@cmmd-center/forge 0.13.12 → 0.13.13

package/dist/bin.cjs

@@ -17402,7 +17402,8 @@ const ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS = {
 	getArchivedShellSnapshot: "orchestration.getArchivedShellSnapshot",
 	subscribeShell: "orchestration.subscribeShell",
 	subscribeThread: "orchestration.subscribeThread",
-	searchThreads: "orchestration.searchThreads"
+	searchThreads: "orchestration.searchThreads",
+	getThreadDetailPage: "orchestration.getThreadDetailPage"
 };
 const ProviderKind = require_Schema$1.Literals([
 	"codex",
@@ -17931,6 +17932,21 @@ require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	beforeCursor: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(TrimmedNonEmptyString)
 });
 /**
+* Reads one windowed page of a thread's detail directly over the RPC socket.
+*
+* The HTTP snapshot route and `subscribeThread`'s fallback snapshot both take
+* the same `turnLimit`/`beforeCursor` window, but neither can serve "load
+* earlier" on a connection with no HTTP endpoint: the fallback snapshot only
+* fires once, on subscribe. This method exists for exactly that case (a
+* relay-only connection), gated on the server's `threadDetailPageRpc`
+* capability so older servers are never sent a method they do not know.
+*/
+const OrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	threadId: ThreadId,
+	turnLimit: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(PositiveInt),
+	beforeCursor: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(TrimmedNonEmptyString)
+});
+/**
 * Page metadata for a windowed thread detail read. `beforeCursor` is opaque and
 * exclusive: passing it back returns the adjacent slice of older turns. `null`
 * means nothing older is left. `snapshotSequence` mirrors the top-level
@@ -18928,6 +18944,10 @@ const OrchestrationRpcSchemas = {
 	searchThreads: {
 		input: OrchestrationSearchThreadsInput,
 		output: OrchestrationSearchThreadsResult
+	},
+	getThreadDetailPage: {
+		input: OrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageInput,
+		output: OrchestrationThreadDetailSnapshot
 	}
 };
 var OrchestrationGetSnapshotError = class extends require_Schema$1.TaggedErrorClass()("OrchestrationGetSnapshotError", {
@@ -23006,6 +23026,7 @@ const ServerConfig$1 = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	shellRevealInFileManagerKind: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(FileManagerRevealKind),
 	threadResumeCompletionMarker: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
 	threadSnapshotPagination: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
+	threadDetailPageRpc: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
 	observability: ServerObservability,
 	settings: ServerSettings
 });
@@ -26965,6 +26986,17 @@ const WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc = make$30(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.searchT
 	error: OrchestrationSearchThreadsError
 });
 /**
+* The socket-only path for "load earlier turns": a relay-only connection has
+* no HTTP endpoint, so this reads the same windowed page the HTTP snapshot
+* route and `subscribeThread`'s fallback snapshot serve, over the RPC socket
+* instead.
+*/
+const WsOrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageRpc = make$30(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage, {
+	payload: OrchestrationRpcSchemas.getThreadDetailPage.input,
+	success: OrchestrationRpcSchemas.getThreadDetailPage.output,
+	error: OrchestrationGetSnapshotError
+});
+/**
 * Resolve `owner/repo` to the repository the caller is allowed to clone.
 *
 * Both of these run against the same CMMD-brokered GitHub credential the web
@@ -27077,7 +27109,7 @@ const WsRpcGroup = make$29(WsServerGetConfigRpc, WsServerRefreshProvidersRpc, Ws
 	payload: ProviderUploadFeedbackInput,
 	success: ProviderUploadFeedbackResult,
 	error: ProviderUploadFeedbackError
-}), WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc, WsSourceControlLookupRepositoryRpc, WsSourceControlCloneRepositoryRpc);
+}), WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc, WsSourceControlLookupRepositoryRpc, WsSourceControlCloneRepositoryRpc, WsOrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageRpc);
 const RelayWsRpcGroup = WsRpcGroup.middleware(RelayAuthorizationMiddleware).middleware(RelayDeliveryMiddleware);
 /**
 * The direct-WebSocket mount of the same group, with per-method scope
@@ -27150,6 +27182,32 @@ function encodeCmmdRuntimeToolActivityPayload(kind, payload) {
 		}
 	};
 }
+const WORKTREE_LAUNCH_ACTIVITY_KINDS = new Set([
+	"worktree.requested",
+	"worktree.stage",
+	"worktree.output",
+	"worktree.created",
+	"worktree.failed",
+	"setup-script.requested",
+	"setup-script.started",
+	"setup-script.skipped",
+	"setup-script.failed",
+	"launch.agent-starting",
+	"launch.cancelled"
+]);
+function encodeCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityPayload(kind, payload) {
+	return {
+		...isRecord$23(payload) ? payload : { sourcePayload: payload },
+		forgeWorktreeLaunchActivity: {
+			schemaVersion: 1,
+			source: "native",
+			kind
+		}
+	};
+}
+function isCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) {
+	return WORKTREE_LAUNCH_ACTIVITY_KINDS.has(kind);
+}
 //#endregion
 //#region ../../packages/contracts/src/cmmdProjectPatch.ts
 const CMMD_PROJECT_PATCH_FIELDS = {
@@ -32260,6 +32318,11 @@ const RELAY_METHOD_POLICY_BASES = [
 		requiredScope: "thread.read",
 		deliveryClass: "subscription"
 	},
+	{
+		method: ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage,
+		requiredScope: "thread.read",
+		deliveryClass: "read"
+	},
 	{
 		method: WS_METHODS.assetsCreateUrl,
 		requiredScope: "thread.read",
@@ -66317,7 +66380,7 @@ function normalizeNumberish(value) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region package.json
-var version$1 = "0.13.12";
+var version$1 = "0.13.13";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/sentry.ts
 const SERVER_APP_NAME = "forge-server";
@@ -66719,6 +66782,129 @@ const respondToAuthError = (error) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	}));
 	return response;
 });
+//#endregion
+//#region src/http/rateLimit.ts
+/**
+* Per-client, per-route-class rate limiting for Forge's own HTTP surface.
