@codyswann/lisa 2.165.8 → 2.166.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (89) hide show
  1. package/cdk/package-lisa/package.lisa.json +4 -1
  2. package/dist/codex/scripts/block-no-verify.sh +1 -1
  3. package/expo/create-only/stryker.conf.json +28 -0
  4. package/expo/package-lisa/package.lisa.json +3 -0
  5. package/nestjs/package-lisa/package.lisa.json +4 -1
  6. package/package.json +1 -1
  7. package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  8. package/plugins/lisa/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  9. package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +1 -1
  10. package/plugins/lisa/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +4 -5
  11. package/plugins/lisa/rules/eager/base-rules.md +1 -0
  12. package/plugins/lisa/rules/eager/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  13. package/plugins/lisa/rules/reference/base-rules.md +1 -0
  14. package/plugins/lisa/rules/reference/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  15. package/plugins/lisa-agy/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +1 -1
  16. package/plugins/lisa-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  17. package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  18. package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  19. package/plugins/lisa-cdk-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  20. package/plugins/lisa-cdk-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  21. package/plugins/lisa-cdk-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  22. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  23. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +4 -5
  24. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/eager/base-rules.md +1 -0
  25. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/eager/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  26. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/reference/base-rules.md +1 -0
  27. package/plugins/lisa-copilot/rules/reference/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  28. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  29. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +4 -5
  30. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/rules/base-rules-reference.mdc +1 -0
  31. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/rules/base-rules.mdc +1 -0
  32. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/rules/security-audit-handling-reference.mdc +8 -2
  33. package/plugins/lisa-cursor/rules/security-audit-handling.mdc +8 -2
  34. package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  35. package/plugins/lisa-expo/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  36. package/plugins/lisa-expo-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  37. package/plugins/lisa-expo-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  38. package/plugins/lisa-expo-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  39. package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  40. package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  41. package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  42. package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  43. package/plugins/lisa-harper-fabric-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  44. package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  45. package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  46. package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  47. package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  48. package/plugins/lisa-nestjs-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  49. package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  50. package/plugins/lisa-openclaw/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  51. package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  52. package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  53. package/plugins/lisa-openclaw-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  54. package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  55. package/plugins/lisa-phaser/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  56. package/plugins/lisa-phaser-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  57. package/plugins/lisa-phaser-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  58. package/plugins/lisa-phaser-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  59. package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  60. package/plugins/lisa-rails/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  61. package/plugins/lisa-rails-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  62. package/plugins/lisa-rails-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  63. package/plugins/lisa-rails-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  64. package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  65. package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  66. package/plugins/lisa-typescript-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  67. package/plugins/lisa-typescript-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  68. package/plugins/lisa-typescript-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  69. package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  70. package/plugins/lisa-wiki/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  71. package/plugins/lisa-wiki-agy/plugin.json +1 -1
