@codacy/verity-cli 0.28.1-experimental.c2dc717 → 0.28.1-experimental.db64e52

package/bin/verity.js

@@ -10386,10 +10386,9 @@ function projectPath(relativePath) {
   return (0, import_node_path.join)(repoRoot(), relativePath);
 }
 var MAX_DELTA_BYTES = 194560;
-var MAX_FILES = 20;
+var MAX_FILES = 40;
 var MAX_FILE_BYTES = 51200;
 var DEBOUNCE_SECONDS = 30;
-var MAX_ITERATIONS = 2;
 var MAX_SPEC_FILES = 10;
 var MAX_SPEC_FILE_BYTES = 10240;
 var MAX_TOTAL_SPEC_BYTES = 30720;
@@ -10924,8 +10923,8 @@ function filterReviewable(files) {
     const ext = (0, import_node_path3.extname)(f).slice(1);
     if (ANALYZABLE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) return false;
     if (REVIEWABLE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) return true;
-    const basename4 = f.split("/").pop() ?? "";
-    if (REVIEWABLE_FILENAMES.has(basename4)) return true;
+    const basename3 = f.split("/").pop() ?? "";
+    if (REVIEWABLE_FILENAMES.has(basename3)) return true;
     if (REVIEWABLE_PATH_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(f))) return true;
     return false;
   });
@@ -11016,7 +11015,54 @@ function listTrackedFiles() {
   return Array.from(set);
 }
 function sanitizeRemote(remote) {
-  return remote.replace(/^([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^/]*@/, "$1");
+  const withoutUserinfo = remote.replace(/^([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^/]*@/, "$1");
+  return /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/.test(withoutUserinfo) ? "" : withoutUserinfo;
+}
+
+// src/lib/token-pin.ts
+var cached;
+var warned = false;
+function warnOnce(message, warn) {
+  if (!warned) {
+    warned = true;
+    warn(message);
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+async function storedCredential() {
+  if (cached !== void 0) return cached;
+  const rec = await readGlobalCredential(currentRemote());
+  cached = rec ? { token: rec.token, serviceUrl: rec.serviceUrl } : null;
+  return cached;
+}
+var userNamedUrl = null;
+function setUserNamedServiceUrl(url) {
+  userNamedUrl = url?.trim() || null;
+}
+async function checkTokenPin(token, targetUrl) {
+  if (process.env.VERITY_TOKEN && token === process.env.VERITY_TOKEN) return { attach: true };
+  const envUrl = process.env.VERITY_SERVICE_URL?.trim();
+  if (envUrl && normalizeUrl(envUrl) === normalizeUrl(targetUrl)) return { attach: true };
+  if (userNamedUrl && normalizeUrl(userNamedUrl) === normalizeUrl(targetUrl)) return { attach: true };
+  const stored = await storedCredential();
+  if (!stored || stored.token !== token) return { attach: true };
+  if (!stored.serviceUrl) return { attach: false, reason: "unpinnable" };
+  return normalizeUrl(stored.serviceUrl) === normalizeUrl(targetUrl) ? { attach: true } : { attach: false, reason: "mismatch", mintedFor: stored.serviceUrl };
+}
+function normalizeUrl(raw) {
+  const trimmed = raw.trim().replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  try {
+    const u = new URL(trimmed);
+    return `${u.protocol}//${u.host.toLowerCase()}${u.pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "")}`;
+  } catch {
+    return trimmed.toLowerCase();
+  }
+}
+function pinRefusalMessage(verdict, targetUrl) {
+  if (verdict.reason === "unpinnable") {
+    return `Refusing to send your Verity login to ${targetUrl}: this machine's credential does not record which service issued it, so it cannot be verified. Run "verity login" to re-issue it.`;
+  }
+  return `Refusing to send your Verity login to ${targetUrl}: it was issued by ${verdict.mintedFor}. A repository cannot redirect your credential to another service. If this service is genuinely yours, log in against it explicitly: VERITY_SERVICE_URL=${targetUrl} verity login`;
 }
 
 // src/lib/api-client.ts
@@ -11053,6 +11099,24 @@ async function apiRequest(options) {
     "Content-Type": "application/json"
   };
   if (token) {
+    const pin = await checkTokenPin(token, serviceUrl);
+    if (!pin.attach) {
+      const message = warnOnce(pinRefusalMessage(pin, serviceUrl), printWarn);
+      logHttpCall({
+        cmd,
+        method,
+        url,
+        duration_ms: 0,
+        http_status: null,
+        // 'network' rather than a new category on purpose: no request left the
+        // machine, and every caller's offline path is exactly the handling a
+        // refusal wants (fall back to local, never fabricate a verdict).
+        category: "network",
+        error: "token_pin_refused",
+        retry
+      });
+      return { ok: false, error: `TOKEN_PIN_REFUSED: ${message}`, category: "network" };
+    }
     headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${token}`;
   }
   const remote = requestRemote();
@@ -11165,14 +11229,9 @@ async function serviceUrlFromCredentials() {
 async function serviceUrlFromVerityMd() {
   try {
     const content = await (0, import_promises2.readFile)(projectPath(VERITY_MD_FILE), "utf-8");
-    const boldLine = content.split("\n").find((l) => /\*\*url\*\*/i.test(l));
-    if (boldLine) {
-      const urlMatch = boldLine.match(/https:\/\/[^\s]+/);
-      if (urlMatch) return urlMatch[0];
-    }
-    const plainLine = content.split("\n").find((l) => /(?:url|service)\s*:/i.test(l));
-    if (plainLine) {
-      const urlMatch = plainLine.match(/https:\/\/[^\s]+/);
+    const line = content.split("\n").find((l) => /\*{0,2}(?:url|service)\*{0,2}\s*:/i.test(l));
+    if (line) {
+      const urlMatch = line.match(/https:\/\/[^\s]+/);
       if (urlMatch) return urlMatch[0];
     }
   } catch {
@@ -11195,7 +11254,15 @@ async function resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl) {
   if (mdUrl) {
     return { ok: true, data: { url: mdUrl, source: "verity_md" } };
   }
-  return { ok: false, error: "No Verity service URL found. Run /verity-setup to configure." };
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'No Verity service URL found. Run "verity login" to get started, or /verity-setup to configure this project.'
+  };
+}
+async function resolveServiceUrlForAuth(flagUrl) {
+  const strict = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl);
+  if (strict.ok) return strict.data;
+  return { url: DEFAULT_SERVICE_URL, source: "default" };
 }
 async function resolveServiceUrl(flagUrl) {
   const result = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl);
@@ -11234,7 +11301,10 @@ async function resolveToken(flagToken) {
       data: { token: local.token, source: "local", userId: local.userId, email: local.email }
     };
   }
-  return { ok: false, error: "No Verity token found. Run /verity-setup to configure." };
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'No Verity token found. Run "verity login" to sign in, or /verity-setup to set up this project.'
