@cmmd-center/forge 0.13.11 → 0.13.13

package/dist/bin.cjs

@@ -3,16 +3,16 @@
 Object.defineProperty(exports, Symbol.toStringTag, { value: "Module" });
 const require_chunk = require("./chunk-BhaIgcZK.cjs");
 const require_Schema$1 = require("./Schema-CDCJ3xZo.cjs");
-const require_Path = require("./Path-BunGrE8F.cjs");
-const require_NodeTerminal = require("./NodeTerminal-B89MobLp.cjs");
-const require_NodeServices = require("./NodeServices-CKFIZVu5.cjs");
-const require_HttpServer = require("./HttpServer-CggZzScj.cjs");
+const require_Path = require("./Path-BQOH_fWQ.cjs");
+const require_NodeTerminal = require("./NodeTerminal-CO-i-6Je.cjs");
+const require_NodeServices = require("./NodeServices-CtC4a-h5.cjs");
+const require_HttpServer = require("./HttpServer-BBzRBmVt.cjs");
 const require_Config = require("./Config-CwKCCk14.cjs");
-const require_Cache = require("./Cache-Cf3ARNaS.cjs");
-const require_SqlError = require("./SqlError-1wIMjXAf.cjs");
+const require_Cache = require("./Cache-BmGc_2BZ.cjs");
+const require_SqlError = require("./SqlError-g4pLzNWR.cjs");
 const require_Mime = require("./Mime-Bilnh8zE.cjs");
 const require_esm = require("./esm-BZhXwX5p.cjs");
-const require_runtimeControlAuthority = require("./runtimeControlAuthority-B3kNmYRT.cjs");
+const require_runtimeControlAuthority = require("./runtimeControlAuthority-BkVB0uAA.cjs");
 const require_PTY = require("./PTY-B4ZctbwQ.cjs");
 let node_child_process = require("node:child_process");
 node_child_process = require_chunk.__toESM(node_child_process);
@@ -17402,7 +17402,8 @@ const ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS = {
 	getArchivedShellSnapshot: "orchestration.getArchivedShellSnapshot",
 	subscribeShell: "orchestration.subscribeShell",
 	subscribeThread: "orchestration.subscribeThread",
-	searchThreads: "orchestration.searchThreads"
+	searchThreads: "orchestration.searchThreads",
+	getThreadDetailPage: "orchestration.getThreadDetailPage"
 };
 const ProviderKind = require_Schema$1.Literals([
 	"codex",
@@ -17920,10 +17921,47 @@ const OrchestrationShellStreamItem = require_Schema$1.Union([require_Schema$1.St
 	kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("snapshot"),
 	snapshot: OrchestrationShellSnapshot
 }), OrchestrationShellStreamEvent]);
-const OrchestrationSubscribeThreadInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({ threadId: ThreadId });
+const OrchestrationSubscribeThreadInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	threadId: ThreadId,
+	afterSequence: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(NonNegativeInt),
+	requestCompletionMarker: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
+	turnLimit: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(PositiveInt)
+});
+require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	turnLimit: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(PositiveInt),
+	beforeCursor: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(TrimmedNonEmptyString)
+});
+/**
+* Reads one windowed page of a thread's detail directly over the RPC socket.
+*
+* The HTTP snapshot route and `subscribeThread`'s fallback snapshot both take
+* the same `turnLimit`/`beforeCursor` window, but neither can serve "load
+* earlier" on a connection with no HTTP endpoint: the fallback snapshot only
+* fires once, on subscribe. This method exists for exactly that case (a
+* relay-only connection), gated on the server's `threadDetailPageRpc`
+* capability so older servers are never sent a method they do not know.
+*/
+const OrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	threadId: ThreadId,
+	turnLimit: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(PositiveInt),
+	beforeCursor: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(TrimmedNonEmptyString)
+});
+/**
+* Page metadata for a windowed thread detail read. `beforeCursor` is opaque and
+* exclusive: passing it back returns the adjacent slice of older turns. `null`
+* means nothing older is left. `snapshotSequence` mirrors the top-level
+* sequence so a history page can be sequence-checked against live state before
+* a client merges it.
+*/
+const OrchestrationThreadDetailPage = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	beforeCursor: require_Schema$1.NullOr(TrimmedNonEmptyString),
+	hasMore: require_Schema$1.Boolean,
+	snapshotSequence: NonNegativeInt
+});
 const OrchestrationThreadDetailSnapshot = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	snapshotSequence: NonNegativeInt,
-	thread: OrchestrationThread
+	thread: OrchestrationThread,
+	page: require_Schema$1.optional(OrchestrationThreadDetailPage)
 });
 const ProjectCreateCommand = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	type: require_Schema$1.Literal("project.create"),
@@ -18747,13 +18785,17 @@ const OrchestrationEvent = require_Schema$1.Union([
 		payload: ThreadRateLimitSetPayload$1
 	})
 ]);
-const OrchestrationThreadStreamItem = require_Schema$1.Union([require_Schema$1.Struct({
-	kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("snapshot"),
-	snapshot: OrchestrationThreadDetailSnapshot
-}), require_Schema$1.Struct({
-	kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("event"),
-	event: OrchestrationEvent
-})]);
+const OrchestrationThreadStreamItem = require_Schema$1.Union([
+	require_Schema$1.Struct({ kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("synchronized") }),
+	require_Schema$1.Struct({
+		kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("snapshot"),
+		snapshot: OrchestrationThreadDetailSnapshot
+	}),
+	require_Schema$1.Struct({
+		kind: require_Schema$1.Literal("event"),
+		event: OrchestrationEvent
+	})
+]);
 const OrchestrationCommandReceiptStatus = require_Schema$1.Literals(["accepted", "rejected"]);
 const TurnCountRange = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	fromTurnCount: NonNegativeInt,
@@ -18902,6 +18944,10 @@ const OrchestrationRpcSchemas = {
 	searchThreads: {
 		input: OrchestrationSearchThreadsInput,
 		output: OrchestrationSearchThreadsResult
+	},
+	getThreadDetailPage: {
+		input: OrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageInput,
+		output: OrchestrationThreadDetailSnapshot
 	}
 };
 var OrchestrationGetSnapshotError = class extends require_Schema$1.TaggedErrorClass()("OrchestrationGetSnapshotError", {
@@ -22978,6 +23024,9 @@ const ServerConfig$1 = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	availableEditors: require_Schema$1.ArraySchema(EditorId),
 	shellRevealInFileManager: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
 	shellRevealInFileManagerKind: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(FileManagerRevealKind),
+	threadResumeCompletionMarker: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
+	threadSnapshotPagination: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
+	threadDetailPageRpc: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Boolean),
 	observability: ServerObservability,
 	settings: ServerSettings
 });
@@ -26937,6 +26986,17 @@ const WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc = make$30(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.searchT
 	error: OrchestrationSearchThreadsError
 });
 /**
+* The socket-only path for "load earlier turns": a relay-only connection has
+* no HTTP endpoint, so this reads the same windowed page the HTTP snapshot
+* route and `subscribeThread`'s fallback snapshot serve, over the RPC socket
+* instead.