  72. package/plugins/lisa-wiki-copilot/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  73. package/plugins/lisa-wiki-cursor/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  74. package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.agy.sh +1 -1
  75. package/plugins/src/base/hooks/block-no-verify.sh +4 -5
  76. package/plugins/src/base/rules/eager/base-rules.md +1 -0
  77. package/plugins/src/base/rules/eager/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  78. package/plugins/src/base/rules/reference/base-rules.md +1 -0
  79. package/plugins/src/base/rules/reference/security-audit-handling.md +8 -2
  80. package/rails/copy-contents/scripts/lisa-mutation.sh +72 -0
  81. package/rails/copy-overwrite/Gemfile.lisa +5 -0
  82. package/rails/copy-overwrite/lefthook.yml +4 -0
  83. package/rails/create-only/.mutant.yml +21 -0
  84. package/rails/create-only/mutation.gate.yml +8 -0
  85. package/typescript/copy-contents/.husky/pre-push +14 -0
  86. package/typescript/copy-contents/scripts/lisa-mutation.mjs +152 -0
  87. package/typescript/create-only/mutation.gate.json +4 -0
  88. package/typescript/create-only/stryker.conf.json +23 -0
  89. package/typescript/package-lisa/package.lisa.json +4 -1
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
10
10
  "test:unit": "vitest run --exclude='**/integration/**'",
11
11
  "test:integration": "vitest run tests/integration --passWithNoTests",
12
12
  "test:cov": "vitest run --coverage",
13
+ "test:mutation": "node scripts/lisa-mutation.mjs",
13
14
  "test:watch": "vitest",
14
15
  "lint": "oxlint && eslint . --quiet",
15
16
  "lint:fix": "oxlint --fix && eslint . --fix"
@@ -28,7 +29,9 @@
28
29
  "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.0",
29
30
  "eslint-plugin-oxlint": "^1.62.0",
30
31
  "oxlint": "^1.62.0",
31
- "oxlint-tsgolint": "^0.22.1"
32
+ "oxlint-tsgolint": "^0.22.1",
33
+ "@stryker-mutator/core": "^9.0.0",
34
+ "@stryker-mutator/vitest-runner": "^9.0.0"
32
35
  },
33
36
  "bin": {
34
37
  "infrastructure": "bin/infrastructure.js"
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ then
81
81
  "hookSpecificOutput": {
82
82
  "hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
83
83
  "permissionDecision": "deny",
84
- "permissionDecisionReason": "Blocked: this command bypasses pre-commit/pre-push hooks (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue or ask the user before bypassing."
84
+ "permissionDecisionReason": "Blocked: this command bypasses pre-commit/pre-push hooks (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint, typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never bypass the hook."
85
85
  }
86
86
  }'
87
87
  fi
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
1
+ {
2
+ "$schema": "./node_modules/@stryker-mutator/core/schema/stryker-schema.json",
3
+ "testRunner": "jest",
4
+ "jest": {
5
+ "projectType": "custom",
6
+ "configFile": "jest.config.ts",
7
+ "enableFindRelatedTests": true
8
+ },
9
+ "reporters": ["clear-text", "progress", "html"],
10
+ "coverageAnalysis": "perTest",
11
+ "ignoreStatic": true,
12
+ "incremental": true,
13
+ "mutate": [
14
+ "src/**/*.ts",
15
+ "src/**/*.tsx",
16
+ "!src/**/*.spec.ts",
17
+ "!src/**/*.spec.tsx",
18
+ "!src/**/*.test.ts",
19
+ "!src/**/*.test.tsx",
20
+ "!src/**/*.d.ts",
21
+ "!src/**/*.stories.tsx"
22
+ ],
23
+ "thresholds": {
24
+ "high": 80,
25
+ "low": 60,
26
+ "break": 60
27
+ }
28
+ }
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
49
49
  "test:unit": "NODE_ENV=test jest --testPathIgnorePatterns=\"\\.integration[.\\\\-](test|spec)\\.(ts|tsx)$\" --passWithNoTests",
50
50
  "test:integration": "NODE_ENV=test jest --testPathPatterns=\"\\.integration[.\\\\-](test|spec)\\.(ts|tsx)$\" --passWithNoTests",
51
51
  "test:cov": "NODE_ENV=test jest --coverage",
52
+ "test:mutation": "node scripts/lisa-mutation.mjs",
52
53
  "test:watch": "NODE_ENV=test jest --watch",
53
54
  "lint": "oxlint && eslint . --quiet",
54
55
  "lint:fix": "oxlint --fix && eslint . --fix"
@@ -90,6 +91,8 @@
90
91
  "@types/jest": "^30.0.0",
91
92
  "@jest/test-sequencer": "^30.2.0",
92
93
  "jest-environment-jsdom": "^30.2.0",
94
+ "@stryker-mutator/core": "^9.0.0",
95
+ "@stryker-mutator/jest-runner": "^9.0.0",
93
96
  "serve": "^14.2.0",
94
97
  "eslint-plugin-oxlint": "^1.62.0",
95
98
  "oxlint": "^1.62.0",
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
39
39
  "test:unit": "vitest run --exclude='**/integration/**'",
40
40
  "test:integration": "vitest run '.integration.' --passWithNoTests",
41
41
  "test:cov": "vitest run --coverage",
42
+ "test:mutation": "node scripts/lisa-mutation.mjs",
42
43
  "test:watch": "vitest",
43
44
  "lint": "oxlint && eslint . --quiet",
44
45
  "lint:fix": "oxlint --fix && eslint . --fix"
@@ -91,7 +92,9 @@
91
92
  "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.1.0",
92
93
  "eslint-plugin-oxlint": "^1.62.0",
93
94
  "oxlint": "^1.62.0",
94
- "oxlint-tsgolint": "^0.22.1"
95
+ "oxlint-tsgolint": "^0.22.1",
96
+ "@stryker-mutator/core": "^9.0.0",
97
+ "@stryker-mutator/vitest-runner": "^9.0.0"
95
98
  }
96
99
  }
97
100
  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
85
85
  "lodash": ">=4.18.1"
86
86
  },
87
87
  "name": "@codyswann/lisa",
88
- "version": "2.165.8",
88
+ "version": "2.166.1",
89
89
  "description": "Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects",
90
90
  "main": "dist/index.js",
91
91
  "exports": {
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Universal governance: agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects.",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ allow() {
25
25
  }
26
26
 