+  };
 }
 async function whoami(token, serviceUrl, verbose) {
   return apiRequest({
@@ -11671,16 +11741,81 @@ function registerAuthCommands(program2) {
   });
 }
 
+// src/lib/login-report.ts
+async function reportLoginOutcome(out, opts = {}) {
+  const identity = out.email ?? (out.userId != null ? `user #${out.userId}` : "your account");
+  printInfo(`Logged in as ${identity}. \u2713`);
+  printInfo(`  Access granted to ${out.repoCount} ${out.repoCount === 1 ? "repository" : "repositories"}.`);
+  if (out.expiresAt) {
+    printInfo(`  This login expires on ${out.expiresAt.slice(0, 10)} \u2014 "verity login" again to renew.`);
+    printInfo('  See your machines with "verity sessions list"; sign out with "verity logout".');
+  }
+  if (out.repoCount > 0) {
+    printInfo("  Runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity everywhere you have write access.");
+  }
+  if (out.prunedCredentials > 0) {
+    printVerbose(`Pruned ${out.prunedCredentials} superseded per-repository credential line(s).`, opts.verbose);
+  } else if (out.prunedCredentials < 0) {
+    printWarn("  Could not rewrite ~/.verity/credentials: superseded per-repository tokens remain and");
+    printWarn("  will keep taking precedence over this login in their own repositories.");
+    printInfo(`  Check the file's permissions; the next successful "verity login" retries the cleanup.`);
+  }
+  if (out.repoCount === 0) {
+    printWarn("The Verity GitHub App is not installed on any account you can access.");
+    printInfo("  Install it (and grant your repositories), then re-run verity login:");
+    printInfo(`  ${githubAppInstallUrl(null)}`);
+    return;
+  }
+  const remote = opts.remote;
+  if (!remote) return;
+  const who = await whoami(out.token, out.serviceUrl, opts.verbose);
+  if (who.ok && who.data.grant_status != null) {
+    printInfo("  \u2713 This repository is covered.");
+  } else if (!who.ok) {
+    printWarn(`  Could not confirm this repository's coverage (${who.error}) \u2014 verity status will show it.`);
+  } else {
+    const parsed = parseRemote(remote);
+    const installUrl = githubAppInstallUrl(parsed ? await githubAccountId(parsed.owner) : null);
+    printWarn(`  This repository (${parsed ? `${parsed.owner}/${parsed.repo}` : remote}) is NOT covered by your grants.`);
+    printInfo("  Grant the Verity GitHub App access to it, then re-run verity login:");
+    printInfo(`  ${installUrl}`);
+  }
+  const rec = await readGlobalCredential(remote);
+  if (rec && rec.token !== out.token) {
+    const otherBackend = rec.serviceUrl != null && rec.serviceUrl !== out.serviceUrl;
+    const otherIdentity = rec.userId != null && out.userId != null && rec.userId !== out.userId;
+    if (otherBackend) {
+      printWarn(`  Note: this repository is pinned to a different Verity service (${rec.serviceUrl})`);
+      printWarn("  by its own credential line, which takes precedence here \u2014 this login does not");
+      printWarn("  change that. To move the repository, remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials.");
+      printWarn('  Until that line is removed, "verity login" here cannot fast-path and will run');
+      printWarn("  the full GitHub flow every time.");
+    } else if (otherIdentity) {
+      printWarn("  Note: this repository uses a different account's credential, which takes");
+      printWarn('  precedence here \u2014 this login leaves it in place, and "verity login" in this');
+      printWarn("  repository will report that account. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials");
+      printWarn("  only if you want this repository on the login you just completed.");
+    } else {
+      const kind = rec.userId != null ? "superseded per-repository" : "anonymous project-specific";
+      printWarn(`  Note: this repository has a ${kind} credential that takes`);
+      printWarn("  precedence here. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials to use your login.");
+      printWarn('  Until then, "verity login" in this repository re-runs the full GitHub flow');
+      printWarn("  every time.");
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 // src/commands/login.ts
 function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
   program2.command("login").description("Log in to Verity (one GitHub login grants access to all your repositories)").option("--force", "Re-authenticate even if already logged in").action(async (opts) => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
-    const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(globals.serviceUrl);
-    if (!urlResult.ok) {
-      printError(urlResult.error);
-      process.exit(1);
+    const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+    if (resolution.source === "default") {
+      printInfo(`No Verity service configured on this machine \u2014 using the default: ${resolution.url}`);
+    } else {
+      printVerbose(`Service URL from ${resolution.source}: ${resolution.url}`, globals.verbose);
     }
-    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(urlResult.data, globals.verbose);
+    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, globals.verbose);
     const serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
     if (heal.healed) {
       printInfo("  Completing login updates ~/.verity/credentials against the live service.");
@@ -11721,65 +11856,7 @@ function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
       printError(`Login failed: ${result.error}`);
       process.exit(1);
     }
-    const out = result.data;
-    const identity = out.email ?? (out.userId != null ? `user #${out.userId}` : "your account");
-    printInfo(`Logged in as ${identity}. \u2713`);
-    printInfo(`  Access granted to ${out.repoCount} ${out.repoCount === 1 ? "repository" : "repositories"}.`);
-    if (out.expiresAt) {
-      printInfo(`  This login expires on ${out.expiresAt.slice(0, 10)} \u2014 "verity login" again to renew.`);
-      printInfo('  See your machines with "verity sessions list"; sign out with "verity logout".');
-    }
-    printInfo("  Runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity everywhere you have write access.");
-    if (out.prunedCredentials > 0) {
-      printVerbose(`Pruned ${out.prunedCredentials} superseded per-repository credential line(s).`, globals.verbose);
-    } else if (out.prunedCredentials < 0) {
-      printWarn("  Could not rewrite ~/.verity/credentials: superseded per-repository tokens remain and");
-      printWarn("  will keep taking precedence over this login in their own repositories.");
-      printInfo(`  Check the file's permissions; the next successful "verity login" retries the cleanup.`);
-    }
-    if (out.repoCount === 0) {
-      printWarn("The Verity GitHub App is not installed on any account you can access.");
-      printInfo(`  Install it (and grant your repositories), then re-run verity login:`);
-      printInfo(`  ${githubAppInstallUrl(null)}`);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (remote) {
-      const who = await whoami(out.token, out.serviceUrl, globals.verbose);
-      if (who.ok && who.data.grant_status != null) {
-        printInfo("  \u2713 This repository is covered.");
-      } else if (!who.ok) {
-        printWarn(`  Could not confirm this repository's coverage (${who.error}) \u2014 verity status will show it.`);
-      } else {
-        const parsed = parseRemote(remote);
-        const installUrl = githubAppInstallUrl(parsed ? await githubAccountId(parsed.owner) : null);
