@codacy/verity-cli 0.28.1-experimental.5ec7373 → 0.28.1-experimental.8cc9c66

package/README.md

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ No re-setup needed: your token, Standard, and run history all carry over.
 | `verity token create --name <name>` | Mint a service token for CI (`--expires <days>` optional) |
 | `verity token list` | List this repository's tokens (ids and metadata only) |
 | `verity token revoke <id>` | Revoke a token by id |
+| `verity sessions list` | List your logins — device, last use, expiry (logins expire after 90 days) |
+| `verity sessions revoke <id>` | Revoke one login by session id |
+| `verity logout` | Sign out on this machine |
+| `verity logout --others` | Sign out every OTHER machine (e.g. a lost laptop) |
+| `verity logout --all` | Sign out everywhere, including here |
 | `verity hooks install` | Wire Claude Code hooks |
 | `verity standard push` | Upload project Standard |
 | **Knowledge** | |

package/bin/verity.js

@@ -10636,14 +10636,14 @@ async function readGlobalCredential(remote) {
       const parsed = parseCredentialLine(line);
       if (parsed && parsed.remote === key) last = parsed.rec;
     }
-    if (last) return last;
+    if (last) return { ...last, keyed: true };
   }
   let plain = null;
   for (const line of lines) {
     const parsed = parseCredentialLine(line);
     if (parsed && parsed.remote === "") plain = parsed.rec;
   }
-  return plain;
+  return plain ? { ...plain, keyed: false } : null;
 }
 async function upsertGlobalCredential(remote, rec) {
   const path = globalCredentialsPath();
@@ -10707,6 +10707,36 @@ async function removeSupersededUserCredentials(loginServiceUrl, loginUserId) {
   }
   return removed;
 }
+async function removeGlobalCredential(remote) {
+  const path = globalCredentialsPath();
+  let content;
+  try {
+    content = await (0, import_promises.readFile)(path, "utf-8");
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  const key = encodeRemoteKey(remote);
+  const kept = [];
+  let removed = false;
+  for (const line of content.split("\n")) {
+    const parsed = parseCredentialLine(line);
+    if (parsed && parsed.remote === key) {
+      removed = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    kept.push(line);
+  }
+  if (!removed) return false;
+  while (kept.length && kept[kept.length - 1].trim() === "") kept.pop();
+  try {
+    await (0, import_promises.writeFile)(path, kept.length ? kept.join("\n") + "\n" : "", { mode: 384 });
+    await (0, import_promises.chmod)(path, 384).catch(() => {
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
 function parseLocalCredentialFile(content) {
   const tokenMatch = content.match(/token:\s*((?:gate_|verity_)[a-f0-9]+)/);
   if (!tokenMatch) return null;
@@ -11188,7 +11218,13 @@ async function resolveToken(flagToken) {
   if (rec) {
     return {
       ok: true,
-      data: { token: rec.token, source: "global", userId: rec.userId, email: rec.email }
+      data: {
+        token: rec.token,
+        source: "global",
+        userId: rec.userId,
+        email: rec.email,
+        keyed: rec.keyed
+      }
     };
   }
   const local = await readLegacyLocalCredential();
@@ -11220,6 +11256,16 @@ function reverifyNudge(who) {
   }
   return null;
 }
+function isLegacyPerRepoCredential(auth2) {
+  return auth2.source === "local" || auth2.source === "global" && auth2.keyed === true;
+}
+async function shouldUpgradeOnLogin(auth2) {
+  if (!isLegacyPerRepoCredential(auth2)) return false;
+  if (auth2.userId == null) return true;
+  const bare = await readGlobalCredential("");
+  if (bare?.userId == null) return true;
+  return bare.userId === auth2.userId;
+}
 function authDenialRemedy(error) {
   if (error.startsWith("STALE_VERIFICATION")) {
     return {
@@ -11233,6 +11279,12 @@ function authDenialRemedy(error) {
       remedy: 'No access grant for this repository \u2014 run "verity login" to refresh your grants (a repo granted after your last login needs one), or get write access to it.'
     };
   }
+  if (error.startsWith("INVALID_TOKEN")) {
+    return {
+      code: "INVALID_TOKEN",
+      remedy: 'Your Verity login has expired or was revoked \u2014 run "verity login" to sign in again.'
+    };
+  }
   return null;
 }
 async function probeService(serviceUrl, verbose) {
@@ -11273,6 +11325,7 @@ async function maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, verbose) {
 
 // src/lib/register.ts
 var readline = __toESM(require("node:readline/promises"));
+var import_node_os = require("node:os");
 
 // src/lib/provider-auth.ts
 var sleep = (ms) => new Promise((resolve2) => setTimeout(resolve2, ms));
@@ -11460,6 +11513,15 @@ async function registerProject(opts) {
   }
   return { ok: true, data: { projectId: project_id, serviceUrl: service_url, email, userId } };
 }
+function deviceLabel() {
+  const override = process.env.VERITY_DEVICE_LABEL?.trim();
+  if (override) return override;
+  try {
+    return (0, import_node_os.hostname)() || void 0;
+  } catch {
+    return void 0;
+  }
+}
 async function loginOnce(opts) {
   const usingTokenOverride = Boolean(process.env.VERITY_PROVIDER_TOKEN);
   const providerAuth = await githubDeviceFlow();
@@ -11480,13 +11542,19 @@ async function loginOnce(opts) {
     path: "/auth/login",
     serviceUrl: opts.serviceUrl,
     extraHeaders: { "X-Provider-Token": providerToken },
+    // Label the session so its owner can tell their machines apart in
+    // `verity sessions list` — a list of identical "login" rows is unusable when
+    // the question is "which of these is the laptop I lost?". The hostname is the
+    // useful default; VERITY_DEVICE_LABEL overrides it for anyone who would
+    // rather not send it. Server-side it is sanitized and capped.