27
27
  deny() {
28
- printf '%s\n' '{"decision":"deny","reason":"This command bypasses Lisa pre-commit/pre-push quality gates (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (lint, tests, formatting) or ask the user before bypassing."}'
28
+ printf '%s\n' '{"decision":"deny","reason":"This command bypasses Lisa pre-commit/pre-push quality gates (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint, typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never bypass the hook."}'
29
29
  exit 0
30
30
  }
31
31
 
@@ -91,11 +91,10 @@ PY
91
91
  then
92
92
  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
93
93
  Blocked: this command bypasses pre-commit/pre-push hooks (--no-verify, HUSKY=0,
94
- or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (lint error, failing
95
- test, formatting) or ask the user before bypassing.
96
-
97
- If the user has explicitly authorized the bypass for this specific command,
98
- re-run after they confirm.
94
+ or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint,
95
+ typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the
96
+ user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore;
97
+ never bypass the hook.
99
98
  EOF
100
99
  exit 2
101
100
  fi
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Do not begin work if there are blockers, ambiguities, access requirements, or un
25
25
  ## Git Discipline
26
26
 
27
27
  - **Never use `--no-verify`** or bypass any git hook.
28
+ - When a hook or quality gate fails, fix the root cause first. If no fix is genuinely possible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never use a blanket bypass.
28
29
  - **Never bypass branch protection** — no `--admin`, `--force`, no merging a PR with failing CI. "Green in CI" is the definition of done.
29
30
  - Never commit directly to environment branches (`dev`, `staging`, `main`).
30
31
  - Prefix `git push` with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
1
1
  # Security Audit Handling (load-bearing)
2
2
 
3
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`** to bypass the security audit.
3
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`**, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
4
+
5
+ ## Fix before ignore
6
+
7
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
8
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
9
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
4
10
 
5
11
  ## Core rule
6
12
 
@@ -17,7 +23,7 @@ Before adding any override, verify:
17
23
 
18
24
  1. Note GHSA ID, package, advisory URL.
19
25
  2. If a patched version exists: add a resolution AND override in `package.json` for the leaf package, regenerate the lockfile, commit, retry.
20
- 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
26
+ 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
21
27
 
22
28
  ## Rails (bundler-audit)
23
29
 
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Git Discipline:
50
50
  - Prefix git push with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
51
51
  - Never commit directly to an environment branch (dev, staging, main).
52
52
  - Never use --no-verify or attempt to bypass a git hook.
53
+ - When a pre-commit, pre-push, CI, or other quality gate fails, fix the root cause first: upgrade the vulnerable dependency, fix the lint/type/test failure, remove the secret, or repair the failing check. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a narrow, documented ignore for the specific failing rule or advisory. Never use `--no-verify`, hook environment switches, blanket ignores, or threshold reductions as a substitute for fixing the gate.
53
54
  - Never bypass branch protection. Never use `--admin`, `--force`, or any other flag to merge a PR that has failing CI checks. If CI fails, fix it. If you cannot fix it, escalate to the human. There are zero exceptions. "Green in CI" is the definition of done — not "green locally." A PR is not complete until CI passes on the actual PR branch.
54
55
  - Never stash changes you cannot commit. Either fix whatever is preventing the commit or fail out and let the human know why.
55
56
  - Never add "BREAKING CHANGE" to a commit message unless there is actually a breaking change.
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
1
1
  # Security Audit Handling
2
2
 