+*/
+const WsOrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageRpc = make$30(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage, {
+	payload: OrchestrationRpcSchemas.getThreadDetailPage.input,
+	success: OrchestrationRpcSchemas.getThreadDetailPage.output,
+	error: OrchestrationGetSnapshotError
+});
+/**
 * Resolve `owner/repo` to the repository the caller is allowed to clone.
 *
 * Both of these run against the same CMMD-brokered GitHub credential the web
@@ -27049,7 +27109,7 @@ const WsRpcGroup = make$29(WsServerGetConfigRpc, WsServerRefreshProvidersRpc, Ws
 	payload: ProviderUploadFeedbackInput,
 	success: ProviderUploadFeedbackResult,
 	error: ProviderUploadFeedbackError
-}), WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc, WsSourceControlLookupRepositoryRpc, WsSourceControlCloneRepositoryRpc);
+}), WsOrchestrationSearchThreadsRpc, WsSourceControlLookupRepositoryRpc, WsSourceControlCloneRepositoryRpc, WsOrchestrationGetThreadDetailPageRpc);
 const RelayWsRpcGroup = WsRpcGroup.middleware(RelayAuthorizationMiddleware).middleware(RelayDeliveryMiddleware);
 /**
 * The direct-WebSocket mount of the same group, with per-method scope
@@ -27122,6 +27182,32 @@ function encodeCmmdRuntimeToolActivityPayload(kind, payload) {
 		}
 	};
 }
+const WORKTREE_LAUNCH_ACTIVITY_KINDS = new Set([
+	"worktree.requested",
+	"worktree.stage",
+	"worktree.output",
+	"worktree.created",
+	"worktree.failed",
+	"setup-script.requested",
+	"setup-script.started",
+	"setup-script.skipped",
+	"setup-script.failed",
+	"launch.agent-starting",
+	"launch.cancelled"
+]);
+function encodeCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityPayload(kind, payload) {
+	return {
+		...isRecord$23(payload) ? payload : { sourcePayload: payload },
+		forgeWorktreeLaunchActivity: {
+			schemaVersion: 1,
+			source: "native",
+			kind
+		}
+	};
+}
+function isCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) {
+	return WORKTREE_LAUNCH_ACTIVITY_KINDS.has(kind);
+}
 //#endregion
 //#region ../../packages/contracts/src/cmmdProjectPatch.ts
 const CMMD_PROJECT_PATCH_FIELDS = {
@@ -32232,6 +32318,11 @@ const RELAY_METHOD_POLICY_BASES = [
 		requiredScope: "thread.read",
 		deliveryClass: "subscription"
 	},
+	{
+		method: ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage,
+		requiredScope: "thread.read",
+		deliveryClass: "read"
+	},
 	{
 		method: WS_METHODS.assetsCreateUrl,
 		requiredScope: "thread.read",
@@ -41486,7 +41577,7 @@ function splitPath(filename) {
 	const parts = splitPathRe.exec(truncated);
 	return parts ? parts.slice(1) : [];
 }
-function dirname$7(path) {
+function dirname$8(path) {
 	const result = splitPath(path);
 	const root = result[0] || "";
 	let dir = result[1];
@@ -58801,7 +58892,7 @@ function getSpotlightConfig(optionsSpotlight) {
 function normalizeWindowsPath(path) {
 	return path.replace(/^[A-Z]:/, "").replace(/\\/g, "/");
 }
-function createGetModuleFromFilename(basePath = process.argv[1] ? dirname$7(process.argv[1]) : process.cwd(), isWindows = node_path.sep === "\\") {
+function createGetModuleFromFilename(basePath = process.argv[1] ? dirname$8(process.argv[1]) : process.cwd(), isWindows = node_path.sep === "\\") {
 	const normalizedBase = isWindows ? normalizeWindowsPath(basePath) : basePath;
 	return (filename) => {
 		if (!filename) return;
@@ -66289,7 +66380,7 @@ function normalizeNumberish(value) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region package.json
-var version$1 = "0.13.11";
+var version$1 = "0.13.13";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/sentry.ts
 const SERVER_APP_NAME = "forge-server";
@@ -66691,6 +66782,129 @@ const respondToAuthError = (error) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	}));
 	return response;
 });
+//#endregion
+//#region src/http/rateLimit.ts
+/**
+* Per-client, per-route-class rate limiting for Forge's own HTTP surface.
+*
+* Scoped to the routes a broken or looping client can hammer before it ever
+* has an authenticated session — the CMMD device-code poll, the bootstrap and
+* pairing-token exchanges — plus the authenticated /api/cmmd proxy, which
+* every desktop UI interaction runs through. None of these had any limit
+* before FOR-36706: a stuck pairing loop or a poll that never saw `slow_down`
+* could retry as fast as the network allowed, with nothing to stop it and
+* nothing telling the client to back off.
+*
+* Defaults are generous on purpose. This exists to bound a runaway client,
+* not to throttle a working one — see `defaultRateLimitPolicies` for the
+* reasoning behind each number and how to override it.
+*
+* Deliberately plain module state, not an Effect service: every route this
+* guards is a synchronous decision (count, compare, maybe reset a window),
+* and threading a new Context requirement through the whole server's layer
+* graph for that would touch every test file that stands up any of these
+* routes. `cmmdJwtResolver.ts`'s in-flight-refresh map is the same call.
+*/
+function envInt(name, fallback) {
+	const raw = process.env[name];
+	if (!raw) return fallback;
+	const parsed = Number(raw);
+	return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? Math.floor(parsed) : fallback;
+}
+/**
+* One reasoning line per class, so a future change to a default has to
+* confront why the old one was picked:
+*
+* - `auth-device-poll` (`/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device` and `/token`): RFC 8628
+*   polls every `interval` seconds, 5 by default, so a well-behaved client
+*   sits under 12/min. 120/min leaves room for several concurrent sign-in
+*   attempts and CMMD's own `slow_down` handling without ever tripping on
+*   normal use, while still bounding a client that ignores `slow_down`.
+* - `auth-bootstrap` (`/api/auth/bootstrap*`, the bearer bootstrap routes):
+*   a working client bootstraps once per sign-in. 30/min is generous headroom
+*   for retries after a network blip, not a budget anyone should approach.