+*
+* Scoped to the routes a broken or looping client can hammer before it ever
+* has an authenticated session — the CMMD device-code poll, the bootstrap and
+* pairing-token exchanges — plus the authenticated /api/cmmd proxy, which
+* every desktop UI interaction runs through. None of these had any limit
+* before FOR-36706: a stuck pairing loop or a poll that never saw `slow_down`
+* could retry as fast as the network allowed, with nothing to stop it and
+* nothing telling the client to back off.
+*
+* Defaults are generous on purpose. This exists to bound a runaway client,
+* not to throttle a working one — see `defaultRateLimitPolicies` for the
+* reasoning behind each number and how to override it.
+*
+* Deliberately plain module state, not an Effect service: every route this
+* guards is a synchronous decision (count, compare, maybe reset a window),
+* and threading a new Context requirement through the whole server's layer
+* graph for that would touch every test file that stands up any of these
+* routes. `cmmdJwtResolver.ts`'s in-flight-refresh map is the same call.
+*/
+function envInt(name, fallback) {
+	const raw = process.env[name];
+	if (!raw) return fallback;
+	const parsed = Number(raw);
+	return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? Math.floor(parsed) : fallback;
+}
+/**
+* One reasoning line per class, so a future change to a default has to
+* confront why the old one was picked:
+*
+* - `auth-device-poll` (`/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device` and `/token`): RFC 8628
+*   polls every `interval` seconds, 5 by default, so a well-behaved client
+*   sits under 12/min. 120/min leaves room for several concurrent sign-in
+*   attempts and CMMD's own `slow_down` handling without ever tripping on
+*   normal use, while still bounding a client that ignores `slow_down`.
+* - `auth-bootstrap` (`/api/auth/bootstrap*`, the bearer bootstrap routes):
+*   a working client bootstraps once per sign-in. 30/min is generous headroom
+*   for retries after a network blip, not a budget anyone should approach.
+* - `auth-token-exchange` (`/oauth/token`, the vendored pairing exchange):
+*   same shape as bootstrap — one pairing attempt, occasionally retried.
+* - `cmmd-proxy` (every `/api/cmmd/*` route): this is the one real desktop
+*   traffic actually leans on — task lists, project browsing, comments, all
+*   day. 1200/min (20/sec) is set high enough that no normal session should
+*   ever see it; it exists for a retry loop or a runaway resync, not for
+*   ordinary use.
+*/
+function buildPoliciesFromEnv() {
+	return {
+		"auth-device-poll": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_DEVICE_POLL_MAX", 120),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_DEVICE_POLL_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"auth-bootstrap": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_MAX", 30),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"auth-token-exchange": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_MAX", 30),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"cmmd-proxy": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_CMMD_PROXY_MAX", 1200),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_CMMD_PROXY_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		}
+	};
+}
+let policies = buildPoliciesFromEnv();
+const windows = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function windowKey(routeClass, clientKey) {
+	return `${routeClass}\0${clientKey}`;
+}
+/**
+* Fixed-window counting: cheap, and precise enough for a loop-guard rather
+* than a security boundary. The one imprecision this trades away — up to 2x
+* the configured rate right at a window boundary — matters for an attacker
+* budgeting requests against the limiter's clock, not for the runaway
+* clients this exists to catch.
+*/
+function checkHttpRateLimit(input) {
+	const policy = policies[input.routeClass];
+	const nowMs = Date.now();
+	const key = windowKey(input.routeClass, input.clientKey);
+	const existing = windows.get(key);
+	const windowIsLive = existing !== void 0 && nowMs - existing.windowStartMs < policy.windowMs;
+	const windowStartMs = windowIsLive ? existing.windowStartMs : nowMs;
+	const count = (windowIsLive ? existing.count : 0) + 1;
+	windows.set(key, {
+		windowStartMs,
+		count
+	});
+	return {
+		allowed: count <= policy.maxRequests,
+		retryAfterSeconds: Math.max(0, Math.ceil((windowStartMs + policy.windowMs - nowMs) / 1e3))
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Checks the limiter for one request and, when the caller is over budget,
+* returns the 429 to send instead of running the route — `null` means
+* proceed. Every route this guards is expected to call this first and return
+* early on a non-null result, before doing any other work.
