@coderifts/sdk 3.13.3 → 3.14.1

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Files changed (46) hide show
  1. package/README.md +50 -1
  2. package/dist/cjs/authorize.d.ts +46 -4
  3. package/dist/cjs/authorize.d.ts.map +1 -1
  4. package/dist/cjs/authorize.js +57 -6
  5. package/dist/cjs/authorize.js.map +1 -1
  6. package/dist/cjs/client.d.ts +31 -3
  7. package/dist/cjs/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/cjs/client.js +35 -5
  9. package/dist/cjs/client.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/cjs/index.d.ts +2 -0
  11. package/dist/cjs/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/cjs/index.js +13 -1
  13. package/dist/cjs/index.js.map +1 -1
  14. package/dist/cjs/vendor/package.json +1 -0
  15. package/dist/cjs/vendor/receipt-verifier/VENDOR.sha256 +39 -3
  16. package/dist/cjs/vendor/receipt-verifier/verified-execution-binding.d.ts +48 -0
  17. package/dist/cjs/vendor/receipt-verifier/verified-execution-binding.js +202 -11
  18. package/dist/cjs/vendor/receipt-verifier/verify-grant.js +34 -1
  19. package/dist/cjs/vendor/receipt-verifier/verify.d.ts +31 -0
  20. package/dist/cjs/verify-receipt-local.d.ts +69 -0
  21. package/dist/cjs/verify-receipt-local.d.ts.map +1 -0
  22. package/dist/cjs/verify-receipt-local.js +108 -0
  23. package/dist/cjs/verify-receipt-local.js.map +1 -0
  24. package/dist/esm/authorize.d.ts +46 -4
  25. package/dist/esm/authorize.d.ts.map +1 -1
  26. package/dist/esm/authorize.js +53 -5
  27. package/dist/esm/authorize.js.map +1 -1
  28. package/dist/esm/client.d.ts +31 -3
  29. package/dist/esm/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/esm/client.js +35 -5
  31. package/dist/esm/client.js.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts +2 -0
  33. package/dist/esm/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/esm/index.js +11 -0
  35. package/dist/esm/index.js.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/esm/vendor/package.json +1 -0
  37. package/dist/esm/vendor/receipt-verifier/VENDOR.sha256 +39 -3
  38. package/dist/esm/vendor/receipt-verifier/verified-execution-binding.d.ts +48 -0
  39. package/dist/esm/vendor/receipt-verifier/verified-execution-binding.js +202 -11
  40. package/dist/esm/vendor/receipt-verifier/verify-grant.js +34 -1
  41. package/dist/esm/vendor/receipt-verifier/verify.d.ts +31 -0
  42. package/dist/esm/verify-receipt-local.d.ts +69 -0
  43. package/dist/esm/verify-receipt-local.d.ts.map +1 -0
  44. package/dist/esm/verify-receipt-local.js +102 -0
  45. package/dist/esm/verify-receipt-local.js.map +1 -0
  46. package/package.json +4 -3
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ const crypto = require('node:crypto');
43
43
 
44
44
  const { verifyExecutionGrant } = require('./verify-grant.js');
45
45
  const { verifyEvidenceRootBinding } = require('./verify-evidence.js');
46
+ const { verifyReceipt } = require('./verify.js');
46
47
 
47
48
  const BINDING_V = 'cr.verified-execution-binding.v1';
48
49
 
@@ -57,6 +58,24 @@ const STATE = Object.freeze({
57
58
  RECORDED_UNWITNESSED: 'RECORDED_UNWITNESSED',
58
59
  NOT_COMMITTED: 'NOT_COMMITTED',
59
60
  AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED: 'AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED',
61
+ /**
62
+ * A CUSTOM aggregation was satisfied — and it is NOT the global success token.
63
+ *
64
+ * ── THE HOLE THIS CLOSES, REPRODUCED BEFORE IT WAS WRITTEN ──────────────────────────────
65
+ *
66
+ * valid grant + committed + NO attestation + NO root, required: ['issuer_grant']
67
+ * -> AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED, authorized_and_committed: true
68
+ *
69
+ * Nothing was forged. The caller simply asked for less, and the function handed back the token
70
+ * every consumer reads as "authorized and committed". `required[]` was a strictness dial that
71
+ * also selected the NAME of success, so narrowing the dial upgraded the verdict — the strongest
72
+ * word in the vocabulary, reachable by asking for the least.
73
+ *
74
+ * A caller may still choose its own authorities. What it may no longer do is call the result by
75
+ * the global name. `AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED` is now reachable ONLY through a closed, versioned
76
+ * profile whose authority set the caller does not get to shorten.
77
+ */
78
+ CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED: 'CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED',
60
79
  });
61
80
 
62
81
  /** What each authority is allowed to be missing for, so a caller can choose its own strictness. */
@@ -67,6 +86,36 @@ const AUTHORITY = Object.freeze({
67
86
  PROVIDER_WITNESS: 'provider_witness',
68
87
  });
69
88
 
89
+ /**
90
+ * CLOSED, VERSIONED ASSURANCE PROFILES.
