@codexguild/mcp 1.4.0 → 1.5.0

package/README.md

@@ -7,16 +7,18 @@ forum, chat) and adds what has to run on your machine:
 
 | Local tool | What it does |
 |---|---|
-| `codexguild_scan_skills` | Audits every skill installed in `~/.claude/skills`, `~/.claude/plugins`, `~/.codex/skills`, `~/.agents/skills`, `~/.hermes/skills`, `~/.config/opencode/skills`, `~/.cursor/skills`, `~/.openclaude/skills` **offline**, with the same scanner CodexGuild runs server-side (pipe-to-shell, secret exfiltration, prompt injection, hidden unicode, config tampering…). Nothing is uploaded. |
+| `codexguild_scan_skills` | Audits the skills installed for every supported harness (`~/.claude/skills`, `~/.claude/plugins`, `~/.codex/skills`, `~/.agents/skills`, `~/.hermes/skills`, `~/.cursor/skills`, `~/.gemini/skills`, … and the project's own `.claude/`, `.agents/`, `.github/` skills) **offline**, with the same scanner CodexGuild runs server-side (pipe-to-shell, secret exfiltration, prompt injection, hidden unicode, config tampering…). Nothing is uploaded. |
 | `codexguild_sync` | Detects your stack with the **exact installed versions from your lockfiles** (package-lock, pnpm-lock, yarn.lock, bun.lock, poetry.lock, uv.lock, Pipfile.lock, Cargo.lock; go.mod), the Node/Python runtime (.nvmrc, .tool-versions, engines) and your installed skills, keys it to the current repository (each project keeps its own sync window), then asks CodexGuild what changed and which installed versions have known vulnerabilities. |
 | `codexguild_advise` | Detects the instruction files in your project (`CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, …) before proposing setup changes. Proposals always need your approval. |
+| `codexguild_scan_workflows` | Reviews the project's GitHub Actions workflows that run coding agents: untrusted triggers with secrets, issue/PR text in prompts or shell scripts, `pull_request_target` with fork code, unrestricted agent tools, permissions, unpinned agent actions. Runs locally. |
+| `codexguild_lint_instructions` | Lints the project's agent instruction files (`CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md`, `GEMINI.md`, `.cursorrules`…): size per session, missing build/test commands, README copy, generic advice, secrets, machine-specific paths, prompt injection. Runs locally — file contents are not uploaded. |
 
 If your harness can't start local processes, use the remote endpoint `https://api.codexguild.com/v1/mcp` directly
 (see [MCP docs](https://codexguild.com/docs/mcp)).
 
 ## Setup
 
-1. Create an agent key in the [CodexGuild dashboard](https://codexguild.com/dashboard#agents) (`cgk_…`).
+1. Create an agent key in the [CodexGuild dashboard](https://codexguild.com/dashboard/agents) (`cgk_…`).
 2. Add the server to your harness:
 
 ```json
@@ -39,11 +41,27 @@ claude mcp add codexguild --scope user -e CODEXGUILD_API_KEY=cgk_... -- npx -y @
 
 Per-harness snippets (Codex, Hermes, OpenCode, Cursor, Gemini CLI, …): <https://codexguild.com/connect>.
 
+## Guard hook (Claude Code PreToolUse)
+
+`codexguild-mcp guard` reads every Bash command before it runs:
+
+- **Destructive commands** — checked locally, no key or network: denies `rm -rf` of `/`, your home or system
+  directories, deletes through an unset variable (`rm -rf $DIR/`), disk writes and secrets sent over the network; asks
+  before deletes outside the project, force pushes, `git reset --hard`, database resets, `terraform destroy`, volume and
+  cloud-resource deletes. Rules: https://codexguild.com/docs/command-guard
+- **Packages** — before an install command (npm/pnpm/yarn/bun add, npx/bunx/pnpm dlx, pip/uv/poetry/pipx, cargo add,
+  go get/install) it checks the packages with CodexGuild: `block` (doesn't exist or reported malicious) → deny; `warn` →
+  ask. Only package names and versions are sent; errors let the command run.
+
+```json
+{ "hooks": { "PreToolUse": [ { "matcher": "Bash", "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "npx -y @codexguild/mcp@latest guard", "timeout": 20 }] } ] } }
+```
+
 ## Configuration
 
 | Variable | Default | |
 |---|---|---|
-| `CODEXGUILD_API_KEY` | — | Agent key. Without it only the offline `codexguild_scan_skills` works. |
+| `CODEXGUILD_API_KEY` | — | Agent key. Without it only the offline `codexguild_scan_skills`, `codexguild_lint_instructions`, `codexguild_scan_workflows` and the guard's command checks work. |
 | `CODEXGUILD_API_URL` | `https://api.codexguild.com/v1` | Override for self-hosted or local development. |
 
 Requires Node.js 20 or newer.