+*/
+function rateLimitOrRespond(input) {
+	const decision = checkHttpRateLimit(input);
+	if (decision.allowed) return null;
+	return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Too many requests. Try again later." }, {
+		status: 429,
+		headers: { "retry-after": String(decision.retryAfterSeconds) }
+	});
+}
+/**
+* The client identity for a route with no session yet — the device-code
+* poll, bootstrap and pairing-token exchange all run before Forge has issued
+* one. IP address is the only stable-enough signal available at that point;
+* the authenticated `/api/cmmd` proxy keys on the session instead (see its
+* call site), so one desktop and one phone sharing a NAT never share a
+* budget there.
+*/
+function clientKeyFromRequest(request) {
+	return normalizeIpAddress(require_Schema$1.getOrNull(request.remoteAddress)) ?? "unknown";
+}
 const OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token";
 /**
 * The one exchange this endpoint performs, or the reason it will not.
@@ -68566,6 +68752,11 @@ function commandOAuthProxyStatus(path, status, body) {
 }
 const authBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(AuthBootstrapInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
@@ -68583,6 +68774,11 @@ const authBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap", require_Sch
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/command", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	if (serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() === true) return yield* new AuthError({
@@ -68631,6 +68827,11 @@ const authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/comman
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/command/bearer", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	if (serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() === true) return yield* new AuthError({
@@ -68679,6 +68880,11 @@ const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/
 	}, { status: 200 });
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-device-poll",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(CommandOAuthDeviceInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid CMMD OAuth device payload.",
 		status: 400,
@@ -68690,7 +68896,17 @@ const authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device
 		...payload.scope ? { scope: payload.scope } : {}
 	});
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
+/**
+* The device-code poll. Called every `interval` seconds by design (RFC
+* 8628), which is exactly why FOR-36706 puts a limiter on it: a client that
+* ignores `slow_down` — a bug, not a person — has no other backstop here.
+*/
 const authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/token", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-device-poll",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(CommandOAuthTokenInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid CMMD OAuth token payload.",
 		status: 400,
@@ -68985,6 +69201,11 @@ const authWebCallbackRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/auth/callback", require_Sch
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/bearer", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(AuthBootstrapInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid bootstrap payload.",
@@ -69017,6 +69238,11 @@ const authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/bearer"
 */
 const authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/oauth/token", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-token-exchange",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyUrlParams(OAuthTokenExchangeInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid token exchange payload.",
@@ -71242,9 +71468,12 @@ function trySubjectFallback(sessionId, subject, logPrefix) {
 * Fail-closed: never returns a non-user / malformed Bearer. Callers must map
 * null to CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED and must not call CMMD upstream with a bad token.
 */
-function resolveCmmdJwtForSession({ sessionId, subject, logPrefix = "cmmd-auth", forceRefresh = false }) {
+function resolveCmmdJwtForSession({ sessionId, subject, logPrefix = "cmmd-auth", forceRefresh = false, staleAccessToken = null }) {
 	const cached = usableCmmdUserJwt(readCommandJwtForSession(sessionId));
-	if (!forceRefresh && cached && !isJwtExpiredForSession(sessionId)) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+	if (cached && !isJwtExpiredForSession(sessionId)) {
+		if (!forceRefresh) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+		if (staleAccessToken && cached !== staleAccessToken) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+	}
 	const normalizedSubject = subject?.trim() || null;
 	if (!normalizedSubject && !forceRefresh) return require_Schema$1.succeed(null);
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
@@ -72081,6 +72310,11 @@ function buildProxyRouteLayer(route) {
 	const handler = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const req = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
 		const session = yield* (yield* ServerAuth).authenticateHttpRequest(req);
+		const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+			routeClass: "cmmd-proxy",
+			clientKey: session.sessionId
+		});
+		if (limited) return limited;
 		const pathParams = yield* params;
 		const cmmdPath = substitutePath(route.cmmdPath, pathParams);
 		if (!cmmdPath) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Missing required path parameter." }, { status: 400 });
@@ -72141,6 +72375,11 @@ function buildProxyHandlerEffect(route) {
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const req = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
 		const session = yield* (yield* ServerAuth).authenticateHttpRequest(req);
+		const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+			routeClass: "cmmd-proxy",
+			clientKey: session.sessionId
+		});
+		if (limited) return limited;
 		if (!readCommandAccessTokenForSession(session.sessionId)) return yield* respondCmmdConnectionRequired(session.sessionId);
 		const parsed = yield* route.parse(req);
 		if (!parsed.ok) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe(parsed.body, { status: parsed.status });
@@ -98040,6 +98279,26 @@ function serializeNativeToolActivity(activity) {
 		}
 	};
 }
+function serializeWorktreeLaunchActivity(activity) {
+	if (decodeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(activity.kind) === null) return null;
+	const summary = text(activity.summary, 4e3);
+	if (summary === null) return null;
+	return {
+		sourceSequence: null,
+		event: {
+			eventId: `activity:${activity.id}`,
+			occurredAt: canonicalRuntimeEventTimestamp(activity.createdAt),
+			...eventTurn(activity.turnId),
+			kind: "tool_call",
+			summary,
+			status: "completed",
+			payload: encodeCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityPayload(activity.kind, activity.payload)
+		}
+	};
+}
+function decodeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) {
+	return isCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) ? kind : null;
+}
 function isReplicatedFailureActivity(activity) {
 	return activity.kind === "runtime.error" || activity.kind.startsWith("provider.") && activity.kind.endsWith(".failed");
 }
@@ -98420,12 +98679,17 @@ function serializeRuntimeThreadEvents(thread) {
 		const event = serializeNativeToolActivity(activity);
 		return event === null ? [] : [event];
 	});
+	const worktreeLaunchActivities = thread.activities.flatMap((activity) => {
+		const event = serializeWorktreeLaunchActivity(activity);
+		return event === null ? [] : [event];
+	});
 	const recordedTurns = serializeRecordedTurns(thread);
 	const textGenerations = serializeTextGenerations(thread);
 	return [
 		...messages,
 		...replicaActivities,
 		...toolActivities,
+		...worktreeLaunchActivities,
 		...failureActivities,
 		...recordedTurns,
 		...textGenerations
@@ -106589,6 +106853,39 @@ function loadInitialShellSnapshot(input) {
 		return yield* input.projectionSnapshotQuery.getShellSnapshot();
 	});
 }
+/**
+* The thread snapshot a subscription falls back to, windowed when the
+* subscriber asked for a window. A missing thread is a failure rather than an
+* empty snapshot: the subscriber asked about a thread this server does not
+* have, and saying so is the only honest answer.
