@cmmd-center/forge 0.13.123 → 0.13.125

package/dist/bin.cjs

@@ -30767,7 +30767,7 @@ function frameClassByte(frameClass) {
 	if (frameClass === "application") return Uint8Array.of(1);
 	return Uint8Array.of(2);
 }
-function encodeBase64Url$1(value) {
+function encodeBase64Url$2(value) {
 	let output = "";
 	for (let index = 0; index < value.byteLength; index += 3) {
 		const first = value[index] ?? 0;
@@ -30797,7 +30797,7 @@ function decodeBase64Url$1(value) {
 			outputIndex += 1;
 		}
 	}
-	if (encodeBase64Url$1(output) !== value) throw new RelayPayloadChannelFailure("channel_authentication_failed", "Encrypted relay frame has a non-canonical base64url encoding.");
+	if (encodeBase64Url$2(output) !== value) throw new RelayPayloadChannelFailure("channel_authentication_failed", "Encrypted relay frame has a non-canonical base64url encoding.");
 	return output;
 }
 function isLowOrderX25519PublicKey(value) {
@@ -30836,7 +30836,7 @@ async function createRelayPayloadBinding(input, digestProvider = defaultDigestPr
 	};
 }
 function relayPayloadTicketDigestBase64Url(binding) {
-	return encodeBase64Url$1(binding.ticketDigest);
+	return encodeBase64Url$2(binding.ticketDigest);
 }
 function relayPayloadInfo(binding) {
 	return concat([
@@ -30873,7 +30873,7 @@ async function generateRelayEndpointKeyPair(randomSource = defaultRandomSource)
 }
 async function serializeRelayEndpointPublicKey(publicKey) {
 	try {
-		return encodeBase64Url$1(bytes(await suite.kem.serializePublicKey(publicKey)));
+		return encodeBase64Url$2(bytes(await suite.kem.serializePublicKey(publicKey)));
 	} catch (error) {
 		throw new RelayPayloadChannelFailure("endpoint_key_invalid", error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Endpoint public-key serialization failed.");
 	}
@@ -30928,7 +30928,7 @@ var HpkeRelayPayloadSender = class {
 	constructor(binding, context) {
 		this.binding = binding;
 		this.context = context;
-		this.encapsulatedKey = encodeBase64Url$1(bytes(context.enc));
+		this.encapsulatedKey = encodeBase64Url$2(bytes(context.enc));
 	}
 	seal(input) {
 		return this.queue.run(async () => {
@@ -30958,7 +30958,7 @@ var HpkeRelayPayloadSender = class {
 				direction: this.binding.direction,
 				frameClass: input.frameClass,
 				sequence,
-				ciphertext: encodeBase64Url$1(ciphertext)
+				ciphertext: encodeBase64Url$2(ciphertext)
 			};
 		});
 	}
@@ -66337,7 +66337,7 @@ function normalizeNumberish(value) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region package.json
-var version$1 = "0.13.123";
+var version$1 = "0.13.125";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/sentry.ts
 const SERVER_APP_NAME = "forge-server";
@@ -71414,6 +71414,19 @@ function mintCmmdShortLivedToken(grantToken) {
 	});
 }
 /**
+* The redemption request body. `popPublicKeyPem` is the server's PoP identity
+* (forge#3534): presented when bound sessions are enabled so CMMD stamps the
+* returned JWT with this server's key (`cnf.jkt`), omitted otherwise.
+*/
+function buildSessionGrantRedemptionBody(grantToken, popPublicKeyPem) {
+	return {
+		grant_type: "forge_session_grant",
+		grant_token: grantToken,
+		client_id: "cmmd-forge-web",
+		...popPublicKeyPem ? { pop_public_key: popPublicKeyPem } : {}
+	};
+}
+/**
 * Redeem a durable CMMD session grant for a fresh credential set.
 *
 * The grant is CMMD's designed recovery path for exactly the case a rotating
@@ -71425,15 +71438,11 @@ function mintCmmdShortLivedToken(grantToken) {
 * Returns the new MCP PAT alongside the JWT/refresh pair, because CMMD mints a
 * fresh PAT on redemption and the old one is not carried over.
 */
-function redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken) {
+function redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken, popPublicKeyPem) {
 	return fetch(new URL("/api/mcp-server/oauth/token", resolveCommandAppUrl()).toString(), {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-		body: JSON.stringify({
-			grant_type: "forge_session_grant",
-			grant_token: grantToken,
-			client_id: "cmmd-forge-web"
-		})
+		body: JSON.stringify(buildSessionGrantRedemptionBody(grantToken, popPublicKeyPem))
 	}).then(async (response) => {
 		if (!response.ok) return null;
 		const payload = await response.json();
@@ -71504,6 +71513,140 @@ async function readOAuthErrorCode(response) {
 	}
 }
 //#endregion
+//#region ../../packages/shared/src/cmmdSessionPop.ts
+/**
+* CMMD session proof-of-possession client protocol (forge#3517).