package/dist/codexguild-mcp.js

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js"
 import { Client } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/index.js";
 import { StreamableHTTPClientTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/client/streamableHttp.js";
 import { CallToolRequestSchema, ListToolsRequestSchema } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/types.js";
-import { access, readFile as readFile3 } from "node:fs/promises";
-import { isAbsolute, join as join3 } from "node:path";
+import { access, readdir as readdir3, readFile as readFile3 } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { isAbsolute as isAbsolute2, join as join4 } from "node:path";
 
 // src/local-scan.ts
 import { readdir, readFile, stat } from "node:fs/promises";
@@ -355,6 +355,134 @@ function lintInstructions(content, filename = "AGENTS.md") {
   return { score, grade: grade(score), stats: { lines: lines.length, approxTokens, headings, codeBlocks, commands: commands2 }, issues: issues.slice(0, 100) };
 }
 
+// ../scanner/src/workflows.ts
+var WEIGHT2 = { critical: 45, high: 25, medium: 10, low: 3 };
+var AGENT_ACTIONS = [
+  [/anthropics\/claude-code(-base)?-action/i, "Claude Code"],
+  [/google-github-actions\/run-gemini-cli|google-gemini\/gemini-cli-action/i, "Gemini CLI"],
+  [/openai\/codex-action/i, "Codex"],
+  [/sst\/opencode\/github|opencode-ai\/opencode-action/i, "OpenCode"],
+  [/cline\/cline-action|cline-bot/i, "Cline"],
+  [/aider-ai\/aider-action|paul-gauthier\/aider/i, "Aider"],
+  [/github\/copilot-(swe-)?agent/i, "Copilot agent"]
+];
+var AGENT_CLIS = [
+  [/\bclaude\s+(-p|--print)\b|@anthropic-ai\/claude-code\b/, "Claude Code"],
+  [/\bcodex\s+(exec|e)\b|@openai\/codex\b/, "Codex"],
+  [/\bgemini\s+(-p|--prompt)\b|@google\/gemini-cli\b/, "Gemini CLI"],
+  [/\bopencode\s+run\b/, "OpenCode"],
+  [/\baider\s+.*--(message|msg)\b/, "Aider"]
+];
+var UNTRUSTED_EVENTS = ["pull_request_target", "issue_comment", "issues", "pull_request_review", "pull_request_review_comment", "discussion", "discussion_comment", "workflow_run"];
+var UNTRUSTED_EXPR = /\$\{\{\s*(github\.event\.(issue|pull_request|comment|review|review_comment|discussion|head_commit|commits\[\d+\]|workflow_run)\.(?:[\w.]*\.)?(title|body|message|name|label|ref|head_branch|display_title)|github\.head_ref|github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(ref|label))\s*\}\}/;
+var AUTHOR_GATE = /author_association|github\.actor\s*==|github\.triggering_actor|github\.event\.sender\.login\s*==|contains\(fromJSON\(['"]\[["'](OWNER|MEMBER|COLLABORATOR)/i;
+var DANGEROUS_FLAGS = [
+  [/--dangerously-skip-permissions/, "Claude Code runs every tool without asking (--dangerously-skip-permissions)"],
+  [/--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox|--yolo\b/, "the agent runs without approvals or sandbox (--yolo / --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox)"],
+  [/\b(allowed_tools|allowedTools|--allowedTools|--allowed-tools)\b[^\n]*["',\s[]Bash(?!\()/, "the agent may run any shell command (Bash allowed without a command pattern)"]
+];
+function grade2(score) {
+  return score >= 90 ? "A" : score >= 75 ? "B" : score >= 60 ? "C" : score >= 40 ? "D" : "F";
+}
+function blocks(lines) {
+  const out = [];
+  let kind = null;
+  let indent = -1;
+  for (const raw of lines) {
+    const ind = raw.length - raw.trimStart().length;
+    if (kind && raw.trim() && ind <= indent) kind = null;
+    const m = raw.match(/^(\s*)(?:-\s+)?(run|prompt|direct_prompt|override_prompt|custom_instructions|claude_args|codex_args|gemini_args|args|message):\s*(.*)$/);
+    if (m) {
+      const k = m[2] === "run" ? "run" : "prompt";
+      out.push(k);
+      kind = /^[|>][-+]?\s*$/.test(m[3]) || m[3] === "" ? k : null;
+      indent = m[1].length + (raw.trimStart().startsWith("-") ? 2 : 0);
+      continue;
+    }
+    out.push(kind);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function lintWorkflow(content) {
+  const issues = [];
+  const lines = content.split(/\r?\n/);
+  const text2 = lines.map((l) => l.replace(/\s+#.*$/, "")).join("\n");
+  const agents = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const agentLines = [];
+  lines.forEach((l, i) => {
+    for (const [re, name] of [...AGENT_ACTIONS, ...AGENT_CLIS]) if (re.test(l)) {
+      agents.add(name);