+* - `auth-token-exchange` (`/oauth/token`, the vendored pairing exchange):
+*   same shape as bootstrap — one pairing attempt, occasionally retried.
+* - `cmmd-proxy` (every `/api/cmmd/*` route): this is the one real desktop
+*   traffic actually leans on — task lists, project browsing, comments, all
+*   day. 1200/min (20/sec) is set high enough that no normal session should
+*   ever see it; it exists for a retry loop or a runaway resync, not for
+*   ordinary use.
+*/
+function buildPoliciesFromEnv() {
+	return {
+		"auth-device-poll": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_DEVICE_POLL_MAX", 120),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_DEVICE_POLL_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"auth-bootstrap": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_MAX", 30),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_BOOTSTRAP_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"auth-token-exchange": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_MAX", 30),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_AUTH_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		},
+		"cmmd-proxy": {
+			maxRequests: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_CMMD_PROXY_MAX", 1200),
+			windowMs: envInt("FORGE_RATE_LIMIT_CMMD_PROXY_WINDOW_SECONDS", 60) * 1e3
+		}
+	};
+}
+let policies = buildPoliciesFromEnv();
+const windows = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function windowKey(routeClass, clientKey) {
+	return `${routeClass}\0${clientKey}`;
+}
+/**
+* Fixed-window counting: cheap, and precise enough for a loop-guard rather
+* than a security boundary. The one imprecision this trades away — up to 2x
+* the configured rate right at a window boundary — matters for an attacker
+* budgeting requests against the limiter's clock, not for the runaway
+* clients this exists to catch.
+*/
+function checkHttpRateLimit(input) {
+	const policy = policies[input.routeClass];
+	const nowMs = Date.now();
+	const key = windowKey(input.routeClass, input.clientKey);
+	const existing = windows.get(key);
+	const windowIsLive = existing !== void 0 && nowMs - existing.windowStartMs < policy.windowMs;
+	const windowStartMs = windowIsLive ? existing.windowStartMs : nowMs;
+	const count = (windowIsLive ? existing.count : 0) + 1;
+	windows.set(key, {
+		windowStartMs,
+		count
+	});
+	return {
+		allowed: count <= policy.maxRequests,
+		retryAfterSeconds: Math.max(0, Math.ceil((windowStartMs + policy.windowMs - nowMs) / 1e3))
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Checks the limiter for one request and, when the caller is over budget,
+* returns the 429 to send instead of running the route — `null` means
+* proceed. Every route this guards is expected to call this first and return
+* early on a non-null result, before doing any other work.
+*/
+function rateLimitOrRespond(input) {
+	const decision = checkHttpRateLimit(input);
+	if (decision.allowed) return null;
+	return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Too many requests. Try again later." }, {
+		status: 429,
+		headers: { "retry-after": String(decision.retryAfterSeconds) }
+	});
+}
+/**
+* The client identity for a route with no session yet — the device-code
+* poll, bootstrap and pairing-token exchange all run before Forge has issued
+* one. IP address is the only stable-enough signal available at that point;
+* the authenticated `/api/cmmd` proxy keys on the session instead (see its
+* call site), so one desktop and one phone sharing a NAT never share a
+* budget there.
+*/
+function clientKeyFromRequest(request) {
+	return normalizeIpAddress(require_Schema$1.getOrNull(request.remoteAddress)) ?? "unknown";
+}
 const OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN_TYPE = "urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:access_token";
 /**
 * The one exchange this endpoint performs, or the reason it will not.
@@ -66716,6 +66930,29 @@ function accessTokenExpiresInSeconds(remainingMillis) {
 	return Math.max(0, Math.floor(remainingMillis / 1e3));
 }
 //#endregion
+//#region src/auth/commandBootstrapClient.ts
+const BOOTSTRAP_CLIENT_LABELS = {
+	desktop: "Forge Desktop Cloud",
+	mobile: "Forge Mobile Cloud"
+};
+/**
+* Client metadata for a bearer bootstrap session.
+*
+* The declared device type wins over the one inferred from the user agent. A
+* React Native fetch sends whatever the platform's networking stack sends, and
+* on iOS that is a CFNetwork string no user-agent heuristic reads as a phone.
+*/
+function resolveCommandBootstrapClient(input) {
+	const deviceType = input.clientDeviceType ?? "desktop";
+	return {
+		...deriveAuthClientMetadata({
+			request: input.request,
+			label: BOOTSTRAP_CLIENT_LABELS[deviceType]
+		}),
+		deviceType
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region ../../packages/shared/src/cmmdIdentity.ts
 const MAX_CMMD_AVATAR_URL_LENGTH = 256 * 1024;
 const DATA_IMAGE_AVATAR_PATTERN = /^data:image\/(?:avif|gif|jpeg|jpg|png|webp);base64,[a-z0-9+/=]+$/i;
@@ -67169,14 +67406,26 @@ function extractJwtExpiresAt(jwtToken) {
 	}
 }
 /**
-* Returns true when a stored JWT is past its expiry or has no decodable expiry.
-* CMMD REST JWTs are short-lived bearer tokens, so unknown expiry is not safe.
+* How long before `exp` a stored JWT is already treated as spent.
+*
+* Comparing against `exp` exactly leaves a window where Forge sends a token it
+* believes is good and CMMD has already stopped accepting it: the clocks differ by a
+* little, the request spends time in flight, and the answer comes back 401 on a
+* session that had a perfectly good refresh token sitting next to it. Two
+* minutes is far inside the JWT's own lifetime, so this costs one early
+* rotation and removes the race.
+*/
+const JWT_EXPIRY_SKEW_MS = 2 * 6e4;
+/**
+* Returns true when a stored JWT is at or near its expiry, or has no decodable
+* expiry. CMMD REST JWTs are short-lived bearer tokens, so unknown expiry is
+* not safe.
 */
 function isJwtExpiredForSession(sessionId) {
 	if (!jwtCache.has(sessionId)) return false;
 	const expiresAt = jwtExpiryCache.get(sessionId);
 	if (!expiresAt) return true;
-	return new Date(expiresAt) <= /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
+	return new Date(expiresAt).getTime() - JWT_EXPIRY_SKEW_MS <= Date.now();
 }
 /**
 * Hydrate the in-memory cache from the configured persistence layer. Call once at server startup
@@ -67732,10 +67981,27 @@ const clearUnrecoverableCmmdAuthForSession = (sessionId) => require_Schema$1.gen
 * Retire refresh credentials copied into historical desktop bearer sessions.
 * Electron owns rotation for native desktop OAuth; Forge Local keeps only the
 * derived access authority needed by the current bearer session.