+*
+* A CMMD session issued to a Forge client can be bound to the client's Ed25519
+* device key: the public key travels with the login (`pop_public_key`), CMMD
+* stamps its thumbprint into the token (`cnf.jkt`), and every authenticated
+* request must then carry a detached Ed25519 signature over a canonical
+* request binding (method + path + timestamp + nonce). A stolen bearer token
+* alone is unusable.
+*
+* This module is the client half of the scheme CMMD verifies in
+* `server/services/auth/session-pop-binding.ts`. The protocol deliberately
+* reuses CMMD's existing crypto shapes rather than inventing a new scheme: the
+* thumbprint is the same sha256-over-SPKI-DER base64url digest as the forge
+* device registry and the desktop relay identity, and the signature covers
+* `<purpose>.<base64url payload>`, the forge relay challenge shape, with
+* Ed25519. It is not a DPoP port: proofs are plain headers, not JWTs.
+*/
+const HEADER_KEY = "x-cmmd-pop-key";
+const HEADER_INPUT = "x-cmmd-pop-input";
+const HEADER_SIGNATURE = "x-cmmd-pop-signature";
+const CMMD_SESSION_POP_PURPOSE = "cmmd-session-pop-v1";
+function encodeBase64Url$1(bytes) {
+	let binary = "";
+	for (const byte of bytes) binary += String.fromCharCode(byte);
+	return btoa(binary).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/u, "");
+}
+function buildCmmdSessionPopSigningInput(payload) {
+	return `${CMMD_SESSION_POP_PURPOSE}.${encodeBase64Url$1(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload)))}`;
+}
+function randomNonce() {
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
+	crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+	return encodeBase64Url$1(bytes);
+}
+/**
+* Build the three proof headers for one request. Each call produces a fresh
+* nonce; callers must not reuse the returned headers across attempts
+* (retries included), because CMMD rejects replayed nonces.
+*/
+async function buildCmmdSessionPopProofHeaders(input) {
+	const payload = {
+		version: 1,
+		htm: input.method.toUpperCase(),
+		htu: input.path,
+		ts: input.nowSeconds ?? Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3),
+		nonce: input.nonce ?? randomNonce()
+	};
+	const signingInput = buildCmmdSessionPopSigningInput(payload);
+	const signature = await input.signer.sign(signingInput);
+	const spkiDer = decodePemSpkiDer(input.signer.publicKeyPem);
+	return {
+		[HEADER_KEY]: encodeBase64Url$1(spkiDer),
+		[HEADER_INPUT]: encodeBase64Url$1(new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(payload))),
+		[HEADER_SIGNATURE]: encodeBase64Url$1(signature)
+	};
+}
+function decodePemSpkiDer(pem) {
+	const base64 = pem.replace("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----", "").replace("-----END PUBLIC KEY-----", "").replace(/\s+/gu, "").replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/");
+	const padded = base64 + "=".repeat((4 - base64.length % 4) % 4);
+	const binary = atob(padded);
+	const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length);
+	for (let index = 0; index < binary.length; index += 1) bytes[index] = binary.charCodeAt(index);
+	return bytes;
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/cmmd/cmmdSessionPopServer.ts
+/**
+* The Forge server's own CMMD session proof-of-possession identity (forge#3534,
+* D3): the server holds an Ed25519 key, presents its SPKI PEM as
+* `pop_public_key` when it redeems a CMMD session grant, and signs every
+* CMMD-origin REST call it makes with detached proofs, so a stolen bearer JWT
+* alone is unusable. CMMD verifies the scheme in
+* `server/services/auth/session-pop-binding.ts`.
+*
+* Rollout order (docs/forge-cmmd-auth-lanes.md): CMMD deploys first; Forge
+* flips `FORGE_CMMD_SESSION_POP_ENABLED` afterwards; CMMD's
+* `JWT_REQUIRE_BOUND_SESSIONS=true` is the contract phase. While the flag is
+* off this module produces no keys and no headers, and CMMD treats tokens as
+* plain bearers.
+*
+* The identity lives in memory for the process lifetime. After a restart the
+* server mints a new identity; CMMD then refuses proofs from the old one, and
+* the JWT resolver's recovery ladder re-mints the affected credentials. The
+* persistence duty (a stable identity across restarts) lands with the flag
+* rollout, not with this plumbing.
+*/
+const ENABLED_FLAG = "FORGE_CMMD_SESSION_POP_ENABLED";
+/** Enables session proofs only when the rollout flag is exactly "true". */
+function isCmmdSessionPopEnabled() {
+	return process.env[ENABLED_FLAG] === "true";
+}
+let cachedSigner = null;
+/** Creates an in-memory Ed25519 identity with a public SPKI PEM and a detached signer. */
+function createServerSigner() {
+	const { publicKey, privateKey } = (0, node_crypto.generateKeyPairSync)("ed25519");
+	const exported = publicKey.export({
+		type: "spki",
+		format: "pem"
+	});
+	return {
+		publicKeyPem: typeof exported === "string" ? exported : exported.toString("utf8"),
+		sign: async (signingInput) => new Uint8Array((0, node_crypto.sign)(null, Buffer.from(signingInput, "utf8"), privateKey))
+	};
+}
+/**
+* The server's PoP identity, created on first use under the flag and stable
+* for the process lifetime. Null while the flag is off.