91
+ *
92
+ * A profile fixes its authority set. The caller names the profile; it does not get to edit what
93
+ * the profile means, and the version in the name is what lets the set change later without
94
+ * silently changing what an older caller was promised.
95
+ *
96
+ * `TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1` is the honest ceiling of a single-machine chain: the decision
97
+ * receipt verified, the issuer's grant verified, the executor's attestation verified, and one
98
+ * signed root binding the set to one run. It says nothing about a third party, and the name is
99
+ * chosen so it cannot be read as one — `EXTERNALLY_WITNESSED_EXECUTION_V1` is a different profile
100
+ * and no producer can satisfy it today (no signed-witness format exists), which is why it is not
101
+ * declared here as an empty promise.
102
+ */
103
+ const PROFILE = Object.freeze({
104
+ TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1: Object.freeze({
105
+ name: 'TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1',
106
+ authorities: Object.freeze([
107
+ AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT,
108
+ AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION,
109
+ AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT,
110
+ ]),
111
+ // The receipt is mandatory in every profile and is not listed as an authority because it is
112
+ // not optional anywhere — it gates the whole predicate above the state machine.
113
+ proof_scope: 'TRUSTED_EXECUTOR',
114
+ externally_witnessed: false,
115
+ }),
116
+ });
117
+ const PROFILE_NAMES = Object.freeze(Object.keys(PROFILE));
118
+
70
119
  const sha256pref = (v) =>
71
120
  `sha256:${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(v), 'utf8').digest('hex')}`;
72
121
 
@@ -116,12 +165,55 @@ function grantClaims(token) {
116
165
  * @param {{artifact: object, executorKey}} [o.evidenceRoot]
117
166
  * @param {{signed: boolean}} [o.providerReadback]
118
167
  * @param {boolean} o.committed
119
- * @param {string[]} [o.required] authorities this caller demands; default: grant + attestation.
168
+ * @param {string} [o.profile] a CLOSED profile name (see PROFILE). Its authority set cannot be
169
+ * edited by the caller, and only a profile can reach AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED.
170
+ * @param {string[]} [o.required] a CUSTOM authority set. Legal, and it can never produce the
171
+ * global success token — a satisfied custom set reads CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED.
120
172
  */
121
173
  function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
122
- const required = new Set(Array.isArray(o.required) && o.required.length
123
- ? o.required
124
- : [AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION]);
174
+ // ── WHICH SET, AND WHO CHOSE IT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
175
+ //
176
+ // A profile and a custom set are different KINDS of question, so they are answered separately
177
+ // and never merged. Passing both is refused rather than resolved by precedence: a caller that
178
+ // names a profile and then also lists authorities is asking two things at once, and picking one
179
+ // silently is how a caller ends up believing it got the other.
180
+ const profileName = typeof o.profile === 'string' && o.profile ? o.profile : null;
181
+ const customRequired = Array.isArray(o.required) && o.required.length ? o.required : null;
182
+ if (profileName && customRequired) {
183
+ return {
184
+ v: BINDING_V,
185
+ authorized_and_committed: false,
186
+ requirements_satisfied: false,
187
+ profile: null,
188
+ proof_scope: null,
189
+ externally_witnessed: false,
190
+ state: STATE.UNAUTHORIZED,
191
+ authorities: {},
192
+ shortfalls: ['profile: both `profile` and `required` were supplied — a closed profile\'s '
193
+ + 'authority set is not editable, so this asks two different questions at once'],
194
+ does_not_prove: [],
195
+ };
196
+ }
197
+ if (profileName && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILE, profileName)) {
198
+ // FAIL CLOSED on an unknown profile. Falling back to a default would let a typo — or a caller
199
+ // written against a future version — silently receive a weaker check than it named.
200
+ return {
201
+ v: BINDING_V,
202
+ authorized_and_committed: false,
203
+ requirements_satisfied: false,
204
+ profile: null,
205
+ proof_scope: null,
206
+ externally_witnessed: false,
207
+ state: STATE.UNAUTHORIZED,
208
+ authorities: {},
209
+ shortfalls: [`profile: unknown assurance profile "${profileName}"; known: ${PROFILE_NAMES.join(', ')}`],
210
+ does_not_prove: [],
211
+ };
212
+ }
213
+ const profile = profileName ? PROFILE[profileName] : null;
214
+ const required = new Set(profile
215
+ ? profile.authorities
216
+ : (customRequired || [AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION]));
125
217
  const shortfalls = [];
126
218
  const authorities = {};
127
219
  const note = (name, ok, detail) => {
@@ -225,9 +317,31 @@ function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
225
317
  if (!er || !er.artifact) {
226
318
  note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, false,
227
319
  'no cr.evidence.root.v1 was supplied, so these bytes are not shown to be one run');
320
+ } else if (typeof verifyEvidenceRootBinding !== 'function') {
321
+ // ── A MISSING VERIFIER IS A REFUSAL, NEVER A CRASH ───────────────────────────────────
322
+ //
323
+ // MEASURED on a consumer: agent-guard vendors an OLDER `verify-evidence.js` that does not
324
+ // export `verifyEvidenceRootBinding` (true on its HEAD too), so this line threw a TypeError
325
+ // the moment anyone passed an `evidenceRoot`. Latent there — that guard holds no root — and
326
+ // the SHAPE is what matters: a crash is not an answer, and a caller cannot tell "the core
327
+ // blew up" from "the core is unavailable" from "the binding failed".