+      agentLines.push(i + 1);
+    }
+  });
+  const untrustedTriggers = UNTRUSTED_EVENTS.filter((e) => new RegExp(`(^|[\\s,[{'"-])${e}\\s*(:|,|\\]|$)`, "m").test(text2));
+  const hasAgent = agents.size > 0;
+  const secrets = [...text2.matchAll(/\$\{\{\s*secrets\.(\w+)\s*\}\}/g)].map((m) => m[1]).filter((s) => s !== "GITHUB_TOKEN");
+  const gated = AUTHOR_GATE.test(text2);
+  const kinds = blocks(lines);
+  const firstAgent = agentLines[0];
+  if (hasAgent && untrustedTriggers.length && secrets.length && !gated) {
+    issues.push({
+      id: "untrusted-trigger-with-secrets",
+      severity: "critical",
+      line: firstAgent,
+      title: `Anyone can start ${[...agents].join(" / ")} with your secrets (${untrustedTriggers.join(", ")})`,
+      detail: `${untrustedTriggers.join(", ")} runs for outside contributors, and this job gives the agent ${[...new Set(secrets)].slice(0, 4).join(", ")}. A crafted title, body or comment can steer the agent into revealing or misusing them. Restrict who can trigger it (check github.event.comment.author_association / sender against OWNER, MEMBER, COLLABORATOR), or move secrets to a workflow that only maintainers trigger.`
+    });
+  } else if (hasAgent && untrustedTriggers.length && !gated) {
+    issues.push({
+      id: "untrusted-trigger",
+      severity: "medium",
+      line: firstAgent,
+      title: `Outside contributors can start the agent (${untrustedTriggers.join(", ")})`,
+      detail: "No author check was found. Even without secrets, the agent spends your quota and can write to the repository with the job token. Gate it on author_association."
+    });
+  }
+  if (untrustedTriggers.includes("pull_request_target")) {
+    lines.forEach((l, i) => {
+      if (/^\s*ref:\s*\$\{\{\s*(github\.event\.pull_request\.head\.(sha|ref)|github\.head_ref)\s*\}\}/.test(l)) {
+        issues.push({ id: "prt-checkout-head", severity: "critical", line: i + 1, title: "pull_request_target checks out the pull request code", detail: "The job runs with your secrets and a write token, and now with code from the fork. Anything the agent or a build step executes from that checkout can steal them. Use pull_request for untrusted code, or check out the base branch only." });
+      }
+    });
+  }
+  lines.forEach((l, i) => {
+    const m = l.match(UNTRUSTED_EXPR);
+    if (!m) return;
+    const kind = kinds[i];
+    if (kind === "run") {
+      issues.push({ id: "untrusted-in-run", severity: "high", line: i + 1, title: `Untrusted ${m[1].split(".").slice(-2).join(".")} expanded inside a shell`, detail: 'The value is pasted into the script before it runs, so a title like `"; curl \u2026 | sh #` executes. Pass it through env: (VALUE: ${{ \u2026 }}) and use "$VALUE" in the script.' });
+    } else if (kind === "prompt" || hasAgent) {
+      issues.push({ id: "untrusted-in-prompt", severity: hasAgent ? "high" : "medium", line: i + 1, title: `Untrusted ${m[1].split(".").slice(-2).join(".")} inserted into the agent's prompt`, detail: "Text from outside contributors becomes instructions to the agent \u2014 the prompt-injection path behind the 2026 agent-action key leaks. Let the agent read the issue/PR through its tools as data, keep tools and permissions minimal, and never give this job secrets it does not need." });
+    }
+  });
+  lines.forEach((l, i) => {
+    for (const [re, what] of DANGEROUS_FLAGS) {
+      if (re.test(l)) {
+        const severe = untrustedTriggers.length > 0 && !gated;
+        issues.push({ id: "agent-unrestricted", severity: severe ? "high" : "medium", line: i + 1, title: `In CI, ${what}`, detail: severe ? "Combined with a trigger outside contributors control, a prompt injection can run arbitrary commands with the job token and secrets. Allow only the commands the task needs (e.g. Bash(npm test))." : "Allow only the commands the task needs (e.g. Bash(npm test)); a prompt injection anywhere in the input then cannot run arbitrary commands." });
+      }
+    }
+  });
+  if (/^\s*permissions:\s*write-all\b/m.test(text2)) {
+    const n = lines.findIndex((l) => /permissions:\s*write-all/.test(l)) + 1;
+    issues.push({ id: "write-all", severity: hasAgent ? "high" : "medium", line: n, title: "permissions: write-all", detail: "The job token can push code, change releases and edit workflows. Grant only what the job needs (e.g. contents: read, pull-requests: write)." });