-        printWarn(`  This repository (${parsed ? `${parsed.owner}/${parsed.repo}` : remote}) is NOT covered by your grants.`);
-        printInfo("  Grant the Verity GitHub App access to it, then re-run verity login:");
-        printInfo(`  ${installUrl}`);
-      }
-      const rec = await readGlobalCredential(remote);
-      if (rec && rec.token !== out.token) {
-        const otherBackend = rec.serviceUrl != null && rec.serviceUrl !== out.serviceUrl;
-        const otherIdentity = rec.userId != null && out.userId != null && rec.userId !== out.userId;
-        if (otherBackend) {
-          printWarn(`  Note: this repository is pinned to a different Verity service (${rec.serviceUrl})`);
-          printWarn("  by its own credential line, which takes precedence here \u2014 this login does not");
-          printWarn("  change that. To move the repository, remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials.");
-          printWarn('  Until that line is removed, "verity login" here cannot fast-path and will run');
-          printWarn("  the full GitHub flow every time.");
-        } else if (otherIdentity) {
-          printWarn("  Note: this repository uses a different account's credential, which takes");
-          printWarn('  precedence here \u2014 this login leaves it in place, and "verity login" in this');
-          printWarn("  repository will report that account. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials");
-          printWarn("  only if you want this repository on the login you just completed.");
-        } else {
-          const kind = rec.userId != null ? "superseded per-repository" : "anonymous project-specific";
-          printWarn(`  Note: this repository has a ${kind} credential that takes`);
-          printWarn("  precedence here. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials to use your login.");
-          printWarn('  Until then, "verity login" in this repository re-runs the full GitHub flow');
-          printWarn("  every time.");
-        }
-      }
-    }
+    await reportLoginOutcome(result.data, { remote: remote || void 0, verbose: globals.verbose });
   });
 }
 
@@ -11914,12 +11991,12 @@ async function auth(globals) {
     printError(tokenResult.error);
     process.exit(1);
   }
-  const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrl(globals.serviceUrl);
-  if (!urlResult.ok) {
-    printError(urlResult.error);
-    process.exit(1);
-  }
-  return { token: tokenResult.data.token, serviceUrl: urlResult.data };
+  const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+  return {
+    token: tokenResult.data.token,
+    serviceUrl: resolution.url,
+    keyed: tokenResult.data.keyed === true
+  };
 }
 function explain(error) {
   if (error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN")) {
@@ -11928,6 +12005,20 @@ function explain(error) {
     printInfo('  This login has expired or was revoked \u2014 run "verity login" to sign in again.');
   }
 }
+async function logoutLocallyOnly(keyed) {
+  printWarn("Could not reach the Verity service to revoke this login (see above).");
+  const cleared = await removeGlobalCredential(keyed ? currentRemote() : "");
+  if (cleared) {
+    printInfo(keyed ? "This repository\u2019s Verity credential cleared \u2014 it is signed out. \u2713" : "Local login credential cleared \u2014 this machine is signed out. \u2713");
+    printInfo("  The session may still exist server-side; revoke it from another machine with");
+    printInfo('  "verity sessions revoke <session-id>" if that matters.');
+  } else {
+    printInfo("No local credential to clear \u2014 already signed out here.");
+  }
+}
+function isPinRefusal(error) {
+  return error.startsWith("TOKEN_PIN_REFUSED");
+}
 function registerSessionsCommands(program2) {
   const sessions = program2.command("sessions").description("List and revoke your Verity logins (one per machine)");
   sessions.command("list").description("List your active logins \u2014 device, last use, and expiry").option("--json", "Output raw JSON").action(async (opts) => {
@@ -11972,7 +12063,7 @@ function registerSessionsCommands(program2) {
   });
   sessions.command("revoke <session-id>").description("Revoke one login. Revoking this machine's also clears the local credential").action(async (sessionId) => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
-    const { token, serviceUrl } = await auth(globals);
+    const { token, serviceUrl, keyed } = await auth(globals);
     const result = await apiRequest({
       method: "DELETE",
       path: `/auth/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`,
@@ -11991,7 +12082,7 @@ function registerSessionsCommands(program2) {
     }
     printInfo(`Session ${sessionId} revoked. \u2713`);
     if (result.data.was_current) {
-      const cleared = await removeGlobalCredential("");
+      const cleared = await removeGlobalCredential(keyed ? currentRemote() : "");
       printInfo(cleared ? '  That was this machine \u2014 local credential cleared. Run "verity login" to sign back in.' : '  That was this machine. Run "verity login" to sign back in.');
     }
   });
@@ -12003,7 +12094,7 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
       printError("Use either --all or --others, not both.");
       process.exit(1);
     }
-    const { token, serviceUrl } = await auth(globals);
+    const { token, serviceUrl, keyed } = await auth(globals);
     if (opts.all || opts.others) {
       const result = await apiRequest({
         method: "DELETE",
@@ -12014,6 +12105,10 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
         cmd: "logout"
       });
       if (!result.ok) {
+        if (isPinRefusal(result.error) && !opts.others) {
+          await logoutLocallyOnly(keyed);
+          return;
+        }
         printError(result.error);
         explain(result.error);
         process.exit(1);
@@ -12038,15 +12133,21 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
       cmd: "logout"
     });
     if (!list.ok) {
+      if (isPinRefusal(list.error)) {
+        await logoutLocallyOnly(keyed);
+        return;
+      }
       printError(list.error);
       explain(list.error);
       process.exit(1);
     }
     const current = list.data.sessions.find((s) => s.current);
     if (!current) {
-      printWarn("This machine is not signed in with a Verity login.");
-      const cleared2 = await removeGlobalCredential("");
-      if (cleared2) printInfo("  Cleared the local login credential anyway.");
+      printWarn(keyed ? "This repository uses its own Verity credential, not a machine login." : "This machine is not signed in with a Verity login.");
+      const cleared2 = await removeGlobalCredential(keyed ? currentRemote() : "");
+      if (cleared2) {
+        printInfo(keyed ? "  Cleared this repository\u2019s credential; your machine login is untouched." : "  Cleared the local login credential anyway.");
+      }
       return;
     }
     const revoked = await apiRequest({
@@ -12058,6 +12159,10 @@ function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
       cmd: "logout"
     });
     if (!revoked.ok) {
+      if (isPinRefusal(revoked.error)) {
+        await logoutLocallyOnly(keyed);
+        return;
+      }
       printError(revoked.error);
       explain(revoked.error);
       process.exit(1);
@@ -13649,6 +13754,84 @@ function isMetaTaskLabel(label2) {
   ];
   return metaPatterns.some((p) => p.test(trimmed));
 }
+function shouldSkipForBareAck(input) {
+  if (!isBareAckPrompt(input.prompt)) return false;
+  if (input.turnAuthoredCode) return false;
+  return input.canSeeTurnAuthorship;
