@codacy/verity-cli 0.28.1-experimental.055cd97 → 0.28.1-experimental.2cbb593

package/bin/verity.js

@@ -10386,10 +10386,9 @@ function projectPath(relativePath) {
   return (0, import_node_path.join)(repoRoot(), relativePath);
 }
 var MAX_DELTA_BYTES = 194560;
-var MAX_FILES = 20;
+var MAX_FILES = 40;
 var MAX_FILE_BYTES = 51200;
 var DEBOUNCE_SECONDS = 30;
-var MAX_ITERATIONS = 2;
 var MAX_SPEC_FILES = 10;
 var MAX_SPEC_FILE_BYTES = 10240;
 var MAX_TOTAL_SPEC_BYTES = 30720;
@@ -10924,8 +10923,8 @@ function filterReviewable(files) {
     const ext = (0, import_node_path3.extname)(f).slice(1);
     if (ANALYZABLE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) return false;
     if (REVIEWABLE_EXTENSIONS.has(ext)) return true;
-    const basename4 = f.split("/").pop() ?? "";
-    if (REVIEWABLE_FILENAMES.has(basename4)) return true;
+    const basename3 = f.split("/").pop() ?? "";
+    if (REVIEWABLE_FILENAMES.has(basename3)) return true;
     if (REVIEWABLE_PATH_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(f))) return true;
     return false;
   });
@@ -11195,7 +11194,15 @@ async function resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl) {
   if (mdUrl) {
     return { ok: true, data: { url: mdUrl, source: "verity_md" } };
   }
-  return { ok: false, error: "No Verity service URL found. Run /verity-setup to configure." };
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'No Verity service URL found. Run "verity login" to get started, or /verity-setup to configure this project.'
+  };
+}
+async function resolveServiceUrlForAuth(flagUrl) {
+  const strict = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl);
+  if (strict.ok) return strict.data;
+  return { url: DEFAULT_SERVICE_URL, source: "default" };
 }
 async function resolveServiceUrl(flagUrl) {
   const result = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(flagUrl);
@@ -11234,7 +11241,10 @@ async function resolveToken(flagToken) {
       data: { token: local.token, source: "local", userId: local.userId, email: local.email }
     };
   }
-  return { ok: false, error: "No Verity token found. Run /verity-setup to configure." };
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'No Verity token found. Run "verity login" to sign in, or /verity-setup to set up this project.'
+  };
 }
 async function whoami(token, serviceUrl, verbose) {
   return apiRequest({
@@ -11671,16 +11681,81 @@ function registerAuthCommands(program2) {
   });
 }
 
+// src/lib/login-report.ts
+async function reportLoginOutcome(out, opts = {}) {
+  const identity = out.email ?? (out.userId != null ? `user #${out.userId}` : "your account");
+  printInfo(`Logged in as ${identity}. \u2713`);
+  printInfo(`  Access granted to ${out.repoCount} ${out.repoCount === 1 ? "repository" : "repositories"}.`);
+  if (out.expiresAt) {
+    printInfo(`  This login expires on ${out.expiresAt.slice(0, 10)} \u2014 "verity login" again to renew.`);
+    printInfo('  See your machines with "verity sessions list"; sign out with "verity logout".');
+  }
+  if (out.repoCount > 0) {
+    printInfo("  Runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity everywhere you have write access.");
+  }
+  if (out.prunedCredentials > 0) {
+    printVerbose(`Pruned ${out.prunedCredentials} superseded per-repository credential line(s).`, opts.verbose);
+  } else if (out.prunedCredentials < 0) {
+    printWarn("  Could not rewrite ~/.verity/credentials: superseded per-repository tokens remain and");
+    printWarn("  will keep taking precedence over this login in their own repositories.");
+    printInfo(`  Check the file's permissions; the next successful "verity login" retries the cleanup.`);
+  }
+  if (out.repoCount === 0) {
+    printWarn("The Verity GitHub App is not installed on any account you can access.");
+    printInfo("  Install it (and grant your repositories), then re-run verity login:");
+    printInfo(`  ${githubAppInstallUrl(null)}`);
+    return;
+  }
+  const remote = opts.remote;
+  if (!remote) return;
+  const who = await whoami(out.token, out.serviceUrl, opts.verbose);
+  if (who.ok && who.data.grant_status != null) {
+    printInfo("  \u2713 This repository is covered.");
+  } else if (!who.ok) {
+    printWarn(`  Could not confirm this repository's coverage (${who.error}) \u2014 verity status will show it.`);
+  } else {
+    const parsed = parseRemote(remote);
+    const installUrl = githubAppInstallUrl(parsed ? await githubAccountId(parsed.owner) : null);
+    printWarn(`  This repository (${parsed ? `${parsed.owner}/${parsed.repo}` : remote}) is NOT covered by your grants.`);
+    printInfo("  Grant the Verity GitHub App access to it, then re-run verity login:");
+    printInfo(`  ${installUrl}`);
+  }
+  const rec = await readGlobalCredential(remote);
+  if (rec && rec.token !== out.token) {
+    const otherBackend = rec.serviceUrl != null && rec.serviceUrl !== out.serviceUrl;
+    const otherIdentity = rec.userId != null && out.userId != null && rec.userId !== out.userId;
+    if (otherBackend) {
+      printWarn(`  Note: this repository is pinned to a different Verity service (${rec.serviceUrl})`);
+      printWarn("  by its own credential line, which takes precedence here \u2014 this login does not");
+      printWarn("  change that. To move the repository, remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials.");
+      printWarn('  Until that line is removed, "verity login" here cannot fast-path and will run');
+      printWarn("  the full GitHub flow every time.");
+    } else if (otherIdentity) {
+      printWarn("  Note: this repository uses a different account's credential, which takes");
+      printWarn('  precedence here \u2014 this login leaves it in place, and "verity login" in this');
+      printWarn("  repository will report that account. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials");
+      printWarn("  only if you want this repository on the login you just completed.");
+    } else {
+      const kind = rec.userId != null ? "superseded per-repository" : "anonymous project-specific";
+      printWarn(`  Note: this repository has a ${kind} credential that takes`);
+      printWarn("  precedence here. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials to use your login.");
+      printWarn('  Until then, "verity login" in this repository re-runs the full GitHub flow');
+      printWarn("  every time.");
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 // src/commands/login.ts
 function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
   program2.command("login").description("Log in to Verity (one GitHub login grants access to all your repositories)").option("--force", "Re-authenticate even if already logged in").action(async (opts) => {
     const globals = program2.opts();
-    const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(globals.serviceUrl);
-    if (!urlResult.ok) {
-      printError(urlResult.error);
-      process.exit(1);
+    const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+    if (resolution.source === "default") {
+      printInfo(`No Verity service configured on this machine \u2014 using the default: ${resolution.url}`);
+    } else {
+      printVerbose(`Service URL from ${resolution.source}: ${resolution.url}`, globals.verbose);
     }
