|
|
264
|
+
"'"*) t="${t#\'}" ;;
|
|
265
|
+
'`'*) t="${t#'`'}" ;;
|
|
266
|
+
'('*) t="${t#(}" ;;
|
|
267
|
+
esac
|
|
268
|
+
done
|
|
269
|
+
prev=""
|
|
270
|
+
while [ "$t" != "$prev" ]; do
|
|
271
|
+
prev="$t"
|
|
272
|
+
case "$t" in
|
|
273
|
+
*')') t="${t%)}" ;;
|
|
274
|
+
*'`') t="${t%'`'}" ;;
|
|
275
|
+
*'"') t="${t%'"'}" ;;
|
|
276
|
+
*"'") t="${t%\'}" ;;
|
|
277
|
+
esac
|
|
278
|
+
done
|
|
279
|
+
printf '%s' "$t"
|
|
280
|
+
}
|
|
227
281
|
while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
|
|
228
282
|
if ! printf '%s' "$rm_stmt" | grep -Eiq -- "$RM_RF_CLUSTER" \
|
|
229
283
|
&& ! printf '%s' "$rm_stmt" | grep -Eiq -- "$RM_RF_SPLIT"; then
|
|
@@ -242,10 +296,7 @@ while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
|
|
|
242
296
|
set -f
|
|
243
297
|
seen_rm=0
|
|
244
298
|
for raw_token in $rm_stmt; do
|
|
245
|
-
token="$
|
|
246
|
-
token="${token#\'}"
|
|
247
|
-
token="${token%\"}"
|
|
248
|
-
token="${token%\'}"
|
|
299
|
+
token="$(strip_subst_wrappers "$raw_token")"
|
|
249
300
|
if [ "$seen_rm" -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
250
301
|
# Path-prefixed spellings (`/bin/rm`, `./rm`) are still rm (F2).
|
|
251
302
|
case "$token" in
|
|
@@ -276,6 +327,13 @@ while IFS= read -r rm_stmt; do
|
|
|
276
327
|
;;
|
|
277
328
|
esac
|
|
278
329
|
;;
|
|
330
|
+
'*')
|
|
331
|
+
# Bare top-level wildcard expands to every entry in the cwd. Guard 1a no
|
|
332
|
+
# longer bounds `*)` (T4b F1), so a substitution-wrapped `rm -rf *` is
|
|
333
|
+
# caught here after the trailing-closer strip peels `*)"` down to `*`.
|
|
334
|
+
set +f
|
|
335
|
+
block "recursive forced delete of a top-level wildcard (rm -rf *)"
|
|
336
|
+
;;
|
|
279
337
|
*'$'*)
|
|
280
338
|
case "$token" in
|
|
281
339
|
'$TMPDIR' | '$TMPDIR'/* | '${TMPDIR}' | '${TMPDIR}'/*) : ;;
|
|
@@ -98,7 +98,12 @@ is screened the same as `git <destructive>`.
|
|
|
98
98
|
Malformed hook input fails **closed** (exit 2 denies the command). A text-scan
|
|
99
99
|
hook cannot exempt display commands, so prose like
|
|
100
100
|
`echo "docs about rm -rf /"` can false-positive — quote-break the string or use
|
|
101
|
-
the gh-writer heredoc form (payload is stripped before the guards run).
|
|
101
|
+
the gh-writer heredoc form (payload is stripped before the guards run). For the
|
|
102
|
+
same reason the rm guard treats substitution-wrapping as verdict-neutral (issue
|
|
103
|
+
#1982): an executable `echo "$(rm -rf /)"` is blocked, and so are inert twins the
|
|
104
|
+
shell would never expand — a single-quoted `echo '$(rm -rf /)'` or an escaped
|
|
105
|
+
`echo "\$(rm -rf /)"` — since the scan has no quote-context awareness. The same
|
|
106
|
+
quote-break or heredoc workaround applies.
|
|
102
107
|
|
|
103
108
|
## View the current rules
|
|
104
109
|
|