+*/
+function resolveCmmdSessionPopSigner() {
+	if (!isCmmdSessionPopEnabled()) return null;
+	cachedSigner ??= createServerSigner();
+	return cachedSigner;
+}
+/** The `pop_public_key` value to present at issuance, or null while disabled. */
+function cmmdSessionPopPublicKey() {
+	return resolveCmmdSessionPopSigner()?.publicKeyPem ?? null;
+}
+/**
+* The three proof headers for one CMMD-origin request, or no headers while
+* disabled. Each call carries a fresh nonce; never reuse the result across
+* attempts, because CMMD rejects replayed nonces.
+*/
+async function cmmdSessionPopRequestHeaders(input) {
+	const signer = resolveCmmdSessionPopSigner();
+	if (!signer) return {};
+	return buildCmmdSessionPopProofHeaders({
+		signer,
+		method: input.method,
+		path: input.path
+	});
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region src/command/cmmdTokenMintLane.ts
 /**
 * The CMMD token-mint lane (forge#3518, expand phase).
@@ -71756,7 +71899,7 @@ function tryGrantRedemption(sessionId, context) {
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		yield* logCmmdJwtRung(context, "grant-redemption", "attempted", "redeeming this session's durable CMMD session grant");
 		yield* recordCmmdCredentialRefreshMetric("grant-redemption", "attempted");
-		const redeemed = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken)).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => null));
+		const redeemed = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken, cmmdSessionPopPublicKey())).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => null));
 		const accessToken = usableCmmdUserJwt(redeemed?.accessToken);
 		if (!accessToken) {
 			yield* logCmmdJwtRung(context, "grant-redemption", "failed", "session grant redemption did not return a usable user access JWT");
@@ -72045,11 +72188,25 @@ async function requireCmmdProxySuccess(response, signal) {
 * Uses the stored JWT (set after OAuth auth-code flow with post-update CMMD)
 * to make authenticated REST calls on behalf of the user. A missing delegated
 * JWT is an authentication-required state, not a CMMD availability failure.
+*
+* Every request this module sends can carry the server's session
+* proof-of-possession headers (forge#3534): while
+* `FORGE_CMMD_SESSION_POP_ENABLED` is true, `authHeaders` attaches detached
+* Ed25519 proofs over each request's method and path, which CMMD requires for
+* tokens bound with `cnf.jkt` and ignores otherwise. Each call gets a fresh
+* nonce, so retries re-sign rather than replay.
 */
-function authHeaders(jwt, orgId) {
+/** Builds owner JWT and optional organization headers with fresh, flag-gated session proofs. */
+async function authHeaders(jwt, orgId, method, path) {
 	const headers = { Authorization: `Bearer ${jwt}` };
 	if (orgId) headers["X-Organization-ID"] = orgId;
-	return headers;
+	return {
+		...headers,
+		...await cmmdSessionPopRequestHeaders({
+			method,
+			path
+		})
+	};
 }
 async function fetchResponse(url, init, options) {
 	try {
@@ -72061,18 +72218,20 @@ async function fetchResponse(url, init, options) {
 		rethrowCmmdProxyTimeout(error, options?.signal);
 	}
 }
+/** Fetches a CMMD JSON resource with optional query parameters and caller cancellation. */
 async function proxyGet(jwt, path, searchParams, orgId, options) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	const url = new URL(path, cmmdBase);
 	if (searchParams) for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(searchParams)) url.searchParams.set(k, v);
-	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetchResponse(url.toString(), { headers: authHeaders(jwt, orgId) }, options), options?.signal);
+	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetchResponse(url.toString(), { headers: await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "GET", path) }, options), options?.signal);
 }
+/** Posts JSON to CMMD on the owner JWT lane and decodes the response or upstream error. */
 async function proxyPost(jwt, path, body, orgId, options) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetchResponse(new URL(path, cmmdBase).toString(), {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "POST", path),
 			"Content-Type": "application/json"
 		},
 		body: JSON.stringify(body)
@@ -72086,44 +72245,49 @@ async function responseWithMetadata(response, signal) {
 		retryAfter: response.headers.get("retry-after")
 	};
 }
+/** Fetches a CMMD resource while preserving status, Location, and Retry-After metadata. */
 async function proxyGetWithMetadata(jwt, path, orgId, options) {
-	return responseWithMetadata(await fetchResponse(new URL(path, resolveCommandAppUrl()).toString(), { headers: authHeaders(jwt, orgId) }, options), options?.signal);
