@coderifts/agent-guard 17.2.0 → 17.3.1

package/dist/esm/vendor/verified-execution-binding.js

@@ -0,0 +1,507 @@
+'use strict';
+
+/**
+ * verifiedExecutionBinding — the ONE predicate that answers "authorized and committed".
+ *
+ * ── WHY ONE (1459) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * The same question was being answered in several places with different rules, and the answers
+ * disagreed. Measured on the public agent-guard 17.2.0, with a forged-signature grant and a REAL
+ * attestation from a trusted executor bound to that grant's jti and scope:
+ *
+ *     ENFORCING_STRICT  authorized_and_committed = false
+ *     ENFORCING_ATOMIC  authorized_and_committed = true
+ *
+ * Two profiles of one product, looking at one set of bytes, reaching opposite conclusions — because
+ * the Atomic formula was `receipt_verified && committed && class === 'executor_attested'` and never
+ * asked whether the GRANT was signed by anyone. A predicate that is recomputed is a predicate that
+ * drifts; this file exists so callers QUOTE the answer instead.
+ *
+ * ── FOUR AUTHORITIES, AND ONLY THEIR INTERSECTION ───────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * Each is independently true or not, and each answers a different question. None of them implies
+ * another, which is exactly why the intersection — not any one of them — is the success condition:
+ *
+ *   issuer_grant          did CodeRifts authorize THIS change?      (a signature under a pinned key)
+ *   executor_attestation  did the executor commit THAT grant?       (a signature over the grant's ids)
+ *   one_run_root          are these bytes from ONE run?             (cr.evidence.root.v1 digests)
+ *   provider_witness      did the provider record it?               (a readback — UNSIGNED by nature)
+ *
+ * ── SHORTFALLS ARE NAMED, NOT FOLDED INTO `false` ───────────────────────────────────────────
+ *
+ * "Not authorized" and "authorized but the commit is unproven" are different facts with different
+ * remedies, and a boolean loses that. Every shortfall gets a state a human can act on, and the
+ * states are ORDERED by severity so the returned one is the most serious thing that is wrong.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS DOES NOT DO. It reaches no network and holds no keys: every input is supplied by the
+ * caller, already-verified or verifiable, and the four authorities are recomputed here from those
+ * inputs rather than taken as claims. It also cannot see a lying executor — the root closes
+ * third-party splicing, not an executor misreporting its own run.
+ */
+
+const crypto = require('node:crypto');
+
+const { verifyExecutionGrant } = require('./verify-grant.js');
+const { verifyEvidenceRootBinding } = require('./verify-evidence.js');
+const { verifyReceipt } = require('./verify.js');
+
+const BINDING_V = 'cr.verified-execution-binding.v1';
+
+/**
+ * Ordered most-severe first. The returned `state` is the FIRST unmet one, so a caller that renders
+ * a single line renders the thing that most needs fixing.
+ */
+const STATE = Object.freeze({
+  UNAUTHORIZED: 'UNAUTHORIZED',
+  COMMIT_UNPROVEN: 'COMMIT_UNPROVEN',
+  ONE_RUN_UNPROVEN: 'ONE_RUN_UNPROVEN',
+  RECORDED_UNWITNESSED: 'RECORDED_UNWITNESSED',
+  NOT_COMMITTED: 'NOT_COMMITTED',
+  AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED: 'AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED',
+  /**
+   * A CUSTOM aggregation was satisfied — and it is NOT the global success token.
+   *
+   * ── THE HOLE THIS CLOSES, REPRODUCED BEFORE IT WAS WRITTEN ──────────────────────────────
+   *
+   *   valid grant + committed + NO attestation + NO root, required: ['issuer_grant']
+   *     -> AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED, authorized_and_committed: true
+   *
+   * Nothing was forged. The caller simply asked for less, and the function handed back the token
+   * every consumer reads as "authorized and committed". `required[]` was a strictness dial that
+   * also selected the NAME of success, so narrowing the dial upgraded the verdict — the strongest
+   * word in the vocabulary, reachable by asking for the least.
