@codewizard-dt/bootstrap 2.15.0 → 2.18.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/lib/hooks/README.md +192 -184
- package/lib/hooks/absolute-path-guard.js +5 -0
- package/lib/hooks/claude-settings-guard.js +43 -73
- package/lib/hooks/env-content-read-guard.js +13 -3
- package/lib/hooks/env-file-guard.js +42 -0
- package/lib/hooks/interpreter-indirection-guard.js +7 -0
- package/lib/hooks/lib/command-parse.js +8 -0
- package/lib/hooks/lib/serena-languages.js +94 -1
- package/lib/hooks/lib/serena.js +228 -0
- package/lib/hooks/mv-absolute-path-block.js +84 -3
- package/lib/hooks/package-install-consent.js +11 -0
- package/lib/hooks/protected-write-guard.js +7 -0
- package/lib/hooks/serena-bash-grep-block.js +507 -44
- package/lib/hooks/serena-first-glob-guard.js +65 -20
- package/lib/hooks/serena-first-guard.js +98 -2
- package/lib/hooks/serena-first-read-guard.js +92 -2
- package/lib/hooks/serena-pre-delegation.js +123 -0
- package/lib/hooks/serena-write-guard.js +56 -3
- package/lib/scripts/README.md +319 -16
- package/lib/scripts/bootstrap-prefs.js +734 -0
- package/lib/scripts/install-global.sh +182 -25
- package/lib/scripts/install-mcps.sh +102 -14
- package/lib/scripts/lib.sh +595 -20
- package/lib/scripts/merge-gitignore.sh +254 -16
- package/lib/scripts/merge-settings-hooks.js +374 -0
- package/lib/scripts/sync-wiki-scaffold.sh +33 -4
- package/lib/scripts/templates/CLAUDE-wiki.md +1 -1
- package/lib/scripts/templates/bootstrap-prefs-schema.json +175 -0
- package/lib/scripts/templates/settings-hooks.json +151 -0
- package/lib/scripts/update-project.sh +42 -9
- package/lib/skills/README.md +2 -1
- package/lib/skills/bootstrap-config/SKILL.md +154 -0
- package/lib/skills/git-commit/SKILL.md +54 -1
- package/lib/skills/research/SKILL.md +34 -3
- package/lib/skills/simplify/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/lib/skills/uat-auto/SKILL.md +9 -4
- package/lib/skills/uat-auto-plus/SKILL.md +6 -6
- package/lib/skills/uat-generate/SKILL.md +30 -3
- package/lib/skills/uat-walk/UAT-CORE.md +41 -6
- package/lib/skills/wiki-query/SKILL.md +48 -8
- package/package.json +1 -1
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#!/usr/bin/env node
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'use strict';
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-
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/**
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* mv-absolute-path-block.js — PreToolUse / Bash (wiring adds `if: Bash(mv *)`)
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*
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* Blocks: an `mv` with an absolute-path argument rooted outside the hook's idea
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* of the project root (see BUG-0005 below — that idea is not the session's) —
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* the "I thought I was somewhere else" move that lands a file in /etc, /usr,
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* or a neighbouring repo.
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* Why a hook: whether an absolute path is acceptable depends on where the
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* project root is, and a settings.json pattern cannot see the project root.
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* Denying every absolute-path mv would deny the legitimate in-project ones
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* too, and enumerating the roots worth protecting is precisely the unbounded
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* list a hook exists to replace. The verdict also has to arrive as a
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* CORRECTION ("check that you are in the project root") rather than a
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* prohibition, and a deny rule cannot carry a message at all.
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* Fails: open — unparseable stdin exits 0 silently at the JSON.parse catch
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* below. A payload that parses to a non-object (`null`) throws on
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* `data.tool_name` and exits non-zero, which Claude Code reads as a
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* NON-blocking hook error: stderr is surfaced and the tool call proceeds
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* anyway. Both paths allow. This file does not use lib/command-parse.js's
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* readHookInput, so there is no handler-level catch; of the hooks in this
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* directory only interpreter-indirection-guard.js genuinely fails closed.
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* False positives: a pipeline is not a segment boundary here, so a later
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* stage's absolute path is attributed to the `mv` —
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* `mv notes.md archive.md | tee /var/log/mvlog.txt` denies a move that is
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* entirely in-project (BUG-0006, annotated at the segment split below) —
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* escape hatch: join with `&&` instead of `|`, which IS a segment boundary,
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* so the `mv` is then judged on its own two operands.
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* See README.md § Safety / policy hooks for the full rationale.
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*/
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const path = require('path');
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const fullCmd = String(data.tool_input?.command ?? '').trim();
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if (!fullCmd) process.exit(0);
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// BUG-0005 — UNEXPLAINED DIVERGENCE, annotated here and deliberately not fixed.