328
+ //
329
+ // Every OTHER dependency this file has is already used unconditionally, so this is the one
330
+ // place a mixed vendor pin can leave a hole. Refusing here is the fail-closed answer, and it
331
+ // names the cause rather than reporting a generic unbound root.
332
+ note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, false,
333
+ 'the evidence-root verifier is not available in this build (the vendored verify-evidence.js '
334
+ + 'does not export verifyEvidenceRootBinding) — the root was NOT checked, and an unchecked '
335
+ + 'root is refused rather than reported as unbound');
228
336
  } else {
229
- const r = verifyEvidenceRootBinding(er.artifact, { executorKey: er.executorKey, sidecars: er.sidecars });
230
- note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, r.ok === true, r.ok ? 'bound' : (r.failures[0] || 'unbound'));
337
+ let r;
338
+ try {
339
+ r = verifyEvidenceRootBinding(er.artifact, { executorKey: er.executorKey, sidecars: er.sidecars });
340
+ } catch (err) {
341
+ r = { ok: false, failures: [`the evidence-root verifier threw: ${(err && err.message) || 'error'}`] };
342
+ }
343
+ note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, r.ok === true,
344
+ r.ok ? 'bound' : ((r.failures && r.failures[0]) || 'unbound'));
231
345
  }
232
346
 
233
347
  // ── 4. THE PROVIDER WITNESS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -273,11 +387,65 @@ function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
273
387
  // Left as-is deliberately: making a bare boolean insufficient would change the input shape of
274
388
  // all five consumers at once, and that belongs with the closed-profile work (1465), not
275
389
  // half-done in a round that would leave them broken. The gap is named, not narrowed in silence.
276
- const receiptOk = !!(o.receipt && o.receipt.verified === true);
277
- const receiptAsserted = receiptOk && !(o.receipt.token && (o.receipt.keyring || o.receipt.publicKey));
278
- if (!receiptOk) shortfalls.unshift('receipt: the decision receipt did not verify');
390
+ // ── THE DECISION RECEIPT, VERIFIED HERE WHEN IT CAN BE ─────────────────────────────────
391
+ //
392
+ // ── THE FOURTH CALLER-BOOLEAN THIS REPOSITORY HAS MET ──────────────────────────────────
393
+ //
394
+ // providerReadback: { signed: true } believed because it was set (closed)
395
+ // attestation: { present: true } believed because it was set (closed)
396
+ // call_hash present == "tool-call bound" (pre-empted)
397
+ // receipt: { verified: true } believed because it was set (this)
398
+ //
399
+ // `receipt.verified` is the CALLER's word. With no token and no keyring, nothing was checked and
400
+ // this function had no way to check it — and a caller that simply set the flag reached a
401
+ // satisfied verdict. `receipt_caller_asserted` recorded it, which is honest reporting and not a
402
+ // gate: a field nobody branches on does not stop anything.
403
+ //
404
+ // Now: when a token AND a key source are supplied, THIS function verifies the receipt. When they
405
+ // are not, the assertion is accepted only for a CUSTOM aggregation — where the caller owns its
406
+ // own question — and can never reach AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED, which is the word every consumer
407
+ // reads as the answer.
408
+ const rc = o.receipt || {};
409
+ let receiptOk = false;
410
+ let receiptAsserted = false;
411
+ let receiptDetail = 'the decision receipt did not verify';
412
+ const keySource = rc.keyring || rc.publicKey;
413
+ if (typeof rc.token === 'string' && rc.token.length > 0 && keySource) {
414
+ let rv;
415
+ try {
416
+ rv = verifyReceipt(rc.token, {
417
+ ctx: { ...(rc.keyring ? { keyring: rc.keyring } : { publicKey: rc.publicKey }),
418
+ expectedKid: rc.expectedKid === undefined ? null : rc.expectedKid },
419
+ ...(Number.isFinite(rc.now) ? { now: rc.now } : {}),
420
+ });
421
+ } catch (err) {
422
+ rv = { valid: false, status: 'VERIFIER_ERROR', reason: (err && err.message) || 'error' };
423
+ }
424
+ receiptOk = rv.valid === true;
425
+ if (!receiptOk) receiptDetail = `the decision receipt did not verify (${rv.status}: ${rv.reason})`;
426
+ } else if (rc.verified === true) {
427
+ // Accepted, and MARKED. The state machine below refuses to hand this the global name.
428
+ receiptOk = true;
429
+ receiptAsserted = true;
430
+ } else if (rc.token || keySource) {
431
+ receiptDetail = 'the receipt was supplied without '
432
+ + `${rc.token ? 'a keyring or public key' : 'its token'}, so it could not be verified here`;
433
+ } else {
434
+ receiptDetail = 'no decision receipt was supplied';
435
+ }
436
+ if (!receiptOk) shortfalls.unshift(`receipt: ${receiptDetail}`);
437
+ if (receiptAsserted) {
438
+ shortfalls.push('decision_receipt: `verified` was taken on the caller\'s word — no token and '
439
+ + 'no keyring were supplied, so nothing was checked here');
440
+ }
279
441
 
280
- let state = STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED;
442
+ // THE NAME OF SUCCESS DEPENDS ON WHO CHOSE THE SET, not on how much of it passed. A custom
443
+ // aggregation that meets everything it asked for is satisfied — and says so in its own words.