-    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(urlResult.data, globals.verbose);
+    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, globals.verbose);
     const serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
     if (heal.healed) {
       printInfo("  Completing login updates ~/.verity/credentials against the live service.");
@@ -11721,65 +11796,7 @@ function registerLoginCommand(program2) {
       printError(`Login failed: ${result.error}`);
       process.exit(1);
     }
-    const out = result.data;
-    const identity = out.email ?? (out.userId != null ? `user #${out.userId}` : "your account");
-    printInfo(`Logged in as ${identity}. \u2713`);
-    printInfo(`  Access granted to ${out.repoCount} ${out.repoCount === 1 ? "repository" : "repositories"}.`);
-    if (out.expiresAt) {
-      printInfo(`  This login expires on ${out.expiresAt.slice(0, 10)} \u2014 "verity login" again to renew.`);
-      printInfo('  See your machines with "verity sessions list"; sign out with "verity logout".');
-    }
-    printInfo("  Runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity everywhere you have write access.");
-    if (out.prunedCredentials > 0) {
-      printVerbose(`Pruned ${out.prunedCredentials} superseded per-repository credential line(s).`, globals.verbose);
-    } else if (out.prunedCredentials < 0) {
-      printWarn("  Could not rewrite ~/.verity/credentials: superseded per-repository tokens remain and");
-      printWarn("  will keep taking precedence over this login in their own repositories.");
-      printInfo(`  Check the file's permissions; the next successful "verity login" retries the cleanup.`);
-    }
-    if (out.repoCount === 0) {
-      printWarn("The Verity GitHub App is not installed on any account you can access.");
-      printInfo(`  Install it (and grant your repositories), then re-run verity login:`);
-      printInfo(`  ${githubAppInstallUrl(null)}`);
-      return;
-    }
-    if (remote) {
-      const who = await whoami(out.token, out.serviceUrl, globals.verbose);
-      if (who.ok && who.data.grant_status != null) {
-        printInfo("  \u2713 This repository is covered.");
-      } else if (!who.ok) {
-        printWarn(`  Could not confirm this repository's coverage (${who.error}) \u2014 verity status will show it.`);
-      } else {
-        const parsed = parseRemote(remote);
-        const installUrl = githubAppInstallUrl(parsed ? await githubAccountId(parsed.owner) : null);
-        printWarn(`  This repository (${parsed ? `${parsed.owner}/${parsed.repo}` : remote}) is NOT covered by your grants.`);
-        printInfo("  Grant the Verity GitHub App access to it, then re-run verity login:");
-        printInfo(`  ${installUrl}`);
-      }
-      const rec = await readGlobalCredential(remote);
-      if (rec && rec.token !== out.token) {
-        const otherBackend = rec.serviceUrl != null && rec.serviceUrl !== out.serviceUrl;
-        const otherIdentity = rec.userId != null && out.userId != null && rec.userId !== out.userId;
-        if (otherBackend) {
-          printWarn(`  Note: this repository is pinned to a different Verity service (${rec.serviceUrl})`);
-          printWarn("  by its own credential line, which takes precedence here \u2014 this login does not");
-          printWarn("  change that. To move the repository, remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials.");
-          printWarn('  Until that line is removed, "verity login" here cannot fast-path and will run');
-          printWarn("  the full GitHub flow every time.");
-        } else if (otherIdentity) {
-          printWarn("  Note: this repository uses a different account's credential, which takes");
-          printWarn('  precedence here \u2014 this login leaves it in place, and "verity login" in this');
-          printWarn("  repository will report that account. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials");
-          printWarn("  only if you want this repository on the login you just completed.");
-        } else {
-          const kind = rec.userId != null ? "superseded per-repository" : "anonymous project-specific";
-          printWarn(`  Note: this repository has a ${kind} credential that takes`);
-          printWarn("  precedence here. Remove its line from ~/.verity/credentials to use your login.");
-          printWarn('  Until then, "verity login" in this repository re-runs the full GitHub flow');
-          printWarn("  every time.");
-        }
-      }
-    }
+    await reportLoginOutcome(result.data, { remote: remote || void 0, verbose: globals.verbose });
   });
 }
 
@@ -11914,12 +11931,8 @@ async function auth(globals) {
     printError(tokenResult.error);
     process.exit(1);
   }
-  const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrl(globals.serviceUrl);
-  if (!urlResult.ok) {
-    printError(urlResult.error);
-    process.exit(1);
-  }
-  return { token: tokenResult.data.token, serviceUrl: urlResult.data };
+  const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+  return { token: tokenResult.data.token, serviceUrl: resolution.url };
 }
 function explain(error) {
   if (error.startsWith("FORBIDDEN")) {
@@ -13591,6 +13604,143 @@ var import_node_fs10 = require("node:fs");
 var import_node_crypto5 = require("node:crypto");
 var import_node_path11 = require("node:path");
 
+// src/lib/skip-detection.ts
+function isBareAckPrompt(prompt) {
+  if (typeof prompt !== "string") return false;
+  const trimmed = prompt.trim();
+  if (trimmed.length === 0) return false;
+  if (trimmed.length > 20) return false;
+  const bareAckPattern = /^(\d{1,2}|y|n|yes|no|yep|nope|ok(ay)?|sure|skip|cancel|stop|done|noted|got\s+it|sounds\s+good|thanks|thank\s+you|thx)[.!?]*$/i;
+  return bareAckPattern.test(trimmed);
+}
+function isContinuationPrompt(prompt) {
+  if (typeof prompt !== "string") return false;
+  const trimmed = prompt.trim();
+  if (trimmed.length === 0) return false;
+  if (trimmed.length > 24) return false;
+  const continuation = /^(let['’]?s\s+(go|do\s+it|start|continue)|go|go\s+ahead|go\s+on|proceed|continue|carry\s+on|keep\s+going|do\s+it|make\s+it\s+so|next|start|begin|ship\s+it|yes\s+please|please\s+continue|perfect|great|nice|excellent|agreed)[.!]*$/i;
+  return continuation.test(trimmed) || isBareAckPrompt(trimmed);
+}
+function resolveGoalPrompt(prompts) {
+  if (prompts.length === 0) return null;
+  const latest = prompts[prompts.length - 1];
+  if (!isContinuationPrompt(latest.prompt)) return { entry: latest, turnsBack: 0 };
+  for (let i = prompts.length - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+    if (!isContinuationPrompt(prompts[i].prompt)) {
+      return { entry: prompts[i], turnsBack: prompts.length - 1 - i };
+    }
+  }
+  return { entry: latest, turnsBack: 0 };
+}
+function isReflectionQuestion(response) {
+  if (!response || typeof response !== "string") return false;
+  const markers = [
+    /reflection\s+for\s+future\s+agents/i,
+    /what(?:'s|\s+is)\s+one\s+thing\s+you\s+learned/i,
+    /say\s+['"]?skip['"]?\s+to\s+skip/i,
+    /quick\s+reflection\s+question/i,
+    // Post-flip (VRT-21): the agent drafts the reflection itself and, when
+    // interactive, asks the user to confirm/correct before recording. That
+    // turn authors no code either, so it's still a reflection turn.