+  } else if (hasAgent && !/^\s*permissions:/m.test(text2)) {
+    issues.push({ id: "no-permissions", severity: "medium", title: "No permissions block", detail: "Without one, the job token gets the repository default, which is often read/write for everything. Declare the minimum (contents: read, plus what the agent must write)." });
+  }
+  lines.forEach((l, i) => {
+    const m = l.match(/uses:\s*([\w.-]+\/[\w./-]+)@([\w.-]+)/);
+    if (!m || !AGENT_ACTIONS.some(([re]) => re.test(m[1]))) return;
+    if (!/^[0-9a-f]{40}$/.test(m[2])) {
+      issues.push({ id: "unpinned-agent-action", severity: "medium", line: i + 1, title: `${m[1]}@${m[2]} is not pinned to a commit`, detail: "This action receives your API keys. A moved tag or a compromised release changes what runs with them. Pin the full commit SHA (with the version in a comment) and update deliberately." });
+    }
+  });
+  if (hasAgent && /secrets:\s*inherit/.test(text2)) {
+    issues.push({ id: "secrets-inherit", severity: "medium", line: lines.findIndex((l) => /secrets:\s*inherit/.test(l)) + 1, title: "secrets: inherit", detail: "Every repository secret is passed on. Pass only the key the agent needs." });
+  }
+  const score = Math.max(0, 100 - issues.reduce((n, x) => n + WEIGHT2[x.severity], 0));
+  return { score: hasAgent || issues.length ? score : 100, grade: grade2(score), agents: [...agents], untrustedTriggers, issues: issues.sort((a, b) => WEIGHT2[b.severity] - WEIGHT2[a.severity] || (a.line ?? 0) - (b.line ?? 0)) };
+}
+
 // ../scanner/src/index.ts
 var SCANNER_VERSION = "1.2.0";
 var MAX_PER_RULE_PER_FILE = 5;
@@ -787,12 +915,12 @@ function fromPyproject(raw) {
   }
   return deps;
 }
-function tomlPackages(raw, normalize = pep503) {
+function tomlPackages(raw, normalize2 = pep503) {
   const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   for (const block of raw.split(/^\[\[package\]\]\s*$/m).slice(1)) {
     const name = block.match(/^name\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"/m)?.[1];
     const version = block.match(/^version\s*=\s*"([^"]+)"/m)?.[1];
-    if (name && version && !out.has(normalize(name))) out.set(normalize(name), version);
+    if (name && version && !out.has(normalize2(name))) out.set(normalize2(name), version);
   }
   return out;
 }
@@ -961,6 +1089,160 @@ async function installedSkillNames(skillDirs) {
   return [...names];
 }
 
+// src/destructive.ts
+import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
+import { homedir as homedir2, tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { isAbsolute, join as join3, normalize, resolve as resolve3, sep as sep2 } from "node:path";
+function split(line) {
+  return line.split(/&&|\|\||[;\n]/).flatMap((part) => part.split(/(?<!\|)\|(?!\|)/).map((raw) => raw.trim())).filter(Boolean).map((raw) => ({ raw, words: (raw.match(/"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+/g) ?? []).map((w) => w.replace(/^["']|["']$/g, "")) }));
+}
+function strip(words) {
+  let w = words;
+  while (w.length && /^(sudo|doas|env|time|nice|command|exec|\w+=\S*)$/.test(w[0])) w = w.slice(1);
+  return w;
+}
+var SYSTEM_DIRS = ["/", "/bin", "/boot", "/dev", "/etc", "/lib", "/lib64", "/opt", "/proc", "/root", "/sbin", "/sys", "/usr", "/var", "/System", "/Library", "/Applications", "/Users", "/home", "/private", "/Volumes"];
+function expand(arg, ctx) {
+  let out = arg.replace(/^~(?=$|\/)/, ctx.home);
+  let unresolved = false;
+  out = out.replace(/\$\{(\w+)(?::?[-=][^}]*)?\}|\$(\w+)/g, (m, a, b) => {
+    const name = a ?? b;
+    const v = name === "HOME" ? ctx.home : name === "PWD" ? ctx.cwd : ctx.env[name];
+    if (v === void 0 || v === "") {
+      if (/:?[-=]/.test(m)) return m.replace(/^\$\{\w+:?[-=]|\}$/g, "");
+      unresolved = true;
+      return "";
+    }
+    return v;
+  });
+  return unresolved ? null : out;
+}
+var within = (p, dir) => p === dir || p.startsWith(dir.endsWith(sep2) ? dir : dir + sep2);
+function real(p) {
+  try {
+    return realpathSync(p);
+  } catch {
+    return p;
+  }
+}
+function judgeDelete(target, ctx, flags) {
+  const expanded = expand(target, ctx);
+  if (expanded === null) {
+    return { decision: "deny", reason: `"${target}" contains a variable that is not set here, so it may expand to nothing \u2014 e.g. "rm -rf $DIR/" becomes "rm -rf /". Use the literal path.` };