+*
+* Also the read behind `getThreadDetailPage`, the socket RPC a relay-only
+* connection uses for "load earlier turns" in place of the HTTP snapshot
+* route: same window, same pure `windowThreadDetail`, so the two reads cannot
+* disagree about what a page is.
+*/
+function loadThreadDetailSnapshot(input) {
+	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const [threadDetail, snapshotSequence] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([input.projectionSnapshotQuery.getThreadDetailById(input.threadId).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+			message: `Failed to load thread ${input.threadId}`,
+			cause
+		}))), input.orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence))]);
+		if (require_Schema$1.isNone(threadDetail)) return yield* new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+			message: `Thread ${input.threadId} was not found`,
+			cause: input.threadId
+		});
+		const windowed = windowThreadDetail({
+			thread: threadDetail.value,
+			window: input.window,
+			snapshotSequence
+		});
+		return {
+			snapshotSequence,
+			thread: windowed.thread,
+			...windowed.page === void 0 ? {} : { page: windowed.page }
+		};
+	});
+}
 function makeSnapshotThenLiveStream(input) {
 	return require_Path.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const liveEvents = yield* input.subscribeLiveEvents;
@@ -106815,32 +107112,6 @@ const makeWsRpcLayer = (currentSessionId, currentUserId) => WsRpcGroup.toLayer(r
 		}, normalizedCommand) : (normalizedCommand.type === "thread.turn.interrupt" ? interruptBootstrapTurnStart(orchestrationEngine, normalizedCommand) : orchestrationEngine.dispatch(normalizedCommand)).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => toDispatchCommandError(cause, "Failed to dispatch orchestration command")));
 		return startup.enqueueCommand(dispatchEffect).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => toDispatchCommandError(cause, "Failed to dispatch orchestration command")));
 	};
-	/**
-	* The thread snapshot a subscription falls back to, windowed when the
-	* subscriber asked for a window. A missing thread is a failure rather
-	* than an empty snapshot: the subscriber asked about a thread this server
-	* does not have, and saying so is the only honest answer.
-	*/
-	const loadThreadDetailSnapshot = (threadId, turnLimit) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		const [threadDetail, snapshotSequence] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([projectionSnapshotQuery.getThreadDetailById(threadId).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
-			message: `Failed to load thread ${threadId}`,
-			cause
-		}))), orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence))]);
-		if (require_Schema$1.isNone(threadDetail)) return yield* new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
-			message: `Thread ${threadId} was not found`,
-			cause: threadId
-		});
-		const windowed = windowThreadDetail({
-			thread: threadDetail.value,
-			window: turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit },
-			snapshotSequence
-		});
-		return {
-			snapshotSequence,
-			thread: windowed.thread,
-			...windowed.page === void 0 ? {} : { page: windowed.page }
-		};
-	});
 	const loadServerConfig = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const keybindingsConfig = yield* keybindings.loadConfigState;
 		const providers = yield* providerRegistry.getProviders;
@@ -106864,6 +107135,7 @@ const makeWsRpcLayer = (currentSessionId, currentUserId) => WsRpcGroup.toLayer(r
 			},
 			threadResumeCompletionMarker: true,
 			threadSnapshotPagination: true,
+			threadDetailPageRpc: true,
 			observability: {
 				logsDirectoryPath: config.logsDir,
 				localTracingEnabled: true,
@@ -106964,12 +107236,26 @@ const makeWsRpcLayer = (currentSessionId, currentUserId) => WsRpcGroup.toLayer(r
 		[ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread]: (input) => observeRpcStreamEffect(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread, require_Schema$1.succeed(makeThreadSubscriptionStream(input, {
 			subscribeLiveEvents: orchestrationEngine.subscribeDomainEvents().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((events) => events.pipe(require_Path.filter(isThreadDetailEventFor(input.threadId))))),
 			currentSequence: orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence)),
-			loadSnapshot: loadThreadDetailSnapshot(input.threadId, input.turnLimit),
+			loadSnapshot: loadThreadDetailSnapshot({
+				threadId: input.threadId,
+				window: input.turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit: input.turnLimit },
+				projectionSnapshotQuery,
+				orchestrationEngine
+			}),