+    body: { device: deviceLabel() },
     verbose: opts.verbose,
     cmd: "login"
   });
   if (!result.ok) {
     return { ok: false, error: result.error };
   }
-  const { token, service_url, user_id, user, repo_count } = result.data;
+  const { token, service_url, user_id, user, repo_count, expires_at } = result.data;
   const loginUserId = user_id ?? user?.id ?? void 0;
   try {
     await upsertGlobalCredential("", {
@@ -11510,15 +11578,16 @@ async function loginOnce(opts) {
       email: user?.email,
       userId: loginUserId,
       repoCount: repo_count ?? 0,
-      prunedCredentials: pruned
+      prunedCredentials: pruned,
+      expiresAt: expires_at
     }
   };
 }
 
 // src/commands/auth.ts
 function registerAuthCommands(program2) {
-  const auth = program2.command("auth").description("Manage project authentication");
-  auth.command("register").description("Register a project with Verity").requiredOption("--project <name>", "Project name").option("--remote <url>", "Git remote URL (auto-detected if omitted)").action(async (opts) => {
+  const auth2 = program2.command("auth").description("Manage project authentication");
+  auth2.command("register").description("Register a project with Verity").requiredOption("--project <name>", "Project name").option("--remote <url>", "Git remote URL (auto-detected if omitted)").action(async (opts) => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
     const serviceUrl = globals.serviceUrl ?? DEFAULT_SERVICE_URL;
     let remote = opts.remote;
@@ -11545,7 +11614,7 @@ function registerAuthCommands(program2) {
     if (email) printInfo(`Authenticated as: ${email}`);
     printJson({ project_id: projectId, service_url: resolvedUrl });
   });
-  auth.command("verify").description("Verify the current token is valid").action(async () => {
+  auth2.command("verify").description("Verify the current token is valid").action(async () => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
     const tokenResult = await resolveToken(globals.token);
     if (!tokenResult.ok) {
@@ -11571,7 +11640,7 @@ function registerAuthCommands(program2) {
     printInfo(`Token valid. Project: ${result.data.project_name}`);
     printJson(result.data);
   });
-  auth.command("discover").description("Check if a project is registered").option("--remote <url>", "Git remote URL (auto-detected if omitted)").action(async (opts) => {
+  auth2.command("discover").description("Check if a project is registered").option("--remote <url>", "Git remote URL (auto-detected if omitted)").action(async (opts) => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
     let remote = opts.remote;
     if (!remote) {
@@ -11627,13 +11696,19 @@ function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
       const who = await whoami(existing.data.token, serviceUrl, globals.verbose);
       if (who.ok && who.data.logged_in) {
         const nudge = reverifyNudge(who.data);
-        if (!nudge) {
+        const upgrade = await shouldUpgradeOnLogin(existing.data);
+        if (!nudge && !upgrade) {
           printInfo(`Already logged in as ${who.data.email ?? `user #${who.data.user_id}`}. \u2713`);
           printInfo("  Re-authenticate with: verity login --force");
           return;
         }
-        printWarn(nudge);
-        printInfo("Re-verifying your repository access\u2026");
+        if (nudge) {
+          printWarn(nudge);
+          printInfo("Re-verifying your repository access\u2026");
+        } else {
+          printInfo("You are signed in with a per-repository token (the old format).");
+          printInfo("  Upgrading to a single login that covers every repository you can write to\u2026");
+        }
       } else if (who.ok && who.data.anonymous) {
         printInfo("You have an anonymous token (the gate runs, but nothing is saved). Logging you in\u2026");
       } else if (!who.ok) {
@@ -11650,6 +11725,10 @@ function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
     const identity = out.email ?? (out.userId != null ? `user #${out.userId}` : "your account");
     printInfo(`Logged in as ${identity}. \u2713`);
     printInfo(`  Access granted to ${out.repoCount} ${out.repoCount === 1 ? "repository" : "repositories"}.`);
+    if (out.expiresAt) {
+      printInfo(`  This login expires on ${out.expiresAt.slice(0, 10)} \u2014 "verity login" again to renew.`);
+      printInfo('  See your machines with "verity sessions list"; sign out with "verity logout".');
+    }
     printInfo("  Runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity everywhere you have write access.");
     if (out.prunedCredentials > 0) {
       printVerbose(`Pruned ${out.prunedCredentials} superseded per-repository credential line(s).`, globals.verbose);
@@ -11680,14 +11759,24 @@ function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
       const rec = await readGlobalCredential(remote);
       if (rec && rec.token !== out.token) {
         const otherBackend = rec.serviceUrl != null && rec.serviceUrl !== out.serviceUrl;
+        const otherIdentity = rec.userId != null && out.userId != null && rec.userId !== out.userId;
         if (otherBackend) {
           printWarn(`  Note: this repository is pinned to a different Verity service (${rec.serviceUrl})`);
           printWarn("  by its own credential line, which takes precedence here \u2014 this login does not");
           printWarn("  change that. To move the repository, remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials.");
+          printWarn('  Until that line is removed, "verity login" here cannot fast-path and will run');
+          printWarn("  the full GitHub flow every time.");
+        } else if (otherIdentity) {
+          printWarn("  Note: this repository uses a different account's credential, which takes");
+          printWarn('  precedence here \u2014 this login leaves it in place, and "verity login" in this');