+   *
+   * A caller may still choose its own authorities. What it may no longer do is call the result by
+   * the global name. `AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED` is now reachable ONLY through a closed, versioned
+   * profile whose authority set the caller does not get to shorten.
+   */
+  CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED: 'CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED',
+});
+
+/** What each authority is allowed to be missing for, so a caller can choose its own strictness. */
+const AUTHORITY = Object.freeze({
+  ISSUER_GRANT: 'issuer_grant',
+  EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION: 'executor_attestation',
+  ONE_RUN_ROOT: 'one_run_root',
+  PROVIDER_WITNESS: 'provider_witness',
+});
+
+/**
+ * CLOSED, VERSIONED ASSURANCE PROFILES.
+ *
+ * A profile fixes its authority set. The caller names the profile; it does not get to edit what
+ * the profile means, and the version in the name is what lets the set change later without
+ * silently changing what an older caller was promised.
+ *
+ * `TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1` is the honest ceiling of a single-machine chain: the decision
+ * receipt verified, the issuer's grant verified, the executor's attestation verified, and one
+ * signed root binding the set to one run. It says nothing about a third party, and the name is
+ * chosen so it cannot be read as one — `EXTERNALLY_WITNESSED_EXECUTION_V1` is a different profile
+ * and no producer can satisfy it today (no signed-witness format exists), which is why it is not
+ * declared here as an empty promise.
+ */
+const PROFILE = Object.freeze({
+  TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1: Object.freeze({
+    name: 'TRUSTED_EXECUTOR_INTEGRITY_V1',
+    authorities: Object.freeze([
+      AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT,
+      AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION,
+      AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT,
+    ]),
+    // The receipt is mandatory in every profile and is not listed as an authority because it is
+    // not optional anywhere — it gates the whole predicate above the state machine.
+    proof_scope: 'TRUSTED_EXECUTOR',
+    externally_witnessed: false,
+  }),
+});
+const PROFILE_NAMES = Object.freeze(Object.keys(PROFILE));
+
+const sha256pref = (v) =>
+  `sha256:${crypto.createHash('sha256').update(String(v), 'utf8').digest('hex')}`;
+
+const b64json = (seg) => {
+  try { return JSON.parse(Buffer.from(seg, 'base64url').toString('utf8')); } catch (_) { return null; }
+};
+
+/** The four fields an attestation binds, read from its own signed preimage. */
+function attestationClaims(token) {
+  if (typeof token !== 'string') return null;
+  const seg = token.split('|');
+  if (seg.length !== 4 || !seg[2]) return null;
+  const body = b64json(seg[2]);
+  return body && typeof body === 'object' ? body : null;
+}
+
+/** The grant's identity, in one vocabulary across v1 and v2. */
+function grantClaims(token) {
+  if (typeof token !== 'string') return null;
+  const body = b64json(String(token).split('.')[0]);
+  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object') return null;
+  return {
+    v: body.v,
+    jti: body.grant_id || body.jti || null,
+    scope_hash: body.after_payload_hash || body.scope_hash || null,
+    receipt_hash: body.receipt_hash || body.receipt_digest || null,
+    operation: body.operation || null,
+    // The rest of what a grant SAYS, so the attestation can be checked against all of it rather
+    // than against the two fields that happened to be compared first.
+    target: body.target_uri || body.target_id || null,
+    tenant_id: body.tenant_id || null,
+    executor_id: body.executor_id || null,
+    adapter_id: body.adapter_id || null,
+    audience: body.audience_hash || body.audience || null,
+    policy_hash: body.policy_hash || null,
+    state_token: body.expected_state_token || body.state_nonce || null,
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} o
+ * @param {{verified: boolean, token?: string}} o.receipt
+ * @param {{token: string, publicKey?, keyring?, intended?: object, now?: number}} o.grant
+ *        THE EXACT BYTES THE ISSUER SIGNED. Not a grant read back out of a tool result: a caller
+ *        that lets the executed tool hand back its own authorization has already lost.