 			replayEvents: (afterSequence) => orchestrationEngine.readEvents(afterSequence).pipe(require_Path.filter(isThreadDetailEventFor(input.threadId)), require_Path.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
 				message: `Failed to replay thread ${input.threadId}`,
 				cause
 			})))
 		})), { "rpc.aggregate": "orchestration" }),
+		[ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage]: (input) => observeRpcEffect(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage, loadThreadDetailSnapshot({
+			threadId: input.threadId,
+			window: {
+				...input.turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit: input.turnLimit },
+				...input.beforeCursor === void 0 ? {} : { beforeCursor: input.beforeCursor }
+			},
+			projectionSnapshotQuery,
+			orchestrationEngine
+		}), { "rpc.aggregate": "orchestration" }),
 		[WS_METHODS.serverGetConfig]: (_input) => observeRpcEffect(WS_METHODS.serverGetConfig, loadServerConfig, { "rpc.aggregate": "server" }),
 		[WS_METHODS.serverRefreshProviders]: (_input) => observeRpcEffect(WS_METHODS.serverRefreshProviders, providerRegistry.refresh().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((providers) => ({ providers }))), { "rpc.aggregate": "server" }),
 		[WS_METHODS.serverStartProviderAuth]: (input) => observeRpcEffect(WS_METHODS.serverStartProviderAuth, require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
@@ -213039,6 +213325,8 @@ const PUBLIC_PROVIDER_LEAK_PATTERNS = [
 	/\bCURSOR_API_KEY\b/,
 	/\bOPENCODE_API_KEY\b/,
 	/\bforge_proxy_[A-Za-z0-9._-]+\b/,
+	/\bProviderValidationError\b/,
+	/\/forge-server\/node_modules\//,
 	/https?:\/\/[^\s'"<>)]*\/api\/provider-egress\/[^\s'"<>)]*/i,
 	/https?:\/\/[^\s'"<>)]*(?:apex|deepseek|moonshot|kimi)[^\s'"<>)]*/i
 ];
@@ -213048,6 +213336,12 @@ function isProviderRateOrQuotaError(message) {
 	const normalized = message.toLowerCase();
 	return /\b(rate[\s-]?limit|too\s+many\s+requests|usage[ _-]limit|usage_limit_reached|quota|insufficient_quota)\b/.test(normalized) || /\b429\b/.test(normalized);
 }
+function providerLifecycleOrAccountCopy(message) {
+	if (/\bbound to provider account\b/.test(message) && /\bcannot use provider account\b/.test(message)) return "Forge could not switch this conversation to the selected AI account. Retry the account switch.";
+	if (/\bforge_runtime_repairing\b/.test(message) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment is being repaired\b/.test(message)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment is being repaired. Retry after the repair finishes.";
+	if (/\bforge_runtime_stopped\b/.test(message) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped\b/.test(message)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped. Start the environment and retry.";
+	return null;
+}
 /**
 * Infer a SAFE, clearer failure category from a (possibly leaky) provider error.
 *
@@ -213060,7 +213354,8 @@ function isProviderRateOrQuotaError(message) {
 function categorizePublicProviderError(message) {
 	if (!message) return null;
 	const m = message.toLowerCase();
-	if (/\bforge_runtime_stopped\b/.test(m) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped\b/.test(m)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped. Start the environment and retry.";
+	const lifecycleOrAccountCopy = providerLifecycleOrAccountCopy(m);
+	if (lifecycleOrAccountCopy !== null) return lifecycleOrAccountCopy;
 	if (/\bforge_provider_model_not_allowed\b/.test(m) || /\bnot\s+scoped\s+to\s+the\s+requested\s+model\b/.test(m)) return "The workspace AI credential does not cover the model this turn asked for. Retry, or pick that model for the thread.";
 	if (/\bmodel\b[\s\S]*\b(not\s+(found|available|supported)|does\s+not\s+exist|unsupported|invalid|unknown)\b/.test(m) || /\b(unsupported|unknown|invalid)\b[\s\S]*\bmodel\b/.test(m) || /\b(model_not_found|invalid_model|model_not_supported)\b/.test(m)) return "The selected model isn't available right now. Pick a different model and retry.";
 	if (isProviderRateOrQuotaError(m)) return "The AI service is rate-limited or out of quota. Wait a moment and retry.";
@@ -213240,13 +213535,20 @@ function claudeConfigDirectory(env) {
 		return null;
 	}
 }
-/** The fallback is allowed only for the exact credential bytes CMMD signed. */
-function primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesRevision(env, revision) {
+/**
+* The fallback is allowed only when the primary on-disk credential is
+* byte-identical to what CMMD prepared for the selected account. A ticket's
+* `credentialRevisionHash` cannot express that: it hashes the encrypted row
+* CMMD stores, not the decrypted bytes this process ever sees. Comparing
+* files directly is the only check that means what the fallback needs.