+          printWarn("  repository will report that account. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials");
+          printWarn("  only if you want this repository on the login you just completed.");
         } else {
           const kind = rec.userId != null ? "superseded per-repository" : "anonymous project-specific";
           printWarn(`  Note: this repository has a ${kind} credential that takes`);
           printWarn("  precedence here. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials to use your login.");
+          printWarn('  Until then, "verity login" in this repository re-runs the full GitHub flow');
+          printWarn("  every time.");
         }
       }
     }
@@ -11809,6 +11898,177 @@ function registerTokenCommand(program2) {
   });
 }
 
+// src/commands/sessions.ts
+function shortDate(iso) {
+  return iso ? iso.slice(0, 10) : "\u2014";
+}
+function daysUntil(iso) {
+  if (!iso) return null;
+  const ms = Date.parse(iso);
+  if (Number.isNaN(ms)) return null;
+  return Math.round((ms - Date.now()) / 864e5);
+}
+async function auth(globals) {
+  const tokenResult = await resolveToken(globals.token);
+  if (!tokenResult.ok) {
+    printError(tokenResult.error);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrl(globals.serviceUrl);
+  if (!urlResult.ok) {
+    printError(urlResult.error);
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+  return { token: tokenResult.data.token, serviceUrl: urlResult.data };
+}
+function explain(error) {
+  if (error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN")) {
+    printInfo('  Sessions belong to a logged-in account \u2014 run "verity login" first.');
+  } else if (error.startsWith("INVALID_TOKEN")) {
+    printInfo('  This login has expired or was revoked \u2014 run "verity login" to sign in again.');
+  }
+}
+function registerSessionsCommands(program2) {
+  const sessions = program2.command("sessions").description("List and revoke your Verity logins (one per machine)");
+  sessions.command("list").description("List your active logins \u2014 device, last use, and expiry").option("--json", "Output raw JSON").action(async (opts) => {
+    const globals = program2.opts();
+    const { token, serviceUrl } = await auth(globals);
+    const result = await apiRequest({
+      method: "GET",
+      path: "/auth/sessions",
+      serviceUrl,
+      token,
+      verbose: globals.verbose,
+      cmd: "sessions"
+    });
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      printError(result.error);
+      explain(result.error);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    if (opts.json) {
+      printJson(result.data);
+      return;
+    }
+    const list = result.data.sessions;
+    if (list.length === 0) {
+      printInfo('No active logins. (Run "verity login".)');
+      return;
+    }
+    printInfo(`${list.length} active login${list.length === 1 ? "" : "s"}:`);
+    printInfo("");
+    printInfo(`${"SESSION ID".padEnd(38)}${"DEVICE".padEnd(24)}${"CREATED".padEnd(12)}${"LAST USED".padEnd(12)}EXPIRES`);
+    for (const s of list) {
+      const days = daysUntil(s.expires_at);
+      const expiry = s.expires_at ? `${shortDate(s.expires_at)}${days != null ? ` (${days}d)` : ""}` : "never";
+      const device = (s.device ?? "login").slice(0, 22);
+      printInfo(
+        `${s.id.padEnd(38)}${device.padEnd(24)}${shortDate(s.created_at).padEnd(12)}${shortDate(s.last_used_at).padEnd(12)}${expiry}${s.current ? "   \u2190 this machine" : ""}`
+      );
+    }
+    printInfo("");
+    printInfo("Revoke one:  verity sessions revoke <session-id>");
+    printInfo("Sign out everywhere else:  verity logout --others");
+  });
+  sessions.command("revoke <session-id>").description("Revoke one login. Revoking this machine's also clears the local credential").action(async (sessionId) => {
+    const globals = program2.opts();
+    const { token, serviceUrl } = await auth(globals);
+    const result = await apiRequest({
+      method: "DELETE",
+      path: `/auth/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`,
+      serviceUrl,
+      token,
+      verbose: globals.verbose,
+      cmd: "sessions-revoke"
+    });
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      printError(result.error);
+      if (result.http_status === 404) {
+        printInfo('  No session with that id on your account \u2014 check "verity sessions list".');
+      }
+      explain(result.error);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    printInfo(`Session ${sessionId} revoked. \u2713`);
+    if (result.data.was_current) {
+      const cleared = await removeGlobalCredential("");
+      printInfo(cleared ? '  That was this machine \u2014 local credential cleared. Run "verity login" to sign back in.' : '  That was this machine. Run "verity login" to sign back in.');
+    }
+  });
+}
+function registerLogoutCommand(program2) {
+  program2.command("logout").description("Sign out of Verity on this machine (--all / --others for every machine)").option("--all", "Revoke every login on every machine, including this one").option("--others", "Revoke every login EXCEPT this machine (e.g. a lost laptop)").action(async (opts) => {
+    const globals = program2.opts();
+    if (opts.all && opts.others) {
+      printError("Use either --all or --others, not both.");
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    const { token, serviceUrl } = await auth(globals);
+    if (opts.all || opts.others) {
+      const result = await apiRequest({
+        method: "DELETE",
+        path: opts.others ? "/auth/sessions?others=true" : "/auth/sessions",
+        serviceUrl,
+        token,
+        verbose: globals.verbose,
+        cmd: "logout"
+      });
+      if (!result.ok) {
+        printError(result.error);
+        explain(result.error);
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      const n = result.data.revoked;
+      printInfo(`Revoked ${n} login${n === 1 ? "" : "s"}. \u2713`);
+      if (opts.others) {