+}
+
+// src/lib/pending-repeat.ts
+var STOP = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "the",
+  "and",
+  "that",
+  "this",
+  "with",
+  "from",
+  "have",
+  "been",
+  "were",
+  "what",
+  "when",
+  "which",
+  "their",
+  "there",
+  "these",
+  "those",
+  "would",
+  "could",
+  "should",
+  "must",
+  "will",
+  "also",
+  "just",
+  "only",
+  "into",
+  "over",
+  "than",
+  "then",
+  "them",
+  "some",
+  "such",
+  "more",
+  "most",
+  "other",
+  "about",
+  "after",
+  "before",
+  "since",
+  "because",
+  "while",
+  "where",
+  "whether",
+  "ensure",
+  "confirm",
+  "verify",
+  "check"
+]);
+function pendingTokens(text) {
+  if (!text || typeof text !== "string") return [];
+  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (const raw of text.toLowerCase().split(/[^a-z0-9]+/)) {
+    if (raw.length <= 3) continue;
+    if (STOP.has(raw)) continue;
+    out.add(raw);
+  }
+  return [...out].sort();
+}
+var REPEAT_THRESHOLD = 0.3;
+function overlapCoefficient(a, b) {
+  if (a.length === 0 || b.length === 0) return 0;
+  const setB = new Set(b);
+  let shared = 0;
+  for (const t of a) if (setB.has(t)) shared++;
+  return shared / Math.min(a.length, b.length);
+}
+function isRepeatOfAny(text, priorFingerprints, threshold = REPEAT_THRESHOLD) {
+  const tokens = pendingTokens(text);
+  if (tokens.length === 0) return false;
+  return priorFingerprints.some((prior) => overlapCoefficient(tokens, prior) >= threshold);
+}
 
 // src/lib/dossier.ts
 var import_node_fs9 = require("node:fs");
@@ -13658,6 +13841,7 @@ var MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096;
 var MAX_GOAL_CHARS = 2e3;
 var GOAL_KEEP = 8;
 var GOAL_TOTAL_CAP = 32;
+var RECENT_PENDING_CAP = 20;
 var HASH_WIDTH = 16;
 var AUTHORED_CAP = 300;
 var NOT_MINE_CAP = 300;
@@ -14026,6 +14210,10 @@ function reduce(state, events, now) {
           consecutiveIdle: ev.idle === false ? 0 : (state.meta.channel?.consecutiveIdle ?? 0) + 1
         };
         state.meta.last_adjudication = ev.intent_verdict ? { verdict: ev.intent_verdict, score: ev.intent_score ?? null, at: ev.at, decision: ev.decision } : void 0;
+        if (Array.isArray(ev.pending_sigs) && ev.pending_sigs.length > 0) {
+          const prior = state.meta.recent_pending_sigs ?? [];
+          state.meta.recent_pending_sigs = [...prior, ...ev.pending_sigs].slice(-RECENT_PENDING_CAP);
+        }
         if (ev.intent_sig) {
           state.meta.intent_repeat = state.meta.intent_repeat && state.meta.intent_repeat.sig === ev.intent_sig ? { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: state.meta.intent_repeat.consecutive + 1 } : { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: 1 };
         } else {
@@ -14250,12 +14438,12 @@ function readFoldCache(d) {
     if (!(0, import_node_fs9.existsSync)(d.foldPath)) return null;
     const raw = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs9.readFileSync)(d.foldPath, "utf8"));
     if (raw?.v !== 1) return null;
-    const cached = expandState(raw);
-    if (!cached?.meta) return null;
+    const cached2 = expandState(raw);
+    if (!cached2?.meta) return null;
     const size = (0, import_node_fs9.existsSync)(d.eventsPath) ? (0, import_node_fs9.statSync)(d.eventsPath).size : 0;
     const rotations = (0, import_node_fs9.existsSync)(d.rotatedDir) ? (0, import_node_fs9.readdirSync)(d.rotatedDir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".jsonl")).length : 0;
-    if (cached.meta.upto_offset !== size || cached.meta.rotations !== rotations) return null;
-    return cached;
+    if (cached2.meta.upto_offset !== size || cached2.meta.rotations !== rotations) return null;
+    return cached2;
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -14882,6 +15070,13 @@ function recordVerdict(d, v) {
     branch: v.branch,
     decision: v.decision,
     ...sig && { intent_sig: sig },
+    // Fingerprints of the pending items this verdict delivered, so the NEXT turn
+    // can tell a repeat from a new requirement. Only recorded when the channel
+    // actually spoke — a silenced turn delivered nothing, so nothing was "said
+    // before" and labelling the next turn's items as repeats would be a lie.
+    ...v.emitted === true && v.pendingTexts && v.pendingTexts.length > 0 && {
+      pending_sigs: v.pendingTexts.slice(0, 8).map((t) => pendingTokens(t).slice(0, 16))
+    },
     emitted: v.emitted === true,
     idle: v.idle !== false,
     ...v.intent?.verdict && { intent_verdict: v.intent.verdict },
@@ -15493,8 +15688,8 @@ function preImage(repoRelPath, baseline) {
     perBaseline = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
     preImageCache.set(baseline, perBaseline);
   }
-  const cached = perBaseline.get(repoRelPath);
-  if (cached) return cached;
+  const cached2 = perBaseline.get(repoRelPath);
+  if (cached2) return cached2;
   const resolved = resolvePreImage(repoRelPath, baseline);
   perBaseline.set(repoRelPath, resolved);
   return resolved;
@@ -15538,6 +15733,34 @@ ${addedLines}`,
   }
   return { diffs, has_baseline: true };
 }
+function absorbIntoBaseline(paths, sessionId) {
+  const baseline = readBaseline(sessionId);
+  if (!baseline || paths.length === 0) return 0;
+  const dir = sessionDir(sessionKey(baseline.session_id));
+  let adopted = 0;
+  const dirty = new Set(baseline.dirty_paths);
+  for (const p of paths) {
+    try {
+      const content = safeReadForMirror(projectPath(p));
+      if (content === null) continue;
+      const dest = mirrorPath(dir, p);
+      (0, import_node_fs13.mkdirSync)((0, import_node_path14.dirname)(dest), { recursive: true });
+      (0, import_node_fs13.writeFileSync)(dest, content);
+      dirty.add(p);
+      adopted++;
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  if (adopted === 0) return 0;
+  try {
+    const updated = { ...baseline, dirty_paths: [...dirty] };
+    (0, import_node_fs13.writeFileSync)(manifestPath(dir), JSON.stringify(updated));
+    preImageCache.delete(baseline);
+  } catch {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return adopted;
+}
 function changedSinceBaseline(repoRelPath, baseline) {
   const pre = preImage(repoRelPath, baseline);
   let current;
@@ -16414,40 +16637,40 @@ function narrowToRecent(files, sessionId) {
   });
   return recent.length > 0 ? recent : files;
 }
-function readIteration(currentCommit, _contentHash) {
-  if (!(0, import_node_fs15.existsSync)(ITERATION_FILE)) return 1;
+function readIterationState(currentCommit) {
+  if (!(0, import_node_fs15.existsSync)(ITERATION_FILE)) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
   try {
     const stored = (0, import_node_fs15.readFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, "utf-8").trim();
     const parts = stored.split(":");
     const iter = parseInt(parts[0], 10);
     const storedCommit = parts[1] ?? "";
     const storedTimestamp = parseInt(parts[2] ?? "0", 10);
-    if (isNaN(iter)) return 1;
-    if (storedCommit !== currentCommit) return 1;
+    const fingerprint = parts.slice(3).join(":") || null;
+    if (isNaN(iter)) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
+    if (storedCommit !== currentCommit) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
     if (storedTimestamp > 0) {
       const elapsed = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3) - storedTimestamp;
-      if (elapsed > 600) return 1;
+      if (elapsed > 600) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
     }
-    return iter;
+    return { iteration: iter, fingerprint };
   } catch {
-    return 1;