+*/
+function primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesPrepared(env, preparedDirectory) {
 	const directory = claudeConfigDirectory(env);
-	if (!directory || !/^[a-f0-9]{64}$/.test(revision)) return false;
+	if (!directory) return false;
 	try {
-		const credential = (0, node_fs.readFileSync)((0, node_path.join)(directory, CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME), "utf8");
-		return (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(credential).digest("hex") === revision && hasAccessToken(JSON.parse(credential));
+		const primary = (0, node_fs.readFileSync)((0, node_path.join)(directory, CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME), "utf8");
+		const prepared = (0, node_fs.readFileSync)((0, node_path.join)(preparedDirectory, CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME), "utf8");
+		return hasAccessToken(JSON.parse(primary)) && (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(primary).digest("hex") === (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(prepared).digest("hex");
 	} catch {
 		return false;
 	}
@@ -217775,7 +218077,7 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 			baseDir: serverConfig.baseDir,
 			accountIdentity: selectedAccountIdentity,
 			probeSupport: claudeCredentialDirectoryProbeFor(claudeBinaryPath).support,
-			primaryCredentialMatchesSelected: preparedCredential?.accountKind === "primary" && primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesRevision(process.env, preparedCredential.credentialRevisionHash)
+			primaryCredentialMatchesSelected: preparedCredential?.accountKind === "primary" && primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesPrepared(process.env, preparedCredential.directory)
 		});
 		if (credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "refused") return yield* new ProviderAdapterValidationError({
 			provider: PROVIDER$11,
@@ -232944,7 +233246,7 @@ async function acquireSelectedClaudeCredential(expected, transport) {
 		const claims = token === null ? null : verifyCmmdClaudeSelectedTicket(token, expected);
 		if (!token || !claims) throw new Error("invalid_ticket");
 		const credentialJson = await transport.readCredential(token);
-		if (Buffer.byteLength(credentialJson, "utf8") > 512e3 || (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(credentialJson).digest("hex") !== claims.credentialRevisionHash || !hasUsableClaudeCredentialBlob(credentialJson)) throw new Error("invalid_credential");
+		if (Buffer.byteLength(credentialJson, "utf8") > 512e3 || !hasUsableClaudeCredentialBlob(credentialJson)) throw new Error("invalid_credential");
 		return {
 			claims,
 			credentialJson
@@ -292168,6 +292470,10 @@ const make$8 = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 				shouldRestartForAccountChange,
 				hasResumeCursor: resumeCursor !== void 0
 			});
+			if (shouldRestartForAccountChange) yield* providerService.stopSession({
+				threadId,
+				preserveResumeState: true
+			});
 			const restartedSession = yield* startProviderSession(resumeCursor !== void 0 ? { resumeCursor } : void 0);
 			yield* require_Schema$1.logInfo("provider command reactor restarted provider session", {
 				threadId,
@@ -298152,7 +298458,7 @@ function resolveBuildCommitFromEnv(env) {
 * environment descriptor down instead of reporting an honest "unknown".
 */
 function readBakedBuildCommit() {
-	return "e51896589531a57a458ca5c2430dfd54cdc16476";
+	return "81ce9360f406bcb5ae9fbdc9f90dd55d33f25f0c";
 }
 async function resolveServerBuildCommit(input) {
 	if (isFullCommitSha(input.baked)) return input.baked;
@@ -299577,20 +299883,20 @@ const generatePairingToken = () => {
 	const randomBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(PAIRING_TOKEN_LENGTH));
 	return Array.from(randomBytes, (value) => PAIRING_TOKEN_ALPHABET[value & 31]).join("");
 };
+const invalidBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
+	message,
+	status: 401
+});
+const internalBootstrapCredentialError = (message, cause) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
+	message,
+	status: 500,
+	cause
+});
 const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const config = yield* ServerConfig;
 	const pairingLinks = yield* AuthPairingLinkRepository;
 	const seededGrantsRef = yield* require_HttpServer.make$3(/* @__PURE__ */ new Map());
 	const changesPubSub = yield* require_Path.unbounded$1();
-	const invalidBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
-		message,
-		status: 401
-	});
-	const internalBootstrapCredentialError = (message, cause) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
-		message,
-		status: 500,
-		cause
-	});
 	const seedGrant = (credential, grant) => require_HttpServer.update(seededGrantsRef, (current) => {
 		const next = new Map(current);
 		next.set(credential, grant);
@@ -299605,19 +299911,19 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		id
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.asVoid);
 	if (config.desktopBootstrapToken) {
-		const now$2 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const now$3 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
 		yield* seedGrant(config.desktopBootstrapToken, {
 			method: "desktop-bootstrap",
 			role: "owner",
 			subject: "desktop-bootstrap",
-			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.add(now$2, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DESKTOP_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_TTL) }),
+			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.add(now$3, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DESKTOP_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_TTL) }),
 			remainingUses: "unbounded"
 		});
 	}
 	const toBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => (cause) => internalBootstrapCredentialError(message, cause);
 	const listActive = () => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		const now$5 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
-		return (yield* pairingLinks.listActive({ now: now$5 })).map((row) => row.label ? {
+		const now$2 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		return (yield* pairingLinks.listActive({ now: now$2 })).map((row) => row.label ? {
 			id: row.id,
 			credential: row.credential,
 			role: row.role,
@@ -299647,8 +299953,8 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const id = crypto.randomUUID();
 		const credential = generatePairingToken();
 		const ttl = input?.ttl ?? DEFAULT_ONE_TIME_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES;
-		const now$4 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
-		const expiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(now$4, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(ttl) });
+		const now$5 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const expiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(now$5, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(ttl) });
 		const issued = {
 			id,
 			credential,
@@ -299662,7 +299968,7 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: input?.role ?? "client",
 			subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token",
 			label: input?.label ?? null,
-			createdAt: now$4,
+			createdAt: now$5,
 			expiresAt
 		});
 		yield* emitUpsert({
@@ -299671,13 +299977,13 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: input?.role ?? "client",
 			subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token",
 			...input?.label ? { label: input.label } : {},
-			createdAt: now$4,
+			createdAt: now$5,
 			expiresAt
 		});
 		return issued;
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to issue pairing credential.")));
 	const consume = (credential) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		const now$3 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const now$4 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
 		const seededResult = yield* require_HttpServer.modify(seededGrantsRef, (current) => {
 			const grant = current.get(credential);
 			if (!grant) return [{
@@ -299686,7 +299992,7 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 				error: invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.")