+        printInfo("  This machine is still signed in.");
+        return;
+      }
+      const cleared2 = await removeGlobalCredential("");
+      if (cleared2) printInfo("  Local credential cleared.");
+      printInfo('  Run "verity login" to sign back in.');
+      return;
+    }
+    const list = await apiRequest({
+      method: "GET",
+      path: "/auth/sessions",
+      serviceUrl,
+      token,
+      verbose: globals.verbose,
+      cmd: "logout"
+    });
+    if (!list.ok) {
+      printError(list.error);
+      explain(list.error);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    const current = list.data.sessions.find((s) => s.current);
+    if (!current) {
+      printWarn("This machine is not signed in with a Verity login.");
+      const cleared2 = await removeGlobalCredential("");
+      if (cleared2) printInfo("  Cleared the local login credential anyway.");
+      return;
+    }
+    const revoked = await apiRequest({
+      method: "DELETE",
+      path: `/auth/sessions/${current.id}`,
+      serviceUrl,
+      token,
+      verbose: globals.verbose,
+      cmd: "logout"
+    });
+    if (!revoked.ok) {
+      printError(revoked.error);
+      explain(revoked.error);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    const cleared = await removeGlobalCredential("");
+    printInfo("Signed out on this machine. \u2713");
+    if (cleared) printInfo("  Local credential cleared.");
+    printInfo('  Your other machines are unaffected \u2014 use "verity logout --all" for all of them.');
+  });
+}
+
 // src/lib/hooks.ts
 var import_promises4 = require("node:fs/promises");
 var import_node_path5 = require("node:path");
@@ -12430,7 +12690,7 @@ function getRecentCommitMessages() {
 // src/lib/context-identity.ts
 var import_node_crypto2 = require("node:crypto");
 var import_node_fs5 = require("node:fs");
-var import_node_os = require("node:os");
+var import_node_os2 = require("node:os");
 var import_node_path6 = require("node:path");
 var SHARED_SENTINELS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "",
@@ -12485,7 +12745,7 @@ function contextIdentity(input) {
 }
 function verityHome() {
   const override = process.env.VERITY_HOME;
-  return override && override.trim() ? (0, import_node_path6.resolve)(override) : (0, import_node_path6.join)((0, import_node_os.homedir)(), ".verity");
+  return override && override.trim() ? (0, import_node_path6.resolve)(override) : (0, import_node_path6.join)((0, import_node_os2.homedir)(), ".verity");
 }
 function dossierDir(identity) {
   return (0, import_node_path6.join)(verityHome(), "sessions", identity.userKey, identity.treeKey, identity.sessionKey);
@@ -13700,6 +13960,12 @@ function reduce(state, events, now) {
       }
       case "verdict": {
         state.meta.last_verdict_seq = ev.seq;
+        state.meta.channel = {
+          emittedLast: ev.emitted === true,
+          // Reset by ANY movement, so the counter measures a standstill rather
+          // than session length.
+          consecutiveIdle: ev.idle === false ? 0 : (state.meta.channel?.consecutiveIdle ?? 0) + 1
+        };
         state.meta.last_adjudication = ev.intent_verdict ? { verdict: ev.intent_verdict, score: ev.intent_score ?? null, at: ev.at, decision: ev.decision } : void 0;
         if (ev.intent_sig) {
           state.meta.intent_repeat = state.meta.intent_repeat && state.meta.intent_repeat.sig === ev.intent_sig ? { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: state.meta.intent_repeat.consecutive + 1 } : { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: 1 };
@@ -14067,6 +14333,10 @@ function projectMemory(state, opts) {
       ...active.delivered && { delivered: active.delivered }
     };
   }
+  if (opts.capture) {
+    const missed = Math.max(0, opts.capture.seen - opts.capture.captured);
+    p.capture = { seen: opts.capture.seen, captured: opts.capture.captured, missed };
+  }
   if (state.meta.last_adjudication) {
     const a = state.meta.last_adjudication;
     p.last_adjudication = { verdict: a.verdict, score: a.score, at: a.at };
@@ -14313,7 +14583,8 @@ function recall(d, input) {
     continuity,
     spoken: reanchored.spoken,
     refused: reanchored.dropped.length,
-    lastVerdictSeq
+    lastVerdictSeq,
+    ...input.capture && { capture: input.capture }
   });
   return {
     state: effective,
@@ -14527,6 +14798,11 @@ function recordVerdict(d, v) {
       line_sha: at !== void 0 ? lineSha(at) : null
     });
   }
+  const foldedNow = foldDossier(d);
+  const sig = intentSignature(v.intent, {
+    goalSeq: foldedNow.goal.find((g) => g.status === "active")?.seq ?? 0,
+    idle: v.idle !== false
+  });
   appendEvent(d, {
     k: "verdict",
     run_id: v.runId,
@@ -14534,15 +14810,19 @@ function recordVerdict(d, v) {
     watermark_sha: v.watermarkSha,
     branch: v.branch,
     decision: v.decision,
-    ...intentSignature(v.intent) && { intent_sig: intentSignature(v.intent) },
+    ...sig && { intent_sig: sig },
+    emitted: v.emitted === true,
+    idle: v.idle !== false,
     ...v.intent?.verdict && { intent_verdict: v.intent.verdict },
     ...typeof v.intent?.score === "number" && { intent_score: v.intent.score }
   });
 }
-function intentSignature(intent) {
+function intentSignature(intent, ctx) {
   if (!intent?.verdict) return null;
   if (intent.verdict !== "misaligned" && intent.verdict !== "partial") return null;
-  return `${intent.verdict}:${lineSha(intent.gaps?.[0] ?? "")}`;
+  const goal = ctx ? `g${ctx.goalSeq}` : "g?";
+  const moved = ctx?.idle === false ? "active" : "idle";
+  return `${intent.verdict}:${goal}:${moved}`;
 }
 function toRegister(severity) {
   switch (severity) {
@@ -14579,7 +14859,9 @@ function recallMemory(d, identity, opts) {
     const state = foldDossier(d);
     const watermark = state.meta.watermark?.sha ?? null;
     const watermarkPaths = (state.authored ?? []).map((a) => a.path);