+    /reflection\s+draft/i,
+    /confirm,?\s+correct,?\s+or\s+add/i
+  ];
+  return markers.some((m) => m.test(response));
+}
+function isMetaTaskLabel(label2) {
+  if (label2 === null || label2 === void 0) return false;
+  if (typeof label2 !== "string") return false;
+  const trimmed = label2.trim();
+  if (trimmed.length === 0) return true;
+  const metaPatterns = [
+    /^verity\s+[\w-]+\s+response$/i,
+    // "Verity reflect response"
+    /^simple user response$/i,
+    /^verity\s+command$/i,
+    // "Verity command"
+    /^user\s+(question|reply|response|ack)$/i
+  ];
+  return metaPatterns.some((p) => p.test(trimmed));
+}
+function shouldSkipForBareAck(input) {
+  if (!isBareAckPrompt(input.prompt)) return false;
+  if (input.turnAuthoredCode) return false;
+  return input.canSeeTurnAuthorship;
+}
+
+// src/lib/pending-repeat.ts
+var STOP = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+  "the",
+  "and",
+  "that",
+  "this",
+  "with",
+  "from",
+  "have",
+  "been",
+  "were",
+  "what",
+  "when",
+  "which",
+  "their",
+  "there",
+  "these",
+  "those",
+  "would",
+  "could",
+  "should",
+  "must",
+  "will",
+  "also",
+  "just",
+  "only",
+  "into",
+  "over",
+  "than",
+  "then",
+  "them",
+  "some",
+  "such",
+  "more",
+  "most",
+  "other",
+  "about",
+  "after",
+  "before",
+  "since",
+  "because",
+  "while",
+  "where",
+  "whether",
+  "ensure",
+  "confirm",
+  "verify",
+  "check"
+]);
+function pendingTokens(text) {
+  if (!text || typeof text !== "string") return [];
+  const out = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (const raw of text.toLowerCase().split(/[^a-z0-9]+/)) {
+    if (raw.length <= 3) continue;
+    if (STOP.has(raw)) continue;
+    out.add(raw);
+  }
+  return [...out].sort();
+}
+var REPEAT_THRESHOLD = 0.3;
+function overlapCoefficient(a, b) {
+  if (a.length === 0 || b.length === 0) return 0;
+  const setB = new Set(b);
+  let shared = 0;
+  for (const t of a) if (setB.has(t)) shared++;
+  return shared / Math.min(a.length, b.length);
+}
+function isRepeatOfAny(text, priorFingerprints, threshold = REPEAT_THRESHOLD) {
+  const tokens = pendingTokens(text);
+  if (tokens.length === 0) return false;
+  return priorFingerprints.some((prior) => overlapCoefficient(tokens, prior) >= threshold);
+}
+
 // src/lib/dossier.ts
 var import_node_fs9 = require("node:fs");
 var import_node_crypto4 = require("node:crypto");
@@ -13599,6 +13749,7 @@ var MAX_LINE_BYTES = 4096;
 var MAX_GOAL_CHARS = 2e3;
 var GOAL_KEEP = 8;
 var GOAL_TOTAL_CAP = 32;
+var RECENT_PENDING_CAP = 20;
 var HASH_WIDTH = 16;
 var AUTHORED_CAP = 300;
 var NOT_MINE_CAP = 300;
@@ -13967,6 +14118,10 @@ function reduce(state, events, now) {
           consecutiveIdle: ev.idle === false ? 0 : (state.meta.channel?.consecutiveIdle ?? 0) + 1
         };
         state.meta.last_adjudication = ev.intent_verdict ? { verdict: ev.intent_verdict, score: ev.intent_score ?? null, at: ev.at, decision: ev.decision } : void 0;
+        if (Array.isArray(ev.pending_sigs) && ev.pending_sigs.length > 0) {
+          const prior = state.meta.recent_pending_sigs ?? [];
+          state.meta.recent_pending_sigs = [...prior, ...ev.pending_sigs].slice(-RECENT_PENDING_CAP);
+        }
         if (ev.intent_sig) {
           state.meta.intent_repeat = state.meta.intent_repeat && state.meta.intent_repeat.sig === ev.intent_sig ? { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: state.meta.intent_repeat.consecutive + 1 } : { sig: ev.intent_sig, consecutive: 1 };
         } else {
@@ -14695,7 +14850,19 @@ function sessionDossier(token, sessionId) {
   const d = openDossier(identity);
   return d ? { d, identity } : null;
 }
+function hasActiveGoal(d) {
+  try {
+    if (!(0, import_node_fs10.existsSync)(d.eventsPath)) return false;
+    return (0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(d.eventsPath, "utf8").includes('"k":"goal"');
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
 function recordGoal(d, prompt, source = "prompt") {
+  if (source === "prompt" && isContinuationPrompt(prompt) && hasActiveGoal(d)) {
+    appendEvent(d, { k: "goal_continue", text: prompt.slice(0, 64) });
+    return;
+  }
   const text = prompt.slice(0, MAX_GOAL_CHARS);
   appendEvent(d, {
     k: "goal",
@@ -14811,6 +14978,13 @@ function recordVerdict(d, v) {
     branch: v.branch,
     decision: v.decision,
     ...sig && { intent_sig: sig },
+    // Fingerprints of the pending items this verdict delivered, so the NEXT turn
+    // can tell a repeat from a new requirement. Only recorded when the channel
+    // actually spoke — a silenced turn delivered nothing, so nothing was "said
+    // before" and labelling the next turn's items as repeats would be a lie.
+    ...v.emitted === true && v.pendingTexts && v.pendingTexts.length > 0 && {
+      pending_sigs: v.pendingTexts.slice(0, 8).map((t) => pendingTokens(t).slice(0, 16))
+    },
     emitted: v.emitted === true,
     idle: v.idle !== false,
     ...v.intent?.verdict && { intent_verdict: v.intent.verdict },
@@ -15118,6 +15292,8 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
   let totalSize = 0;
   let truncationReason = null;
   const droppedPaths = [];
+  const excluded = [];
+  const exclude = (path, reason) => excluded.push({ path, reason, stage: "collectCodeDelta", kind: "capacity" });
   for (const filepath of sorted) {
     if (result.length >= maxFiles) {
       truncationReason ??= "max_files";
@@ -15125,14 +15301,21 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
       continue;
     }
     const resolved = resolveFile(filepath);
-    if (!resolved) continue;
+    if (!resolved) {
+      exclude(filepath, "path-not-resolvable");
+      continue;
+    }
     let size;
     try {
       size = (0, import_node_fs11.statSync)(resolved).size;
     } catch {
+      exclude(filepath, "not-stattable");
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (size > maxFileBytes) {
+      exclude(filepath, `over-file-size-limit-${maxFileBytes}b`);
       continue;
     }
-    if (size > maxFileBytes) continue;
     if (totalSize + size > maxTotalBytes) {
       truncationReason ??= "max_total_bytes";
       const idx = sorted.indexOf(filepath);
@@ -15143,6 +15326,7 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
     try {
       content = (0, import_node_fs11.readFileSync)(resolved, "utf-8");
     } catch {
+      exclude(filepath, "not-readable");
       continue;
     }
     totalSize += size;
@@ -15156,10 +15340,14 @@ function collectCodeDelta(files, opts) {
     (sum, f) => sum + f.content.split("\n").length,
     0
   );
+  for (const path of droppedPaths) {
+    exclude(path, truncationReason === "max_files" ? "max-files-cap" : "max-total-bytes-cap");
+  }
   return {
     files: result,
     total_lines: totalLines,
     total_files: result.length,
+    excluded,
     ...truncationReason && {
       truncated: {
         reason: truncationReason,
@@ -15453,6 +15641,34 @@ ${addedLines}`,
   }
   return { diffs, has_baseline: true };
 }
+function absorbIntoBaseline(paths, sessionId) {
+  const baseline = readBaseline(sessionId);
+  if (!baseline || paths.length === 0) return 0;
+  const dir = sessionDir(sessionKey(baseline.session_id));
+  let adopted = 0;
+  const dirty = new Set(baseline.dirty_paths);
+  for (const p of paths) {
+    try {
+      const content = safeReadForMirror(projectPath(p));
+      if (content === null) continue;
+      const dest = mirrorPath(dir, p);
+      (0, import_node_fs13.mkdirSync)((0, import_node_path14.dirname)(dest), { recursive: true });
+      (0, import_node_fs13.writeFileSync)(dest, content);
+      dirty.add(p);
+      adopted++;
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  if (adopted === 0) return 0;
+  try {
+    const updated = { ...baseline, dirty_paths: [...dirty] };
+    (0, import_node_fs13.writeFileSync)(manifestPath(dir), JSON.stringify(updated));
+    preImageCache.delete(baseline);
+  } catch {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  return adopted;
+}
 function changedSinceBaseline(repoRelPath, baseline) {
   const pre = preImage(repoRelPath, baseline);
   let current;
@@ -16329,40 +16545,40 @@ function narrowToRecent(files, sessionId) {
   });
   return recent.length > 0 ? recent : files;
 }
-function readIteration(currentCommit, _contentHash) {
-  if (!(0, import_node_fs15.existsSync)(ITERATION_FILE)) return 1;
+function readIterationState(currentCommit) {
+  if (!(0, import_node_fs15.existsSync)(ITERATION_FILE)) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
   try {
     const stored = (0, import_node_fs15.readFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, "utf-8").trim();
     const parts = stored.split(":");
     const iter = parseInt(parts[0], 10);
     const storedCommit = parts[1] ?? "";
     const storedTimestamp = parseInt(parts[2] ?? "0", 10);
-    if (isNaN(iter)) return 1;
-    if (storedCommit !== currentCommit) return 1;
+    const fingerprint = parts.slice(3).join(":") || null;
+    if (isNaN(iter)) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
+    if (storedCommit !== currentCommit) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