+	return responseWithMetadata(await fetchResponse(new URL(path, resolveCommandAppUrl()).toString(), { headers: await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "GET", path) }, options), options?.signal);
 }
+/** Posts JSON to CMMD while preserving status, Location, and Retry-After metadata. */
 async function proxyPostWithMetadata(jwt, path, body, orgId, options) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	return responseWithMetadata(await fetchResponse(new URL(path, cmmdBase).toString(), {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "POST", path),
 			"Content-Type": "application/json"
 		},
 		body: JSON.stringify(body)
 	}, options), options?.signal);
 }
+/** Applies a JSON patch request to CMMD using the owner JWT and optional organization. */
 async function proxyPatch(jwt, path, body, orgId) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	const url = new URL(path, cmmdBase);
 	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetch(url.toString(), {
 		method: "PATCH",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "PATCH", path),
 			"Content-Type": "application/json"
 		},
 		body: JSON.stringify(body)
 	}));
 }
+/** Sends a JSON replacement request to CMMD and decodes its response or upstream error. */
 async function proxyPut(jwt, path, body, orgId) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	const url = new URL(path, cmmdBase);
 	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetch(url.toString(), {
 		method: "PUT",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "PUT", path),
 			"Content-Type": "application/json"
 		},
 		body: JSON.stringify(body)
 	}));
 }
+/** Deletes a CMMD resource with optional query parameters and JSON body; 204 returns undefined. */
 async function proxyDelete(jwt, path, searchParams, orgId, body) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	const url = new URL(path, cmmdBase);
@@ -72131,7 +72295,7 @@ async function proxyDelete(jwt, path, searchParams, orgId, body) {
 	const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
 		method: "DELETE",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "DELETE", path),
 			...body === void 0 ? {} : { "Content-Type": "application/json" }
 		},
 		...body === void 0 ? {} : { body: JSON.stringify(body) }
@@ -72139,13 +72303,14 @@ async function proxyDelete(jwt, path, searchParams, orgId, body) {
 	if (!response.ok && response.status !== 204) await requireCmmdProxySuccess(response);
 	return response.status === 204 ? void 0 : handleCmmdProxyResponse(response);
 }
+/** Forwards multipart bytes to CMMD, preserving the caller's content type and boundary. */
 async function proxyMultipart(jwt, path, body, contentType, orgId) {
 	const cmmdBase = resolveCommandAppUrl();
 	const url = new URL(path, cmmdBase);
 	return handleCmmdProxyResponse(await fetch(url.toString(), {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: {
-			...authHeaders(jwt, orgId),
+			...await authHeaders(jwt, orgId, "POST", path),
 			"Content-Type": contentType
 		},
 		body
@@ -300407,7 +300572,7 @@ function resolveBuildCommitFromEnv(env) {
 * environment descriptor down instead of reporting an honest "unknown".
 */
 function readBakedBuildCommit() {
-	return "36ad9a06120f61eef3931979fa6c199d3c862efb";
+	return "2b217d6b85f7c98cf77e2a23bce2ef8102d3a0a5";
 }
 async function resolveServerBuildCommit(input) {
 	if (isFullCommitSha(input.baked)) return input.baked;
@@ -313335,6 +313500,44 @@ const cmmdUpdateProjectAgentMemberAvatarRouteLayer = registerProxyRoute({
 	responseShape: "unwrapData"
 });
 //#endregion
+//#region src/command/cmmdPushProxyRoutes.ts
+/**
+* The signed-in phone's push registration, forwarded to CMMD's push
+* device-token API on the owner's stored CMMD JWT (forge#3534).
+*
+* CMMD owns push delivery: the `device_push_tokens` table, the Expo transport,
+* and the `mobile_push_v1` delivery flag are all CMMD-side, and its
+* registration API lives at `/api/push`, not under `/api/forge/context`. The
+* mobile push delivery spec (docs/specs/2026-09-09-mobile-push-delivery.md,
+* stage 2) recommends reusing that API over adding a forge-context doorway
+* first: the Forge server already holds the phone's CMMD credential, and the
+* registry prologue here provides the same session auth, CMMD-connection
+* gate, and `CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED` mapping every `/api/cmmd` route gets. The
+* deny-listed legacy owner control paths are untouched. If review wants a
+* forge-context doorway first, these two routes are the only call sites to
+* repoint.
+*
+* `orgIdSource` is `none` (the organization comes from the JWT, like the
+* settings and device-registry routes): a phone registers against its default
+* organization and has no workspace context to pass.