+    const captureCmp = typeof opts.userMessagesSeen === "number" ? { seen: opts.userMessagesSeen, captured: state.meta.goal_chain } : void 0;
     const r = recall(d, {
+      ...captureCmp && { capture: captureCmp },
       identity,
       currentSessionKey: opts.currentSessionKey,
       branchNow: getCurrentBranch(),
@@ -14836,6 +15118,8 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
   let totalSize = 0;
   let truncationReason = null;
   const droppedPaths = [];
+  const excluded = [];
+  const exclude = (path, reason) => excluded.push({ path, reason, stage: "collectCodeDelta", kind: "capacity" });
   for (const filepath of sorted) {
     if (result.length >= maxFiles) {
       truncationReason ??= "max_files";
@@ -14843,14 +15127,21 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
       continue;
     }
     const resolved = resolveFile(filepath);
-    if (!resolved) continue;
+    if (!resolved) {
+      exclude(filepath, "path-not-resolvable");
+      continue;
+    }
     let size;
     try {
       size = (0, import_node_fs11.statSync)(resolved).size;
     } catch {
+      exclude(filepath, "not-stattable");
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (size > maxFileBytes) {
+      exclude(filepath, `over-file-size-limit-${maxFileBytes}b`);
       continue;
     }
-    if (size > maxFileBytes) continue;
     if (totalSize + size > maxTotalBytes) {
       truncationReason ??= "max_total_bytes";
       const idx = sorted.indexOf(filepath);
@@ -14861,6 +15152,7 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
     try {
       content = (0, import_node_fs11.readFileSync)(resolved, "utf-8");
     } catch {
+      exclude(filepath, "not-readable");
       continue;
     }
     totalSize += size;
@@ -14874,10 +15166,14 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
     (sum, f) => sum + f.content.split("\n").length,
     0
   );
+  for (const path of droppedPaths) {
+    exclude(path, truncationReason === "max_files" ? "max-files-cap" : "max-total-bytes-cap");
+  }
   return {
     files: result,
     total_lines: totalLines,
     total_files: result.length,
+    excluded,
     ...truncationReason && {
       truncated: {
         reason: truncationReason,
@@ -16329,7 +16625,7 @@ function resolveTaskContext(opts) {
 // src/lib/cli-version.ts
 function cliVersion() {
   try {
-    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.5ec7373" : "dev";
+    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.8cc9c66" : "dev";
   } catch {
     return "dev";
   }
@@ -16554,6 +16850,16 @@ var KNOWN_RECORD_TYPES = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "subagent"
 ]);
 var EDIT_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["Edit", "Write", "NotebookEdit", "MultiEdit"]);
+var DISPATCH_TOOLS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["Task", "Workflow"]);
+function hasUserText(record) {
+  const message = record.message;
+  const content = message?.content ?? record.content;
+  if (typeof content === "string") return content.trim().length > 0;
+  if (!Array.isArray(content)) return false;
+  return content.some(
+    (b) => b?.type === "text" && typeof b.text === "string" && b.text.trim().length > 0
+  );
+}
 var COMMAND_CLASSES = [
   [/\b(npm|yarn|pnpm|bun)\s+(run\s+)?test\b|\bvitest\b|\bjest\b|\bpytest\b|\bgo test\b/, "test"],
   [/\b(npm|yarn|pnpm|bun)\s+(run\s+)?build\b|\btsc\b|\bwebpack\b|\bcargo build\b/, "build"],
@@ -16680,6 +16986,8 @@ function fold(transcriptPath, opts = {}) {
       totalRecords: 0,
       malformed: 0,
       subagentFiles: 0,
+      dispatched: 0,
+      userMessages: 0,
       subagentSkipped: 0,
       compactions: 0,
       complete: false
@@ -16706,7 +17014,8 @@ function fold(transcriptPath, opts = {}) {
       if (type === "system" && record.subtype === "compact_boundary") {
         result.coverage.compactions++;
       }
-      collectFromRecord(record, owner, byPath, commandStats, pendingByToolUse, opts.repoRoot);
+      if (type === "user" && hasUserText(record)) result.coverage.userMessages++;
+      collectFromRecord(record, owner, byPath, commandStats, pendingByToolUse, opts.repoRoot, result.coverage);
     }
   };
   try {
@@ -16778,7 +17087,7 @@ function classifyUnobserved(path) {
   if (/\.(png|jpg|jpeg|gif|pdf|zip|woff2?|ico|mp4)$/i.test(path)) return "binary";
   return "no_edit_record";
 }
-function collectFromRecord(record, owner, byPath, commandStats, pendingByToolUse, repoRoot2) {
+function collectFromRecord(record, owner, byPath, commandStats, pendingByToolUse, repoRoot2, tally) {
   const message = record.message;
   const content = message?.content ?? record.content;
   const blocks = Array.isArray(content) ? content : content && typeof content === "object" ? [content] : [];
@@ -16800,6 +17109,9 @@ function collectFromRecord(record, owner, byPath, commandStats, pendingByToolUse
           byPath.set(path, entry);
         }
       }
+      if (DISPATCH_TOOLS.has(name) && tally) {
+        tally.dispatched += 1;
+      }
       if (name === "Bash") {
         const cmd = typeof input.command === "string" ? input.command : "";
         if (cmd) {
@@ -16858,6 +17170,59 @@ function checkConservation(changedFiles, result, repoRoot2) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/lib/verdict.ts
+function reconcileCoverage(changed, coverage) {
+  const changedSet = new Set(changed);
+  const reviewed = coverage.reviewed.filter((p) => changedSet.has(p));
+  const claimed = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...reviewed, ...coverage.notReviewed.map((n) => n.path)]);
+  const unaccounted = [...changedSet].filter((p) => !claimed.has(p)).sort();
+  const notReviewed = [
+    ...coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => changedSet.has(n.path)),
+    ...unaccounted.map((path) => ({
+      path,
+      reason: "unaccounted",
+      // Named so the eventual bug report writes itself: some stage removed this
+      // path and did not say so.