+    return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
   }
 }
-function checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations = MAX_ITERATIONS, contentHash) {
-  const iteration = readIteration(currentCommit, contentHash);
-  if (iteration > maxIterations) {
-    writeIteration(1, currentCommit, contentHash);
-    return {
-      skip: `Max Verity iterations (${maxIterations}) reached \u2014 accepting to prevent infinite loop. Human review required before deploying.`,
-      iteration
-    };
-  }
-  return { skip: null, iteration };
+function findingsFingerprint(findings) {
+  const keys = findings.map((f) => `${String(f.pattern_id ?? "?")}|${String(f.file ?? "?")}`).filter((k) => k !== "?|?");
+  return [...new Set(keys)].sort().join(",");
 }
-function writeIteration(iteration, commit, _contentHash) {
+function isSameProblem(previous, current) {
+  if (!previous || !current) return false;
+  const prev = new Set(previous.split(","));
+  return current.split(",").some((k) => prev.has(k));
+}
+function writeIteration(iteration, commit, _contentHash, fingerprint) {
   (0, import_node_fs15.mkdirSync)(VERITY_DIR, { recursive: true });
   const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
-  (0, import_node_fs15.writeFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, `${iteration}:${commit}:${ts}`);
+  const fp = fingerprint ? `:${fingerprint}` : "";
+  (0, import_node_fs15.writeFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, `${iteration}:${commit}:${ts}${fp}`);
 }
 
 // src/lib/static-analysis.ts
@@ -16696,7 +16919,7 @@ function resolveTaskContext(opts) {
 // src/lib/cli-version.ts
 function cliVersion() {
   try {
-    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.c2dc717" : "dev";
+    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.db64e52" : "dev";
   } catch {
     return "dev";
   }
@@ -16790,10 +17013,26 @@ function cacheRequest(body) {
     (0, import_node_fs18.mkdirSync)(CACHE_DIR, { recursive: true });
     const suffix = (0, import_node_crypto9.randomBytes)(4).toString("hex");
     const filename = `pending-${Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)}-${suffix}.json`;
-    (0, import_node_fs18.writeFileSync)(`${CACHE_DIR}/${filename}`, JSON.stringify(body));
+    (0, import_node_fs18.writeFileSync)(`${CACHE_DIR}/${filename}`, JSON.stringify(redactRequest(body)));
   } catch {
   }
 }
+function redactRequest(body) {
+  const b = body ?? {};
+  const delta = b.code_delta ?? {};
+  const files = Array.isArray(delta.files) ? delta.files : [];
+  return {
+    captured_at: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+    undelivered: true,
+    total_files: files.length,
+    total_bytes: files.reduce(
+      (n, f) => n + (typeof f.content === "string" ? f.content.length : 0),
+      0
+    ),
+    // Paths only. A path is already visible in the repository; the content is not.
+    files: files.map((f) => typeof f.path === "string" ? f.path : "<unknown>").slice(0, 100)
+  };
+}
 function buildOfflineFallback(reason, staticResults) {
   return {
     // G12 / INV-18 — WARN, not PASS.
@@ -17020,8 +17259,8 @@ function commandShape(cmd) {
 var COMMAND_HEAD_CHARS = 80;
 var rootCandidateCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
 function candidateRoots(repoRoot2) {
-  const cached = rootCandidateCache.get(repoRoot2);
-  if (cached) return cached;
+  const cached2 = rootCandidateCache.get(repoRoot2);
+  if (cached2) return cached2;
   const norm = repoRoot2.replace(/\\/g, "/").replace(/\/+$/, "");
   const out = [norm];
   try {
@@ -17370,9 +17609,13 @@ function buildAgentContext(input) {
   }
   for (const p of input.pendingItems ?? []) {
     if (lines.length >= MAX_AGENT_ITEMS) break;
+    if (p.pattern_id === "intent-misalignment") continue;
     const text = p.description ?? p.title ?? p.reason;
     if (!text) continue;
-    lines.push(renderItem("", text, p.pattern_id, p.file, p.line));
+    const seenBefore = isRepeatOfAny(text, input.priorPendingFingerprints ?? []);
+    lines.push(
+      renderItem("", text, p.pattern_id, p.file, p.line) + (seenBefore ? "\n    (raised earlier this session and still open \u2014 do not re-explain it; act on it or carry on)" : "")
+    );
   }
   if (lines.length === 0) return null;
   const body = `${REPORT_PREFIX}
@@ -17522,6 +17765,13 @@ function isGitOnlyPrompt(prompt) {
   return true;
 }
 function reconcileAnalysisMode(predictedMode, signals) {
+  const mode = resolveAnalysisMode(predictedMode, signals);
+  if (mode !== "skip") return mode;
+  const windowIsOrphaned = signals.actionSummary?.transcript_windowed === "orphaned";
+  if (windowIsOrphaned && !signals.sessionAuthoredCode) return "standard";
+  return mode;
+}
+function resolveAnalysisMode(predictedMode, signals) {
   if (!predictedMode || !isValidMode(predictedMode)) {
     return detectAnalysisMode(
       signals.noFilesChanged,
@@ -17633,9 +17883,11 @@ var MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES = 4096;
 var HOME = process.env.HOME ?? "";
 async function extractActionSummary(transcriptPath) {
   try {
-    const lines = readTurnLines(transcriptPath);
-    if (!lines || lines.length === 0) return null;
-    return buildSummary(lines);
+    const read = readTurnLines(transcriptPath);
+    if (!read || read.lines.length === 0) return null;
+    const summary = buildSummary(read.lines);
+    if (summary) summary.transcript_windowed = read.window;
+    return summary;
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -17649,9 +17901,11 @@ function readTurnLines(transcriptPath) {
   }
   if (size === 0) return null;
   let raw;
+  let windowed = false;
   if (size <= SMALL_FILE_BYTES) {
     raw = (0, import_node_fs22.readFileSync)(transcriptPath, "utf-8");
   } else {
+    windowed = true;
     const buf = Buffer.alloc(Math.min(MAX_READ_BYTES, size));
     const fd = require("node:fs").openSync(transcriptPath, "r");
     try {
@@ -17669,17 +17923,22 @@ function readTurnLines(transcriptPath) {
   const allLines = raw.split("\n").filter((l) => l.trim().length > 0);
   if (allLines.length === 0) return null;
   let turnStart = 0;
+  let boundaryFound = false;
   for (let i = allLines.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
     try {
       const parsed = JSON.parse(allLines[i]);
       if (parsed.type === "user" && isRealUserMessage(parsed)) {
         turnStart = i;
+        boundaryFound = true;
         break;
       }
     } catch {
     }
   }
-  return allLines.slice(turnStart);
+  return {
+    lines: allLines.slice(turnStart),
+    window: !windowed ? "whole" : boundaryFound ? "windowed" : "orphaned"
+  };
 }
 function isRealUserMessage(parsed) {
   const message = parsed.message;
@@ -18237,11 +18496,12 @@ async function readStopHookStdin() {
     return empty;
   }
 }
-function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0) {
+function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0, priorPendingFingerprints = []) {
   const metadata = response.metadata ?? {};
   const intent = response.intent_alignment ?? {};
   return buildAgentContext({
     intentRepeat,
+    priorPendingFingerprints,
     gateDecision: String(response.gate_decision ?? ""),
     findings: response.findings ?? [],
     pendingItems: response.pending_items ?? [],
@@ -18276,7 +18536,7 @@ async function passAndExit(reason, skip, kindOverride) {
   if (unaccounted.length > 0) {
     logEvent("coverage_unaccounted", { where: "passAndExit", skip, count: unaccounted.length });
   }
-  const AGENT_SILENT_SKIPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["iteration-cap"]);