+*/
+const cmmdRegisterMobilePushDeviceRouteLayer = registerProxyRoute({
+	forgePath: "/api/cmmd/mobile/push/registration",
+	method: "POST",
+	cmmdPath: "/api/push/device-tokens",
+	orgIdSource: "none",
+	responseShape: "unwrapData",
+	successStatus: 201
+});
+const cmmdDeleteMobilePushDeviceRouteLayer = registerProxyRoute({
+	forgePath: "/api/cmmd/mobile/push/registration",
+	method: "DELETE",
+	cmmdPath: "/api/push/device-tokens",
+	orgIdSource: "none",
+	responseShape: "unwrapData",
+	requestBody: "json"
+});
+//#endregion
 //#region src/command/runtimeProviderAuthorityUpgradeModel.ts
 const AUTHORITY_UPGRADE_OPERATION_KEYS = new Set([
 	"operationId",
@@ -315066,9 +315269,17 @@ const RuntimeReplicationLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplication, requi
 		concurrency: 1,
 		discard: true
 	});
+	const retryStuckThreadStreams = (streamKeys) => runtimeId ? require_Schema$1.forEach(streamKeys, (streamKey) => outbox.resetStuckThreadGeneration({
+		runtimeId,
+		streamKey
+	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap((reset) => reset ? enqueueThread(threadIdFromStreamKey(streamKey)) : require_Schema$1.void_)), {
+		concurrency: 1,
+		discard: true
+	}) : require_Schema$1.void_;
 	return RuntimeReplication.of({
 		start,
-		retryReprojectionPending
+		retryReprojectionPending,
+		retryStuckThreadStreams
 	});
 }));
 //#endregion
@@ -315415,6 +315626,31 @@ const THREAD_STREAM_PAYLOAD_HASH_MISMATCH_CODE = "THREAD_STREAM_PAYLOAD_HASH_MIS
 */
 const THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_REPROJECTION_PENDING_CODE = "THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_REPROJECTION_PENDING";
 /**
+* Terminal park code for a thread-events reset `refusedResetIsStuck` judges
+* genuinely stuck: the exact canonical reset shape was already sent once
+* under this generation and CMMD refused it again with zero acknowledged
+* progress (forge#3635). Before this code existed, that case fell through to
+* `failGeneric`, which recorded the raw `THREAD_STREAM_PAYLOAD_CONFLICT` /
+* `THREAD_STREAM_HEAD_MISMATCH` code -- a code neither
+* `readReprojectionPendingThreadStreamKeys` nor
+* `MANUALLY_RECOVERABLE_BLOCKED_CODES` selects, so the manual retry endpoint
+* could never reach the row.
+*
+* Deliberately excluded from `CLAIMABLE_BLOCKED_CODES`,
+* `STARTUP_RECOVERABLE_BLOCKED_CODES`, and `MANUALLY_RECOVERABLE_BLOCKED_CODES`:
+* a plain status flip back to `pending` would resend the exact batch CMMD
+* already refused twice. `enqueueThread` also leaves a row parked under this
+* code alone on new domain events and the heartbeat (see the stuck check
+* inside `enqueueThread` below) instead of re-projecting it back to `pending`
+* the way it does for every other generation, so a stuck row only clears once
+* the operator retry endpoint calls `RuntimeReplicationOutboxShape`'s
+* `resetStuckThreadGeneration` (which mints a fresh, never-before-sent repair
+* generation before re-projecting) or
+* a genuinely new generation id supersedes it (e.g. the thread archives and
+* gets a `:final:` id).
+*/
+const THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK_CODE = "THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK";
+/**
 * Whether a refused batch is the exact canonical reset shape (`fromSequence
 * === 1`, empty previous head, deterministic content) under a generation the
 * local cursor already holds with zero acknowledged progress -- i.e. this
@@ -315692,6 +315928,23 @@ const readReprojectionPendingThreadStreamKeys = require_Schema$1.gen(function* (
       AND last_error_code = ${THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_REPROJECTION_PENDING_CODE}
   `).map((row) => row.streamKey);
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.orDie);
+/**
+* Thread streams parked under THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK_CODE, for the
+* manual `/api/runtime-replication/retry` endpoint (forge#3635). Deliberately absent
+* from MANUALLY_RECOVERABLE_BLOCKED_CODES for the same reason
+* `readReprojectionPendingThreadStreamKeys` is: a plain status flip back to `pending`
+* would resend the exact reset CMMD already refused twice. `http.ts`'s retry handler
+* passes these to `RuntimeReplication`'s `retryStuckThreadStreams`, which calls
+* `resetStuckThreadGeneration` for each of these before re-projecting, so the retry
+* always sends a fresh, never-before-refused generation.
+*/
+const readStuckThreadStreamKeys = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	return (yield* (yield* require_SqlError.SqlClient)`
+    SELECT stream_key AS "streamKey" FROM runtime_replication_outbox
+    WHERE operation = 'thread-events' AND status = 'blocked'
+      AND last_error_code = ${THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK_CODE}
+  `).map((row) => row.streamKey);
+}).pipe(require_Schema$1.orDie);
 const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationOutbox, require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const sql = yield* require_SqlError.SqlClient;
 	const upsertPayload = (input) => {
@@ -315912,6 +316165,12 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
 			now
 		}).pipe(require_Schema$1.orDie);
 	};
+	const isThreadStreamParkedStuck = (input) => sql`
+        SELECT runtime_id AS "runtimeId" FROM runtime_replication_outbox
+        WHERE runtime_id = ${input.runtimeId} AND stream_key = ${input.streamKey}
+          AND operation = 'thread-events' AND status = 'blocked'
+          AND last_error_code = ${THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK_CODE}
+      `.pipe(require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.length === 1));
 	const enqueueThread = (input) => {
 		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
 		const baseGenerationId = runtimeThreadGenerationId(input.runtimeId, input.streamKey);
@@ -315920,6 +316179,7 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
 			const previousActiveGeneration = activeRuntimeThreadGenerationId(baseGenerationId, previousCursor?.generationId);
 			const generationId = input.historyFinalized ? runtimeThreadFinalGenerationId(input.runtimeId, input.streamKey, input.events) : previousActiveGeneration;
 			const replacesGeneration = previousCursor !== void 0 && previousCursor.generationId !== generationId;
+			if (!replacesGeneration && (yield* isThreadStreamParkedStuck(input))) return;
 			yield* initializeThreadCursor({
 				runtimeId: input.runtimeId,
 				streamKey: input.streamKey,
@@ -316221,12 +316481,16 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
 	})).pipe(require_Schema$1.orDie);
 	/**
 	* Recovers from a CMMD-reported thread stream conflict (see
-	* THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_CODES). Returns `null` when this item is
-	* not eligible (its payload does not decode, or `refusedResetIsStuck`
-	* says the exact reset shape already failed once -- in which case the
-	* caller falls back to blocking) and `false` when the row was superseded
-	* before this could apply, mirroring `fail`'s own supersession signal.
