@cnwenf/occ 2.1.289 → 2.1.291

package/README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 [![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/@cnwenf/occ.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@cnwenf/occ)
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](./LICENSE)
 [![Runtime: Bun](https://img.shields.io/badge/Runtime-Bun-%23000000.svg)](https://bun.sh/)
-[![Tracks: Claude Code 2.1.218](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tracks-Claude%20Code%202.1.218-blueviolet.svg)](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)
+[![Tracks: Claude Code 2.1.219](https://img.shields.io/badge/Tracks-Claude%20Code%202.1.219-blueviolet.svg)](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)
 
 [简体中文](./README.zh-CN.md) · **English**
 
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 
 ## What is OCC
 
-**Open C Code (OCC)** is an open-source coding agent. Its capabilities are aligned with [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code) (currently tracking `2.1.218`). The code is fully open, auditable, backdoor-free, and your data stays under your control.
+**Open C Code (OCC)** is an open-source coding agent. Its capabilities are aligned with [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code) (currently tracking `2.1.219` — 2.1.218 fully aligned, 2.1.219 partial per OCC-39 gap report). The code is fully open, auditable, backdoor-free, and your data stays under your control.
 
 If you worry that a closed-source CLI might hide backdoors, or that your code and credentials are uploaded to unauditable services, OCC is for you: all source is open and unobfuscated, the build is reproducible from source, and API credentials are sent only to endpoints you configure.
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ Requires a valid Anthropic API Key (or AWS Bedrock / Google Vertex / Azure Found
 | **Auditability** | Line-by-line reviewable | No |
 | **Telemetry** | Minimal (analytics stubbed) | Standard |
 | **Data sovereignty** | Credentials stay on your machine; requests only to endpoints you configure | Anthropic endpoints |
-| **Capability parity** | Tracks CC `2.1.218` | Reference implementation |
+| **Capability parity** | Tracks CC `2.1.219` (partial) | Reference implementation |
 | **Providers** | Anthropic Direct, Bedrock, Vertex, Azure | Anthropic, Bedrock, Vertex |
 | **Cost** | Free & open-source (MIT) | Subscription |
 | **Build** | Reproducible from source | N/A |
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ For architecture, entry/bootstrap, tool system, UI layer, and module-status deta
 
 ## Status
 
-- Tracks Claude Code **`2.1.218`**.
+- Tracks Claude Code **`2.1.219` (partial)**.
 - Published to npm as [`@cnwenf/occ`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@cnwenf/occ).
 - Many modules are intentionally stubbed or feature-flagged off — see "Disabled / stubbed" above.
 