+ * @param {{token: string, registry?: object, verify?: Function}} [o.attestation]
+ * @param {{artifact: object, executorKey}} [o.evidenceRoot]
+ * @param {{signed: boolean}} [o.providerReadback]
+ * @param {boolean} o.committed
+ * @param {string} [o.profile]     a CLOSED profile name (see PROFILE). Its authority set cannot be
+ *        edited by the caller, and only a profile can reach AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED.
+ * @param {string[]} [o.required]  a CUSTOM authority set. Legal, and it can never produce the
+ *        global success token — a satisfied custom set reads CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED.
+ */
+function verifiedExecutionBinding(o = {}) {
+  // ── WHICH SET, AND WHO CHOSE IT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // A profile and a custom set are different KINDS of question, so they are answered separately
+  // and never merged. Passing both is refused rather than resolved by precedence: a caller that
+  // names a profile and then also lists authorities is asking two things at once, and picking one
+  // silently is how a caller ends up believing it got the other.
+  const profileName = typeof o.profile === 'string' && o.profile ? o.profile : null;
+  const customRequired = Array.isArray(o.required) && o.required.length ? o.required : null;
+  if (profileName && customRequired) {
+    return {
+      v: BINDING_V,
+      authorized_and_committed: false,
+      requirements_satisfied: false,
+      profile: null,
+      proof_scope: null,
+      externally_witnessed: false,
+      state: STATE.UNAUTHORIZED,
+      authorities: {},
+      shortfalls: ['profile: both `profile` and `required` were supplied — a closed profile\'s '
+        + 'authority set is not editable, so this asks two different questions at once'],
+      does_not_prove: [],
+    };
+  }
+  if (profileName && !Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(PROFILE, profileName)) {
+    // FAIL CLOSED on an unknown profile. Falling back to a default would let a typo — or a caller
+    // written against a future version — silently receive a weaker check than it named.
+    return {
+      v: BINDING_V,
+      authorized_and_committed: false,
+      requirements_satisfied: false,
+      profile: null,
+      proof_scope: null,
+      externally_witnessed: false,
+      state: STATE.UNAUTHORIZED,
+      authorities: {},
+      shortfalls: [`profile: unknown assurance profile "${profileName}"; known: ${PROFILE_NAMES.join(', ')}`],
+      does_not_prove: [],
+    };
+  }
+  const profile = profileName ? PROFILE[profileName] : null;
+  const required = new Set(profile
+    ? profile.authorities
+    : (customRequired || [AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION]));
+  const shortfalls = [];
+  const authorities = {};
+  const note = (name, ok, detail) => {
+    authorities[name] = { ok, required: required.has(name), detail };
+    if (!ok && required.has(name)) shortfalls.push(`${name}: ${detail}`);
+    return ok;
+  };
+
+  // ── 1. THE ISSUER GRANT ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const g = o.grant || {};
+  let grantOk = false;
+  let gClaims = null;
+  if (typeof g.token !== 'string' || g.token.length === 0) {
+    note(AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, false, 'no execution grant was supplied');
+  } else if (!g.publicKey && !g.keyring) {
+    // FAIL-CLOSED, and named as its own thing: "we had no key" is not "the signature was bad".