-	* Otherwise replaces the local cursor with a brand-new repair generation
+	* THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_CODES). Returns `null` only when this
+	* item's payload does not decode, in which case the caller falls back to
+	* `failGeneric`. When `refusedResetIsStuck` says the exact reset shape
+	* already failed once with zero progress, parks the row under
+	* `THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK_CODE` directly (see that code's
+	* doc comment) and returns `true`/`false` the same way the normal repair
+	* path below does -- never `null` -- so the caller never falls through to
+	* `failGeneric`'s raw conflict code (forge#3635). `false` means the row
+	* was superseded before this could apply, mirroring `fail`'s own
+	* supersession signal. Otherwise replaces the local cursor with a brand-new repair generation
 	* from sequence 1, empty previous head -- the shape CMMD's reset rule
 	* accepts unconditionally -- and parks the row blocked under
 	* `THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_REPROJECTION_PENDING_CODE`, deferring the
@@ -316245,13 +316509,30 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
 			runtimeId: item.runtimeId,
 			streamKey: item.streamKey
 		});
+		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
 		if (refusedResetIsStuck({
 			baseGenerationId,
 			refusedGenerationId: parsedBatch.generationId,
 			refusedFromSequence: parsedBatch.fromSequence,
 			cursor
-		})) return null;
-		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+		})) {
+			if ((yield* sql`
+            UPDATE runtime_replication_outbox SET
+              status = 'blocked', next_attempt_at = '9999-12-31T23:59:59.999Z',
+              last_error_code = ${"THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK"},
+              last_error = ${`Runtime replication conflict (${failure.code}) refused a thread-events reset that had already been refused once with zero acknowledged progress under this generation. Parked as stuck rather than resent; use the manual retry endpoint to reset it to a fresh generation.`}, updated_at = ${now}
+            WHERE runtime_id = ${item.runtimeId} AND stream_key = ${item.streamKey}
+              AND payload_hash = ${item.payloadHash}
+            RETURNING runtime_id AS "runtimeId"
+          `).length !== 1) return false;
+			yield* require_Schema$1.logWarning("Runtime replication parked a thread-stream repair as stuck after its reset was refused with zero progress.", {
+				runtimeId: item.runtimeId,
+				streamKey: item.streamKey,
+				errorCode: failure.code,
+				refusedGenerationId: parsedBatch.generationId
+			});
+			return true;
+		}
 		const repairGenerationId = `${baseGenerationId}:repair:${node_crypto.randomUUID()}`;
 		const message = `Runtime replication conflict (${failure.code}) refused a thread-events batch; deferring to a full-history re-projection under a new repair generation.`;
 		if (!(yield* sql.withTransaction(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
@@ -316319,6 +316600,30 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
             AND status = 'blocked'
             AND last_error_code = 'RUNTIME_REVOKED'
         `.pipe(require_Schema$1.asVoid, require_Schema$1.orDie);
+	const resetStuckThreadGeneration = (input) => {
+		const now = (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString();
+		const repairGenerationId = `${runtimeThreadGenerationId(input.runtimeId, input.streamKey)}:repair:${node_crypto.randomUUID()}`;
+		const message = "Runtime replication operator retry reset a stuck thread-stream repair to a new generation.";
+		return sql.withTransaction(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+			if ((yield* sql`
+              UPDATE runtime_replication_outbox SET
+                status = 'blocked', next_attempt_at = '9999-12-31T23:59:59.999Z',
+                last_error_code = ${"THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_REPROJECTION_PENDING"},
+                last_error = ${message}, updated_at = ${now}
+              WHERE runtime_id = ${input.runtimeId} AND stream_key = ${input.streamKey}
+                AND operation = 'thread-events'
+                AND last_error_code = ${"THREAD_STREAM_REMOTE_CONFLICT_STUCK"}
+              RETURNING runtime_id AS "runtimeId"
+            `).length !== 1) return false;
+			yield* replaceThreadCursor({
+				runtimeId: input.runtimeId,
+				streamKey: input.streamKey,
+				generationId: repairGenerationId,
+				now
+			});
+			return true;
+		})).pipe(require_Schema$1.orDie);
+	};
 	const getStatus = () => readRuntimeReplicationOutboxStatus.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideService(require_SqlError.SqlClient, sql));
 	const getDiagnostics = () => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const [diagnostics] = decodeDiagnostics(yield* sql`
@@ -316349,6 +316654,7 @@ const RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive = require_Schema$1.effect(RuntimeReplicationO
 		acknowledge,
 		fail,
 		retryBlocked,
+		resetStuckThreadGeneration,
 		recover,
 		recoverLegacyRevokedInventory,
 		getStatus,
@@ -316481,10 +316787,14 @@ const retryHandler = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const replication = yield* require_Schema$1.serviceOption(RuntimeReplication);
 	const requeued = yield* retryBlockedRuntimeReplicationOutbox;
 	const reprojectionPendingStreamKeys = yield* readReprojectionPendingThreadStreamKeys;
-	if (require_Schema$1.isSome(replication)) yield* replication.value.retryReprojectionPending(reprojectionPendingStreamKeys);
+	const stuckStreamKeys = yield* readStuckThreadStreamKeys;
+	if (require_Schema$1.isSome(replication)) {
+		yield* replication.value.retryReprojectionPending(reprojectionPendingStreamKeys);
+		yield* replication.value.retryStuckThreadStreams(stuckStreamKeys);
+	}
 	const status = yield* readRuntimeReplicationOutboxStatus;
 	return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({