+      stage: "unknown-stage",
+      // An undeclared drop is CAPACITY by default. A stage that cannot be
+      // bothered to say why it dropped a file does not get the benefit of the
+      // doubt — that default is what makes forgetting expensive.
+      kind: "capacity"
+    }))
+  ];
+  return {
+    coverage: { reviewed: [...new Set(reviewed)].sort(), notReviewed },
+    unaccounted,
+    balances: unaccounted.length === 0
+  };
+}
+function resolveVerdict(proposed, coverage) {
+  if (proposed === "FAIL") return "FAIL";
+  const blocking = coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => (n.kind ?? "capacity") !== "policy");
+  if (blocking.length === 0) return proposed;
+  return "WARN";
+}
+function describeCoverage(coverage, maxPaths = 5) {
+  const relevant = coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => (n.kind ?? "capacity") !== "policy");
+  if (relevant.length === 0) return null;
+  const byReason = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const n of relevant) {
+    const key = `${n.reason}`;
+    const list = byReason.get(key) ?? [];
+    list.push(n.path);
+    byReason.set(key, list);
+  }
+  const lines = [];
+  for (const [reason, paths] of [...byReason.entries()].sort()) {
+    const shown = paths.slice(0, maxPaths).join(", ");
+    const more = paths.length > maxPaths ? ` (+${paths.length - maxPaths} more)` : "";
+    lines.push(`  ${paths.length} not reviewed \u2014 ${reason}: ${shown}${more}`);
+  }
+  return `NOT A CLEAN REVIEW. ${relevant.length} changed file(s) never reached the reviewer, so this verdict does not cover them:
+${lines.join("\n")}
+Treat those files as UNCHECKED, not as approved.`;
+}
+
 // src/lib/channel.ts
 var MAX_AGENT_CONTEXT_CHARS = 1500;
 var MAX_AGENT_ITEMS = 5;
@@ -16936,6 +17301,45 @@ function buildHookOutput(gateDecision, systemMessage, agentContext) {
     } : {}
   };
 }
+var IDLE_EPISODE_CAP = 3;
+function channelSilence(input) {
+  const movedSomething = input.newUserPrompt || input.newAuthorship;
+  if (movedSomething) return null;
+  if (input.consecutiveIdle >= IDLE_EPISODE_CAP) return "idle-episode-cap";
+  if (input.emittedLast) return "caused-by-our-own-emission";
+  return null;
+}
+
+// src/lib/emit.ts
+var YELLOW2 = "\x1B[33m";
+var NC2 = "\x1B[0m";
+function emitVerdict(input) {
+  const exit = input.exit ?? ((code) => process.exit(code));
+  const { coverage, unaccounted } = reconcileCoverage(input.changed, input.coverage);
+  const verdict = resolveVerdict(input.proposed, coverage);
+  const note = describeCoverage(coverage);
+  if (unaccounted.length > 0) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${YELLOW2}Verity: ${unaccounted.length} changed file(s) could not be attributed to any review stage \u2014 counted as unreviewed.${NC2}
+`
+    );
+  }
+  if (verdict === "FAIL") {
+    input.renderBlocking?.();
+    if (input.agentContext) {
+      process.stderr.write(`
+${input.agentContext}
+`);
+    }
+    if (note) process.stderr.write(`
+${YELLOW2}${note}${NC2}
+`);
+    return exit(2);
+  }
+  const agentBlock = [input.agentContext, note].filter(Boolean).join("\n\n") || null;
+  printJsonCompact(buildHookOutput(verdict, input.userSummary, agentBlock));
+  return exit(0);
+}
 
 // src/lib/cache-cleanup.ts
 var import_node_fs21 = require("node:fs");
@@ -17319,6 +17723,13 @@ function buildSummary(lines) {
     files_read: capArray(filesRead, MAX_FILES_LIST),
     files_edited: capArray(filesEdited, MAX_FILES_LIST),
     files_created: capArray(filesCreated, MAX_CREATED_LIST),
+    // The complement of the two caps that affect SCOPE. `files_read` is excluded
+    // deliberately: reading a file is not authoring it, so a capped read list
+    // narrows nothing.
+    capped_out: [
+      ...cappedOut(filesEdited, MAX_FILES_LIST),
+      ...cappedOut(filesCreated, MAX_CREATED_LIST)
+    ],
     searches,
     commands,
     subagents,
@@ -17369,6 +17780,9 @@ function sanitizeCommand(rawCmd) {
 function capArray(set, max) {
   return Array.from(set).slice(0, max);
 }
+function cappedOut(set, max) {
+  return Array.from(set).slice(max);
+}
 
 // src/lib/run-mode.ts
 function parseAutonomousEnv(raw) {
@@ -17778,12 +18192,43 @@ function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0) {
   });
 }
 var beaconCtx = null;
-async function passAndExit(reason, skip) {
+async function passAndExit(reason, skip, kindOverride) {
   const sent = await sendSkipBeacon(beaconCtx, skip);
   logEvent("skip", { reason: skip, beacon: sent });
-  printJsonCompact({ gate_decision: "PASS", systemMessage: `Verity: ${reason}` });
+  const POLICY_SKIPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    "no-analyzable-files",
+    "verity-command",
+    "bare-acknowledgment",
+    "reflection-prompt",
+    "skip-mode",
+    "zero-increment",
+    "debounce",
+    "no-delta-since-last-review"
+  ]);
+  const skipKind = kindOverride ?? (POLICY_SKIPS.has(skip) ? "policy" : "capacity");
+  const changed = skipCoverageChanged;
+  const { coverage, unaccounted } = reconcileCoverage(changed, {
+    reviewed: [],
+    notReviewed: changed.map((path) => ({ path, reason: skip, stage: "pre-flight", kind: skipKind }))
+  });
+  const verdict = resolveVerdict("PASS", coverage);
+  const note = describeCoverage(coverage);
+  if (unaccounted.length > 0) {
+    logEvent("coverage_unaccounted", { where: "passAndExit", skip, count: unaccounted.length });
+  }
+  printJsonCompact(
+    buildHookOutput(
+      verdict,
+      `Verity: ${reason}`,
+      // The agent's ONLY input is additionalContext. Sixteen of the nineteen
+      // terminating paths wrote `systemMessage` — the human's field — and told
+      // the agent nothing at all.