 			}, current];
 			const next = new Map(current);
-			if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$3, grant.expiresAt)) {
+			if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$4, grant.expiresAt)) {
 				next.delete(credential);
 				return [{
 					_tag: "error",
@@ -299715,8 +300021,8 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (seededResult.reason !== "not-found") return yield* seededResult.error;
 		const consumed = yield* pairingLinks.consumeAvailable({
 			credential,
-			consumedAt: now$3,
-			now: now$3
+			consumedAt: now$4,
+			now: now$4
 		});
 		if (require_Schema$1.isSome(consumed)) {
 			yield* emitRemoved(consumed.value.id);
@@ -299732,9 +300038,9 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (require_Schema$1.isNone(matching)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.");
 		if (matching.value.revokedAt !== null) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential is no longer available.");
 		if (matching.value.consumedAt !== null) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.");
-		if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$3, matching.value.expiresAt)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential expired.");
+		if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$4, matching.value.expiresAt)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential expired.");
 		return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential is no longer available.");
-	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof BootstrapCredentialError ? cause : internalBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to consume bootstrap credential.", cause)));
+	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof BootstrapCredentialError ? cause : internalBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to consume bootstrap credential.", cause)), require_Schema$1.tapError((error) => error.status === 401 ? require_Schema$1.logWarning("Rejected bootstrap credential exchange.", { reason: error.message }) : require_Schema$1.void_));
 	return {
 		issueOneTimeToken,
 		listActive,
@@ -299790,6 +300096,10 @@ const SetAuthSessionLastConnectedAtInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	sessionId: AuthSessionId,
 	lastConnectedAt: require_Schema$1.DateTimeUtcFromString
 });
+const ExtendAuthSessionExpiryInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	sessionId: AuthSessionId,
+	expiresAt: require_Schema$1.DateTimeUtcFromString
+});
 var AuthSessionRepository = class extends require_Schema$1.Service()("forge/persistence/Services/AuthSessions/AuthSessionRepository") {};
 //#endregion
 //#region src/persistence/Layers/AuthSessions.ts
@@ -299941,6 +300251,17 @@ const makeAuthSessionRepository = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
         WHERE session_id = ${sessionId}
           AND revoked_at IS NULL
         RETURNING session_id AS "sessionId"
+      `
+	});
+	const extendSessionExpiryRows = findAll({
+		Request: ExtendAuthSessionExpiryInput,
+		Result: require_Schema$1.Struct({ sessionId: AuthSessionId }),
+		execute: ({ sessionId, expiresAt }) => sql`
+        UPDATE auth_sessions
+        SET expires_at = ${expiresAt}
+        WHERE session_id = ${sessionId}
+          AND revoked_at IS NULL
+        RETURNING session_id AS "sessionId"
       `
 	});
 	const revokeOtherSessionRows = findAll({
@@ -299963,13 +300284,15 @@ const makeAuthSessionRepository = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const revoke = (input) => revokeSessionRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.revoke:query", "AuthSessionRepository.revoke:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.length > 0));
 	const revokeAllExcept = (input) => revokeOtherSessionRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.revokeAllExcept:query", "AuthSessionRepository.revokeAllExcept:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.map((row) => row.sessionId)));
 	const setLastConnectedAt = (input) => setLastConnectedAtRow(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.setLastConnectedAt:query", "AuthSessionRepository.setLastConnectedAt:encodeRequest")));
+	const extendExpiry = (input) => extendSessionExpiryRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.extendExpiry:query", "AuthSessionRepository.extendExpiry:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.length > 0));
 	return {
 		create,
 		getById,
 		listActive,
 		revoke,
 		revokeAllExcept,
-		setLastConnectedAt
+		setLastConnectedAt,
+		extendExpiry
 	};
 });
 const AuthSessionRepositoryLive = require_Schema$1.effect(AuthSessionRepository, makeAuthSessionRepository);
@@ -299978,6 +300301,20 @@ const AuthSessionRepositoryLive = require_Schema$1.effect(AuthSessionRepository,
 const SIGNING_SECRET_NAME = "server-signing-key";
 const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = require_Schema$1.days(30);
 const DEFAULT_WEBSOCKET_TOKEN_TTL = require_Schema$1.minutes(5);
+/**
+* Whether a session presented at `nowMs` has used up half its own lifetime.
+*
+* A phone that opens the app daily should never hit the 30-day wall, but a
+* lost phone's session should still die on schedule if it is never presented
+* again. Sliding the expiry forward only when the session is already more
+* than half spent gives an active phone many chances to renew before expiry
+* while keeping a dormant session's remaining lifetime bounded by the last
+* time it was actually used.