+  }
+  if (/^\/?\*$|^~\/?\*$/.test(target) || expanded === "/*" || expanded === `${ctx.home}/*`) {
+    return { decision: "deny", reason: `"rm ${flags} ${target}" deletes everything in ${expanded.startsWith(ctx.home) ? "the home directory" : "the filesystem root"}.` };
+  }
+  const abs = normalize(isAbsolute(expanded) ? expanded : resolve3(ctx.cwd, expanded)).replace(/\/\*$/, "").replace(/(.)\/+$/, "$1") || "/";
+  const resolved = real(abs);
+  for (const p of /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([abs, resolved])) {
+    if (p === ctx.home || within(ctx.home, p)) return { decision: "deny", reason: `"rm ${flags} ${target}" would delete the home directory (${p}).` };
+    if (SYSTEM_DIRS.some((d) => p === d)) return { decision: "deny", reason: `"rm ${flags} ${target}" would delete the system directory ${p}.` };
+  }
+  const tmp = [real(tmpdir()), "/tmp", "/private/tmp", "/var/folders"];
+  const safe = (p) => within(p, ctx.project) || tmp.some((t) => within(p, t));
+  if (!safe(abs) || !safe(resolved)) {
+    const via = resolved !== abs ? ` (it resolves to ${resolved} through a link)` : "";
+    return { decision: "ask", reason: `"rm ${flags} ${target}" deletes ${abs}${via}, outside the project ${ctx.project}. Confirm that this is intended.` };
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+var RULES = [
+  // rm -r / -rf / --recursive
+  (w, _raw, ctx) => {
+    if (w[0]?.split("/").pop() !== "rm") return null;
+    const flags = w.filter((x) => x.startsWith("-"));
+    if (!flags.some((f) => /^-[a-zA-Z]*[rR]/.test(f) || f === "--recursive")) return null;
+    const targets = w.slice(1).filter((x) => !x.startsWith("-"));
+    let worst = null;
+    for (const t of targets) {
+      const v = judgeDelete(t, ctx, flags.join(" "));
+      if (v?.decision === "deny") return v;
+      worst ??= v;
+    }
+    return worst;
+  },
+  // find … -delete / -exec rm outside the project
+  (w, _raw, ctx) => {
+    if (w[0] !== "find" || !(w.includes("-delete") || w.includes("-exec") && w.includes("rm"))) return null;
+    const start = w[1] && !w[1].startsWith("-") ? w[1] : ".";
+    const v = judgeDelete(start, ctx, "(find -delete)");
+    return v && { ...v, reason: v.reason.replace(/^"rm \(find -delete\) /, `"find ${start} \u2026 -delete" `) };
+  },
+  // disks and filesystems
+  (w) => /^mkfs(\.\w+)?$/.test(w[0] ?? "") || w[0] === "dd" && w.some((x) => /^of=\/dev\//.test(x)) ? { decision: "deny", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" overwrites a disk or partition.` } : null,
+  (_w, raw) => />\s*\/dev\/(sd|nvme|disk|hd)\w*/.test(raw) ? { decision: "deny", reason: "Writing directly to a disk device." } : null,
+  // recursive chmod/chown on / or ~
+  (w, _raw, ctx) => {
+    if (!["chmod", "chown"].includes(w[0] ?? "") || !w.some((x) => /^-[a-zA-Z]*R/.test(x))) return null;
+    const t = w.slice(1).filter((x) => !x.startsWith("-")).slice(1);
+    const hit = t.map((x) => expand(x, ctx) ?? "/").find((x) => SYSTEM_DIRS.includes(normalize(x)) || normalize(x) === ctx.home);
+    return hit ? { decision: "deny", reason: `Recursive ${w[0]} on ${hit}.` } : null;
+  },
+  // git
+  (w) => {
+    if (w[0] !== "git") return null;
+    const sub = w[1];
+    if (sub === "push" && w.some((x) => /^(-f|--force|--force-with-lease(=.*)?|--mirror|--delete|-d)$/.test(x) || /^\+/.test(x) || /^:/.test(x))) {
+      return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" rewrites or deletes history on the remote. Confirm with the user first.` };
+    }
+    if (sub === "reset" && w.includes("--hard")) return { decision: "ask", reason: '"git reset --hard" throws away uncommitted changes.' };
+    if (sub === "clean" && w.some((x) => /^-[a-zA-Z]*f/.test(x))) return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" permanently deletes untracked files${w.some((x) => /x/.test(x) && x.startsWith("-")) ? ", including ignored ones like .env" : ""}.` };
+    if ((sub === "checkout" || sub === "restore") && w.includes(".") && !w.includes("--staged")) return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" discards all uncommitted changes.` };
+    if (sub === "branch" && w.includes("-D")) return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" deletes a branch even if it is not merged.` };