     if (storedTimestamp > 0) {
       const elapsed = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3) - storedTimestamp;
-      if (elapsed > 600) return 1;
+      if (elapsed > 600) return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
     }
-    return iter;
+    return { iteration: iter, fingerprint };
   } catch {
-    return 1;
+    return { iteration: 1, fingerprint: null };
   }
 }
-function checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations = MAX_ITERATIONS, contentHash) {
-  const iteration = readIteration(currentCommit, contentHash);
-  if (iteration > maxIterations) {
-    writeIteration(1, currentCommit, contentHash);
-    return {
-      skip: `Max Verity iterations (${maxIterations}) reached \u2014 accepting to prevent infinite loop. Human review required before deploying.`,
-      iteration
-    };
-  }
-  return { skip: null, iteration };
+function findingsFingerprint(findings) {
+  const keys = findings.map((f) => `${String(f.pattern_id ?? "?")}|${String(f.file ?? "?")}`).filter((k) => k !== "?|?");
+  return [...new Set(keys)].sort().join(",");
+}
+function isSameProblem(previous, current) {
+  if (!previous || !current) return false;
+  const prev = new Set(previous.split(","));
+  return current.split(",").some((k) => prev.has(k));
 }
-function writeIteration(iteration, commit, _contentHash) {
+function writeIteration(iteration, commit, _contentHash, fingerprint) {
   (0, import_node_fs15.mkdirSync)(VERITY_DIR, { recursive: true });
   const ts = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
-  (0, import_node_fs15.writeFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, `${iteration}:${commit}:${ts}`);
+  const fp = fingerprint ? `:${fingerprint}` : "";
+  (0, import_node_fs15.writeFileSync)(ITERATION_FILE, `${iteration}:${commit}:${ts}${fp}`);
 }
 
 // src/lib/static-analysis.ts
@@ -16611,7 +16827,7 @@ function resolveTaskContext(opts) {
 // src/lib/cli-version.ts
 function cliVersion() {
   try {
-    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.055cd97" : "dev";
+    return true ? "0.28.1-experimental.2cbb593" : "dev";
   } catch {
     return "dev";
   }
@@ -17156,6 +17372,86 @@ function checkConservation(changedFiles, result, repoRoot2) {
   };
 }
 
+// src/lib/verdict.ts
+function reconcileCoverage(changed, coverage) {
+  const changedSet = new Set(changed);
+  const reviewed = coverage.reviewed.filter((p) => changedSet.has(p));
+  const claimed = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([...reviewed, ...coverage.notReviewed.map((n) => n.path)]);
+  const unaccounted = [...changedSet].filter((p) => !claimed.has(p)).sort();
+  const notReviewed = [
+    ...coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => changedSet.has(n.path)),
+    ...unaccounted.map((path) => ({
+      path,
+      reason: "unaccounted",
+      // Named so the eventual bug report writes itself: some stage removed this
+      // path and did not say so.
+      stage: "unknown-stage",
+      // An undeclared drop is CAPACITY by default. A stage that cannot be
+      // bothered to say why it dropped a file does not get the benefit of the
+      // doubt — that default is what makes forgetting expensive.
+      kind: "capacity"
+    }))
+  ];
+  return {
+    coverage: { reviewed: [...new Set(reviewed)].sort(), notReviewed },
+    unaccounted,
+    balances: unaccounted.length === 0
+  };
+}
+function resolveVerdict(proposed, coverage) {
+  if (proposed === "FAIL") return "FAIL";
+  const blocking = coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => (n.kind ?? "capacity") !== "policy");
+  if (blocking.length === 0) return proposed;
+  return "WARN";
+}
+function describeCoverage(coverage, maxPaths = 5) {
+  const relevant = coverage.notReviewed.filter((n) => (n.kind ?? "capacity") !== "policy");
+  if (relevant.length === 0) return null;
+  const byReason = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const n of relevant) {
+    const key = `${n.reason}`;
+    const list = byReason.get(key) ?? [];
+    list.push(n.path);
+    byReason.set(key, list);
+  }
+  const lines = [];
+  for (const [reason, paths] of [...byReason.entries()].sort()) {
+    const shown = paths.slice(0, maxPaths).join(", ");
+    const more = paths.length > maxPaths ? ` (+${paths.length - maxPaths} more)` : "";
+    lines.push(`  ${paths.length} not reviewed \u2014 ${reason}: ${shown}${more}`);
+  }
+  return `NOT A CLEAN REVIEW. ${relevant.length} changed file(s) never reached the reviewer, so this verdict does not cover them:
+${lines.join("\n")}
+Treat those files as UNCHECKED, not as approved.`;
+}
+function openBlockingElsewhere(statements, reviewedNow, lineShaAt) {
+  const reviewed = new Set(reviewedNow);
+  const out = [];
+  const seen = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  for (const s of statements) {
+    if (s.outcome !== "open") continue;
+    if (s.register !== "BLOCK") continue;
+    if (s.carried) continue;
+    if (reviewed.has(s.file)) continue;
+    if (!s.line_sha) continue;
+    if (lineShaAt(s.file, s.line) !== s.line_sha) continue;
+    const key = `${s.file}::${s.pattern_id}`;
+    if (seen.has(key)) continue;
+    seen.add(key);
+    out.push({ file: s.file, line: s.line, pattern_id: s.pattern_id });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+function describeOpenElsewhere(open) {
+  if (open.length === 0) return null;
+  const lines = open.slice(0, 5).map((o) => `  ${o.file}:${o.line} [${o.pattern_id}]`);
+  const more = open.length > 5 ? `
+  (+${open.length - 5} more)` : "";
+  return `STILL OPEN ELSEWHERE. ${open.length} blocking finding(s) Verity raised earlier are still present in files this run did not review:
+${lines.join("\n")}${more}
+This verdict covers the current change only. The tree is not clean.`;
+}
+
 // src/lib/channel.ts
 var MAX_AGENT_CONTEXT_CHARS = 1500;
 var MAX_AGENT_ITEMS = 5;
@@ -17205,9 +17501,13 @@ function buildAgentContext(input) {
   }
   for (const p of input.pendingItems ?? []) {
     if (lines.length >= MAX_AGENT_ITEMS) break;
+    if (p.pattern_id === "intent-misalignment") continue;
     const text = p.description ?? p.title ?? p.reason;
     if (!text) continue;
-    lines.push(renderItem("", text, p.pattern_id, p.file, p.line));
+    const seenBefore = isRepeatOfAny(text, input.priorPendingFingerprints ?? []);
+    lines.push(
+      renderItem("", text, p.pattern_id, p.file, p.line) + (seenBefore ? "\n    (raised earlier this session and still open \u2014 do not re-explain it; act on it or carry on)" : "")
+    );
   }
   if (lines.length === 0) return null;
   const body = `${REPORT_PREFIX}
@@ -17243,6 +17543,39 @@ function channelSilence(input) {
   return null;
 }
 
+// src/lib/emit.ts
+var YELLOW2 = "\x1B[33m";
+var NC2 = "\x1B[0m";
+function emitVerdict(input) {
+  const exit = input.exit ?? ((code) => process.exit(code));
+  const { coverage, unaccounted } = reconcileCoverage(input.changed, input.coverage);
+  let verdict = resolveVerdict(input.proposed, coverage);
+  const openElsewhere = input.openElsewhere ?? [];
+  if (verdict === "PASS" && openElsewhere.length > 0) verdict = "WARN";
+  const note = [describeCoverage(coverage), describeOpenElsewhere(openElsewhere)].filter(Boolean).join("\n\n") || null;
+  if (unaccounted.length > 0) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${YELLOW2}Verity: ${unaccounted.length} changed file(s) could not be attributed to any review stage \u2014 counted as unreviewed.${NC2}
+`
+    );
+  }
+  if (verdict === "FAIL") {
+    input.renderBlocking?.();
+    if (input.agentContext) {
+      process.stderr.write(`
+${input.agentContext}
+`);
+    }
+    if (note && !input.silenced) process.stderr.write(`
+${YELLOW2}${note}${NC2}
+`);
+    return exit(2);
+  }
+  const agentBlock = input.silenced ? null : [input.agentContext, note].filter(Boolean).join("\n\n") || null;
+  printJsonCompact(buildHookOutput(verdict, input.userSummary, agentBlock));
+  return exit(0);
+}
+
 // src/lib/cache-cleanup.ts
 var import_node_fs21 = require("node:fs");
 var import_node_path18 = require("node:path");
@@ -17422,46 +17755,6 @@ function shouldWarmRetryAnalyze(result) {
   return false;
 }
 
-// src/lib/skip-detection.ts
-function isBareAckPrompt(prompt) {
-  if (typeof prompt !== "string") return false;
-  const trimmed = prompt.trim();
-  if (trimmed.length === 0) return false;
-  if (trimmed.length > 20) return false;
-  const bareAckPattern = /^(\d{1,2}|y|n|yes|no|yep|nope|ok(ay)?|sure|skip|cancel|stop|done|noted|got\s+it|sounds\s+good|thanks|thank\s+you|thx)[.!?]*$/i;
-  return bareAckPattern.test(trimmed);
-}
-function isReflectionQuestion(response) {
-  if (!response || typeof response !== "string") return false;
-  const markers = [
-    /reflection\s+for\s+future\s+agents/i,
-    /what(?:'s|\s+is)\s+one\s+thing\s+you\s+learned/i,
-    /say\s+['"]?skip['"]?\s+to\s+skip/i,
-    /quick\s+reflection\s+question/i,
-    // Post-flip (VRT-21): the agent drafts the reflection itself and, when
-    // interactive, asks the user to confirm/correct before recording. That
-    // turn authors no code either, so it's still a reflection turn.