444
+ // A CALLER-ASSERTED RECEIPT CAN NEVER BE THE GLOBAL CLAIM. It is not downgraded to a failure —
445
+ // a custom aggregation may legitimately own that determination — but the strongest word in the
446
+ // vocabulary is not available to a run whose receipt nobody verified.
447
+ let state = (profile && !receiptAsserted)
448
+ ? STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED : STATE.CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED;
281
449
  if (!receiptOk || (required.has(AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT) && !grantOk)) state = STATE.UNAUTHORIZED;
282
450
  else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION) && !attOk) state = STATE.COMMIT_UNPROVEN;
283
451
  else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT) && !authorities[AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT].ok) {
@@ -285,11 +453,31 @@ function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
285
453
  } else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.PROVIDER_WITNESS) && !authorities[AUTHORITY.PROVIDER_WITNESS].ok) {
286
454
  state = STATE.RECORDED_UNWITNESSED;
287
455
  } else if (!committed) state = STATE.NOT_COMMITTED;
456
+ // The default set (no profile, no custom list) is the historical grant+attestation pair. It is
457
+ // an implicit choice by the caller, not a profile, so it lands in the custom lane too.
458
+
288
459
 
289
460
  return {
290
461
  v: BINDING_V,
291
462
  authorized_and_committed: state === STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED,
463
+ /**
464
+ * Did the set THIS CALLER ASKED FOR pass? True for a satisfied profile and for a satisfied
465
+ * custom aggregation alike.
466
+ *
467
+ * Separated from `authorized_and_committed` on purpose. A caller that only wants to know
468
+ * whether its own question was answered should not have to string-compare a state name, and
469
+ * — more importantly — should not be tempted to read the global claim because it was the only
470
+ * boolean available. That temptation is how `required: ['issuer_grant']` came to mean
471
+ * "authorized and committed" in the first place.
472
+ */
473
+ requirements_satisfied: state === STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED
474
+ || state === STATE.CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED,
292
475
  state,
476
+ /** Which closed profile answered this, or null when the caller aggregated its own set. */
477
+ profile: profile ? profile.name : null,
478
+ /** Stated on every result so a reader never has to infer it from the state name. */
479
+ proof_scope: profile ? profile.proof_scope : null,
480
+ externally_witnessed: profile ? profile.externally_witnessed : false,
293
481
  authorities,
294
482
  shortfalls,
295
483
  /** True when `receipt.verified` was taken on the caller's word rather than established here. */
@@ -313,4 +501,7 @@ function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
313
501
  };
314
502
  }
315
503
 
316
- module.exports = { verifiedExecutionBinding, STATE, AUTHORITY, BINDING_V, grantClaims, attestationClaims };
504
+ module.exports = {
505
+ verifiedExecutionBinding, STATE, AUTHORITY, PROFILE, PROFILE_NAMES, BINDING_V,
506
+ grantClaims, attestationClaims,
507
+ };
@@ -58,6 +58,35 @@ const V2_REQUIRED_STRINGS = Object.freeze([
58
58
  'operation', 'target_uri', 'expected_state_token', 'after_payload_hash',
59
59
  'nonce_hash', 'policy_hash', 'audience_hash', 'not_before', 'expires_at',
60
60
  ]);
61
+ /**
62
+ * RESERVED, AND INERT. Optional v2 fields a grant MAY carry and this verifier reads as NOTHING.
63
+ *
64
+ * ── WHY THEY EXIST BEFORE THE GATE THAT USES THEM ───────────────────────────────────────────
65
+ *
66
+ * The admitted key set is closed: an unknown field is `MALFORMED/unknown_field`, which is the
67
+ * right default and also means a future field cannot be introduced without every deployed
68
+ * verifier refusing the grants that carry it. Reserving the two names now is what keeps that
69
+ * introduction from being a breaking change later.
70
+ *
71
+ * ── WHAT THEY DO NOT DO, WHICH IS THE POINT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
72
+ *
73
+ * NOTHING. A grant carrying `call_hash` is graded EXACTLY as one without it. There is no check,
74
+ * no comparison, and no `intended` field they bind to.
75
+ *
76
+ * A VERIFIER THAT READS THEIR PRESENCE AS AUTHORIZATION IS WRONG. `call_hash` present does not
77
+ * mean a tool call was bound; `executor_image_digest` present does not mean an executor image was
78
+ * pinned. Nothing signs a promise that the value is true, nothing compares it to anything, and an
79
+ * attacker who can mint a grant can put any value in them. Presence is not proof — it is a slot.
80
+ *
81
+ * They are unsigned-by-default only in the sense that no separate signature covers them: the v2
82
+ * signing input is the canonical JSON of the WHOLE body, so a grant that carries them signs
83
+ * different bytes than one that does not, and neither can be edited into the other. That binds
84
+ * the VALUE to the issuer; it says nothing about whether the value means anything.