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// Every sibling guard that needs a project root reads `data.cwd` off the hook
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// payload and falls back to `process.cwd()` only if it is missing
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// (protected-write-guard.js:189, claude-settings-guard.js:192,
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// interpreter-indirection-guard.js:579, serena-pre-delegation.js:95). This one
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// alone asks node and never looks at the payload. `data.cwd` is the
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// authoritative session cwd Claude Code reports for the tool call;
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// `process.cwd()` is merely wherever the node process running this hook was
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// started. When the two differ the check inverts in BOTH directions: absolute
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// paths that really are in-project stop matching `cwdWithSep` and get denied,
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// while paths under node's cwd but outside the session's project get allowed.
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// No comment, commit message, or test explains the choice, which is why it is
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// filed rather than assumed intentional. Do not swap it in passing — it is a
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// behaviour change to a live shipped control and belongs to BUG-0005.
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const cwd = process.cwd();
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const cwdWithSep = cwd + path.sep;
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// Split on command separators and inspect each segment independently.
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//
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// BUG-0006 — DIVERGENCE, annotated and deliberately not fixed: this list is
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// `;`, `&&`, `||` but NOT `|`, whereas lib/command-parse.js's splitSegments
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// (:48) includes the pipe. Read the next three paragraphs before touching it,
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// because the obvious reading of this gap is wrong.
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//
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// It is NOT a bypass. `args` is `tokens.slice(mvIdx + 1)` and runs to the end
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// of the segment, straight through any `|`, so an absolute path still lands in
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// `args` regardless of which pipeline stage wrote it:
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// echo x | mv /etc/foo /tmp/bar still denies
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// cat mv | mv /etc/x /tmp/y still denies
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//
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// The actual defect is the inverse — FALSE denials. Operands belonging to a
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// later stage are attributed to the `mv`, so a wholly in-project move that
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// merely logs somewhere absolute is refused:
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// mv notes.md archive.md | tee /var/log/mvlog.txt denies, wrongly
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//
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// WARNING TO THE NEXT READER: the tempting fix — anchor the verb at the head
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// of each segment, the way absolute-path-guard.js does — would OPEN the bypass
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// this only looks like it has. With `|` still absent from the split,
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// `echo x | mv /etc/foo /tmp/bar` is one segment headed by `echo`, and an
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// anchored check would stop seeing the `mv` entirely. Adding `|` to the split
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// and anchoring the verb are a single change, not two; either one alone makes
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// this hook strictly worse. That coupling is why it is filed as BUG-0006
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// instead of patched in place.
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//
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// One nuance if you go to reproduce any of the above: the shipped wiring gates
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// this hook behind `if: Bash(mv *)` (settings-hooks.json:104), so only commands
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// whose first token is `mv` reach the file at all. `echo x | mv /etc/foo …` is
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// filtered out upstream and never arrives, while the false-denial case does,
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// because it starts with `mv`. The gate lives in settings-hooks.json, not
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// here, so the logic above still has to stand on its own if it is relaxed.
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const segments = fullCmd.split(/;|&&|\|\|/).map(s => s.trim()).filter(Boolean);
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for (const segment of segments) {
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if (mvIdx === -1) continue;
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// Arguments after 'mv', skipping flags (-n, -f, -v, etc.)
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//
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// `!t.startsWith('-')` is a heuristic, not getopt, and it is safe in this
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// one direction: every mv flag that takes a value takes a PATH as that value
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// (`-t /etc/cron.d`, `--target-directory=/etc/cron.d`). Dropping the flag
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// therefore leaves its value behind in `args`, still inspected — the naive
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// failure mode where a flag swallows the very path you wanted to check
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// cannot occur here. The cost is the mirror case: a file whose name starts
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// with `-` is skipped. That is free, because such a name cannot also start
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// with `/`, and an absolute path is the only thing this hook blocks.
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const args = tokens.slice(mvIdx + 1).filter(t => !t.startsWith('-'));
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const offendingArg = args.find(arg => {
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// `npm install -g @playwright/mcp@latest` at the prompt IS gated. Both are
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// correct: consent was given once for the setup script as a whole; an ad-hoc
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// install carries no such consent.
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//
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// Fails: open — matching is pure token inspection with no external input, and a
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// throw exits 0 via lib/command-parse.js. The asymmetry that matters here is
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// coverage rather than failure: a manager or invocation form absent from the
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// tables below is allowed, which is also why the scope note above holds.
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const { readHookInput, splitSegments, tokenize, deny } = require('./lib/command-parse');
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// `uvx --from X` fetches and runs X, so it is an install in everything but
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// name. The flag is located anywhere in the segment rather than at a fixed
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// position, because `uvx --python 3.12 --from X` is equally valid.
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//
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// NOTE: bare `uvx <pkg>` (no `--from`) returns null here and is therefore
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// above. Whether that is a deliberate scope choice or an oversight is not
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// recoverable from this file or from lib/hooks/README.md — verify before
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// changing, and do not treat the current behaviour as intentional coverage.
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function uvxSource(tokens) {
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// unremarkable but which points into ~/.claude/ is not caught.
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//
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// itself, with no file read, no subprocess, and no external list, so there is no
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// Ambiguous MATCHES go the other way and block — see the inherited false
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// positive above.
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const path = require('path');
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const os = require('os');
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