-*/
-const clearDesktopBearerRefreshTokensForSubject = (subject) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-	const normalizedSubject = subject.trim();
-	if (!normalizedSubject) return;
+*
+* Scoped to the bootstrapping client, not to the whole subject. The phone and
+* Electron sign in as the same `user:<id>`, so a subject-wide sweep let one
+* desktop launch null out a phone's refresh token and end its session a day
+* later. Two clauses keep that from happening:
+*
+* - `client_device_type = 'desktop'`, which now excludes phones outright,
+*   because the mobile app declares itself at bootstrap.
+* - the same recorded `client_user_agent` as the bootstrap doing the
+*   retirement, which is the only thing that separates a phone row written
+*   before that stamp existed from a real Electron row. Both are stamped
+*   `desktop`; neither carries any other mark. An empty or unmatched user agent
+*   retires nothing, which is the direction that keeps a live credential.
+*
+* Electron re-bootstraps under a stable user agent, so its own historical rows
+* still match and still get swept.
+*/
+const clearDesktopBearerRefreshTokensForSubject = (input) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const normalizedSubject = input.subject.trim();
+	const normalizedUserAgent = input.clientUserAgent?.trim() ?? "";
+	if (!normalizedSubject || !normalizedUserAgent) return;
 	const rows = yield* (yield* require_SqlError.SqlClient)`
       UPDATE command_access_tokens
       SET
@@ -67748,6 +68014,7 @@ const clearDesktopBearerRefreshTokensForSubject = (subject) => require_Schema$1.
           AND role = 'owner'
           AND method = 'bearer-session-token'
           AND client_device_type = 'desktop'
+          AND client_user_agent = ${normalizedUserAgent}
       )
       RETURNING session_id AS "sessionId"
     `.pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlError("CommandAccessTokenStore.clearDesktopBearerRefresh:query")));
@@ -67770,6 +68037,17 @@ const OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE = "forge_oauth_state";
 const OAUTH_VERIFIER_COOKIE = "forge_oauth_verifier";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/auth/http/cloudOwnerOAuth.ts
+const FORGE_CLOUD_SESSION_GRANT_COOKIE = "forge_cloud_session_grant";
+function resolveCloudOwnerSessionGrantCookie(input) {
+	const token = input.token?.trim();
+	if (!token || !input.expiresAt) return null;
+	const expiresAt = new Date(input.expiresAt);
+	if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt.getTime()) || expiresAt.getTime() <= Date.now()) return null;
+	return {
+		token,
+		expiresAt
+	};
+}
 function validateCloudOwnerCallbackAssertion(input) {
 	if (input.serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() !== true) return require_Schema$1.succeed(null);
 	if (!input.assertionToken || !input.serverAuth.verifyForgeCloudOwnerAssertion) return require_Schema$1.fail(new AuthError({
@@ -67833,8 +68111,19 @@ function cloudOwnerAssertionCookieOptions(assertion) {
 		secure: true
 	};
 }
-function cloudOwnerOAuthResponse(homeUrl, assertion) {
-	return require_HttpServer.redirect(homeUrl, { status: 302 }).pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, assertion.token, cloudOwnerAssertionCookieOptions(assertion)), require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, "", expiredCallbackCookie)), require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(OAUTH_VERIFIER_COOKIE, "", expiredCallbackCookie)));
+function cloudOwnerSessionGrantCookieOptions(grant) {
+	return {
+		expires: grant.expiresAt,
+		httpOnly: true,
+		path: "/api/auth",
+		sameSite: "lax",
+		secure: true
+	};
+}
+function cloudOwnerOAuthResponse(homeUrl, assertion, sessionGrant) {
+	let response = require_HttpServer.redirect(homeUrl, { status: 302 }).pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, assertion.token, cloudOwnerAssertionCookieOptions(assertion)));
+	if (sessionGrant) response = response.pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_SESSION_GRANT_COOKIE, sessionGrant.token, cloudOwnerSessionGrantCookieOptions(sessionGrant))));
+	return response.pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(OAUTH_STATE_COOKIE, "", expiredCallbackCookie)), require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(OAUTH_VERIFIER_COOKIE, "", expiredCallbackCookie)));
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region src/auth/http.ts
@@ -67884,6 +68173,56 @@ const authSessionRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/auth/session", require_Schema$1
 	}));
 	return response;
 }));
+const authSessionRenewRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/session/renew", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
+	if (serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() !== true) return yield* new AuthError({
+		message: "Session renewal is unavailable.",
+		status: 401
+	});
+	const sessionGrant = request.cookies[FORGE_CLOUD_SESSION_GRANT_COOKIE]?.trim();
+	if (!sessionGrant) return yield* new AuthError({
+		message: "Session renewal is unavailable.",
+		status: 401
+	});
+	const credentials = yield* resolveCmmdTokenBundleCredentials(yield* readCmmdJsonResponse(yield* require_Schema$1.tryPromise({
+		try: () => fetch(resolveCommandAppEndpoint("/api/mcp-server/oauth/token"), {
+			method: "POST",
+			headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+			body: JSON.stringify({
+				grant_type: "forge_session_grant",
+				grant_token: sessionGrant,
+				client_id: "cmmd-forge-web"
+			})
+		}),
+		catch: (cause) => new AuthError({
+			message: "Failed to renew the Forge Cloud session with CMMD.",
+			status: 500,
+			cause
+		})
+	}), "Failed to renew the Forge Cloud session with CMMD."));
+	const { cmmdIdentity, userId, patToStore } = credentials;
+	if (!cmmdIdentity || !userId || !patToStore) return yield* new AuthError({
+		message: "CMMD did not return a complete renewed Forge session.",
+		status: 500
+	});
+	const assertion = yield* validateCloudOwnerCallbackAssertion({
+		serverAuth,
+		assertionToken: credentials.forgeOwnerAssertion,
+		authenticatedUserId: userId
+	});
+	if (!assertion) return yield* require_Schema$1.die(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Expected a renewed Forge Cloud owner assertion."));
+	yield* persistCloudOwnerArtifacts({
+		assertion,
+		accessToken: patToStore,
+		identity: cmmdIdentity,
+		jwtToken: credentials.jwtToStore,
+		refreshToken: credentials.refreshToken,
+		sessionGrant,
+		sessionGrantExpiresAt: void 0
+	});
+	return yield* require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ renewed: true }, { status: 200 }).pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, assertion.token, cloudOwnerAssertionCookieOptions(assertion)));
+}).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authLogoutRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/logout", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
@@ -67906,14 +68245,24 @@ const authLogoutRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/logout", require_Schema$1.