-    /reflection\s+draft/i,
-    /confirm,?\s+correct,?\s+or\s+add/i
-  ];
-  return markers.some((m) => m.test(response));
-}
-function isMetaTaskLabel(label2) {
-  if (label2 === null || label2 === void 0) return false;
-  if (typeof label2 !== "string") return false;
-  const trimmed = label2.trim();
-  if (trimmed.length === 0) return true;
-  const metaPatterns = [
-    /^verity\s+[\w-]+\s+response$/i,
-    // "Verity reflect response"
-    /^simple user response$/i,
-    /^verity\s+command$/i,
-    // "Verity command"
-    /^user\s+(question|reply|response|ack)$/i
-  ];
-  return metaPatterns.some((p) => p.test(trimmed));
-}
-
 // src/lib/transcript.ts
 var import_node_fs22 = require("node:fs");
 var MAX_READ_BYTES = 256 * 1024;
@@ -17475,9 +17768,11 @@ var MAX_SUMMARY_BYTES = 4096;
 var HOME = process.env.HOME ?? "";
 async function extractActionSummary(transcriptPath) {
   try {
-    const lines = readTurnLines(transcriptPath);
-    if (!lines || lines.length === 0) return null;
-    return buildSummary(lines);
+    const read = readTurnLines(transcriptPath);
+    if (!read || read.lines.length === 0) return null;
+    const summary = buildSummary(read.lines);
+    if (summary) summary.transcript_windowed = read.window;
+    return summary;
   } catch {
     return null;
   }
@@ -17491,9 +17786,11 @@ function readTurnLines(transcriptPath) {
   }
   if (size === 0) return null;
   let raw;
+  let windowed = false;
   if (size <= SMALL_FILE_BYTES) {
     raw = (0, import_node_fs22.readFileSync)(transcriptPath, "utf-8");
   } else {
+    windowed = true;
     const buf = Buffer.alloc(Math.min(MAX_READ_BYTES, size));
     const fd = require("node:fs").openSync(transcriptPath, "r");
     try {
@@ -17511,17 +17808,22 @@ function readTurnLines(transcriptPath) {
   const allLines = raw.split("\n").filter((l) => l.trim().length > 0);
   if (allLines.length === 0) return null;
   let turnStart = 0;
+  let boundaryFound = false;
   for (let i = allLines.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
     try {
       const parsed = JSON.parse(allLines[i]);
       if (parsed.type === "user" && isRealUserMessage(parsed)) {
         turnStart = i;
+        boundaryFound = true;
         break;
       }
     } catch {
     }
   }
-  return allLines.slice(turnStart);
+  return {
+    lines: allLines.slice(turnStart),
+    window: !windowed ? "whole" : boundaryFound ? "windowed" : "orphaned"
+  };
 }
 function isRealUserMessage(parsed) {
   const message = parsed.message;
@@ -17625,6 +17927,13 @@ function buildSummary(lines) {
     files_read: capArray(filesRead, MAX_FILES_LIST),
     files_edited: capArray(filesEdited, MAX_FILES_LIST),
     files_created: capArray(filesCreated, MAX_CREATED_LIST),
+    // The complement of the two caps that affect SCOPE. `files_read` is excluded
+    // deliberately: reading a file is not authoring it, so a capped read list
+    // narrows nothing.
+    capped_out: [
+      ...cappedOut(filesEdited, MAX_FILES_LIST),
+      ...cappedOut(filesCreated, MAX_CREATED_LIST)
+    ],
     searches,
     commands,
     subagents,
@@ -17675,6 +17984,9 @@ function sanitizeCommand(rawCmd) {
 function capArray(set, max) {
   return Array.from(set).slice(0, max);
 }
+function cappedOut(set, max) {
+  return Array.from(set).slice(max);
+}
 
 // src/lib/run-mode.ts
 function parseAutonomousEnv(raw) {
@@ -18069,11 +18381,12 @@ async function readStopHookStdin() {
     return empty;
   }
 }
-function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0) {
+function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0, priorPendingFingerprints = []) {
   const metadata = response.metadata ?? {};
   const intent = response.intent_alignment ?? {};
   return buildAgentContext({
     intentRepeat,
+    priorPendingFingerprints,
     gateDecision: String(response.gate_decision ?? ""),
     findings: response.findings ?? [],
     pendingItems: response.pending_items ?? [],
@@ -18084,12 +18397,45 @@ function agentContextFor(response, intentRepeat = 0) {
   });
 }
 var beaconCtx = null;
-async function passAndExit(reason, skip) {
+async function passAndExit(reason, skip, kindOverride) {
   const sent = await sendSkipBeacon(beaconCtx, skip);
   logEvent("skip", { reason: skip, beacon: sent });
-  printJsonCompact({ gate_decision: "PASS", systemMessage: `Verity: ${reason}` });
+  const POLICY_SKIPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
+    "no-analyzable-files",
+    "verity-command",
+    "bare-acknowledgment",
+    "reflection-prompt",
+    "skip-mode",
+    "zero-increment",
+    "debounce",
+    "no-delta-since-last-review"
+  ]);
+  const skipKind = kindOverride ?? (POLICY_SKIPS.has(skip) ? "policy" : "capacity");
+  const changed = skipCoverageChanged;
+  const { coverage, unaccounted } = reconcileCoverage(changed, {
+    reviewed: [],
+    notReviewed: changed.map((path) => ({ path, reason: skip, stage: "pre-flight", kind: skipKind }))
+  });
+  const verdict = resolveVerdict("PASS", coverage);
+  const note = describeCoverage(coverage);
+  if (unaccounted.length > 0) {
+    logEvent("coverage_unaccounted", { where: "passAndExit", skip, count: unaccounted.length });
+  }
+  const AGENT_SILENT_SKIPS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([]);
+  const agentNote = AGENT_SILENT_SKIPS.has(skip) ? null : note;
+  printJsonCompact(
+    buildHookOutput(
+      verdict,
+      `Verity: ${reason}`,
+      // The agent's ONLY input is additionalContext. Sixteen of the nineteen
+      // terminating paths wrote `systemMessage` — the human's field — and told
+      // the agent nothing at all.