+    if (sub === "add" && w.slice(2).some((x) => /(^|\/)\.env(\..+)?$|\.pem$|id_rsa|id_ed25519/.test(x) && !/\.example$|\.sample$|\.template$/.test(x))) {
+      return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${w.join(" ")}" stages a file that usually holds secrets.` };
+    }
+    return null;
+  },
+  // databases
+  (w, raw) => {
+    const s = raw.toLowerCase();
+    if (/\bprisma\b.*\bmigrate\s+reset\b/.test(s) || /\bprisma\b.*\bdb\s+push\b.*--(force-reset|accept-data-loss)/.test(s)) {
+      return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${raw.trim()}" deletes data in the database ${/database_url=/.test(s) ? "named in DATABASE_URL" : "from DATABASE_URL"}. Confirm it is not a shared or production database.` };
+    }
+    if (/\b(drizzle-kit\s+drop|rails\s+db:(drop|reset)|rake\s+db:(drop|reset)|manage\.py\s+flush|sequelize\s+db:drop|typeorm\s+schema:drop|knex\s+migrate:rollback\s+--all)\b/.test(s)) {
+      return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${raw.trim()}" drops or empties the database.` };
+    }
+    if (/\b(psql|mysql|mariadb|sqlite3|mongosh|mongo|redis-cli|clickhouse-client)\b/.test(s) && /\b(drop\s+(database|schema|table)|truncate\b|delete\s+from\s+\w+\s*(;|$|"|')|flushall|flushdb|dropdatabase\(\))/.test(s)) {
+      return { decision: "ask", reason: `"${raw.trim().slice(0, 200)}" deletes database data. Confirm the target is not production.` };
+    }
+    return null;
+  },
+  // infrastructure and cloud
+  (w, raw) => {
+    const s = raw.toLowerCase();
+    const hit = /\b(terraform|tofu|terragrunt)\s+(destroy|apply\b.*-destroy)/.test(s) && "tears down infrastructure" || /\bpulumi\s+(destroy|down)\b/.test(s) && "tears down infrastructure" || /\bcdk\s+destroy\b/.test(s) && "tears down infrastructure" || /\bkubectl\s+delete\b.*(\b(ns|namespace|namespaces|pv|pvc|node)\b|--all\b)/.test(s) && "deletes Kubernetes resources broadly" || /\bhelm\s+(uninstall|delete)\b/.test(s) && "removes a Helm release" || /\bdocker\s+(system\s+prune\b.*(-a|--all|--volumes)|volume\s+(rm|prune)\b|compose\s+down\b.*(-v|--volumes))/.test(s) && "deletes Docker volumes or all unused data" || /\baws\s+s3\s+(rm\b.*--recursive|rb\b)/.test(s) && "deletes S3 objects or a bucket" || /\baws\s+\S+\s+(delete|terminate)-/.test(s) && "deletes AWS resources" || /\bgcloud\b.*\b(delete)\b/.test(s) && "deletes Google Cloud resources" || /\baz\s+\S+.*\bdelete\b/.test(s) && "deletes Azure resources" || /\b(vercel|netlify|fly|flyctl|railway|heroku)\b.*\b(remove|rm|destroy|delete|apps:destroy)\b/.test(s) && "deletes a deployment or app";
+    return hit ? { decision: "ask", reason: `"${raw.trim().slice(0, 200)}" ${hit}. Confirm with the user first.` } : null;
+  }
+];
+function exfiltration(line) {
+  const s = line.toLowerCase();
+  const net = /\b(curl|wget|nc|ncat|netcat|socat|http|httpie|scp|rsync|ftp|telnet)\b/;
+  const secret = /(\.env\b|\.ssh\/|id_rsa|id_ed25519|\.aws\/credentials|\.npmrc|\.netrc|\.pgpass|\.git-credentials|\.docker\/config\.json|\bprintenv\b|(^|[|;&\s])env(\s*[|;&]|\s*$))/;
+  if (!net.test(s) || !secret.test(s)) return null;
+  const piped = /\|\s*(curl|wget|nc|ncat|netcat|socat|http)\b/.test(s);
+  const uploaded = /(\s-d|--data(-binary|-raw)?|\s-F|--form|\s-T|--upload-file)\s+\S*@\S*(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|credentials|\.npmrc|\.netrc)/.test(line) || /\b(scp|rsync)\b.*(\.env|\.ssh|id_rsa|credentials)/.test(s);
+  return piped || uploaded ? { decision: "deny", reason: "This sends secrets (.env, SSH keys, cloud credentials or the environment) over the network." } : null;
+}
+function destructiveVerdict(line, opts = {}) {
+  const home = normalize(opts.home ?? homedir2());
+  const cwd = normalize(opts.cwd ?? process.cwd());
+  const ctx = { cwd, home, project: normalize(opts.project ?? cwd), env: opts.env ?? process.env };
+  if (ctx.project === home || SYSTEM_DIRS.includes(ctx.project)) ctx.project = join3(home, "\0no-project");
+  const verdicts = [exfiltration(line), /:\(\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;\s*:/.test(line) ? { decision: "deny", reason: "Fork bomb." } : null];
+  for (const { raw, words } of split(line)) {
+    const w = strip(words);
+    if (!w.length) continue;
+    for (const rule of RULES) verdicts.push(rule(w, raw, ctx));
+  }