 		sameSite: "lax",
 		secure
 	}));
-	if (cloudShell) response = yield* response.pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, "", {
-		expires: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(0),
-		httpOnly: true,
-		maxAge: 0,
-		path: "/",
-		sameSite: "lax",
-		secure: true
-	}));
+	if (cloudShell) {
+		response = yield* response.pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, "", {
+			expires: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(0),
+			httpOnly: true,
+			maxAge: 0,
+			path: "/",
+			sameSite: "lax",
+			secure: true
+		}));
+		response = yield* response.pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_SESSION_GRANT_COOKIE, "", {
+			expires: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(0),
+			httpOnly: true,
+			maxAge: 0,
+			path: "/api/auth",
+			sameSite: "lax",
+			secure: true
+		}));
+	}
 	response = yield* pipeExpireLegacySessionCookie(sessions.cookieName, require_Schema$1.succeed(response), { secure });
 	if (sessions.cookieName !== "forge_session") response = yield* response.pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(BASE_SESSION_COOKIE_NAME, "", {
 		expires: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(0),
@@ -67936,7 +68285,8 @@ const CommandBootstrapInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	refreshToken: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.String),
 	userId: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Number),
 	displayName: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.String),
-	user: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Unknown)
+	user: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Unknown),
+	clientDeviceType: require_Schema$1.optionalKey(require_Schema$1.Literals(["desktop", "mobile"]))
 });
 const CommandOAuthDeviceInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	client_id: require_Schema$1.String,
@@ -68402,6 +68752,11 @@ function commandOAuthProxyStatus(path, status, body) {
 }
 const authBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(AuthBootstrapInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
@@ -68419,6 +68774,11 @@ const authBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap", require_Sch
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/command", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	if (serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() === true) return yield* new AuthError({
@@ -68467,6 +68827,11 @@ const authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/comman
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/command/bearer", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const sessions = yield* SessionCredentialService;
 	if (serverAuth.isForgeCloudShell?.() === true) return yield* new AuthError({
@@ -68484,13 +68849,10 @@ const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/
 		method: "bearer-session-token",
 		role: "owner",
 		subject: sessionSubject,
-		client: {
-			...deriveAuthClientMetadata({
-				request,
-				label: "Forge Desktop Cloud"
-			}),
-			deviceType: "desktop"
-		}
+		client: resolveCommandBootstrapClient({
+			request,
+			clientDeviceType: payload.clientDeviceType
+		})
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Failed to issue authenticated bearer session.",
 		cause
@@ -68500,7 +68862,10 @@ const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/
 		payload,
 		cmmdIdentity: validated.cmmdIdentity
 	});
-	if (!payload.refreshToken?.trim()) yield* clearDesktopBearerRefreshTokensForSubject(sessionSubject).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
+	if ((payload.clientDeviceType ?? "desktop") === "desktop" && !payload.refreshToken?.trim()) yield* clearDesktopBearerRefreshTokensForSubject({
+		subject: sessionSubject,
+		clientUserAgent: request.headers["user-agent"]
+	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Failed to retire legacy desktop refresh credentials.",
 		status: 500,
 		cause
@@ -68515,6 +68880,11 @@ const authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/
 	}, { status: 200 });
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-device-poll",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(CommandOAuthDeviceInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid CMMD OAuth device payload.",
 		status: 400,
@@ -68526,7 +68896,17 @@ const authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/device
 		...payload.scope ? { scope: payload.scope } : {}
 	});
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
+/**
+* The device-code poll. Called every `interval` seconds by design (RFC
+* 8628), which is exactly why FOR-36706 puts a limiter on it: a client that
+* ignores `slow_down` — a bug, not a person — has no other backstop here.
+*/
 const authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-oauth/token", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-device-poll",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(CommandOAuthTokenInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid CMMD OAuth token payload.",
 		status: 400,
@@ -68568,6 +68948,14 @@ function completeCloudOwnerPasswordLogin(input) {
 			authenticatedUserId: userId
 		});
 		if (!assertion) return yield* require_Schema$1.die(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Expected a Forge Cloud owner assertion in cloud shell mode."));
+		const sessionGrant = resolveCloudOwnerSessionGrantCookie({
+			token: credentials.sessionGrant,
+			expiresAt: credentials.sessionGrantExpiresAt
+		});
+		if (!sessionGrant) return yield* new AuthError({
+			message: "CMMD did not return a durable Forge Cloud session grant.",
+			status: 500
+		});
 		yield* persistCloudOwnerArtifacts({
 			assertion,
 			accessToken: patToStore,
@@ -68577,10 +68965,12 @@ function completeCloudOwnerPasswordLogin(input) {
 			sessionGrant: credentials.sessionGrant,
 			sessionGrantExpiresAt: credentials.sessionGrantExpiresAt
 		});
-		return yield* require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({
+		let response = require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({
 			authenticated: true,
 			cmmdIdentity
 		}, { status: 200 }).pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_OWNER_ASSERTION_COOKIE, assertion.token, cloudOwnerAssertionCookieOptions(assertion)));
+		if (sessionGrant) response = response.pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap(require_HttpServer.setCookie(FORGE_CLOUD_SESSION_GRANT_COOKIE, sessionGrant.token, cloudOwnerSessionGrantCookieOptions(sessionGrant))));
+		return yield* response;
 	});
 }
 const authCmmdPasswordTokenRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/cmmd-password/token", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
@@ -68754,6 +69144,14 @@ const authWebCallbackRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/auth/callback", require_Sch
 		assertionToken: forgeOwnerAssertion,
 		authenticatedUserId: userId
 	});
+	const cloudSessionGrant = cloudOwnerAssertion ? resolveCloudOwnerSessionGrantCookie({
+		token: sessionGrant,
+		expiresAt: sessionGrantExpiresAt
+	}) : null;
+	if (cloudOwnerAssertion && !cloudSessionGrant) return yield* new AuthError({
+		message: "CMMD did not return a durable Forge Cloud session grant.",
+		status: 500
+	});
 	const sessionSubject = resolveCommandOAuthSubject(userId);
 	const issued = cloudOwnerAssertion ? null : yield* sessions.issue({
 		method: "browser-session-cookie",
@@ -68785,7 +69183,7 @@ const authWebCallbackRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/auth/callback", require_Sch
 	else yield* persistLocalOAuthArtifacts(persistenceInput);
 	const homeUrl = `${publicUrl}/`;
 	const secureCookie = shouldUseSecureCookie(publicUrl);
-	if (cloudOwnerAssertion) return yield* cloudOwnerOAuthResponse(homeUrl, cloudOwnerAssertion);
+	if (cloudOwnerAssertion) return yield* cloudOwnerOAuthResponse(homeUrl, cloudOwnerAssertion, cloudSessionGrant);
 	if (!issued) return yield* require_Schema$1.die(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("Expected a local session outside Forge Cloud."));
 	return yield* pipeExpireLegacySessionCookie(sessions.cookieName, require_HttpServer.redirect(homeUrl, { status: 302 }).pipe(require_HttpServer.setCookie(sessions.cookieName, issued.token, {
 		expires: require_Schema$1.toDate(issued.expiresAt),
@@ -68803,6 +69201,11 @@ const authWebCallbackRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/auth/callback", require_Sch
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", (error) => respondToAuthError(error))));
 const authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/bearer", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-bootstrap",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyJson(AuthBootstrapInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid bootstrap payload.",
@@ -68835,6 +69238,11 @@ const authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/auth/bootstrap/bearer"
 */
 const authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/oauth/token", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+		routeClass: "auth-token-exchange",
+		clientKey: clientKeyFromRequest(request)
+	});
+	if (limited) return limited;
 	const serverAuth = yield* ServerAuth;
 	const payload = yield* require_HttpServer.schemaBodyUrlParams(OAuthTokenExchangeInput).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Invalid token exchange payload.",
@@ -70829,6 +71237,11 @@ function redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken) {
 		};
 	}).catch(() => null);
 }
+const REJECTED_OAUTH_ERROR_CODES = new Set([
+	"invalid_grant",
+	"invalid_client",
+	"invalid_request"
+]);
 /**
 * Rotate a CMMD refresh token into a fresh access JWT.