+  const AGENT_SILENT_SKIPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([]);
   const agentNote = AGENT_SILENT_SKIPS.has(skip) ? null : note;
   printJsonCompact(
     buildHookOutput(
@@ -18377,15 +18637,27 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   const conversation = await readAndClearConversationBuffer(baselineSessionId);
   const specs = discoverSpecs();
   const plans = discoverPlans();
+  const agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn = !!(actionSummary && (actionSummary.files_edited.length > 0 || actionSummary.files_created.length > 0));
+  const turnAuthoredCode = agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn || !!baseline && allForReview.some((f) => changedSinceBaseline(f, baseline));
+  const authorshipIsObservable = !!actionSummary && actionSummary.transcript_windowed !== "orphaned" || !!baseline;
+  const canSeeTurnAuthorship = authorshipIsObservable;
+  let earlyFold = null;
   const latestPrompt = conversation?.prompts?.[conversation.prompts.length - 1]?.prompt ?? "";
   if (/^\s*\/verity-/i.test(latestPrompt)) {
+    const setupAuthored = [
+      ...actionSummary?.files_edited ?? [],
+      ...actionSummary?.files_created ?? []
+    ];
+    if (setupAuthored.length > 0) {
+      const adopted = absorbIntoBaseline(setupAuthored, baselineSessionId);
+      logEvent("baseline_absorbed", { skip: "verity-command", offered: setupAuthored.length, adopted });
+    }
     await passAndExit("Verity command \u2014 skipping analysis", "verity-command");
   }
-  if (isBareAckPrompt(latestPrompt)) {
+  if (shouldSkipForBareAck({ prompt: latestPrompt, turnAuthoredCode, canSeeTurnAuthorship })) {
     await passAndExit("Bare acknowledgment \u2014 skipping analysis", "bare-acknowledgment");
   }
-  const agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn = !!(actionSummary && (actionSummary.files_edited.length > 0 || actionSummary.files_created.length > 0));
-  if (isReflectionQuestion(assistantResponse) && !agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn) {
+  if (isReflectionQuestion(assistantResponse) && !turnAuthoredCode && canSeeTurnAuthorship) {
     await passAndExit("Reflection-prompt turn \u2014 skipping analysis", "reflection-prompt");
   }
   const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrl(globals.serviceUrl);
@@ -18431,7 +18703,11 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     );
   }
   if (analysisMode === "skip") {
-    await passAndExit("Skip mode \u2014 no code work to analyze", "skip-mode");
+    await passAndExit(
+      "Skip mode \u2014 no code work to analyze",
+      "skip-mode",
+      turnAuthoredCode ? "capacity" : void 0
+    );
   }
   let staticResults = {
     tool: "@codacy/analysis-cli",
@@ -18483,10 +18759,43 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
       contentHash = hashResult.hash;
       if (analysisMode !== "plan") {
         const scoped = scopeToAuthored(allForReview, actionSummary);
-        if (scoped.signal === "none-authored" && !hasNonEditAuthorship(actionSummary, sessionAuthoredCode)) {
+        const canTrustNoneAuthored = scoped.signal === "none-authored" && authorshipIsObservable;
+        if (canTrustNoneAuthored && !hasNonEditAuthorship(actionSummary, sessionAuthoredCode)) {
           await passAndExit("No agent-authored code this turn \u2014 working-tree changes were not authored by this session", "zero-increment");
         }
-        const baseForReview = scoped.signal === "authored" && scoped.files.length > 0 ? scoped.files : allForReview;
+        if (scoped.signal === "none-authored" && !authorshipIsObservable) {
+          logEvent("none_authored_unverifiable", {
+            reason: "orphaned_window_no_baseline",
+            would_have_skipped: allForReview.length
+          });
+        }
+        const narrowingIsTrustworthy = scoped.signal === "authored" && scoped.files.length > 0 && actionSummary?.transcript_windowed !== "orphaned";
+        let recoveredScope = [];
+        if (!narrowingIsTrustworthy && transcriptPath) {
+          try {
+            earlyFold = fold(transcriptPath, { changedFiles: allForReview, repoRoot: repoRoot() });
+            const authoredWhole = new Set(earlyFold.authored.map((a) => a.p));
+            if (authoredWhole.size > 0) {
+              const root = repoRoot();
+              recoveredScope = allForReview.filter((f) => authoredWhole.has(toRepoRelative(f, root)));
+            }
+            logEvent("scope_recovered_from_fold", {
+              window_saw: scoped.files.length,
+              fold_saw: authoredWhole.size,
+              recovered: recoveredScope.length,
+              would_have_widened_to: allForReview.length
+            });
+          } catch {
+            earlyFold = null;
+          }
+        }
+        if (!narrowingIsTrustworthy && scoped.signal === "authored" && recoveredScope.length === 0) {
+          logEvent("scope_widened_orphaned_window", {
+            would_have_sent: scoped.files.length,
+            widened_to: allForReview.length
+          });
+        }
+        const baseForReview = narrowingIsTrustworthy ? scoped.files : recoveredScope.length > 0 ? recoveredScope : allForReview;
         const recentForReview = narrowToRecent(baseForReview, baselineSessionId);
         if (!opts.skipStatic && isCodacyAvailable()) {
           let allScannable = Array.from(/* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...analyzable, ...securityFiles]));
@@ -18524,19 +18833,13 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         snapshotResult = generateSnapshotDiffs(codeDelta.files);
       }
       currentCommit = getCurrentCommit();
-      const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
-      const iterResult = checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations, contentHash ?? void 0);
-      if (iterResult.skip) await passAndExit(iterResult.skip, "iteration-cap");
-      iteration = iterResult.iteration;
+      iteration = readIterationState(currentCommit).iteration;
     }
   }
   if (analysisMode === "plan") {
     recordAnalysisStart();
     currentCommit = getCurrentCommit();
-    const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
-    const iterResult = checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations);
-    if (iterResult.skip) await passAndExit(iterResult.skip, "iteration-cap");
-    iteration = iterResult.iteration;
+    iteration = readIterationState(currentCommit).iteration;
   }
   const contextFiles = gatherContextFiles(contextFilePaths, codeDelta.files);
   for (const f of codeDelta.files) {
@@ -18603,7 +18906,7 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   let foldConservation = null;
   if (transcriptPath) {
     try {
-      foldResult = fold(transcriptPath, { changedFiles: allForReview, repoRoot: repoRoot() });
+      foldResult = earlyFold ?? fold(transcriptPath, { changedFiles: allForReview, repoRoot: repoRoot() });
       foldConservation = checkConservation(allForReview, foldResult, repoRoot());
       if (!foldConservation.holds) {
         process.stderr.write(
@@ -18709,7 +19012,30 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     hasUserPrompt: (conversation?.prompts?.length ?? 0) > 0,
     isTTY: process.stdout.isTTY === true
   });
+  const excludedByReason = {};
+  for (const e of codeDelta.excluded ?? []) {
+    excludedByReason[e.reason] = (excludedByReason[e.reason] ?? 0) + 1;
+  }
+  const coverageTelemetry = {
+    // git's whole answer, before ANY narrowing. The number that has never been sent.