85
+ *
86
+ * When a gate for them lands it will be a NEW check with its own negative fixtures, and this
87
+ * comment is what a reader should be shown if anyone claims otherwise before then.
88
+ */
89
+ const V2_RESERVED_INERT = Object.freeze(['call_hash', 'executor_image_digest']);
61
90
  const TARGET_SCHEMES = Object.freeze(['fs', 'git', 'api', 'db', 'registry', 'deploy']);
62
91
  const DEFAULT_FETCH_URL = 'https://app.coderifts.com/api/v1/attestation/public-key';
63
92
 
@@ -177,7 +206,9 @@ function verifyExecutionGrantV2(payload, sigB64, ctx, opts = {}) {
177
206
  if (!Number.isInteger(payload.max_attempts) || payload.max_attempts < 1) {
178
207
  return { valid: false, status: 'MALFORMED', reason: 'bad_max_attempts', payload };
179
208
  }
180
- const allowed = new Set([...V2_REQUIRED_STRINGS, 'max_attempts']);
209
+ // The reserved names are ADMITTED, never inspected. Everything below this line treats a payload
210
+ // carrying them identically to one that does not — verified by test, not by intent.
211
+ const allowed = new Set([...V2_REQUIRED_STRINGS, 'max_attempts', ...V2_RESERVED_INERT]);
181
212
  for (const k of Object.keys(payload)) {
182
213
  if (!allowed.has(k)) return { valid: false, status: 'MALFORMED', reason: 'unknown_field', payload };
183
214
  }
@@ -555,6 +586,8 @@ module.exports = {
555
586
  SIGNING_PREFIX_V2,
556
587
  SIGNED_FIELDS,
557
588
  V1_OPTIONAL_SIGNED_FIELDS,
589
+ V2_REQUIRED_STRINGS,
590
+ V2_RESERVED_INERT,
558
591
  CLOCK_SKEW_LEEWAY_MS,
559
592
  isIssuedInFuture,
560
593
  };
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * Types for the vendored `verify.js`, written HERE rather than in the vendored file.
3
+ *
4
+ * The vendored bytes must stay byte-identical to receipt-verifier's — a pin that survives an edit
5
+ * is not a pin — so the declaration lives beside them instead of inside them.
6
+ *
7
+ * Only the two entry points this SDK uses are declared. Declaring the rest would invite callers to
8
+ * reach into the core through this package, and the core is vendored for internal use, not
9
+ * re-exported as an API this SDK then owns.
10
+ */
11
+ export interface CoreReceiptVerdict {
12
+ valid: boolean;
13
+ status: string;
14
+ reason?: string;
15
+ payload?: Record<string, unknown>;
16
+ }
17
+ /**
18
+ * The DEFAULT export — `module.exports` whole.
19
+ *
20
+ * Declared this way because node's cjs-module-lexer does not surface every name on this module to
21
+ * an ESM importer (measured: `verifyReceipt` yes, `keyringFromDocument` no). Named declarations
22
+ * here would type-check and then fail at load in the ESM build.
23
+ */
24
+ declare const core: {
25
+ verifyReceipt(
26
+ token: string,
27
+ opts: { ctx: { keyring: unknown; expectedKid: string | null }; now?: number },
28
+ ): CoreReceiptVerdict;
29
+ keyringFromDocument(doc: unknown): Map<string, unknown> | { byKid: Map<string, unknown> };
30
+ };
31
+ export default core;
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * LOCAL receipt verification — the proof, and the only thing on this surface that is one.
3
+ *
4
+ * ── WHY THIS EXISTS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
5
+ *
6
+ * MEASURED before it was written: this SDK's only `verifyReceipt` was
7
+ * `client.verifyReceipt()` — an HTTP POST to `/api/v1/verify-receipt`. It answers well and it is
8
+ * useful, and it is not an offline verification: the caller learns what CodeRifts says, over a
9
+ * network, about bytes CodeRifts was handed. A reader told "verify offline, without us" and given
10
+ * only that method has been told something the package could not do.
11
+ *
12
+ * This runs the SAME vendored core the public receipt-verifier and the conformance CLI run, in
13
+ * process, over bytes already in memory plus a keyring the CALLER supplies. No API key, no
14
+ * network, full Ed25519.
15
+ *
16
+ * ── WHAT IT IS NOT ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
17
+ *
18
+ * It is not authorization. A valid signature says a holder of the named key signed these bytes and
19
+ * that the receipt has not expired; it does not say the receipt permits the action you are about
20
+ * to take. `client.verifyReceipt(token, intended)` answers that second question, on the server,
21
+ * and `authorize()` answers the execution-binding one. Those are different questions and this
22
+ * module deliberately answers only the first.
23
+ *
24
+ * It also cannot see REVOCATION or the issuer's clock. A key compromised five minutes ago still
25
+ * verifies here, because nothing local can know. That is the whole reason
26
+ * `verifyReceiptViaServer` exists beside it — as a mirror, never as the proof.