+    note(AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, false,
+      'no pinned issuer keyring was supplied, so the grant could not be authenticated');
+  } else {
+    const r = verifyExecutionGrant(g.token, {
+      ctx: { publicKey: g.publicKey, keyring: g.keyring, expectedKid: g.expectedKid ?? null },
+      ...(g.intended ? { intended: g.intended } : {}),
+      ...(Number.isFinite(g.now) ? { now: g.now } : {}),
+    });
+    gClaims = grantClaims(g.token);
+    grantOk = note(AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT, r.valid === true,
+      `${r.status}${r.reason ? `/${r.reason}` : ''}`);
+  }
+
+  // ── 2. THE EXECUTOR ATTESTATION ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const a = o.attestation || {};
+  let attOk = false;
+  if (typeof a.token !== 'string' || a.token.length === 0) {
+    note(AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION, false, 'no executor attestation was supplied');
+  } else if (typeof a.verify !== 'function') {
+    note(AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION, false,
+      'no attestation verifier was supplied, so the commit could not be checked');
+  } else {
+    const r = a.verify(a.token, { registry: a.registry });
+    const sigOk = r && r.valid === true;
+    // BOUND TO THE VERIFIED GRANT'S OWN IDS — not to ids the caller passed alongside. This is the
+    // join that makes the two signatures one statement instead of two unrelated true things.
+    const c = attestationClaims(a.token);
+    // ── THE ATTESTATION MUST BIND THE SAME EXECUTION, NOT MERELY THE SAME NAMES (1464) ────
+    //
+    // REPRODUCED before this was written. A correctly-signed grant bound to receipt R1, and a
+    // correctly-signed attestation from a trusted executor bound to receipt R2, sharing a
+    // grant_jti and a scope_hash — R1 != R2 — read AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED. Both signatures are
+    // real; the two documents describe DIFFERENT executions and the join could not tell.
+    //
+    // `jti` and `scope_hash` are the two fields an attacker controls most cheaply: they are copied
+    // FROM the grant into the attestation by whoever assembles the pair. Comparing only those is
+    // comparing a value with its own copy. What binds is the receipt each side was issued against,
+    // and — the strongest available — the sha256 of the exact grant token bytes.
+    const attReceipt = c ? String(c.receipt_digest || '') : '';
+    const grantReceipt = gClaims ? String(gClaims.receipt_hash || '') : '';
+    const mismatch = (() => {
+      if (!sigOk) return `attestation ${r ? r.status : 'unverifiable'}`;
+      if (!gClaims) return 'there is no verified grant for the attestation to bind';
+      if (String(c.grant_jti || '') !== String(gClaims.jti || '')) {
+        return 'the attestation binds a different grant id than the verified grant';
+      }
+      if (String(c.scope_hash || '') !== String(gClaims.scope_hash || '')) {
+        return 'the attestation binds a different scope than the verified grant';
+      }
+      // THE CROSS-RECEIPT CHECK. Empty on either side is a mismatch: an attestation that names no
+      // receipt cannot be shown to be about this authorization, and "unstated" must not read as
+      // "the same".
+      if (!attReceipt || !grantReceipt || attReceipt !== grantReceipt) {
+        return `the grant was issued against receipt ${grantReceipt || '(none)'} and the `
+          + `attestation commits receipt ${attReceipt || '(none)'} — two different executions`;
+      }
+      // ── WHAT cr.exec.attest.v1 CAN AND CANNOT BE ASKED ──────────────────────────────
+      //
+      // MEASURED, and it bounds this check rather than the check bounding the format: the
+      // attestation body is a CLOSED set — executor_kid, grant_jti, receipt_digest, scope_hash,
+      // committed_at, state_nonce, result_digest, meta. Any other key is refused
+      // ATTEST_MALFORMED / unknown_field by its own verifier.
+      //
+      // So target, operation, tenant, executor, adapter, audience and policy CANNOT be
+      // cross-checked here: the attestation never states them, and a comparison against a field
+      // that cannot exist is not a check — it is a line that always passes. They are named in
+      // `does_not_prove` instead, which is the honest place for a binding the format cannot carry.
+      //
+      // The same is true of the exact grant-token digest: there is no field for it. Binding the
+      // grant BYTES rather than its claims would be the tightest join available and it needs a
+      // format change (a `grant_token_digest` slot in cr.exec.attest.v2), not a check here.