+      agentNote
+    )
+  );
   process.exit(0);
 }
+var skipCoverageChanged = [];
 var EMPTY_STATIC = {
   tool: "@codacy/analysis-cli",
   findings: [],
@@ -18104,7 +18450,7 @@ function runLocalStatic(analyzable, securityFiles, baseline, skipStatic) {
 }
 function localOnlyAndExit(staticResults) {
   printJsonCompact({
-    gate_decision: "PASS",
+    gate_decision: "WARN",
     systemMessage: "Verity: not authenticated \u2014 ran a local static-only check (no deep review, no upload). Run `verity init` to authenticate and enable the full quality gate.",
     unauthenticated: true,
     static_results: staticResults
@@ -18164,6 +18510,7 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     });
   }
   const { files: allChanged, hasRecentCommitFiles } = getChangedFiles();
+  skipCoverageChanged = allChanged;
   const analyzable = filterAnalyzable(allChanged);
   const reviewable = filterReviewable(allChanged);
   const securityFiles = filterSecurity(allChanged);
@@ -18175,14 +18522,24 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   const conversation = await readAndClearConversationBuffer(baselineSessionId);
   const specs = discoverSpecs();
   const plans = discoverPlans();
+  const agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn = !!(actionSummary && (actionSummary.files_edited.length > 0 || actionSummary.files_created.length > 0));
+  const turnAuthoredCode = agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn || !!baseline && allForReview.some((f) => changedSinceBaseline(f, baseline));
+  const canSeeTurnAuthorship = !!actionSummary || !!baseline;
   const latestPrompt = conversation?.prompts?.[conversation.prompts.length - 1]?.prompt ?? "";
   if (/^\s*\/verity-/i.test(latestPrompt)) {
+    const setupAuthored = [
+      ...actionSummary?.files_edited ?? [],
+      ...actionSummary?.files_created ?? []
+    ];
+    if (setupAuthored.length > 0) {
+      const adopted = absorbIntoBaseline(setupAuthored, baselineSessionId);
+      logEvent("baseline_absorbed", { skip: "verity-command", offered: setupAuthored.length, adopted });
+    }
     await passAndExit("Verity command \u2014 skipping analysis", "verity-command");
   }
-  if (isBareAckPrompt(latestPrompt)) {
+  if (shouldSkipForBareAck({ prompt: latestPrompt, turnAuthoredCode, canSeeTurnAuthorship })) {
     await passAndExit("Bare acknowledgment \u2014 skipping analysis", "bare-acknowledgment");
   }
-  const agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn = !!(actionSummary && (actionSummary.files_edited.length > 0 || actionSummary.files_created.length > 0));
   if (isReflectionQuestion(assistantResponse) && !agentAuthoredCodeThisTurn) {
     await passAndExit("Reflection-prompt turn \u2014 skipping analysis", "reflection-prompt");
   }
@@ -18229,7 +18586,11 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     );
   }
   if (analysisMode === "skip") {
-    await passAndExit("Skip mode \u2014 no code work to analyze", "skip-mode");
+    await passAndExit(
+      "Skip mode \u2014 no code work to analyze",
+      "skip-mode",
+      turnAuthoredCode ? "capacity" : void 0
+    );
   }
   let staticResults = {
     tool: "@codacy/analysis-cli",
@@ -18239,7 +18600,8 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   let codeDelta = {
     files: [],
     total_lines: 0,
-    total_files: 0
+    total_files: 0,
+    excluded: []
   };
   let snapshotResult = { has_snapshots: false, diffs: [] };
   let contentHash = null;
@@ -18304,7 +18666,11 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
           if (assistantResponse) {
             analysisMode = "plan";
           } else {
-            await passAndExit("No files within size limits to analyze", "size-limit");
+            await passAndExit(
+              "No files within size limits to analyze",
+              "size-limit",
+              codeDelta.excluded.length > 0 ? "capacity" : "policy"
+            );
           }
         }
       }
@@ -18317,19 +18683,13 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         snapshotResult = generateSnapshotDiffs(codeDelta.files);
       }
       currentCommit = getCurrentCommit();
-      const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
-      const iterResult = checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations, contentHash ?? void 0);
-      if (iterResult.skip) await passAndExit(iterResult.skip, "iteration-cap");
-      iteration = iterResult.iteration;
+      iteration = readIterationState(currentCommit).iteration;
     }
   }
   if (analysisMode === "plan") {
     recordAnalysisStart();
     currentCommit = getCurrentCommit();
-    const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
-    const iterResult = checkMaxIterations(currentCommit, maxIterations);
-    if (iterResult.skip) await passAndExit(iterResult.skip, "iteration-cap");
-    iteration = iterResult.iteration;
+    iteration = readIterationState(currentCommit).iteration;
   }
   const contextFiles = gatherContextFiles(contextFilePaths, codeDelta.files);
   for (const f of codeDelta.files) {
@@ -18502,7 +18862,30 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     hasUserPrompt: (conversation?.prompts?.length ?? 0) > 0,
     isTTY: process.stdout.isTTY === true
   });
+  const excludedByReason = {};
+  for (const e of codeDelta.excluded ?? []) {
+    excludedByReason[e.reason] = (excludedByReason[e.reason] ?? 0) + 1;
+  }
+  const coverageTelemetry = {
+    // git's whole answer, before ANY narrowing. The number that has never been sent.
+    changed_all: allChanged.length,
+    analyzable: analyzable.length,
+    reviewable: reviewable.length,
+    security: securityFiles.length,
+    // after the allowlist, before authorship scoping and the caps
+    for_review: allForReview.length,
+    // what actually reaches the reviewer
+    sent: codeDelta.files.length,
+    // the two silent narrowings, counted separately so they can be told apart
+    capped_out: actionSummary?.capped_out?.length ?? 0,
+    excluded: (codeDelta.excluded ?? []).length,
+    excluded_by_reason: excludedByReason,
+    // was the transcript itself truncated? The 256 KB window means "this turn"
+    // can quietly mean "the last 256 KB of it".
+    transcript_windowed: actionSummary?.transcript_windowed ?? null
+  };
   const requestBody = {
+    coverage_telemetry: coverageTelemetry,
     static_results: staticResults,
     code_delta: codeDelta,
     changed_files: allForReview,
@@ -18588,6 +18971,54 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         // replaced a population floor with ≈35% power that was sub-integer for
         // three-quarters of the fleet.
         conservation: foldConservation,
+        // ⚠ VRT-52 — RECORDED, NOT APPLIED. The number nobody has.
+        //
+        // The whole "task-scoped delta" design space rests on an assumption that
+        // has been observed exactly ONCE: that delta files routinely belong to
+        // earlier work. Three designs were built on it and all three were killed
+        // adversarially — two by measurement — so before another is attempted,
+        // measure the base rate.
+        //
+        // `authored_under_earlier_goal` counts delta paths whose LAST authorship
+        // event precedes the seq of the goal now in force. Both numbers come from
+        // the same append-only counter (`nextSeq`), so the comparison is exact.
+        //
+        // Keyed on the GOAL, deliberately, not on the task id. The task classifier
+        // reported `is_new_task` on two consecutive turns of one task 25 seconds
+        // apart, so a task-keyed number would measure its unreliability rather
+        // than the phenomenon. And this only became meaningful once `recordGoal`
+        // stopped letting a bare "ok" supersede the goal — before that the seq
+        // advanced every turn and this would have degenerated to "not edited this
+        // turn", which is the exact mistake that sank one of the three designs.
+        //
+        // Changes no payload the reviewer sees, no narrowing, no verdict.
+        vrt52: (() => {
+          const goalSeq = memory?.projection.goal?.seq;
+          if (goalSeq === void 0 || !memorySession) return { known: false };
+          const lastSeq2 = new Map(
+            foldDossier(memorySession.d).authored_all.map((a) => [a.path, a.last_seq])
+          );
+          let earlier = 0;
+          let unknown = 0;
+          for (const f of codeDelta.files) {
+            const seen = lastSeq2.get(f.path);
+            if (seen === void 0) unknown++;
+            else if (seen < goalSeq) earlier++;
+          }
+          return {
+            known: true,
+            goal_seq: goalSeq,
+            delta: codeDelta.files.length,
+            // Files this delta carries that were last written under an EARLIER
+            // instruction. If this stays near zero, VRT-52's code half is
+            // unnecessary and should be closed saying so.