package/dist/cli.js

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bun
-globalThis.MACRO={"VERSION":"2.1.289","BINARY_NAME":"occ","BUILD_TIME":"2026-07-28T17:56:28.643Z","FEEDBACK_CHANNEL":"","ISSUES_EXPLAINER":"","NATIVE_PACKAGE_URL":"","PACKAGE_URL":"@cnwenf/occ","VERSION_CHANGELOG":""};
+globalThis.MACRO={"VERSION":"2.1.291","BINARY_NAME":"occ","BUILD_TIME":"2026-07-30T17:31:04.907Z","FEEDBACK_CHANNEL":"","ISSUES_EXPLAINER":"","NATIVE_PACKAGE_URL":"","PACKAGE_URL":"@cnwenf/occ","VERSION_CHANGELOG":""};
 // @bun
 var __create = Object.create;
 var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;
@@ -57625,6 +57625,7 @@ var init_sandboxTypes = __esm(() => {
     allowedDomains: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()).optional(),
     deniedDomains: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()).optional().describe("Domains to block even when a broader allowedDomains wildcard would otherwise permit them."),
     allowManagedDomainsOnly: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("When true (and set in managed settings), only allowedDomains and WebFetch(domain:...) allow rules from managed settings are respected. " + "User, project, local, and flag settings domains are ignored. Denied domains are still respected from all sources."),
+    strictAllowlist: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("When true, the sandbox runtime deterministically denies hosts not in allowedDomains instead of prompting. " + "Enforced for sandboxed commands only \u2014 in-process tools such as WebFetch are not gated by this setting. " + "Only honored from user, managed/policy, or CLI (--settings) settings \u2014 " + "project settings (.claude/settings.json and .claude/settings.local.json) are ignored."),
     allowUnixSockets: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()).optional().describe("macOS only: Unix socket paths to allow. Ignored on Linux (seccomp cannot filter by path)."),
     allowAllUnixSockets: exports_external.boolean().optional().describe("If true, allow all Unix sockets (disables blocking on both platforms)."),
     allowLocalBinding: exports_external.boolean().optional(),
@@ -59376,7 +59377,11 @@ var init_types2 = __esm(() => {
     message: 'Entry must have exactly one of "serverName", "serverCommand", or "serverUrl"'
   }));
   DeniedMcpServerEntrySchema = lazySchema(() => exports_external.object({
-    serverName: exports_external.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, "Server name can only contain letters, numbers, hyphens, and underscores").optional().describe("Name of the MCP server that is explicitly blocked"),
+    serverName: exports_external.string().min(1, "Server name must be non-empty").refine((name) => name.trim().length > 0, {
+      message: "Server name must not be whitespace-only"
+    }).refine((name) => name === name.trim(), {
+      message: "Server name has leading or trailing whitespace and will never match (names are compared verbatim)"
+    }).optional().describe("Name of the MCP server that is explicitly blocked"),
     serverCommand: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()).min(1, "Server command must have at least one element (the command)").optional().describe("Command array [command, ...args] to match exactly for blocked stdio servers"),
     serverUrl: exports_external.string().optional().describe('URL pattern with wildcard support (e.g., "https://*.example.com/*") for blocked remote MCP servers')
   }).refine((data) => {
@@ -100633,6 +100638,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 3,
     outputTokens: 15,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 3.75,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 6,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 0.3,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100640,6 +100646,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 15,
     outputTokens: 75,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 18.75,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 30,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 1.5,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100647,6 +100654,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 5,
     outputTokens: 25,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 6.25,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 10,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 0.5,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100654,6 +100662,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 30,
     outputTokens: 150,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 37.5,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 60,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 3,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100661,6 +100670,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 10,
     outputTokens: 50,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 12.5,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 20,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 1,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100668,6 +100678,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 0.8,
     outputTokens: 4,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 1,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 1.6,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 0.08,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -100675,6 +100686,7 @@ var init_modelCost = __esm(() => {
     inputTokens: 1,
     outputTokens: 5,
     promptCacheWriteTokens: 1.25,
+    promptCacheWrite1hTokens: 2,
     promptCacheReadTokens: 0.1,
     webSearchRequests: 0.01
   };
@@ -201061,6 +201073,7 @@ Usage notes:
 // src/utils/sandbox/sandbox-adapter.ts
 var exports_sandbox_adapter = {};
 __export(exports_sandbox_adapter, {
+  shouldEnforceStrictAllowlist: () => shouldEnforceStrictAllowlist,
   shouldAllowManagedSandboxDomainsOnly: () => shouldAllowManagedSandboxDomainsOnly,
   resolveSandboxFilesystemPath: () => resolveSandboxFilesystemPath,
   resolvePathPatternForSandbox: () => resolvePathPatternForSandbox,
@@ -201108,6 +201121,14 @@ function resolveSandboxFilesystemPath(pattern, source) {
 function shouldAllowManagedSandboxDomainsOnly() {
   return getSettingsForSource("policySettings")?.sandbox?.network?.allowManagedDomainsOnly === true;
 }
+function shouldEnforceStrictAllowlist() {
+  const honoredSources = [
+    "userSettings",
+    "flagSettings",
+    "policySettings"
+  ];
+  return honoredSources.some((source) => getSettingsForSource(source)?.sandbox?.network?.strictAllowlist === true);
+}
 function shouldAllowManagedReadPathsOnly() {
   return getSettingsForSource("policySettings")?.sandbox?.filesystem?.allowManagedReadPathsOnly === true;
 }
@@ -201469,6 +201490,10 @@ async function initialize3(sandboxAskCallback) {
       logForDebugging(`[sandbox] Blocked network request to ${hostPattern.host} (allowManagedDomainsOnly)`);
       return false;
     }
+    if (shouldEnforceStrictAllowlist()) {
+      logForDebugging(`[sandbox] Blocked network request to ${hostPattern.host} (strictAllowlist)`);
+      return false;
+    }
     return sandboxAskCallback(hostPattern);
   } : undefined;
   initializationPromise2 = (async () => {
@@ -452643,6 +452668,11 @@ var init_coreSchemas = __esm(() => {
       name: exports_external.string(),
       status: exports_external.string()
     })),
+    mcp_server_errors: exports_external.array(exports_external.object({
+      name: exports_external.string(),
+      type: exports_external.string(),
+      message: exports_external.string()
+    })).optional().describe("@internal MCP server config errors collected during connection"),
     model: exports_external.string(),
     permissionMode: PermissionModeSchema(),
     slash_commands: exports_external.array(exports_external.string()),
@@ -738433,6 +738463,8 @@ function sdkCompatToolName(name3) {
 function buildSystemInitMessage(inputs) {
   const settings = getSettings_DEPRECATED();
   const outputStyle = settings?.outputStyle ?? DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE_NAME;
+  const mcpClientNames = new Set(inputs.mcpClients.map((client8) => client8.name));
+  const filteredMcpServerErrors = inputs.mcpServerErrors.filter((error52) => !mcpClientNames.has(error52.name));
   const initMessage = {
     type: "system",
     subtype: "init",
@@ -738443,6 +738475,13 @@ function buildSystemInitMessage(inputs) {
       name: client8.name,
       status: client8.type
     })),
+    ...filteredMcpServerErrors.length > 0 && {
+      mcp_server_errors: filteredMcpServerErrors.map((error52) => ({
+        name: error52.name,
+        type: error52.type,
+        message: error52.message
+      }))
+    },
     model: inputs.model,
     permissionMode: inputs.permissionMode,
     slash_commands: inputs.commands.filter((c9) => c9.userInvocable !== false).map((c9) => c9.name),
@@ -742881,6 +742920,7 @@ function useReplBridge(messages, setMessages, abortControllerRef, commands7, mai
                       handleRef.current?.writeSdkMessages([buildSystemInitMessage({
                         tools: [],
                         mcpClients: [],
+                        mcpServerErrors: [],
                         model: mainLoopModelRef.current,
                         permissionMode: state_0.toolPermissionContext.mode,
                         commands: commandsRef.current.filter(isBridgeSafeCommand),
@@ -814885,6 +814925,7 @@ class QueryEngine {
     yield buildSystemInitMessage({
       tools,
       mcpClients,
+      mcpServerErrors: [],
       model: mainLoopModel,
       permissionMode: initialAppState.toolPermissionContext.mode,
       commands: commands7,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@cnwenf/occ",
-  "version": "2.1.289",
+  "version": "2.1.291",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
   "bin": {