+      //
+      // What the format DOES let us bind is the state nonce, and it is bound below.
+      if (gClaims.state_token != null && c.state_nonce != null
+        && String(gClaims.state_token) !== String(c.state_nonce)) {
+        return 'the grant and the attestation disagree about the state nonce';
+      }
+      return null;
+    })();
+    attOk = note(AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION, mismatch === null, mismatch || 'bound');
+  }
+
+  // ── 3. ONE RUN ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const er = o.evidenceRoot || null;
+  if (!er || !er.artifact) {
+    note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, false,
+      'no cr.evidence.root.v1 was supplied, so these bytes are not shown to be one run');
+  } else if (typeof verifyEvidenceRootBinding !== 'function') {
+    // ── A MISSING VERIFIER IS A REFUSAL, NEVER A CRASH ───────────────────────────────────
+    //
+    // MEASURED on a consumer: agent-guard vendors an OLDER `verify-evidence.js` that does not
+    // export `verifyEvidenceRootBinding` (true on its HEAD too), so this line threw a TypeError
+    // the moment anyone passed an `evidenceRoot`. Latent there — that guard holds no root — and
+    // the SHAPE is what matters: a crash is not an answer, and a caller cannot tell "the core
+    // blew up" from "the core is unavailable" from "the binding failed".
+    //
+    // Every OTHER dependency this file has is already used unconditionally, so this is the one
+    // place a mixed vendor pin can leave a hole. Refusing here is the fail-closed answer, and it
+    // names the cause rather than reporting a generic unbound root.
+    note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, false,
+      'the evidence-root verifier is not available in this build (the vendored verify-evidence.js '
+      + 'does not export verifyEvidenceRootBinding) — the root was NOT checked, and an unchecked '
+      + 'root is refused rather than reported as unbound');
+  } else {
+    let r;
+    try {
+      r = verifyEvidenceRootBinding(er.artifact, { executorKey: er.executorKey, sidecars: er.sidecars });
+    } catch (err) {
+      r = { ok: false, failures: [`the evidence-root verifier threw: ${(err && err.message) || 'error'}`] };
+    }
+    note(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT, r.ok === true,
+      r.ok ? 'bound' : ((r.failures && r.failures[0]) || 'unbound'));
+  }
+
+  // ── 4. THE PROVIDER WITNESS ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  // A readback is an UNSIGNED document by nature. It is carried, not verified, and this authority
+  // is false unless a caller states it was witnessed some stronger way — never true by default.
+  // ── A CALLER BOOLEAN IS NOT EVIDENCE (1465) ────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // REPRODUCED before this was written:
+  //
+  //   required: ['provider_witness'], receipt: {verified: true},
+  //   providerReadback: {signed: true}, committed: true, NO grant, NO attestation, NO root
+  //     → AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED, shortfalls: []
+  //
+  // `signed: true` was a bare boolean the caller wrote, and this function aggregated it into a
+  // global success. Nothing was verified; a field named `signed` was believed because it was set.
+  //
+  // A witness now requires a VERIFIED witness envelope: bytes plus a verifier plus a trust anchor.
+  // No such format exists yet (phase D measured that the readback is unsigned by nature), so this
+  // authority cannot currently be satisfied at all — and saying that plainly is the honest answer.
+  // Asking for it yields RECORDED_UNWITNESSED, which is exactly what it means.
+  //
+  // NOT a breaking change for the five consumers: none of them requires `provider_witness` today
+  // (guard and contract-gate ask for issuer_grant + executor_attestation; prove and conformance for
+  // issuer_grant + one_run_root). It removes a way to LIE, not a way anyone works.