+*/
+function isPastHalfLife(input) {
+	const halfLifeMarkMs = input.issuedAtMs + (input.expiresAtMs - input.issuedAtMs) / 2;
+	return input.nowMs >= halfLifeMarkMs;
+}
 const toSessionCredentialError = (message) => (cause) => new SessionCredentialError({
 	message,
 	cause
@@ -300138,6 +300475,42 @@ const makeSessionCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: claims.role
 		};
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toSessionCredentialError("Failed to issue session credential.")));
+	/**
+	* Slide a session's expiry forward when the token it just verified is past
+	* half its own lifetime, so a phone that keeps using the app never runs
+	* into the 30-day wall.
+	*
+	* The session id, subject, role and method carry over unchanged — only the
+	* signature-bearing `iat`/`exp` differ — which is what lets the DB row be
+	* extended in place (`extendExpiry`) rather than replaced: everything keyed
+	* by session id, most importantly the `command_access_tokens` row holding
+	* this session's CMMD credential, needs no migration.
+	*/
+	const renewIfPastHalfLife = (input) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const nowMs = yield* require_Schema$1.currentTimeMillis;
+		if (!isPastHalfLife({
+			issuedAtMs: input.row.issuedAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			expiresAtMs: input.row.expiresAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			nowMs
+		})) return void 0;
+		const newIssuedAt = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const newExpiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(newIssuedAt, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL) });
+		const newClaims = {
+			...input.claims,
+			iat: newIssuedAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			exp: newExpiresAt.epochMilliseconds
+		};
+		const newEncodedPayload = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(newClaims));
+		const newSignature = signPayload(newEncodedPayload, signingSecret);
+		if (!(yield* authSessions.extendExpiry({
+			sessionId: input.claims.sid,
+			expiresAt: newExpiresAt
+		}).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => false)))) return void 0;
+		return {
+			token: `${newEncodedPayload}.${newSignature}`,
+			expiresAt: newExpiresAt
+		};
+	});
 	const verify = (token) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const [encodedPayload, signature] = token.split(".");
 		if (!encodedPayload || !signature) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Malformed session token." });
@@ -300152,14 +300525,19 @@ const makeSessionCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (require_Schema$1.isSome(row)) {
 			if (row.value.revokedAt !== null) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Session token revoked." });
 		} else if (!(statelessCookieSessions && claims.method === "browser-session-cookie")) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Unknown session token." });
+		const renewed = require_Schema$1.isSome(row) ? yield* renewIfPastHalfLife({
+			claims,
+			row: row.value
+		}) : void 0;
 		return {
 			sessionId: claims.sid,
 			token,
 			method: claims.method,
 			client: require_Schema$1.isSome(row) ? toClientMetadata(row.value.client) : createDefaultClientMetadata(),
-			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.makeUnsafe(claims.exp),
+			expiresAt: renewed?.expiresAt ?? require_Schema$1.makeUnsafe(claims.exp),
 			subject: claims.sub,
-			role: claims.role
+			role: claims.role,
+			...renewed ? { renewed } : {}
 		};
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof SessionCredentialError ? cause : new SessionCredentialError({
 		message: "Failed to verify session credential.",
@@ -300652,7 +301030,10 @@ const makeServerAuth = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		subject: session.subject,
 		method: session.method,
 		role: session.role,
-		...session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}
+		...session.renewed ? {
+			expiresAt: session.renewed.expiresAt,
+			renewedSessionToken: session.renewed.token
+		} : session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}
 	})), require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Unauthorized request.",
 		status: 401,
@@ -300687,6 +301068,7 @@ const makeServerAuth = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		role: session.role,
 		sessionMethod: session.method,
 		...session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: require_Schema$1.toUtc(session.expiresAt) } : {},
+		...session.renewedSessionToken ? { renewedSessionToken: session.renewedSessionToken } : {},
 		cmmdIdentity
 	})))), require_Schema$1.tapError((e) => {
 		if (e._tag === "AuthError" && (e.status ?? 500) < 500) return require_Schema$1.void_;
@@ -319052,7 +319434,7 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 		const sql = yield* require_SqlError.SqlClient;
 		const fetchFn = options.fetchFn ?? fetch;
 		const baseUrl = options.baseUrl ?? resolveCommandAppUrl();
-		const resolveStoredJwt = (forceRefresh) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const resolveStoredJwt = (forceRefresh, staleJwt) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			const owner = yield* readMostRecentOwnerCommandAuthSession.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideService(require_SqlError.SqlClient, sql), require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new ProjectLeadControllerClientError({
 				kind: "unavailable",
 				operation: "resolve-owner-session",
@@ -319066,7 +319448,8 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 				sessionId: owner.sessionId,
 				subject: owner.subject,
 				logPrefix: "project-lead-scheduler",
-				forceRefresh
+				forceRefresh,
+				staleAccessToken: staleJwt
 			}).pipe(require_Schema$1.provideService(require_SqlError.SqlClient, sql));
 			if (!jwt) return yield* new ProjectLeadControllerClientError({
 				kind: "unauthenticated",
@@ -319109,7 +319492,7 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 			}));
 			if (first._tag === "Success") return first.success;
 			if (first.failure.kind !== "unauthenticated") return yield* first.failure;
-			const refreshed = yield* resolveJwt(true);
+			const refreshed = yield* resolveJwt(true, jwt);
 			return yield* requestAttempt({
 				...input,
 				jwt: refreshed