+    changed_all: allChanged.length,
+    analyzable: analyzable.length,
+    reviewable: reviewable.length,
+    security: securityFiles.length,
+    // after the allowlist, before authorship scoping and the caps
+    for_review: allForReview.length,
+    // what actually reaches the reviewer
+    sent: codeDelta.files.length,
+    // the two silent narrowings, counted separately so they can be told apart
+    capped_out: actionSummary?.capped_out?.length ?? 0,
+    excluded: (codeDelta.excluded ?? []).length,
+    excluded_by_reason: excludedByReason,
+    // was the transcript itself truncated? The 256 KB window means "this turn"
+    // can quietly mean "the last 256 KB of it".
+    transcript_windowed: actionSummary?.transcript_windowed ?? null
+  };
   const requestBody = {
+    coverage_telemetry: coverageTelemetry,
     static_results: staticResults,
     code_delta: codeDelta,
     changed_files: allForReview,
@@ -18795,6 +19121,54 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         // replaced a population floor with ≈35% power that was sub-integer for
         // three-quarters of the fleet.
         conservation: foldConservation,
+        // ⚠ VRT-52 — RECORDED, NOT APPLIED. The number nobody has.
+        //
+        // The whole "task-scoped delta" design space rests on an assumption that
+        // has been observed exactly ONCE: that delta files routinely belong to
+        // earlier work. Three designs were built on it and all three were killed
+        // adversarially — two by measurement — so before another is attempted,
+        // measure the base rate.
+        //
+        // `authored_under_earlier_goal` counts delta paths whose LAST authorship
+        // event precedes the seq of the goal now in force. Both numbers come from
+        // the same append-only counter (`nextSeq`), so the comparison is exact.
+        //
+        // Keyed on the GOAL, deliberately, not on the task id. The task classifier
+        // reported `is_new_task` on two consecutive turns of one task 25 seconds
+        // apart, so a task-keyed number would measure its unreliability rather
+        // than the phenomenon. And this only became meaningful once `recordGoal`
+        // stopped letting a bare "ok" supersede the goal — before that the seq
+        // advanced every turn and this would have degenerated to "not edited this
+        // turn", which is the exact mistake that sank one of the three designs.
+        //
+        // Changes no payload the reviewer sees, no narrowing, no verdict.
+        vrt52: (() => {
+          const goalSeq = memory?.projection.goal?.seq;
+          if (goalSeq === void 0 || !memorySession) return { known: false };
+          const lastSeq2 = new Map(
+            foldDossier(memorySession.d).authored_all.map((a) => [a.path, a.last_seq])
+          );
+          let earlier = 0;
+          let unknown = 0;
+          for (const f of codeDelta.files) {
+            const seen = lastSeq2.get(f.path);
+            if (seen === void 0) unknown++;
+            else if (seen < goalSeq) earlier++;
+          }
+          return {
+            known: true,
+            goal_seq: goalSeq,
+            delta: codeDelta.files.length,
+            // Files this delta carries that were last written under an EARLIER
+            // instruction. If this stays near zero, VRT-52's code half is
+            // unnecessary and should be closed saying so.
+            authored_under_earlier_goal: earlier,
+            // Delta files the dossier has no authorship record for at all —
+            // pre-existing tree state, or an authorship channel the fold cannot
+            // see. Reported separately so a blind spot is never counted as a zero.
+            no_authorship_record: unknown
+          };
+        })(),
         // P2 — RECORDED, NOT APPLIED. What this run WOULD have reviewed if it
         // narrowed to the within-session increment: what changed since the last
         // VERDICT rather than since task start.
@@ -18829,6 +19203,14 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
       const latest = conversation.prompts[conversation.prompts.length - 1];
       const goalPrompt = resolveGoalPrompt(conversation.prompts) ?? { entry: latest, turnsBack: 0 };
       intentContext.user_prompt = goalPrompt.entry.prompt;
+      if (isContinuationPrompt(intentContext.user_prompt)) {
+        const carried = memory?.projection.goal?.text;
+        if (carried && !isContinuationPrompt(carried)) {
+          intentContext.continuation_prompt = latest.prompt;
+          intentContext.user_prompt = carried;
+          logEvent("goal_from_dossier", { chars: carried.length });
+        }
+      }
       if (goalPrompt.turnsBack > 0) {
         intentContext.continuation_prompt = latest.prompt;
         logEvent("goal_walked_back", { turns_back: goalPrompt.turnsBack });
@@ -19033,6 +19415,13 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     });
   }
   let intentRepeatCount = 0;
+  const priorPendingFingerprints = memorySession ? (() => {
+    try {
+      return foldDossier(memorySession.d).meta.recent_pending_sigs ?? [];
+    } catch {
+      return [];
+    }
+  })() : [];
   if (memorySession) {
     try {
       recordVerdict(memorySession.d, {
@@ -19055,7 +19444,10 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         // What next turn reads as `emittedLast`. A suppressed turn did not
         // speak, so it cannot be the cause of the turn after it — which is what
         // keeps this from becoming a permanent gag.
-        emitted: !silenced
+        emitted: !silenced,
+        // Fingerprinted for the NEXT turn's repeat check. Reviewer pending items
+        // carry no `pattern_id`, so their content is the only available key.