+  const pw = o.providerReadback || null;
+  const witnessVerified = !!(pw && pw.verified === true && pw.envelope && pw.verifier);
+  note(AUTHORITY.PROVIDER_WITNESS, witnessVerified,
+    pw
+      ? (pw.signed === true && !witnessVerified
+        ? 'the caller asserted `signed: true` and supplied no verifiable witness envelope — a '
+          + 'boolean is not evidence, and no signed-witness format exists yet'
+        : 'the provider readback is an unsigned document (carried, not verified)')
+      : 'no provider readback was supplied');
+
+  // ── THE INTERSECTION ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  const committed = o.committed === true;
+  // THE RECEIPT, and what this function can honestly say about it.
+  //
+  // `verified` is the CALLER's determination: this core is not given the receipt token or a
+  // keyring, so it cannot re-establish it. That is recorded rather than hidden — a reader of the
+  // result can see whether the receipt was verified HERE or asserted by whoever called.
+  //
+  // Left as-is deliberately: making a bare boolean insufficient would change the input shape of
+  // all five consumers at once, and that belongs with the closed-profile work (1465), not
+  // half-done in a round that would leave them broken. The gap is named, not narrowed in silence.
+  // ── THE DECISION RECEIPT, VERIFIED HERE WHEN IT CAN BE ─────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // ── THE FOURTH CALLER-BOOLEAN THIS REPOSITORY HAS MET ──────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  //   providerReadback: { signed: true }   believed because it was set        (closed)
+  //   attestation:      { present: true }  believed because it was set        (closed)
+  //   call_hash present == "tool-call bound"                                  (pre-empted)
+  //   receipt:          { verified: true } believed because it was set        (this)
+  //
+  // `receipt.verified` is the CALLER's word. With no token and no keyring, nothing was checked and
+  // this function had no way to check it — and a caller that simply set the flag reached a
+  // satisfied verdict. `receipt_caller_asserted` recorded it, which is honest reporting and not a
+  // gate: a field nobody branches on does not stop anything.
+  //
+  // Now: when a token AND a key source are supplied, THIS function verifies the receipt. When they
+  // are not, the assertion is accepted only for a CUSTOM aggregation — where the caller owns its
+  // own question — and can never reach AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED, which is the word every consumer
+  // reads as the answer.
+  const rc = o.receipt || {};
+  let receiptOk = false;
+  let receiptAsserted = false;
+  let receiptDetail = 'the decision receipt did not verify';
+  const keySource = rc.keyring || rc.publicKey;
+  if (typeof rc.token === 'string' && rc.token.length > 0 && keySource) {
+    let rv;
+    try {
+      rv = verifyReceipt(rc.token, {
+        ctx: { ...(rc.keyring ? { keyring: rc.keyring } : { publicKey: rc.publicKey }),
+          expectedKid: rc.expectedKid === undefined ? null : rc.expectedKid },
+        ...(Number.isFinite(rc.now) ? { now: rc.now } : {}),
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      rv = { valid: false, status: 'VERIFIER_ERROR', reason: (err && err.message) || 'error' };
+    }
+    receiptOk = rv.valid === true;
+    if (!receiptOk) receiptDetail = `the decision receipt did not verify (${rv.status}: ${rv.reason})`;
+  } else if (rc.verified === true) {
+    // Accepted, and MARKED. The state machine below refuses to hand this the global name.
+    receiptOk = true;
+    receiptAsserted = true;
+  } else if (rc.token || keySource) {
+    receiptDetail = 'the receipt was supplied without '
+      + `${rc.token ? 'a keyring or public key' : 'its token'}, so it could not be verified here`;
+  } else {
+    receiptDetail = 'no decision receipt was supplied';
+  }
+  if (!receiptOk) shortfalls.unshift(`receipt: ${receiptDetail}`);
+  if (receiptAsserted) {
+    shortfalls.push('decision_receipt: `verified` was taken on the caller\'s word — no token and '
+      + 'no keyring were supplied, so nothing was checked here');
+  }
+
+  // THE NAME OF SUCCESS DEPENDS ON WHO CHOSE THE SET, not on how much of it passed. A custom
+  // aggregation that meets everything it asked for is satisfied — and says so in its own words.