27
+ */
28
+ import type { PinnedKeyring } from './authorize.js';
29
+ /** The verdict, in the vocabulary the receipt-verifier and the conformance CLI already use. */
30
+ export interface LocalReceiptVerdict {
31
+ /** True only when the signature verified against the pinned key and the receipt is current. */
32
+ valid: boolean;
33
+ /** VERIFIED_CURRENT · INVALID_SIGNATURE · MALFORMED · UNKNOWN_KEY · EXPIRED · … */
34
+ status: string;
35
+ /** Present on a refusal; the specific cause, not a class. */
36
+ reason?: string;
37
+ /** The decoded body, when the token decoded at all. Never evidence on its own. */
38
+ payload?: Record<string, unknown>;
39
+ /**
40
+ * Said on every result, so a caller cannot read this as more than it is.
41
+ *
42
+ * A verdict that travels without its ceiling gets quoted without it.
43
+ */
44
+ does_not_prove: string[];
45
+ }
46
+ export interface VerifyReceiptLocalOptions {
47
+ /**
48
+ * THE KEYS YOU PIN, and the reason this is required rather than fetched.
49
+ *
50
+ * A verifier that downloads the key it is about to trust has not verified anything an attacker
51
+ * on the path could not arrange. Fetching the keyring is a deployment decision — make it once,
52
+ * pin the result, and hand it in.
53
+ */
54
+ keyring: PinnedKeyring;
55
+ /** Refuse a token whose `kid` is not this one. Null (default) accepts any pinned kid. */
56
+ expectedKid?: string | null;
57
+ /** Clock injection. Absent = the host clock. */
58
+ now?: number;
59
+ }
60
+ /**
61
+ * Verify a chain receipt LOCALLY. No network, no API key, full Ed25519.
62
+ *
63
+ * @example
64
+ * import { verifyReceipt } from '@coderifts/sdk';
65
+ * const r = verifyReceipt(token, { keyring: pinnedKeys });
66
+ * if (!r.valid) throw new Error(`${r.status}: ${r.reason}`);
67
+ */
68
+ export declare function verifyReceipt(token: string, options: VerifyReceiptLocalOptions): LocalReceiptVerdict;
69
+ //# sourceMappingURL=verify-receipt-local.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"verify-receipt-local.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/verify-receipt-local.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA0BG;AAEH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAuBpD,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAM,WAAW,mBAAmB;IAChC,+FAA+F;IAC/F,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IACf,mFAAmF;IACnF,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,6DAA6D;IAC7D,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,kFAAkF;IAClF,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IAClC;;;;OAIG;IACH,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;CAC5B;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,yBAAyB;IACtC;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;IACvB,yFAAyF;IACzF,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;IAC5B,gDAAgD;IAChD,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChB;AAmCD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,aAAa,CACzB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,GACnC,mBAAmB,CAarB"}
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
1
+ "use strict";
2
+ /**
3
+ * LOCAL receipt verification — the proof, and the only thing on this surface that is one.
4
+ *
5
+ * ── WHY THIS EXISTS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
6
+ *
7
+ * MEASURED before it was written: this SDK's only `verifyReceipt` was
8
+ * `client.verifyReceipt()` — an HTTP POST to `/api/v1/verify-receipt`. It answers well and it is
9
+ * useful, and it is not an offline verification: the caller learns what CodeRifts says, over a
10
+ * network, about bytes CodeRifts was handed. A reader told "verify offline, without us" and given
11
+ * only that method has been told something the package could not do.
12
+ *
13
+ * This runs the SAME vendored core the public receipt-verifier and the conformance CLI run, in
14
+ * process, over bytes already in memory plus a keyring the CALLER supplies. No API key, no
15
+ * network, full Ed25519.
16
+ *
17
+ * ── WHAT IT IS NOT ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
18
+ *
19
+ * It is not authorization. A valid signature says a holder of the named key signed these bytes and
20
+ * that the receipt has not expired; it does not say the receipt permits the action you are about
21
+ * to take. `client.verifyReceipt(token, intended)` answers that second question, on the server,
22
+ * and `authorize()` answers the execution-binding one. Those are different questions and this
23
+ * module deliberately answers only the first.
24
+ *
25
+ * It also cannot see REVOCATION or the issuer's clock. A key compromised five minutes ago still
26
+ * verifies here, because nothing local can know. That is the whole reason
27
+ * `verifyReceiptViaServer` exists beside it — as a mirror, never as the proof.
28
+ */
29
+ var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
30
+ return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
31
+ };
32
+ Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
33
+ exports.verifyReceipt = verifyReceipt;
34
+ // ── A STATIC IMPORT, AND THAT IS THE POINT ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
35
+ //
36
+ // MEASURED on the built package when this module was written: `authorize()` loaded the same core
37
+ // with a bare `require(...)`, and `dist/esm/authorize.js` therefore threw `require is not defined`
38
+ // for every ESM consumer. The tests never saw it because they load the CJS source — a call-time
39
+ // `require` is invisible to the compiler in exactly the build where it cannot work.
40
+ //
41
+ // FIXED SINCE, in authorize.ts, the same way: static imports plus a default import of the vendored
42
+ // core. `test/dual-module-form.test.js` now loads dist/esm and scans it, so the defect is held
43
+ // shut as a class rather than in this one module. Past tense on purpose — a comment that keeps
44
+ // describing a live bug after it is closed sends the next reader looking for it.