-		requeued: requeued + (require_Schema$1.isSome(replication) ? reprojectionPendingStreamKeys.length : 0),
+		requeued: requeued + (require_Schema$1.isSome(replication) ? reprojectionPendingStreamKeys.length + stuckStreamKeys.length : 0),
 		...responseFromStatus(status)
 	});
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", respondToAuthError));
@@ -324847,7 +325157,7 @@ const MiscRuntimeLayerLive = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(AnalyticsServiceLayerLive
 const RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive = ReactorLayerLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(CheckpointingLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(GitLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(OrchestrationLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProviderLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(TerminalLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(AgentBrowserManagerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(ThreadDevRuntimeLive, DevTunnelLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(ThreadDevRuntimeLive)))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(PersistenceLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(KeybindingsLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProviderRegistryLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(ServerSettingsLive, UsageServiceLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(ServerSettingsLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(UsageSessionLookupLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(UsageRecordedSourceLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(OrchestrationLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(ProviderSessionRuntimeRepositoryLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(TextGenerationSessionRepositoryLive)))))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(WorkspaceLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(WorkspaceReadinessStateLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProjectFaviconResolverLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RepositoryIdentityResolverLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ServerEnvironmentLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(AuthLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ServerSecretStoreLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(CloudRedisCoordinationLive, CloudStateSyncLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(PersistenceLayerLive)))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(MiscRuntimeLayerLive));
 const RuntimeDependenciesLive = pullRequestServiceFactoryLayer.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(cmmdProjectIdentityResolverLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(pullRequestProviderRuntimeLive));
 const RuntimeServicesLive = ServerRuntimeStartupLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RuntimeDependenciesLive));
-const makeRoutesLayer = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(attachmentUploadRouteLayer, authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer, authCmmdEmbedExchangeRouteLayer, authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer, authWebSocketTicketRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer, authCmmdPasswordTokenRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeOthersRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeRouteLayer, authClientsRouteLayer, authLogoutRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRevokeRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRouteLayer, authPairingCredentialRouteLayer, authSessionRenewRouteLayer, authSessionRouteLayer, authWebSocketTokenRouteLayer, authWebLoginRouteLayer, authWebCallbackRouteLayer, cloudOwnerSessionRedeemRouteLayer, cloudOwnerSessionRevokeRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgePublishRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgeBootstrapRouteLayer, desktopRelayControlPlaneRouteLayer, apiDocsHtmlRouteLayer, apiDocsOpenApiRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateListRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateUpsertRouteLayer, cmmdProfileRouteLayer, ...cmmdProxyRouteLayers, cmmdWorkIntakeRouteLayer, cmmdWsTokenRouteLayer, cmmdGetProjectCommentsRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectCommentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectRouteLayer, cmmdUploadTaskAttachmentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateTaskCommentRouteLayer, cmmdListWorkspaceMembersRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectMemberRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectAgentMemberAvatarRouteLayer, runtimeReplicationStatusRouteLayer, cmmdRefreshProviderUsageRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsListRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeEnvironmentsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesConnectRouteLayer, ownerRuntimeCodexReadinessRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStatusRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStartRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStopRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesRecycleRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesUpdateCommitRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesDestroyRouteLayer, mobileProviderCatalogRouteLayer, attachmentsRouteLayer, orchestrationDispatchRouteLayer, orchestrationCmmdWorkRunEventRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationStartThreadRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationRebindRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationTerminalReconcileRouteLayer, mobileGitRunStackedActionRouteLayer, pullRequestDiffRouteLayer, orchestrationSnapshotRouteLayer, orchestrationThreadSnapshotRouteLayer, localAutomationListRouteLayer, localAutomationCreateRouteLayer, localAutomationUpdateRouteLayer, localAutomationDeleteRouteLayer, localAutomationRunRouteLayer, otlpTracesProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelLocalPortProxyRouteLayer, projectFaviconRouteLayer, serverEnvironmentRouteLayer, browserWebRtcReadinessRouteLayer, staticAndDevRouteLayer, githubStatusRouteLayer, githubAuthorizeUrlRouteLayer, githubDisconnectRouteLayer, githubReposRouteLayer, githubCloneRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStartRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStatusRouteLayer, githubRefreshCredentialsRouteLayer, githubToolConfirmationApproveRouteLayer, projectLinkGetRouteLayer, projectLinkListRouteLayer, projectLinkSetRouteLayer, projectLinkDeleteRouteLayer, cmmdWorkspacesRouteLayer, cmmdCampaignsRouteLayer, cmmdProjectLinksRouteLayer, cmmdEnsureGitHubProjectContextRouteLayer, cmmdProjectRepositoryEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsGetRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsCreateRouteLayer, workspaceReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeLivenessRouteLayer, runtimeFilesystemHealthRouteLayer, claudeNativeGenerationProofRouteLayer, claudeUsageRouteLayer, codexRuntimeProviderReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeDiagnosticsRouteLayer, cloudFoldersRouteLayer, cloudProjectCreateRouteLayer, gitUrlCloneRouteLayer, websocketRpcRouteLayer).pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(browserApiCorsLayer));
+const makeRoutesLayer = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(attachmentUploadRouteLayer, authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer, authCmmdEmbedExchangeRouteLayer, authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer, authWebSocketTicketRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer, authCmmdPasswordTokenRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeOthersRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeRouteLayer, authClientsRouteLayer, authLogoutRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRevokeRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRouteLayer, authPairingCredentialRouteLayer, authSessionRenewRouteLayer, authSessionRouteLayer, authWebSocketTokenRouteLayer, authWebLoginRouteLayer, authWebCallbackRouteLayer, cloudOwnerSessionRedeemRouteLayer, cloudOwnerSessionRevokeRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgePublishRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgeBootstrapRouteLayer, desktopRelayControlPlaneRouteLayer, apiDocsHtmlRouteLayer, apiDocsOpenApiRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateListRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateUpsertRouteLayer, cmmdProfileRouteLayer, ...cmmdProxyRouteLayers, cmmdWorkIntakeRouteLayer, cmmdWsTokenRouteLayer, cmmdGetProjectCommentsRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectCommentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectRouteLayer, cmmdUploadTaskAttachmentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateTaskCommentRouteLayer, cmmdListWorkspaceMembersRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectMemberRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectAgentMemberAvatarRouteLayer, runtimeReplicationStatusRouteLayer, cmmdRefreshProviderUsageRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsListRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeEnvironmentsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesConnectRouteLayer, ownerRuntimeCodexReadinessRouteLayer, cmmdRegisterMobilePushDeviceRouteLayer, cmmdDeleteMobilePushDeviceRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStatusRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStartRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStopRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesRecycleRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesUpdateCommitRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesDestroyRouteLayer, mobileProviderCatalogRouteLayer, attachmentsRouteLayer, orchestrationDispatchRouteLayer, orchestrationCmmdWorkRunEventRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationStartThreadRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationRebindRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationTerminalReconcileRouteLayer, mobileGitRunStackedActionRouteLayer, pullRequestDiffRouteLayer, orchestrationSnapshotRouteLayer, orchestrationThreadSnapshotRouteLayer, localAutomationListRouteLayer, localAutomationCreateRouteLayer, localAutomationUpdateRouteLayer, localAutomationDeleteRouteLayer, localAutomationRunRouteLayer, otlpTracesProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelLocalPortProxyRouteLayer, projectFaviconRouteLayer, serverEnvironmentRouteLayer, browserWebRtcReadinessRouteLayer, staticAndDevRouteLayer, githubStatusRouteLayer, githubAuthorizeUrlRouteLayer, githubDisconnectRouteLayer, githubReposRouteLayer, githubCloneRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStartRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStatusRouteLayer, githubRefreshCredentialsRouteLayer, githubToolConfirmationApproveRouteLayer, projectLinkGetRouteLayer, projectLinkListRouteLayer, projectLinkSetRouteLayer, projectLinkDeleteRouteLayer, cmmdWorkspacesRouteLayer, cmmdCampaignsRouteLayer, cmmdProjectLinksRouteLayer, cmmdEnsureGitHubProjectContextRouteLayer, cmmdProjectRepositoryEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsGetRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsCreateRouteLayer, workspaceReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeLivenessRouteLayer, runtimeFilesystemHealthRouteLayer, claudeNativeGenerationProofRouteLayer, claudeUsageRouteLayer, codexRuntimeProviderReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeDiagnosticsRouteLayer, cloudFoldersRouteLayer, cloudProjectCreateRouteLayer, gitUrlCloneRouteLayer, websocketRpcRouteLayer).pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(browserApiCorsLayer));
 const makeServerLayer = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const config = yield* ServerConfig;
 	fixPath({ preferProcessPath: config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMode === true });