+            authored_under_earlier_goal: earlier,
+            // Delta files the dossier has no authorship record for at all —
+            // pre-existing tree state, or an authorship channel the fold cannot
+            // see. Reported separately so a blind spot is never counted as a zero.
+            no_authorship_record: unknown
+          };
+        })(),
         // P2 — RECORDED, NOT APPLIED. What this run WOULD have reviewed if it
         // narrowed to the within-session increment: what changed since the last
         // VERDICT rather than since task start.
@@ -18620,7 +19051,20 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     const intentContext = {};
     if (conversation && conversation.prompts.length > 0) {
       const latest = conversation.prompts[conversation.prompts.length - 1];
-      intentContext.user_prompt = latest.prompt;
+      const goalPrompt = resolveGoalPrompt(conversation.prompts) ?? { entry: latest, turnsBack: 0 };
+      intentContext.user_prompt = goalPrompt.entry.prompt;
+      if (isContinuationPrompt(intentContext.user_prompt)) {
+        const carried = memory?.projection.goal?.text;
+        if (carried && !isContinuationPrompt(carried)) {
+          intentContext.continuation_prompt = latest.prompt;
+          intentContext.user_prompt = carried;
+          logEvent("goal_from_dossier", { chars: carried.length });
+        }
+      }
+      if (goalPrompt.turnsBack > 0) {
+        intentContext.continuation_prompt = latest.prompt;
+        logEvent("goal_walked_back", { turns_back: goalPrompt.turnsBack });
+      }
       intentContext.session_id = latest.session_id || void 0;
       intentContext.prompt_captured_at = latest.captured_at || void 0;
       if (conversation.prompts.length > 1) {
@@ -18712,6 +19156,85 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
   const response = result.data;
   const decision = response.gate_decision ?? "(unrecognised)";
   const sentPaths = codeDelta.files.map((f) => f.path);
+  let openElsewhere = [];
+  if (memorySession) {
+    try {
+      const st = foldDossier(memorySession.d);
+      openElsewhere = openBlockingElsewhere(st.statements, sentPaths, (file, line) => {
+        try {
+          const src = (0, import_node_fs24.readFileSync)((0, import_node_path20.join)(repoRoot(), file), "utf8").split("\n");
+          const at = src[line - 1];
+          return at === void 0 ? null : lineSha(at);
+        } catch {
+          return null;
+        }
+      });
+    } catch {
+    }
+  }
+  const reviewCoverage = {
+    reviewed: sentPaths,
+    // Declared drops from the stages that DO report themselves today. The other
+    // stages surface via `unaccounted`, which is the tripwire, not the design.
+    notReviewed: [
+      // Every exit from the collection loop, each named. Six reasons where there
+      // used to be two recorded and four silent — the silent ones including the
+      // per-file size cap, which could drop a whole source file without leaving a
+      // trace anywhere in the payload or the run row.
+      ...codeDelta.excluded,
+      // The server-side 300-line middle-out truncation. It only bites on the
+      // full-file branch (a first analysis, before snapshots exist) because
+      // analyze normally sends diffs — but on that branch the reviewer sees the
+      // first and last 100 lines and nothing between, and until now said so to
+      // nobody. CAPACITY: a partial look is not a look.
+      ...(response.metadata?.truncated_files ?? []).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "file-middle-truncated-300-lines",
+        stage: "prompt-builder",
+        kind: "capacity"
+      })),
+      // The 20-entry edit cap. CAPACITY, and the sharpest of the lot: it narrows
+      // what is REVIEWED, not merely what is summarised — a session editing 25
+      // files had five silently excluded from the reviewed set.
+      ...(actionSummary?.capped_out ?? []).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "edit-list-cap-20",
+        stage: "extractActionSummary",
+        kind: "capacity"
+      })),
+      // ⚠ BASELINE SCOPING — the biggest source of false NOT A CLEAN REVIEW.
+      //
+      // The universe is `allChanged`, git's whole dirty tree. The reviewed set is
+      // scoped to what THIS SESSION authored (the VRT-26 contamination cure), so
+      // every pre-existing dirty file is in the universe, absent from `reviewed`,
+      // and — until now — declared by nobody. It fell through to `unaccounted`,
+      // became capacity, and produced "NOT A CLEAN REVIEW: admin.js" over a file
+      // that was never this session's to review.
+      //
+      // Measured 2026-08-04: three consecutive runs over an untouched tree gave
+      // three different answers — .claude/settings.json, then admin.js, then six
+      // files — because each run took a different path and each path had a
+      // different idea of the universe. POLICY: not this session's work is not a
+      // coverage gap, it is the cure working.
+      ...allChanged.filter((p) => !sentPaths.includes(p) && !codeDelta.excluded.some((e) => e.path === p)).filter((p) => analyzable.includes(p) || reviewable.includes(p) || securityFiles.includes(p)).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "not-authored-this-session",
+        stage: "baseline-scoping",
+        kind: "policy"
+      })),
+      // The extension allowlist, and it is POLICY rather than capacity: a changed
+      // README was never going to be reviewed, and treating that as a coverage
+      // gap would downgrade nearly every PASS to WARN until WARN meant nothing.
+      // Recorded so the ledger balances and so "what did Verity ignore entirely"
+      // is answerable — but it never touches the verdict.
+      ...allChanged.filter((p) => !analyzable.includes(p) && !reviewable.includes(p) && !securityFiles.includes(p)).map((path) => ({
+        path,
+        reason: "not-a-reviewed-file-type",
+        stage: "extension-allowlist",
+        kind: "policy"
+      }))
+    ]
+  };
   const watermarkHash = sentPaths.length > 0 ? computeContentHash(sentPaths) : contentHash;
   const watermarkIsPartial = !!codeDelta.truncated;
   let silenced = null;
@@ -18742,6 +19265,13 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     });
   }
   let intentRepeatCount = 0;
+  const priorPendingFingerprints = memorySession ? (() => {
+    try {
+      return foldDossier(memorySession.d).meta.recent_pending_sigs ?? [];
+    } catch {
+      return [];
+    }
+  })() : [];
   if (memorySession) {
     try {
       recordVerdict(memorySession.d, {
@@ -18764,7 +19294,10 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
         // What next turn reads as `emittedLast`. A suppressed turn did not
         // speak, so it cannot be the cause of the turn after it — which is what
         // keeps this from becoming a permanent gag.
-        emitted: !silenced
+        emitted: !silenced,
+        // Fingerprinted for the NEXT turn's repeat check. Reviewer pending items
+        // carry no `pattern_id`, so their content is the only available key.
+        pendingTexts: (response.pending_items ?? []).map((p) => String(p.description ?? p.title ?? p.reason ?? "")).filter(Boolean)
       });
       intentRepeatCount = Math.max(0, (foldDossier(memorySession.d).meta.intent_repeat?.consecutive ?? 1) - 1);
     } catch {
@@ -18864,9 +19397,41 @@ async function runAnalyze(opts, globals) {
     reverify_by: response.reverify_by
   });
   const grantNudge = grantWarning ? ` \u26A0\uFE0F ${grantWarning}` : "";
-  switch (decision) {
+  let capReleased = false;
+  let effectiveDecision = decision;
+  if (decision === "FAIL") {
+    const blocking = (response.findings ?? []).filter((f) => {
+      const sev = String(f.severity ?? "").toLowerCase();
+      return sev === "critical" || sev === "high";
+    });
+    const fingerprint = findingsFingerprint(blocking);
+    const prior = readIterationState(currentCommit);
+    const sameProblem = isSameProblem(prior.fingerprint, fingerprint);
+    const nextIteration = sameProblem ? prior.iteration + 1 : 1;
+    const maxIterations = parseInt(opts.maxIterations, 10);
+    writeIteration(nextIteration, currentCommit, contentHash ?? void 0, fingerprint);
+    iteration = nextIteration;
+    if (nextIteration > maxIterations) {
+      capReleased = true;
+      effectiveDecision = "WARN";
+      logEvent("iteration_cap_released", { iteration: nextIteration, fingerprint });
+    }
+  }
+  if (capReleased) {
+    const findings = response.findings ?? [];
+    const lines = findings.slice(0, 5).map((f) => `  [${String(f.severity ?? "?").toUpperCase()}] ${String(f.title ?? f.message ?? "")} (${String(f.file ?? "?")}:${String(f.line ?? "?")})`);
+    emitVerdict({
+      proposed: "WARN",
+      changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+      coverage: reviewCoverage,
+      userSummary: `Verity: WARN \u2014 self-healing limit (${opts.maxIterations}) reached on the same finding. NO LONGER BLOCKING, but ${findings.length} finding(s) remain OPEN and were NOT fixed. Human review required before deploying.