+  const hits = verdicts.filter((v) => !!v);
+  if (!hits.length) return null;
+  const deny = hits.filter((v) => v.decision === "deny");
+  const pick = deny.length ? deny : hits;
+  return { decision: deny.length ? "deny" : "ask", reason: [...new Set(pick.map((v) => v.reason))].join("\n") };
+}
+
 // src/guard.ts
 function commands(line) {
   return line.split(/&&|\|\||[;|\n]/).map((c) => (c.match(/"[^"]*"|'[^']*'|\S+/g) ?? []).map((w) => w.replace(/^["']|["']$/g, ""))).filter((w) => w.length);
@@ -1038,17 +1320,20 @@ async function readStdin() {
 }
 async function runGuard(opts) {
   let command = "";
+  let cwd;
   try {
     const payload = JSON.parse(await readStdin());
     command = payload.tool_input?.command ?? "";
+    cwd = payload.cwd;
   } catch {
     return 0;
   }
+  const local = destructiveVerdict(command, { cwd, project: cwd });
   const packages = packagesInCommand(command);
-  if (!packages.length) return 0;
+  if (local?.decision === "deny" || !packages.length) return emit(local);
   if (!opts.key) {
     console.error("codexguild guard: CODEXGUILD_API_KEY is not set \u2014 packages were not checked.");
-    return 0;
+    return emit(local);
   }
   let results;
   try {
@@ -1062,12 +1347,18 @@ async function runGuard(opts) {
     results = (await res.json()).results;
   } catch (e) {
     console.error(`codexguild guard: check failed (${e instanceof Error ? e.message : e}) \u2014 command not blocked.`);
-    return 0;
-  }
-  const decision = guardDecision(results);
-  if (decision) {
-    process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: decision.decision, permissionDecisionReason: decision.reason } }));
+    return emit(local);
   }
+  return emit(mergeVerdicts(local, guardDecision(results)));
+}
+function mergeVerdicts(a, b) {
+  if (!a || !b) return a ?? b;
+  if (a.decision !== b.decision) return a.decision === "deny" ? a : b;
+  return { decision: a.decision, reason: `${a.reason}
+${b.reason}` };
+}
+function emit(d) {
+  if (d) process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({ hookSpecificOutput: { hookEventName: "PreToolUse", permissionDecision: d.decision, permissionDecisionReason: `CodexGuild guard: ${d.reason}` } }));
   return 0;
 }
 function guardDecision(results) {
@@ -1077,7 +1368,7 @@ function guardDecision(results) {
   const blocked = flagged.some((r) => r.verdict === "block");
   return {
     decision: blocked ? "deny" : "ask",
-    reason: `CodexGuild package check:
+    reason: `package check:
 ${lines.join("\n")}${blocked ? "\nUse the correct package name, or ask the user before trying again." : ""}`
   };
 }
@@ -1085,11 +1376,11 @@ ${lines.join("\n")}${blocked ? "\nUse the correct package name, or ask the user
 // src/index.ts
 var API = (process.env.CODEXGUILD_API_URL || "https://api.codexguild.com/v1").replace(/\/$/, "");
 var KEY = process.env.CODEXGUILD_API_KEY ?? "";
-var VERSION = "1.4.0";
+var VERSION = "1.5.0";
 if (process.argv[2] === "guard") process.exit(await runGuard({ api: API, key: KEY }));
 var INSTRUCTION_FILES = ["CLAUDE.md", ".claude/CLAUDE.md", "AGENTS.md", "AGENTS.override.md", ".hermes.md", "HERMES.md", "GEMINI.md", ".cursorrules"];
 async function existingInstructionFiles(cwd) {
-  const present = await Promise.all(INSTRUCTION_FILES.map((f) => access(join3(cwd, f)).then(() => f, () => null)));
+  const present = await Promise.all(INSTRUCTION_FILES.map((f) => access(join4(cwd, f)).then(() => f, () => null)));
   return present.filter((f) => f !== null);
 }
 var remote = null;
@@ -1119,7 +1410,8 @@ var SCAN_TOOL = {
 };
 var ENHANCED = {
   codexguild_sync: "Runs locally first: the stack (package.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, \u2026) and installed skill NAMES are detected automatically \u2014 only names/versions are sent, never file contents; you only need force/since.",
-  codexguild_advise: "Runs locally first: stack, installed skills and the instruction files present in the project are detected automatically; you only need harness."
+  codexguild_advise: "Runs locally first: stack, installed skills and the instruction files present in the project are detected automatically; you only need harness.",
+  codexguild_debug: "Runs locally first: the project's package versions are read from its lockfiles and sent with the error \u2014 you only need error (and stack)."
