@codyswann/lisa 1.60.5 → 1.60.7
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa/rules/verfication.md +8 -0
- package/plugins/lisa-cdk/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-expo/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-nestjs/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-rails/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/lisa-typescript/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/src/base/rules/verfication.md +8 -0
- package/typescript/copy-overwrite/audit.ignore.config.json +5 -0
package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
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"axios": ">=1.13.5"
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},
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"name": "@codyswann/lisa",
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-
"version": "1.60.
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+
"version": "1.60.7",
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"description": "Claude Code governance framework that applies guardrails, guidance, and automated enforcement to projects",
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"main": "dist/index.js",
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"exports": {
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@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ This layer catches errors that span multiple files or involve staged-but-not-yet
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This layer validates the complete changeset against the project's quality gates. It is the last automated checkpoint before code reaches the remote.
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**Handling Security Audit Failures:** If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities (GHSA advisories), follow these steps in order:
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1. Note the GHSA ID(s), affected package(s), and advisory URL from the error output.
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2. Check the advisory URL to determine if a patched version of the vulnerable package exists.
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3. If a patched version exists, add a resolution/override in `package.json` to force the patched version (add to both `"resolutions"` and `"overrides"` sections), then run the package manager install command to regenerate the lockfile, commit the changes, and retry the push.
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4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only), add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format: `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push.
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5. Never use `--no-verify` to bypass the security audit.
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### Regeneration Over Patching
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When the root cause of errors is architectural (wrong abstraction, incorrect data flow, fundamentally broken approach), delete and regenerate rather than incrementally patching. Incremental patches on a broken foundation accumulate tech debt faster than the self-correction loop can catch it.
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@@ -184,6 +184,14 @@ This layer catches errors that span multiple files or involve staged-but-not-yet
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This layer validates the complete changeset against the project's quality gates. It is the last automated checkpoint before code reaches the remote.
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+
**Handling Security Audit Failures:** If `git push` fails because the pre-push hook reports security vulnerabilities (GHSA advisories), follow these steps in order:
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1. Note the GHSA ID(s), affected package(s), and advisory URL from the error output.
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+
2. Check the advisory URL to determine if a patched version of the vulnerable package exists.
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+
3. If a patched version exists, add a resolution/override in `package.json` to force the patched version (add to both `"resolutions"` and `"overrides"` sections), then run the package manager install command to regenerate the lockfile, commit the changes, and retry the push.
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4. If no patched version exists and the vulnerability is safe for this project (e.g., transitive dependency with no untrusted input, devDeps only, or build tool only), add an exclusion entry to `audit.ignore.local.json` with the format: `{"id": "GHSA-xxx", "package": "pkg-name", "reason": "why this is safe for this project"}`, then commit and retry the push.
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5. Never use `--no-verify` to bypass the security audit.
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### Regeneration Over Patching
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When the root cause of errors is architectural (wrong abstraction, incorrect data flow, fundamentally broken approach), delete and regenerate rather than incrementally patching. Incremental patches on a broken foundation accumulate tech debt faster than the self-correction loop can catch it.
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"package": "fast-xml-parser",
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"reason": "Entity encoding bypass via regex injection — same path as GHSA-jmr7-xgp7-cmfj"
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},
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{
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"id": "GHSA-8gc5-j5rx-235r",
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"package": "fast-xml-parser",
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"reason": "Numeric entity expansion bypass (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-26278) — transitive via AWS SDK, no untrusted XML parsing"
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},
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{
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"id": "GHSA-r6q2-hw4h-h46w",
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"package": "node-tar",
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