+${lines.join("\n")}`,
+      agentContext: null,
+      silenced: true
+    });
+  }
+  switch (effectiveDecision) {
     case "FAIL": {
-      writeIteration(iteration + 1, currentCommit, contentHash ?? void 0);
       const assessment = response.assessment;
       const narrative = assessment?.narrative ?? "";
       const findings = response.findings ?? [];
@@ -18943,7 +19508,19 @@ ${YELLOW}${loginNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (grantNudge) process.stderr.write(`
 ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
 `);
-      process.exit(2);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "FAIL",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary: "",
+        // Subject to the SAME cycle cut as PASS/WARN. Suppressing here is safe:
+        // the findings themselves are rendered above by the blocking renderer,
+        // so what the cut removes is the repeated commentary, never the defect.
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
+        // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
+        silenced: !!silenced,
+        openElsewhere
+      });
       break;
     }
     case "PASS": {
@@ -18955,10 +19532,16 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (viewUrl) userSummary += ` Report: ${viewUrl}`;
       if (autoSeedNotice) userSummary = `${autoSeedNotice} ${userSummary}`;
       userSummary += loginNudge + grantNudge;
-      printJsonCompact(
-        buildHookOutput("PASS", userSummary, silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount))
-      );
-      process.exit(0);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "PASS",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary,
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
+        // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
+        silenced: !!silenced,
+        openElsewhere
+      });
       break;
     }
     case "WARN": {
@@ -18969,10 +19552,16 @@ ${YELLOW}${grantNudge.trim()}${NC}
       if (viewUrl) userSummary += ` Report: ${viewUrl}`;
       if (autoSeedNotice) userSummary = `${autoSeedNotice} ${userSummary}`;
       userSummary += loginNudge + grantNudge;
-      printJsonCompact(
-        buildHookOutput("WARN", userSummary, silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount))
-      );
-      process.exit(0);
+      emitVerdict({
+        proposed: "WARN",
+        changed: skipCoverageChanged,
+        coverage: reviewCoverage,
+        userSummary,
+        agentContext: silenced ? null : agentContextFor(response, intentRepeatCount, priorPendingFingerprints),
+        // The coverage note is silenced with it — half a channel is still a channel.
+        silenced: !!silenced,
+        openElsewhere
+      });
       break;
     }
     default: {
@@ -19085,8 +19674,8 @@ async function runReview(opts, globals) {
     for (const p of specPaths) {
       if (!(0, import_node_fs26.existsSync)(p)) continue;
       try {
-        const { readFileSync: readFileSync15 } = await import("node:fs");
-        const content = readFileSync15(p, "utf-8");
+        const { readFileSync: readFileSync16 } = await import("node:fs");
+        const content = readFileSync16(p, "utf-8");
         specs.push({ path: p, content: content.slice(0, 10240) });
       } catch {
       }
@@ -19889,6 +20478,13 @@ async function confirmExistingLogin(serviceUrl, remote, opts) {
     return "handled";
   }
   if (!who.ok) {
+    const denial = authDenialRemedy(who.error);
+    if (denial) {
+      console.log("");
+      printWarn(`Your existing Verity credential was rejected (${denial.code}).`);
+      printInfo(`  ${denial.remedy}`);
+      return "drive-login";
+    }
     if (existing.data.userId != null) {
       printInfo(`Logged in as ${existing.data.email ?? `user #${existing.data.userId}`} (cached \u2014 could not reach the Verity service). \u2713`);
     } else {
@@ -19904,15 +20500,14 @@ async function confirmExistingLogin(serviceUrl, remote, opts) {
   return "drive-login";
 }
 async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
-  let serviceUrl = resolution?.url ?? DEFAULT_SERVICE_URL;
-  let healed = false;
-  if (resolution) {
-    const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, opts.verbose);
-    serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
-    healed = heal.healed;
-    if (healed) {
-      printInfo("  Log in below to re-register this project and repair ~/.verity/credentials.");
-    }
+  if (resolution.source === "default") {
+    printInfo(`No Verity service configured on this machine \u2014 using the default: ${resolution.url}`);
+  }
+  const heal = await maybeHealServiceUrl(resolution, opts.verbose);
+  const serviceUrl = heal.serviceUrl;
+  const healed = heal.healed;
+  if (healed) {
+    printInfo("  Log in below to re-register this project and repair ~/.verity/credentials.");
   }
   let remote = "";
   try {
@@ -19930,8 +20525,10 @@ async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
   if (process.stdin.isTTY && process.stdout.isTTY) {
     console.log("");
     console.log("  Signing in is optional. What it does:");
-    console.log("    - Confirms you have write access to this repository. The GitHub token");
-    console.log("      is used once to verify that, then discarded \u2014 Verity never stores it.");
+    console.log("    - Confirms which repositories you can write to. The GitHub token is");
+    console.log("      used once for that check, then discarded \u2014 Verity never stores it.");
+    console.log("    - One login covers every repository you can write to \u2014 other repos");
+    console.log("      need no further sign-in on this machine.");
     console.log("    - It does NOT give Verity access to your code. Code checked by the gate");
     console.log("      is analyzed in memory and discarded \u2014 we never store your code.");
     console.log("    - It is required to store and access run history for this repo");
@@ -19946,17 +20543,10 @@ async function runOptionalAuth(resolution, opts = {}) {
     localOnlyNote();
     return;
   }
-  if (!remote) {
-    printWarn("No git remote found \u2014 cannot authenticate yet.");
-    localOnlyNote();
-    return;
-  }
-  const projectName = parseRemote(remote)?.repo ?? (0, import_node_path23.basename)(process.cwd());
   printInfo("Authenticating with GitHub\u2026");
-  const result = await registerProject({ projectName, remote, serviceUrl, verbose: opts.verbose });
+  const result = await loginOnce({ serviceUrl, remote: remote || void 0, verbose: opts.verbose });
   if (result.ok) {
-    const who = result.data.email ?? (result.data.userId != null ? `user #${result.data.userId}` : null);
-    printInfo(`Logged in${who ? ` as ${who}` : ""} \u2713 \u2014 runs, history, and cloud memory now sync to Verity.`);
+    await reportLoginOutcome(result.data, { remote: remote || void 0, verbose: opts.verbose });
   } else {
     printWarn(`Authentication did not complete: ${result.error}`);
     localOnlyNote();
@@ -20107,8 +20697,8 @@ function registerInitCommand(program2) {
     console.log("");
     try {
       const globals = program2.opts();
-      const urlResult = await resolveServiceUrlDetailed(globals.serviceUrl);
-      await runOptionalAuth(urlResult.ok ? urlResult.data : null, {
+      const resolution = await resolveServiceUrlForAuth(globals.serviceUrl);
+      await runOptionalAuth(resolution, {
         token: globals.token,
         verbose: globals.verbose
       });
@@ -20772,7 +21362,7 @@ function registerTelemetryCommands(program2) {
 }
 
 // src/cli.ts
-program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.055cd97").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
+program.name("verity").description("CLI for Verity quality gate service").version("0.28.1-experimental.2cbb593").option("--token <token>", "Override authentication token").option("--service-url <url>", "Override service URL").option("--verbose", "Log HTTP requests/responses to stderr").hook("preAction", async () => {
   try {
     await foldLegacyLocalCredential();
   } catch {