45
+ //
46
+ // A static import is compiled to `require` for the CJS output and left as an import for the ESM
47
+ // one, so this module works in both — and the compiler, not a runtime, is what checks it.
48
+ //
49
+ // The DEFAULT import, not named ones. MEASURED on the built ESM package: node's cjs-module-lexer
50
+ // resolved `verifyReceipt` from the vendored CommonJS and NOT `keyringFromDocument`, so a named
51
+ // import compiled fine and threw at load time — "does not provide an export named". Taking
52
+ // `module.exports` whole and destructuring at runtime is interop that does not depend on a lexer
53
+ // guessing right about bytes this package is forbidden to edit.
54
+ const verify_js_1 = __importDefault(require("./vendor/receipt-verifier/verify.js"));
55
+ const DOES_NOT_PROVE = Object.freeze([
56
+ 'that the receipt AUTHORIZES the action you are about to take — a valid signature is '
57
+ + 'authenticity, not authorization. Pass an intended context to the server verify, or use '
58
+ + 'authorize() for the execution binding',
59
+ 'that the signing key is still trusted — REVOCATION and the issuer\'s clock are not visible '
60
+ + 'to any local verifier, including this one. A key compromised a minute ago still verifies here',
61
+ 'that the bytes came from the run you think they did — this checks ONE token, and "these '
62
+ + 'tokens are one run" is a property of a set (see cr.evidence.root.v1)',
63
+ ]);
64
+ function toKeyringMap(keyring) {
65
+ if (!keyring || !Array.isArray(keyring.keys) || keyring.keys.length === 0) {
66
+ throw new TypeError('verifyReceipt: a keyring with at least one key is required — this '
67
+ + 'verifier does not fetch keys, because a verifier that downloads the key it is about '
68
+ + 'to trust has verified nothing an attacker on the path could not arrange');
69
+ }
70
+ // THE CORE'S OWN keyring parser, not a second one written here.
71
+ //
72
+ // `keyringFromDocument` is the function the receipt-verifier CLI and the conformance measure
73
+ // both use. Re-implementing the parse in this file would be a second idea of what a keyring
74
+ // is — the exact shape 1423 came from, where conformance had its own notion of checking and it
75
+ // was weaker than prove's.
76
+ const parsed = verify_js_1.default.keyringFromDocument(keyring);
77
+ // The core returns either a Map or a `{ byKid }` wrapper depending on the document shape it
78
+ // was handed. Both are accepted here rather than the caller being told which to produce.
79
+ const m = (parsed && parsed.byKid)
80
+ || parsed;
81
+ if (!m || typeof m.get !== 'function' || m.size === 0) {
82
+ throw new TypeError('verifyReceipt: the keyring contained no usable {kid, public_key_pem}');
83
+ }
84
+ return m;
85
+ }
86
+ /**
87
+ * Verify a chain receipt LOCALLY. No network, no API key, full Ed25519.
88
+ *
89
+ * @example
90
+ * import { verifyReceipt } from '@coderifts/sdk';
91
+ * const r = verifyReceipt(token, { keyring: pinnedKeys });
92
+ * if (!r.valid) throw new Error(`${r.status}: ${r.reason}`);
93
+ */
94
+ function verifyReceipt(token, options) {
95
+ const ring = toKeyringMap(options && options.keyring);
96
+ const r = verify_js_1.default.verifyReceipt(token, {
97
+ ctx: { keyring: ring, expectedKid: options.expectedKid ?? null },
98
+ ...(Number.isFinite(options.now) ? { now: options.now } : {}),
99
+ });
100
+ return {
101
+ valid: r.valid === true,
102
+ status: r.status,
103
+ ...(r.reason ? { reason: r.reason } : {}),
104
+ ...(r.payload ? { payload: r.payload } : {}),
105
+ does_not_prove: [...DOES_NOT_PROVE],
106
+ };
107
+ }
108
+ //# sourceMappingURL=verify-receipt-local.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
+ {"version":3,"file":"verify-receipt-local.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/verify-receipt-local.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA0BG;;;;;AAmGH,sCAgBC;AAhHD,+FAA+F;AAC/F,EAAE;AACF,iGAAiG;AACjG,mGAAmG;AACnG,gGAAgG;AAChG,oFAAoF;AACpF,EAAE;AACF,mGAAmG;AACnG,+FAA+F;AAC/F,+FAA+F;AAC/F,iFAAiF;AACjF,EAAE;AACF,gGAAgG;AAChG,0FAA0F;AAC1F,EAAE;AACF,iGAAiG;AACjG,gGAAgG;AAChG,2FAA2F;AAC3F,iGAAiG;AACjG,gEAAgE;AAChE,oFAAuD;AAmCvD,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IACjC,sFAAsF;UACpF,yFAAyF;UACzF,uCAAuC;IACzC,6FAA6F;UAC3F,+FAA+F;IACjG,0FAA0F;UACxF,sEAAsE;CAC3E,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,SAAS,YAAY,CAAC,OAAsB;IACxC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACxE,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,oEAAoE;cAClF,sFAAsF;cACtF,yEAAyE,CAAC,CAAC;IACrF,CAAC;IACD,gEAAgE;IAChE,EAAE;IACF,6FAA6F;IAC7F,4FAA4F;IAC5F,+FAA+F;IAC/F,2BAA2B;IAC3B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,4FAA4F;IAC5F,yFAAyF;IACzF,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,IAAK,MAA2C,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;WAChE,MAA+B,CAAC;IACxC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,UAAU,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACpD,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,CAAC,sEAAsE,CAAC,CAAC;IAChG,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;AACb,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,SAAgB,aAAa,CACzB,KAAa,EACb,OAAkC;IAElC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG,YAAY,CAAC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC;IACtD,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,mBAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE;QAChC,GAAG,EAAE,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE;QAChE,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;KAChE,CAAC,CAAC;IACH,OAAO;QACH,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,IAAI;QACvB,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;QAChB,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACzC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC5C,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;KACtC,CAAC;AACN,CAAC"}
@@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ export type AuthorizationState = 'AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED'
42
42
  | 'ONE_RUN_UNPROVEN'
43
43
  /** Everything above holds, and no provider signed a witness of it. */
44
44
  | 'RECORDED_UNWITNESSED'
45
+ /**
46
+ * A CUSTOM authority set was satisfied — and this is deliberately NOT the global claim.