 *
@@ -70841,7 +71254,7 @@ function redeemCmmdSessionGrant(grantToken) {
 * code are what identify the failure, and `invalid_grant` in particular means
 * the token was already spent, which is a different fix from a 500.
 */
-function refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken) {
+function refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken, observer) {
 	return fetch(new URL("/api/mcp-server/oauth/token", resolveCommandAppUrl()).toString(), {
 		method: "POST",
 		headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
@@ -70852,7 +71265,9 @@ function refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken) {
 		})
 	}).then(async (response) => {
 		if (!response.ok) {
-			console.warn(`[cmmd-auth] CMMD refused a JWT rotation with ${response.status}${await readOAuthError(response)}`);
+			const errorCode = await readOAuthErrorCode(response);
+			if (errorCode !== null && REJECTED_OAUTH_ERROR_CODES.has(errorCode)) observer?.onCredentialRejected?.();
+			console.warn(`[cmmd-auth] CMMD refused a JWT rotation with ${response.status}${errorCode === null ? "" : ` (${errorCode})`}`);
 			return null;
 		}
 		const parsed = parseCmmdOAuthRefreshResponse(await response.json());
@@ -70864,20 +71279,73 @@ function refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken) {
 	});
 }
 /**
-* The OAuth `error` code from a refusal, as a loggable suffix.
+* The OAuth `error` code from a refusal, lowercased, or null when there is none.
 *
 * Best effort by design: a body that is not JSON, or is already consumed, must
-* not turn a logged failure into an unlogged one.
+* not turn a logged failure into an unlogged one. Null also reads correctly as
+* "no evidence the credential is dead", which is the safe answer for a caller
+* deciding whether to keep a refresh token.
 */
-async function readOAuthError(response) {
+async function readOAuthErrorCode(response) {
 	try {
 		const code = (await response.json())["error"];
-		return typeof code === "string" && code.trim().length > 0 ? ` (${code.trim()})` : "";
+		return typeof code === "string" && code.trim().length > 0 ? code.trim().toLowerCase() : null;
 	} catch {
-		return "";
+		return null;
 	}
 }
 //#endregion
+//#region src/command/cmmdRotationFence.ts
+/**
+* True when Forge must not rotate this session's CMMD credentials.
+*
+* Fails closed: if the session row cannot be read, assume the fence applies.
+* Spending a token Forge had no right to spend is worse than one extra
+* reconnect.
+*/
+function isRotationFencedSession(sessionId) {
+	if (readCommandRefreshTokenForSession(sessionId)) return require_Schema$1.succeed(false);
+	return isDesktopBearerAuthSession(sessionId).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => true));
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/cmmdConnection/cmmdCredentialRejection.ts
+/**
+* How long a recorded rejection stays usable.
+*
+* Long enough to span the resolver ladder and the response that follows it,
+* short enough that it cannot outlive the credential it describes.
+*/
+const REJECTION_TTL_MS = 6e4;
+const rejectedAt = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+/** Record that CMMD refused this session's credential outright. */
+function noteCmmdCredentialRejected(sessionId) {
+	rejectedAt.set(sessionId, Date.now());
+}
+/** Whether CMMD refused this session's credential recently enough to act on. */
+function hasCmmdCredentialRejection(sessionId) {
+	const observedAt = rejectedAt.get(sessionId);
+	if (observedAt === void 0) return false;
+	if (Date.now() - observedAt <= REJECTION_TTL_MS) return true;
+	rejectedAt.delete(sessionId);
+	return false;
+}
+/** Drop a recorded rejection, once it has been acted on or superseded. */
+function forgetCmmdCredentialRejection(sessionId) {
+	rejectedAt.delete(sessionId);
+}
+/**
+* Clear a session's CMMD credentials, but only if CMMD rejected them.
+*
+* This is the only door the 401 path may use. A resolver that returned null
+* because it was not allowed to try is a policy refusal and leaves the stored
+* credential exactly where it is, so the next request can rotate it.
+*/
+const clearCmmdAuthAfterCmmdRejection = (sessionId) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	if (!hasCmmdCredentialRejection(sessionId)) return;
+	yield* clearUnrecoverableCmmdAuthForSession(sessionId);
+	forgetCmmdCredentialRejection(sessionId);
+});
+//#endregion
 //#region src/command/cmmdJwtResolver.ts
 function usableCmmdUserJwt(token) {
 	return isCmmdUserAccessJwt(token) ? token : null;
@@ -70890,7 +71358,7 @@ function refreshOnceForSession(sessionId, refreshToken) {
 	return require_Schema$1.promise(() => {
 		const existing = inFlightRefreshes.get(sessionId);
 		if (existing) return existing;
-		const pending = refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken).catch(() => null).finally(() => {
+		const pending = refreshCmmdJwt(refreshToken, { onCredentialRejected: () => noteCmmdCredentialRejected(sessionId) }).catch(() => null).finally(() => {
 			inFlightRefreshes.delete(sessionId);
 		});
 		inFlightRefreshes.set(sessionId, pending);
@@ -71000,13 +71468,16 @@ function trySubjectFallback(sessionId, subject, logPrefix) {
 * Fail-closed: never returns a non-user / malformed Bearer. Callers must map
 * null to CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED and must not call CMMD upstream with a bad token.