+  // A CALLER-ASSERTED RECEIPT CAN NEVER BE THE GLOBAL CLAIM. It is not downgraded to a failure —
+  // a custom aggregation may legitimately own that determination — but the strongest word in the
+  // vocabulary is not available to a run whose receipt nobody verified.
+  let state = (profile && !receiptAsserted)
+    ? STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED : STATE.CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED;
+  if (!receiptOk || (required.has(AUTHORITY.ISSUER_GRANT) && !grantOk)) state = STATE.UNAUTHORIZED;
+  else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.EXECUTOR_ATTESTATION) && !attOk) state = STATE.COMMIT_UNPROVEN;
+  else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT) && !authorities[AUTHORITY.ONE_RUN_ROOT].ok) {
+    state = STATE.ONE_RUN_UNPROVEN;
+  } else if (required.has(AUTHORITY.PROVIDER_WITNESS) && !authorities[AUTHORITY.PROVIDER_WITNESS].ok) {
+    state = STATE.RECORDED_UNWITNESSED;
+  } else if (!committed) state = STATE.NOT_COMMITTED;
+  // The default set (no profile, no custom list) is the historical grant+attestation pair. It is
+  // an implicit choice by the caller, not a profile, so it lands in the custom lane too.
+
+
+  return {
+    v: BINDING_V,
+    authorized_and_committed: state === STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED,
+    /**
+     * Did the set THIS CALLER ASKED FOR pass? True for a satisfied profile and for a satisfied
+     * custom aggregation alike.
+     *
+     * Separated from `authorized_and_committed` on purpose. A caller that only wants to know
+     * whether its own question was answered should not have to string-compare a state name, and
+     * — more importantly — should not be tempted to read the global claim because it was the only
+     * boolean available. That temptation is how `required: ['issuer_grant']` came to mean
+     * "authorized and committed" in the first place.
+     */
+    requirements_satisfied: state === STATE.AUTHORIZED_AND_COMMITTED
+      || state === STATE.CUSTOM_REQUIREMENTS_SATISFIED,
+    state,
+    /** Which closed profile answered this, or null when the caller aggregated its own set. */
+    profile: profile ? profile.name : null,
+    /** Stated on every result so a reader never has to infer it from the state name. */
+    proof_scope: profile ? profile.proof_scope : null,
+    externally_witnessed: profile ? profile.externally_witnessed : false,
+    authorities,
+    shortfalls,
+    /** True when `receipt.verified` was taken on the caller's word rather than established here. */
+    receipt_caller_asserted: receiptAsserted,
+    // Said out loud so a caller cannot read success as more than it is.
+    does_not_prove: [
+      'that the executor told the truth about its own run — the evidence root closes third-party '
+      + 'splicing, not an executor misreporting itself',
+      'that a provider merged anything; `provider_witness` is an unsigned readback unless a caller '
+      + 'states otherwise',
+      'that the grant and the attestation agree about target, operation, tenant, executor, adapter, '
+      + 'audience or policy — cr.exec.attest.v1 is a closed field set that states none of them, so '
+      + 'those are UNCHECKED here rather than checked and equal (1464)',
+      'that the attestation commits the exact grant BYTES — the format carries no grant-token '
+      + 'digest, so the join is over the grant id, scope, receipt and state nonce',
+      ...(receiptAsserted
+        ? ['that the decision receipt verifies — `receipt.verified` was asserted by the caller and '
+          + 'not established here; this core is given no receipt token or keyring to check it with']
+        : []),
+    ],
+  };
+}
+
+module.exports = {
+  verifiedExecutionBinding, STATE, AUTHORITY, PROFILE, PROFILE_NAMES, BINDING_V,
+  grantClaims, attestationClaims,
+};