47
+ *
48
+ * A caller that names its own `required[]` asks a narrower question, and the core will not
49
+ * answer a narrower question with the widest word. Read `requirements_satisfied` for "my set
50
+ * passed"; read `authorized_and_committed` only for the closed-profile claim.
51
+ */
52
+ | 'CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED'
45
53
  /** The evidence is in order and the change was not committed. */
46
54
  | 'NOT_COMMITTED';
47
55
  /** The four independent authorities. Only their intersection yields success. */
@@ -55,6 +63,12 @@ export interface AuthorityResult {
55
63
  export interface AuthorizeResult {
56
64
  /** True only when every REQUIRED authority holds and the change was committed. */
57
65
  authorized_and_committed: boolean;
66
+ /**
67
+ * Did the set THIS CALLER asked for pass? True for a satisfied closed profile and for a
68
+ * satisfied custom aggregation alike — so a caller that only wants its own answer never has
69
+ * to reach for the global one because it was the only boolean available.
70
+ */
71
+ requirements_satisfied: boolean;
58
72
  state: AuthorizationState;
59
73
  authorities: Record<AuthorityName, AuthorityResult>;
60
74
  /** One line per unmet required authority, in the core's words. */
@@ -77,8 +91,17 @@ export interface AuthorizeInput {
77
91
  * this function lie for you.
78
92
  */
79
93
  receipt: {
94
+ /**
95
+ * YOUR determination, accepted only as a custom caller's own. Supplying this alone can no
96
+ * longer produce `authorized_and_committed`: the core marks the result caller-asserted.
97
+ */
80
98
  verified: boolean;
99
+ /** The receipt's exact bytes. With a key source below, THE CORE verifies them. */
81
100
  token?: string;
101
+ keyring?: PinnedKeyring | null;
102
+ publicKeyPem?: string;
103
+ expectedKid?: string | null;
104
+ now?: number;
82
105
  };
83
106
  /**
84
107
  * THE EXACT BYTES THE ISSUER SIGNED. Not a grant read back out of a tool result: a caller who
@@ -109,10 +132,29 @@ export interface AuthorizeInput {
109
132
  } | null;
110
133
  committed: boolean;
111
134
  /**
112
- * Which authorities this caller demands. Defaults to issuer_grant + executor_attestation —
113
- * the pair a holder of a grant and an attestation can actually establish. Ask for more only
114
- * when you hold the evidence for it, or the answer will name a shortfall about evidence you
115
- * were never going to supply.
135
+ * A CLOSED, VERSIONED assurance profile — the only way to reach `authorized_and_committed`.
136
+ *
137
+ * ── THE MEASURED GAP THIS CLOSES ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
138
+ *
139
+ * The core reserves the global claim for a profile whose authority set the caller cannot
140
+ * shorten. This surface did not pass `profile` through AT ALL, so an SDK caller holding a
141
+ * complete capture — grant, attestation and a one-run evidence root — could not ask for that
142
+ * claim by any means. Every answer was `CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED`, which is the honest
143
+ * name for a narrower question, and here it was the only name available.
144
+ *
145
+ * A profile's set is NOT editable: passing `profile` and `required` together is refused by the
146
+ * core rather than resolved by precedence, because that asks two different questions at once.
147
+ */
148
+ profile?: string;
149
+ /**
150
+ * Which authorities this caller demands, when it is aggregating its own set. Defaults to
151
+ * issuer_grant + executor_attestation — the pair a holder of a grant and an attestation can
152
+ * actually establish. Ask for more only when you hold the evidence for it, or the answer will
153
+ * name a shortfall about evidence you were never going to supply.
154
+ *
155
+ * A satisfied custom set reads `CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED`, never the global claim. That
156
+ * is not a downgrade: it is the difference between "the set I chose passed" and "this run is
157
+ * authorized and committed", and only a closed profile can say the second.
116
158
  */
117
159
  required?: AuthorityName[];
118
160
  }
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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