+        pendingTexts: (response.pending_items ?? []).map((p) => String(p.description ?? p.title ?? p.reason ?? "")).filter(Boolean)
       });
       intentRepeatCount = Math.max(0, (foldDossier(memorySession.d).meta.intent_repeat?.consecutive ?? 1) - 1);
     } catch {
@@ -19155,9 +19547,41 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     reverify_by: response.reverify_by
   });
   const grantNudge = grantWarning ? ` \u26A0\uFE0F ${grantWarning}` : "";
-  switch (decision) {
+  let capReleased = false;
+  let effectiveDecision = decision;
+  if (decision === "FAIL") {
+    const blocking = (response.findings ?? []).filter((f) => {
+      const sev = String(f.severity ?? "").toLowerCase();
+      return sev === "critical" || sev === "high";
+    });
+    const fingerprint = findingsFingerprint(blocking);
+    const prior = readIterationState(currentCommit);
+    const sameProblem = isSameProblem(prior.fingerprint, fingerprint);
+    const nextIteration = sameProblem ? prior.iteration + 1 : 1;
+    const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
+    writeIteration(nextIteration, currentCommit, contentHash ?? void 0, fingerprint);
+    iteration = nextIteration;
+    if (nextIteration > maxIterations) {
+      capReleased = true;
+      effectiveDecision = "WARN";
+      logEvent("iteration_cap_released", { iteration: nextIteration, fingerprint });
+    }
+  }
+  if (capReleased) {
+    const findings = response.findings ?? [];
+    const lines = findings.slice(0, 5).map((f) => `  [${String(f.severity ?? "?").toUpperCase()}] ${String(f.title ?? f.message ?? "")} (${String(f.file ?? "?")}:${String(f.line ?? "?")})`);
+    emitVerdict({
+      proposed: "WARN",
+      changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+      coverage: reviewCoverage,
+      userSummary: `Verity: WARN \u2014 self-healing limit (${opts.maxIterations}) reached on the same finding. NO LONGER BLOCKING, but ${findings.length} finding(s) remain OPEN and were NOT fixed. Human review required before deploying.
+${lines.join("\n")}`,
+      agentContext: null,
+      silenced: true
+    });
+  }
+  switch (effectiveDecision) {
     case "FAIL": {
-      writeIteration(iteration + 1, currentCommit, contentHash ?? void 0);
       const assessment = response.assessment;
       const narrative = assessment?.narrative ?? "";
       const findings = response.findings ?? [];
@@ -19242,7 +19666,7 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
         // Subject to the SAME cycle cut as PASS/WARN. Suppressing here is safe:
         // the findings themselves are rendered above by the blocking renderer,
         // so what the cut removes is the repeated commentary, never the defect.
-        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount),
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
         // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
         silenced: !!silenced,
         openElsewhere
@@ -19263,7 +19687,7 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
         changed: skipCoverageChanged,
         coverage: reviewCoverage,
         userSummary,
-        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount),
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
         // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
         silenced: !!silenced,
         openElsewhere
@@ -19283,7 +19707,7 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
         changed: skipCoverageChanged,
         coverage: reviewCoverage,
         userSummary,
-        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount),
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
         // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
         silenced: !!silenced,
         openElsewhere
@@ -20204,6 +20628,13 @@ async function confirmExistingLogin(serviceUrl, remote, opts) {
     return "handled";
   }
   if (!who.ok) {
+    const denial = authDenialRemedy(who.error);
+    if (denial) {
+      console.log("");
+      printWarn(`Your existing Verity credential was rejected (${denial.code}).`);
+      printInfo(`  ${denial.remedy}`);
+      return "drive-login";
+    }
     if (existing.data.userId != null) {
       printInfo(`Logged in as ${existing.data.email ?? `user #${existing.data.userId}`} (cached \u2014 could not reach the Verity service). \u2713`);
     } else {
@@ -20219,15 +20650,14 @@ async function confirmExistingLogin(serviceUrl, remote, opts) {
   return "drive-login";
 }
 async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
-  let serviceUrl = resolution?.url ?? DEFAULT_SERVICE_URL;
-  let healed = false;
-  if (resolution) {
-    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, opts.verbose);
-    serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
-    healed = heal.healed;
-    if (healed) {
-      printInfo("  Log in below to re-register this project and repair ~/.verity/credentials.");
-    }
+  if (resolution.source === "default") {
+    printInfo(`No Verity service configured on this machine \u2014 using the default: ${resolution.url}`);
+  }
+  const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, opts.verbose);
+  const serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
+  const healed = heal.healed;
+  if (healed) {
+    printInfo("  Log in below to re-register this project and repair ~/.verity/credentials.");
   }
   let remote = "";
   try {
@@ -20245,8 +20675,10 @@ async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
   if (process.stdin.isTTY && process.stdout.isTTY) {
     console.log("");
     console.log("  Signing in is optional. What it does:");
-    console.log("    - Confirms you have write access to this repository. The GitHub token");
-    console.log("      is used once to verify that, then discarded \u2014 Verity never stores it.");
+    console.log("    - Confirms which repositories you can write to. The GitHub token is");
+    console.log("      used once for that check, then discarded \u2014 Verity never stores it.");
+    console.log("    - One login covers every repository you can write to \u2014 other repos");
+    console.log("      need no further sign-in on this machine.");
     console.log("    - It does NOT give Verity access to your code. Code checked by the gate");
     console.log("      is analyzed in memory and discarded \u2014 we never store your code.");
     console.log("    - It is required to store and access run history for this repo");
@@ -20261,17 +20693,10 @@ async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
     localOnlyNote();
     return;
   }
-  if (!remote) {
-    printWarn("No git remote found \u2014 cannot authenticate yet.");
-    localOnlyNote();
-    return;
-  }
-  const projectName = parseRemote(remote)?.repo ?? (0, import_node_path23.basename)(process.cwd());
   printInfo("Authenticating with GitHub\u2026");
-  const result = await registerProject({ projectName, remote, serviceUrl, verbose: opts.verbose });
+  const result = await loginOnce({ serviceUrl, remote: remote || void 0, verbose: opts.verbose });
   if (result.ok) {
-    const who = result.data.email ?? (result.data.userId != null ? `user #${result.data.userId}` : null);
-    printInfo(`Logged in${who ? ` as ${who}` : ""} \u2713 \u2014 runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity.`);
+    await reportLoginOutcome(result.data, { remote: remote || void 0, verbose: opts.verbose });
   } else {
     printWarn(`Authentication did not complete: ${result.error}`);
     localOnlyNote();
@@ -20422,8 +20847,8 @@ function registerInitCommand(program2) {
     console.log("");
     try {
       const globals = program2.opts();
-      const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(globals.serviceUrl);
-      await runOptionalAuth(urlResult.ok ? urlResult.data : null, {
+      const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+      await runOptionalAuth(resolution, {
         token: globals.token,
         verbose: globals.verbose
       });
@@ -21039,6 +21464,12 @@ function registerTelemetryCommands(program2) {
       printError(urlResult.error);
       process.exit(1);
     }
+    const pin = await checkTokenPin(tokenResult.data.token, urlResult.data);
+    if (!pin.attach && pin.reason === "unpinnable") {
+      printWarn("Your Verity credential does not record which service issued it, so this endpoint");
+      printWarn("  cannot be verified \u2014 a repository could point your telemetry elsewhere.");
+      printWarn('  Run "verity login" to re-issue the credential; Verity can check it after that.');
+    }
     const result = await installTelemetry(urlResult.data);
     if (!result.ok) {
       printError(result.error);
@@ -21087,7 +21518,8 @@ function registerTelemetryCommands(program2) {
 }
 
 // src/cli.ts
-program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.c2dc717").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
+program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.db64e52").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
+  setUserNamedServiceUrl(program.opts().serviceUrl);
   try {
     await foldLegacyLocalCredential();
   } catch {