 */
-function resolveCmmdJwtForSession({ sessionId, subject, logPrefix = "cmmd-auth", forceRefresh = false }) {
+function resolveCmmdJwtForSession({ sessionId, subject, logPrefix = "cmmd-auth", forceRefresh = false, staleAccessToken = null }) {
 	const cached = usableCmmdUserJwt(readCommandJwtForSession(sessionId));
-	if (!forceRefresh && cached && !isJwtExpiredForSession(sessionId)) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+	if (cached && !isJwtExpiredForSession(sessionId)) {
+		if (!forceRefresh) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+		if (staleAccessToken && cached !== staleAccessToken) return require_Schema$1.succeed(cached);
+	}
 	const normalizedSubject = subject?.trim() || null;
 	if (!normalizedSubject && !forceRefresh) return require_Schema$1.succeed(null);
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		if (yield* isDesktopBearerAuthSession(sessionId).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => true))) return null;
+		if (yield* isRotationFencedSession(sessionId)) return null;
 		if (forceRefresh) {
 			const forced = yield* tryOwnCredentialRecovery(sessionId, logPrefix);
 			if (forced) return forced;
@@ -71765,15 +72236,25 @@ function clearCmmdAuthAfterFailure(sessionId) {
 	})));
 }
 /**
-* The single "no usable CMMD credential" response: clears whatever
-* unrecoverable auth state this session is holding, then returns the
-* canonical `CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED` body. Every prologue path that decides the
-* session has no way to reach CMMD — a missing PAT, a JWT that fails to
-* resolve, a bespoke gate elsewhere in http.ts — emits this same response so
-* the Shell only ever has one `CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED` body to branch on.
+* The single "no usable CMMD credential" response: returns the canonical
+* `CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED` body. Every prologue path that decides the session has
+* no way to reach CMMD — a missing PAT, a JWT that fails to resolve, a bespoke
+* gate elsewhere in http.ts — emits this same response so the Shell only ever
+* has one `CMMD_AUTH_REQUIRED` body to branch on.
+*
+* It used to delete the session's stored credentials on the way out, and that
+* was the wrong reading of its own argument. Most of the paths that reach here
+* are refusals, not rejections: the resolver was fenced, the subject was
+* missing, a gate said no. A phone would arrive holding a refresh token good
+* for the next three months, be refused by a rule, and have that token deleted
+* as "unrecoverable". The clear now happens only where CMMD has actually
+* refused the credential, which `clearCmmdAuthAfterCmmdRejection` checks.
 */
 function respondCmmdConnectionRequired(sessionId) {
-	return clearCmmdAuthAfterFailure(sessionId).pipe(require_Schema$1.as(buildProxyErrorResponse(new CmmdProxyAuthenticationRequiredError("CMMD connection required. Reconnect CMMD to continue."))));
+	return clearCmmdAuthAfterCmmdRejection(sessionId).pipe(require_Schema$1.catch_((error) => require_Schema$1.logWarning("Failed to clear CMMD auth that CMMD itself rejected.", {
+		cause: error,
+		sessionId
+	})), require_Schema$1.as(buildProxyErrorResponse(new CmmdProxyAuthenticationRequiredError("CMMD connection required. Reconnect CMMD to continue."))));
 }
 async function dispatchToProxy(method, jwt, cmmdPath, rawBody, orgId, searchParams) {
 	return cmmdGateway.request({
@@ -71829,6 +72310,11 @@ function buildProxyRouteLayer(route) {
 	const handler = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const req = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
 		const session = yield* (yield* ServerAuth).authenticateHttpRequest(req);
+		const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+			routeClass: "cmmd-proxy",
+			clientKey: session.sessionId
+		});
+		if (limited) return limited;
 		const pathParams = yield* params;
 		const cmmdPath = substitutePath(route.cmmdPath, pathParams);
 		if (!cmmdPath) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Missing required path parameter." }, { status: 400 });
@@ -71889,6 +72375,11 @@ function buildProxyHandlerEffect(route) {
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const req = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
 		const session = yield* (yield* ServerAuth).authenticateHttpRequest(req);
+		const limited = rateLimitOrRespond({
+			routeClass: "cmmd-proxy",
+			clientKey: session.sessionId
+		});
+		if (limited) return limited;
 		if (!readCommandAccessTokenForSession(session.sessionId)) return yield* respondCmmdConnectionRequired(session.sessionId);
 		const parsed = yield* route.parse(req);
 		if (!parsed.ok) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe(parsed.body, { status: parsed.status });
@@ -83674,12 +84165,12 @@ const makePullRequestService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	}));
 	const submitReview = (input) => requireProject(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap((project) => {
 		const review = project.api.capabilities.review;
-		if (!review.verdicts.includes(input.verdict)) return refuse(`This host cannot ${VERDICT_LABELS[input.verdict]} a change request.`);
-		if (input.comments.length > 0 && !review.inlineComment) return refuse("This host cannot comment on a line of a change request.");
-		if (input.verdict !== "approve" && input.body.trim().length === 0 && input.comments.length === 0) return refuse("A review needs a summary or at least one comment.");
+		if (!review.verdicts.includes(input.verdict)) return refuse$1(`This host cannot ${VERDICT_LABELS[input.verdict]} a change request.`);
+		if (input.comments.length > 0 && !review.inlineComment) return refuse$1("This host cannot comment on a line of a change request.");
+		if (input.verdict !== "approve" && input.body.trim().length === 0 && input.comments.length === 0) return refuse$1("A review needs a summary or at least one comment.");
 		return viewerPermissionsOf(project, input, "submitReview").pipe(require_Schema$1.flatMap((viewer) => {
-			if (!viewer.verdicts.includes(input.verdict)) return refuse(`You need write access on this repository to ${VERDICT_LABELS[input.verdict]} a change request.`);
-			if (input.comments.length > 0 && !viewer.comment) return refuse("You need write access on this repository to comment on a line of a change request.");
+			if (!viewer.verdicts.includes(input.verdict)) return refuse$1(`You need write access on this repository to ${VERDICT_LABELS[input.verdict]} a change request.`);
+			if (input.comments.length > 0 && !viewer.comment) return refuse$1("You need write access on this repository to comment on a line of a change request.");
 			return project.api.submitReview({
 				projectId: project.project.id,
 				cwd: project.project.workspaceRoot,
@@ -84077,7 +84568,7 @@ const toEntry = (input) => {
 		...input.item.reviewDecision === void 0 || input.item.reviewDecision === null ? {} : { reviewDecision: input.item.reviewDecision }
 	};
 };
-const refuse = (detail) => require_Schema$1.fail(new PullRequestOperationError({
+const refuse$1 = (detail) => require_Schema$1.fail(new PullRequestOperationError({
 	operation: "submitReview",
 	detail
 }));
@@ -93944,6 +94435,166 @@ const admitNormalizedDispatchCommand = (command, admit) => require_Schema$1.unin
 	};
 }));
 //#endregion
+//#region src/orchestration/threadDetailWindow.ts
+function earliest(current, candidate) {
+	return current === void 0 || candidate < current ? candidate : current;
+}
+/**
+* Every turn in the thread, oldest first.