+      note
+    )
+  );
   process.exit(0);
 }
+var skipCoverageChanged = [];
 var EMPTY_STATIC = {
   tool: "@codacy/analysis-cli",
   findings: [],
@@ -17798,7 +18243,7 @@ function runLocalStatic(analyzable, securityFiles, baseline, skipStatic) {
 }
 function localOnlyAndExit(staticResults) {
   printJsonCompact({
-    gate_decision: "PASS",
+    gate_decision: "WARN",
     systemMessage: "Verity: not authenticated \u2014 ran a local static-only check (no deep review, no upload). Run `verity init` to authenticate and enable the full quality gate.",
     unauthenticated: true,
     static_results: staticResults
@@ -17858,6 +18303,7 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     });
   }
   const { files: allChanged, hasRecentCommitFiles } = getChangedFiles();
+  skipCoverageChanged = allChanged;
   const analyzable = filterAnalyzable(allChanged);
   const reviewable = filterReviewable(allChanged);
   const securityFiles = filterSecurity(allChanged);
@@ -17933,7 +18379,8 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   let codeDelta = {
     files: [],
     total_lines: 0,
-    total_files: 0
+    total_files: 0,
+    excluded: []
   };
   let snapshotResult = { has_snapshots: false, diffs: [] };
   let contentHash = null;
@@ -17998,7 +18445,11 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
           if (assistantResponse) {
             analysisMode = "plan";
           } else {
-            await passAndExit("No files within size limits to analyze", "size-limit");
+            await passAndExit(
+              "No files within size limits to analyze",
+              "size-limit",
+              codeDelta.excluded.length > 0 ? "capacity" : "policy"
+            );
           }
         }
       }
@@ -18172,7 +18623,10 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
       priorState.capabilities
     );
     memory = recallMemory(memorySession.d, memorySession.identity, {
-      currentSessionKey: memorySession.identity.sessionKey
+      currentSessionKey: memorySession.identity.sessionKey,
+      // The independent witness. Only meaningful when a transcript was folded —
+      // otherwise it stays undefined and capture coverage reads as UNKNOWN.
+      ...foldResult && { userMessagesSeen: foldResult.coverage.userMessages }
     });
     if (memory && !memory.provenanceHolds) {
       process.stderr.write("Verity: working-memory provenance check failed \u2014 recall suppressed.\n");
@@ -18387,6 +18841,8 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
       message = "Verity: your GitHub verification expired \u2014 run `verity login` to re-verify (local analysis this run)";
     } else if (result.error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN")) {
       message = "Verity: no access grant for this repository \u2014 run `verity login` to refresh your grants (local analysis this run)";
+    } else if (result.error.startsWith("INVALID_TOKEN")) {
+      message = "Verity: your login expired or was revoked \u2014 run `verity login` to sign in again (local analysis this run)";
     } else if (result.http_status && result.http_status >= 400 && result.http_status < 500) {
       message = `Verity: request rejected (HTTP ${result.http_status}) \u2014 ${result.error}`;
     } else if (result.http_status && result.http_status >= 500) {
@@ -18401,8 +18857,78 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   const response = result.data;
   const decision = response.gate_decision ?? "(unrecognised)";
   const sentPaths = codeDelta.files.map((f) => f.path);
+  const reviewCoverage = {
+    reviewed: sentPaths,
+    // Declared drops from the stages that DO report themselves today. The other
+    // stages surface via `unaccounted`, which is the tripwire, not the design.
+    notReviewed: [
+      // Every exit from the collection loop, each named. Six reasons where there
+      // used to be two recorded and four silent — the silent ones including the
+      // per-file size cap, which could drop a whole source file without leaving a
+      // trace anywhere in the payload or the run row.
+      ...codeDelta.excluded,
+      // The server-side 300-line middle-out truncation. It only bites on the
+      // full-file branch (a first analysis, before snapshots exist) because
+      // analyze normally sends diffs — but on that branch the reviewer sees the
+      // first and last 100 lines and nothing between, and until now said so to
+      // nobody. CAPACITY: a partial look is not a look.
+      ...(response.metadata?.truncated_files ?? []).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "file-middle-truncated-300-lines",
+        stage: "prompt-builder",
+        kind: "capacity"
+      })),
+      // The 20-entry edit cap. CAPACITY, and the sharpest of the lot: it narrows
+      // what is REVIEWED, not merely what is summarised — a session editing 25
+      // files had five silently excluded from the reviewed set.
+      ...(actionSummary?.capped_out ?? []).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "edit-list-cap-20",
+        stage: "extractActionSummary",
+        kind: "capacity"
+      })),
+      // The extension allowlist, and it is POLICY rather than capacity: a changed
+      // README was never going to be reviewed, and treating that as a coverage
+      // gap would downgrade nearly every PASS to WARN until WARN meant nothing.
+      // Recorded so the ledger balances and so "what did Verity ignore entirely"
+      // is answerable — but it never touches the verdict.