3
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify` to bypass the security audit.
3
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify`, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
4
+
5
+ ## Fix before ignore
6
+
7
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
8
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
9
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
4
10
 
5
11
  ## Node.js Projects (GHSA advisories)
6
12
 
7
13
  1. Note the GHSA ID(s), affected package(s), and advisory URL from the error output
8
14
  2. Check the advisory URL to determine if a patched version of the vulnerable package exists
9
15
  3. If a patched version exists: add a resolution/override in package.json to force the patched version (add to both `resolutions` and `overrides` sections), then run the package manager install command to regenerate the lockfile, commit the changes, and retry the push
10
- 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
16
+ 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
11
17
 
12
18
  ### Critical: Override the vulnerable package, not its parent
13
19
 
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ allow() {
25
25
  }
26
26
 
27
27
  deny() {
28
- printf '%s\n' '{"decision":"deny","reason":"This command bypasses Lisa pre-commit/pre-push quality gates (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (lint, tests, formatting) or ask the user before bypassing."}'
28
+ printf '%s\n' '{"decision":"deny","reason":"This command bypasses Lisa pre-commit/pre-push quality gates (--no-verify, HUSKY=0, or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint, typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never bypass the hook."}'
29
29
  exit 0
30
30
  }
31
31
 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-cdk",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-cdk",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "AWS CDK-specific Lisa plugin.",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-cdk",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-cdk",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-cdk",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "AWS CDK-specific plugin",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -91,11 +91,10 @@ PY
91
91
  then
92
92
  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
93
93
  Blocked: this command bypasses pre-commit/pre-push hooks (--no-verify, HUSKY=0,
94
- or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (lint error, failing
95
- test, formatting) or ask the user before bypassing.
96
-
97
- If the user has explicitly authorized the bypass for this specific command,
98
- re-run after they confirm.
94
+ or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint,
95
+ typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the
96
+ user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore;
97
+ never bypass the hook.
99
98
  EOF
100
99
  exit 2
101
100
  fi
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Do not begin work if there are blockers, ambiguities, access requirements, or un
25
25
  ## Git Discipline
26
26
 
27
27
  - **Never use `--no-verify`** or bypass any git hook.
28
+ - When a hook or quality gate fails, fix the root cause first. If no fix is genuinely possible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never use a blanket bypass.
28
29
  - **Never bypass branch protection** — no `--admin`, `--force`, no merging a PR with failing CI. "Green in CI" is the definition of done.
29
30
  - Never commit directly to environment branches (`dev`, `staging`, `main`).
30
31
  - Prefix `git push` with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
1
1
  # Security Audit Handling (load-bearing)
2
2
 
3
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`** to bypass the security audit.
3
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`**, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
4
+
5
+ ## Fix before ignore
6
+
7
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
8
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
9
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
4
10
 
5
11
  ## Core rule
6
12
 
@@ -17,7 +23,7 @@ Before adding any override, verify:
17
23
 
18
24
  1. Note GHSA ID, package, advisory URL.
19
25
  2. If a patched version exists: add a resolution AND override in `package.json` for the leaf package, regenerate the lockfile, commit, retry.
20
- 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
26
+ 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
21
27
 