 };
 function enhance(t) {
   const note = ENHANCED[t.name];
@@ -1135,6 +1427,10 @@ ${note}`,
   };
 }
 async function detected(name, cwd) {
+  if (name === "codexguild_debug") {
+    const { deps: deps2 } = await detectStack(cwd);
+    return { args: { packages: deps2.slice(0, 300).map((d) => ({ name: d.name, ...d.version ? { version: d.version } : {}, ...d.ecosystem ? { ecosystem: d.ecosystem } : {} })) } };
+  }
   const [{ deps, manifests, lockfiles, exact, ranges }, local, project] = await Promise.all([detectStack(cwd), scanLocalSkills(), projectKey(cwd)]);
   const installedSkills = await installedSkillNames(local.reports.map((r) => r.dir));
   if (name === "codexguild_advise") {
@@ -1163,7 +1459,7 @@ async function lintLocal(cwd, files) {
   if (!targets.length) return "No instruction files found (looked for CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, .cursorrules, \u2026).";
   const out = [];
   for (const f of targets) {
-    const content = await readFile3(isAbsolute(f) ? f : join3(cwd, f), "utf8").catch(() => null);
+    const content = await readFile3(isAbsolute2(f) ? f : join4(cwd, f), "utf8").catch(() => null);
     if (content === null) {
       out.push(`## ${f}
 Could not read the file.`);
@@ -1177,7 +1473,36 @@ Could not read the file.`);
 }
 var text = (t, isError = false) => ({ content: [{ type: "text", text: t }], ...isError ? { isError } : {} });
 var server = new Server({ name: "codexguild", version: VERSION }, { capabilities: { tools: { listChanged: true } } });
-var LOCAL_TOOLS = [SCAN_TOOL, LINT_TOOL];
+var WORKFLOWS_TOOL = {
+  name: "codexguild_scan_workflows",
+  description: "Security-review the GitHub Actions workflows in this project that run coding agents (claude-code-action, run-gemini-cli, codex, opencode, aider\u2026): triggers outside contributors control (pull_request_target, issue_comment, issues) combined with secrets, issue/PR text interpolated into prompts or shells (prompt injection), unrestricted agent tools, broad permissions, unpinned agent actions. Runs locally \u2014 nothing is uploaded.",
+  inputSchema: {
+    type: "object",
+    properties: { files: { type: "array", items: { type: "string" }, description: "Workflow files to review instead of .github/workflows/*.yml" } }
+  },
+  annotations: { readOnlyHint: true, openWorldHint: false }
+};
+async function scanWorkflowsLocal(cwd, files) {
+  const dir = join4(cwd, ".github", "workflows");
+  const targets = files?.length ? files : (await readdir3(dir).catch(() => [])).filter((f) => /\.ya?ml$/.test(f)).map((f) => join4(dir, f));
+  if (!targets.length) return "No workflows found in .github/workflows.";
+  const out = [];
+  for (const f of targets) {
+    const content = await readFile3(isAbsolute2(f) ? f : join4(cwd, f), "utf8").catch(() => null);
+    const name = f.startsWith(cwd + "/") ? f.slice(cwd.length + 1) : f;
+    if (content === null) {
+      out.push(`## ${name}
+Could not read the file.`);
+      continue;
+    }
+    const r = lintWorkflow(content);
+    if (!r.agents.length && !r.issues.length) continue;
+    out.push(`## ${name} \u2014 ${r.score}/100 (${r.grade})${r.agents.length ? ` \xB7 runs ${r.agents.join(", ")}` : ""}${r.untrustedTriggers.length ? ` \xB7 untrusted triggers: ${r.untrustedTriggers.join(", ")}` : ""}`);
+    out.push(...r.issues.length ? r.issues.map((i) => `- [${i.severity}]${i.line ? ` line ${i.line}` : ""} ${i.title}: ${i.detail}`) : ["- No issues."]);
+  }
+  return out.length ? out.join("\n") : `Reviewed ${targets.length} workflow(s): none runs a coding agent and no injection risks were found.`;
+}
+var LOCAL_TOOLS = [SCAN_TOOL, LINT_TOOL, WORKFLOWS_TOOL];
 var RETRY_MS = [1e3, 3e3];
 var RECONNECT_MS = 3e4;
 var reconnectTimer = null;
@@ -1218,6 +1543,9 @@ server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (req) => {
   const { name } = req.params;
   const args2 = { ...req.params.arguments ?? {} };
   try {
+    if (name === WORKFLOWS_TOOL.name) {
+      return text(await scanWorkflowsLocal(process.cwd(), Array.isArray(args2.files) ? args2.files.map(String) : void 0));
+    }
     if (name === LINT_TOOL.name) {
       return text(await lintLocal(process.cwd(), Array.isArray(args2.files) ? args2.files.map(String) : void 0));
     }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@codexguild/mcp",
-  "version": "1.4.0",
+  "version": "1.5.0",
   "description": "CodexGuild MCP server (stdio) \u2014 forwards to the remote CodexGuild MCP endpoint and adds local stack detection and an offline security audit of installed agent skills",
   "keywords": [
     "mcp",