+      ...allChanged.filter((p) => !analyzable.includes(p) && !reviewable.includes(p) && !securityFiles.includes(p)).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "not-a-reviewed-file-type",
+        stage: "extension-allowlist",
+        kind: "policy"
+      }))
+    ]
+  };
   const watermarkHash = sentPaths.length > 0 ? computeContentHash(sentPaths) : contentHash;
   const watermarkIsPartial = !!codeDelta.truncated;
+  let silenced = null;
+  let turnIsIdleForChannel = true;
+  if (memorySession) {
+    try {
+      const st = foldDossier(memorySession.d);
+      turnIsIdleForChannel = st.authored_all.every((a) => a.hash_now === a.hash_at_last_verdict);
+      silenced = channelSilence({
+        // The BUFFER, not intentContext.user_prompt: the latter falls back to a
+        // linked issue (VRT-53 W4) when no human spoke, and a fallback goal is
+        // not a user utterance. Treating it as one would keep the loop alive on
+        // exactly the autonomous cohort.
+        newUserPrompt: (conversation?.prompts?.length ?? 0) > 0,
+        newAuthorship: !turnIsIdleForChannel,
+        emittedLast: st.meta.channel?.emittedLast === true,
+        consecutiveIdle: st.meta.channel?.consecutiveIdle ?? 0
+      });
+    } catch {
+      silenced = null;
+    }
+  }
+  if (silenced) {
+    logEvent("channel_silenced", {
+      reason: silenced,
+      run_id: response.run_id ?? turnId,
+      decision
+    });
+  }
   let intentRepeatCount = 0;
   if (memorySession) {
     try {
@@ -18418,7 +18944,15 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
           title: f.title,
           severity: f.severity
         })) ?? [],
-        intent: response.intent_alignment ?? null
+        intent: response.intent_alignment ?? null,
+        // The same signal F1 introduced: bytes differing from the hash frozen at
+        // the last verdict. A turn that moved nothing is the only kind that can
+        // accumulate a repeat.
+        idle: turnIsIdleForChannel,
+        // What next turn reads as `emittedLast`. A suppressed turn did not
+        // speak, so it cannot be the cause of the turn after it — which is what
+        // keeps this from becoming a permanent gag.
+        emitted: !silenced
       });
       intentRepeatCount = Math.max(0, (foldDossier(memorySession.d).meta.intent_repeat?.consecutive ?? 1) - 1);
     } catch {
@@ -18597,7 +19131,16 @@ ${YELLOW}${loginNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (grantNudge) process.stderr.write(`
 ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
 `);
-      process.exit(2);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "FAIL",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary: "",
+        // Subject to the SAME cycle cut as PASS/WARN. Suppressing here is safe:
+        // the findings themselves are rendered above by the blocking renderer,
+        // so what the cut removes is the repeated commentary, never the defect.
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount)
+      });
       break;
     }
     case "PASS": {
@@ -18609,10 +19152,13 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (viewUrl) userSummary += ` Report: ${viewUrl}`;
       if (autoSeedNotice) userSummary = `${autoSeedNotice} ${userSummary}`;
       userSummary += loginNudge + grantNudge;
-      printJsonCompact(
-        buildHookOutput("PASS", userSummary, agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount))
-      );
-      process.exit(0);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "PASS",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary,
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount)
+      });
       break;
     }
     case "WARN": {
@@ -18623,10 +19169,13 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (viewUrl) userSummary += ` Report: ${viewUrl}`;
       if (autoSeedNotice) userSummary = `${autoSeedNotice} ${userSummary}`;
       userSummary += loginNudge + grantNudge;
-      printJsonCompact(
-        buildHookOutput("WARN", userSummary, agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount))
-      );
-      process.exit(0);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "WARN",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary,
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount)
+      });
       break;
     }
     default: {
@@ -19042,7 +19591,7 @@ async function runGuard(opts, globals) {
     cmd: "guard"
   });
   if (!result.ok) {
-    const authRemedy = result.error.startsWith("STALE_VERIFICATION") ? " Your GitHub verification expired \u2014 run `verity login` to re-verify." : result.error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN") ? " No access grant for this repository \u2014 run `verity login` to refresh your grants." : "";
+    const authRemedy = result.error.startsWith("STALE_VERIFICATION") ? " Your GitHub verification expired \u2014 run `verity login` to re-verify." : result.error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN") ? " No access grant for this repository \u2014 run `verity login` to refresh your grants." : result.error.startsWith("INVALID_TOKEN") ? " Your Verity login expired or was revoked \u2014 run `verity login` to sign in again." : "";
     emitAllowNotice(
       `\u26A0 Verity ${moment}: ${authRemedy ? "not authorized" : "service offline"} \u2014 ${verb}ed WITHOUT review${authRemedy}`,
       `Verity ${moment}: ${authRemedy ? "not authorized" : "service unavailable"} (${result.error}); the ${verb} was allowed WITHOUT a Verity review.${authRemedy}`
@@ -20426,7 +20975,7 @@ function registerTelemetryCommands(program2) {
 }
 
 // src/cli.ts
-program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.5ec7373").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
+program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.8cc9c66").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
   try {
     await foldLegacyLocalCredential();
   } catch {
@@ -20435,6 +20984,8 @@ program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").versio
 registerAuthCommands(program);
 registerLoginCommand(program);
 registerTokenCommand(program);
+registerSessionsCommands(program);
+registerLogoutCommand(program);
 registerHooksCommands(program);
 registerIntentCommands(program);
 registerLifecycleCommands(program);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@codacy/verity-cli",
-  "version": "0.28.1-experimental.5ec7373",
+  "version": "0.28.1-experimental.8cc9c66",
   "description": "CLI for Verity quality gate service",
   "homepage": "https://verity.md",
   "bugs": {