22
28
  ## Rails (bundler-audit)
23
29
 
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Git Discipline:
50
50
  - Prefix git push with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
51
51
  - Never commit directly to an environment branch (dev, staging, main).
52
52
  - Never use --no-verify or attempt to bypass a git hook.
53
+ - When a pre-commit, pre-push, CI, or other quality gate fails, fix the root cause first: upgrade the vulnerable dependency, fix the lint/type/test failure, remove the secret, or repair the failing check. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a narrow, documented ignore for the specific failing rule or advisory. Never use `--no-verify`, hook environment switches, blanket ignores, or threshold reductions as a substitute for fixing the gate.
53
54
  - Never bypass branch protection. Never use `--admin`, `--force`, or any other flag to merge a PR that has failing CI checks. If CI fails, fix it. If you cannot fix it, escalate to the human. There are zero exceptions. "Green in CI" is the definition of done — not "green locally." A PR is not complete until CI passes on the actual PR branch.
54
55
  - Never stash changes you cannot commit. Either fix whatever is preventing the commit or fail out and let the human know why.
55
56
  - Never add "BREAKING CHANGE" to a commit message unless there is actually a breaking change.
@@ -1,13 +1,19 @@
1
1
  # Security Audit Handling
2
2
 
3
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify` to bypass the security audit.
3
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify`, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
4
+
5
+ ## Fix before ignore
6
+
7
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
8
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
9
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
4
10
 
5
11
  ## Node.js Projects (GHSA advisories)
6
12
 
7
13
  1. Note the GHSA ID(s), affected package(s), and advisory URL from the error output
8
14
  2. Check the advisory URL to determine if a patched version of the vulnerable package exists
9
15
  3. If a patched version exists: add a resolution/override in package.json to force the patched version (add to both `resolutions` and `overrides` sections), then run the package manager install command to regenerate the lockfile, commit the changes, and retry the push
10
- 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
16
+ 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
11
17
 
12
18
  ### Critical: Override the vulnerable package, not its parent
13
19
 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Universal governance — agents, skills, commands, hooks, and rules for all projects",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -91,11 +91,10 @@ PY
91
91
  then
92
92
  cat >&2 <<'EOF'
93
93
  Blocked: this command bypasses pre-commit/pre-push hooks (--no-verify, HUSKY=0,
94
- or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (lint error, failing
95
- test, formatting) or ask the user before bypassing.
96
-
97
- If the user has explicitly authorized the bypass for this specific command,
98
- re-run after they confirm.
94
+ or core.hooksPath disabling). Fix the underlying issue (security audit, lint,
95
+ typecheck, tests, formatting) instead. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the
96
+ user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore;
97
+ never bypass the hook.
99
98
  EOF
100
99
  exit 2
101
100
  fi
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ Git Discipline:
55
55
  - Prefix git push with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
56
56
  - Never commit directly to an environment branch (dev, staging, main).
57
57
  - Never use --no-verify or attempt to bypass a git hook.
58
+ - When a pre-commit, pre-push, CI, or other quality gate fails, fix the root cause first: upgrade the vulnerable dependency, fix the lint/type/test failure, remove the secret, or repair the failing check. If a fix is genuinely impossible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a narrow, documented ignore for the specific failing rule or advisory. Never use `--no-verify`, hook environment switches, blanket ignores, or threshold reductions as a substitute for fixing the gate.
58
59
  - Never bypass branch protection. Never use `--admin`, `--force`, or any other flag to merge a PR that has failing CI checks. If CI fails, fix it. If you cannot fix it, escalate to the human. There are zero exceptions. "Green in CI" is the definition of done — not "green locally." A PR is not complete until CI passes on the actual PR branch.
59
60
  - Never stash changes you cannot commit. Either fix whatever is preventing the commit or fail out and let the human know why.
60
61
  - Never add "BREAKING CHANGE" to a commit message unless there is actually a breaking change.
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Do not begin work if there are blockers, ambiguities, access requirements, or un
30
30
  ## Git Discipline
31
31
 
32
32
  - **Never use `--no-verify`** or bypass any git hook.
33
+ - When a hook or quality gate fails, fix the root cause first. If no fix is genuinely possible, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision and add a specific documented ignore; never use a blanket bypass.
33
34
  - **Never bypass branch protection** — no `--admin`, `--force`, no merging a PR with failing CI. "Green in CI" is the definition of done.
34
35
  - Never commit directly to environment branches (`dev`, `staging`, `main`).
35
36
  - Prefix `git push` with `GIT_SSH_COMMAND="ssh -o ServerAliveInterval=30 -o ServerAliveCountMax=5"`.
@@ -5,14 +5,20 @@ alwaysApply: false
5
5
 
6
6
  # Security Audit Handling
7
7
 
8
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify` to bypass the security audit.
8
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow these steps. Never use `--no-verify`, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
9
+
10
+ ## Fix before ignore
11
+
12
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
13
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
14
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
9
15
 
10
16
  ## Node.js Projects (GHSA advisories)
11
17
 
12
18
  1. Note the GHSA ID(s), affected package(s), and advisory URL from the error output
13
19
  2. Check the advisory URL to determine if a patched version of the vulnerable package exists
14
20
  3. If a patched version exists: add a resolution/override in package.json to force the patched version (add to both `resolutions` and `overrides` sections), then run the package manager install command to regenerate the lockfile, commit the changes, and retry the push
15
- 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
21
+ 4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push
16
22
 
17
23
  ### Critical: Override the vulnerable package, not its parent
18
24
 
@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@ alwaysApply: true
5
5
 
6
6
  # Security Audit Handling (load-bearing)
7
7
 
8
- If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`** to bypass the security audit.
8
+ If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities, follow the rules below. **Never use `--no-verify`**, `HUSKY=0`, `core.hooksPath`, or any other hook bypass to skip the security audit.
9
+
10
+ ## Fix before ignore
11
+
12
+ 1. Fix the root cause first: upgrade or override the actually-vulnerable leaf package to a patched compatible version, regenerate the lockfile, and retry the gate.
13
+ 2. Only if no safe fix exists, ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision. Add a narrow documented ignore for the specific advisory, package, and reason.
14
+ 3. Never add a blanket audit bypass, lower an audit level, or self-approve a new risk-acceptance entry.
9
15
 
10
16
  ## Core rule
11
17
 
@@ -22,7 +28,7 @@ Before adding any override, verify:
22
28
 
23
29
  1. Note GHSA ID, package, advisory URL.
24
30
  2. If a patched version exists: add a resolution AND override in `package.json` for the leaf package, regenerate the lockfile, commit, retry.
25
- 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
31
+ 3. If no patch but safe (transitive, no untrusted input, dev/build only): ask the user to make the risk-acceptance decision, then add an exclusion to `audit.ignore.local.json` with `{"id", "package", "reason"}`, commit, retry.
26
32
 
27
33
  ## Rails (bundler-audit)
28
34
 
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-expo",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Expo/React Native-specific skills, agents, rules, and MCP servers",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-expo",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Expo and React Native-specific skills, agents, rules, and MCP servers.",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-expo",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Expo/React Native-specific skills, agents, rules, and MCP servers",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-expo",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Expo/React Native-specific skills, agents, rules, and MCP servers",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-expo",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Expo/React Native-specific skills, agents, rules, and MCP servers",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-harper-fabric",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Harper/Fabric-specific rules for TypeScript component apps",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-harper-fabric",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Harper/Fabric-specific Lisa rules for TypeScript component apps.",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-harper-fabric",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Harper/Fabric-specific rules for TypeScript component apps",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-harper-fabric",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Harper/Fabric-specific rules for TypeScript component apps",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-harper-fabric",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "Harper/Fabric-specific rules for TypeScript component apps",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-nestjs",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "NestJS-specific skills (GraphQL, TypeORM) and hooks (migration write-protection)",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-nestjs",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "NestJS-specific skills and migration write-protection hooks.",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-nestjs",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "NestJS-specific skills (GraphQL, TypeORM) and hooks (migration write-protection)",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "lisa-nestjs",
3
- "version": "2.165.8",
3
+ "version": "2.166.1",
4
4
  "description": "NestJS-specific skills (GraphQL, TypeORM) and hooks (migration write-protection)",
5
5
  "author": {
6
6
  "name": "Cody Swann"