+*
+* Ordering is by the earliest timestamp across all four windowed collections
+* rather than by message order alone: a turn can open with an activity (a tool
+* call before any text) and a checkpoint-only turn has no message at all.
+* Ties break on turn id so the order is total and a cursor means the same thing
+* on every read.
+*/
+function orderThreadTurns(thread) {
+	const anchors = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const touch = (turnId, at, isUserMessage) => {
+		if (turnId === null) return;
+		const existing = anchors.get(turnId);
+		anchors.set(turnId, {
+			at: earliest(existing?.at, at),
+			hasUserMessage: (existing?.hasUserMessage ?? false) || isUserMessage
+		});
+	};
+	for (const message of thread.messages) touch(message.turnId, message.createdAt, message.role === "user");
+	for (const activity of thread.activities) touch(activity.turnId, activity.createdAt, false);
+	for (const plan of thread.proposedPlans) touch(plan.turnId, plan.createdAt, false);
+	for (const checkpoint of thread.checkpoints) touch(checkpoint.turnId, checkpoint.completedAt, false);
+	return Array.from(anchors, ([turnId, anchor]) => ({
+		turnId,
+		...anchor
+	})).toSorted((left, right) => left.at === right.at ? left.turnId.localeCompare(right.turnId) : left.at < right.at ? -1 : 1);
+}
+/**
+* Index of the first turn to include, counting back `turnLimit` user-anchored
+* turns from the end of `ordered`. Returns 0 when the thread holds fewer user
+* turns than the limit, which is how a short thread comes back whole.
+*/
+function windowStartIndex(ordered, turnLimit) {
+	let userTurns = 0;
+	for (let index = ordered.length - 1; index >= 0; index -= 1) {
+		const anchor = ordered[index];
+		if (anchor !== void 0 && anchor.hasUserMessage) {
+			userTurns += 1;
+			if (userTurns === turnLimit) return index;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+/**
+* The turns a windowed read returns.
+*
+* `beforeCursor` bounds the read to turns strictly older than a cursor an
+* earlier read handed out, which is what "load earlier" sends back. A cursor
+* naming a turn this thread no longer holds, after a revert, say, yields an
+* empty page rather than the whole thread: returning everything would be a
+* silent full download at the exact moment the client asked for less.
+*/
+function selectWindowTurnIds(ordered, window) {
+	const cursorIndex = window.beforeCursor === void 0 ? ordered.length : ordered.findIndex((anchor) => anchor.turnId === window.beforeCursor);
+	if (cursorIndex < 0) return {
+		turnIds: /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(),
+		beforeCursor: null,
+		hasMore: false,
+		includeUnanchored: false
+	};
+	const candidates = ordered.slice(0, cursorIndex);
+	const startIndex = window.turnLimit === void 0 ? 0 : windowStartIndex(candidates, window.turnLimit);
+	const included = candidates.slice(startIndex);
+	const oldest = included[0];
+	return {
+		turnIds: new Set(included.map((anchor) => anchor.turnId)),
+		beforeCursor: oldest?.turnId ?? null,
+		hasMore: startIndex > 0,
+		includeUnanchored: startIndex === 0
+	};
+}
+function keepsTurn(selection, turnId) {
+	return turnId === null ? selection.includeUnanchored : selection.turnIds.has(turnId);
+}
+/**
+* Applies a turn window to a full thread detail read.
+*
+* A request with neither field is a full read and comes back untouched with no
+* page, which is exactly what a pre-pagination client already receives. Only
+* the four turn-scoped collections are filtered; thread metadata, the session,
+* and `latestTurn` describe the thread as a whole and stay as they are, so a
+* windowed snapshot still renders a correct header and a correct running state.
+*/
+function windowThreadDetail(input) {
+	const { thread, window, snapshotSequence } = input;
+	if (window.turnLimit === void 0 && window.beforeCursor === void 0) return {
+		thread,
+		page: void 0
+	};
+	const selection = selectWindowTurnIds(orderThreadTurns(thread), window);
+	return {
+		thread: {
+			...thread,
+			messages: thread.messages.filter((row) => keepsTurn(selection, row.turnId)),
+			activities: thread.activities.filter((row) => keepsTurn(selection, row.turnId)),
+			proposedPlans: thread.proposedPlans.filter((row) => keepsTurn(selection, row.turnId)),
+			checkpoints: thread.checkpoints.filter((row) => keepsTurn(selection, row.turnId)),
+			...thread.turnModelSelections === void 0 ? {} : { turnModelSelections: thread.turnModelSelections.filter((row) => keepsTurn(selection, row.turnId)) }
+		},
+		page: {
+			beforeCursor: selection.hasMore ? selection.beforeCursor : null,
+			hasMore: selection.hasMore,
+			snapshotSequence
+		}
+	};
+}
+/** Whether a subscriber's cursor can be served by replay rather than a snapshot. */
+function canResumeFromSequence(input) {
+	if (input.afterSequence > input.currentSequence) return false;
+	return input.currentSequence - input.afterSequence <= (input.maxGap ?? 2e3);
+}
+function snapshotCatchUp(snapshot) {
+	return {
+		items: [{
+			kind: "snapshot",
+			snapshot
+		}],
+		watermark: snapshot.snapshotSequence
+	};
+}
+function replayCatchUp(events, afterSequence) {
+	return {
+		items: events.map((event) => ({
+			kind: "event",
+			event
+		})),
+		watermark: events.at(-1)?.sequence ?? afterSequence
+	};
+}
+/**
+* Builds the frames that precede live events: either the replayed catch-up or
+* the snapshot, plus the completion marker when one was asked for.
+*/
+const buildCatchUp = require_Schema$1.fn("threadSubscription.buildCatchUp")(function* (input, sources) {
+	const afterSequence = input.afterSequence;
+	if (afterSequence === void 0) return snapshotCatchUp(yield* sources.loadSnapshot);
+	if (!canResumeFromSequence({
+		afterSequence,
+		currentSequence: yield* sources.currentSequence
+	})) return snapshotCatchUp(yield* sources.loadSnapshot);
+	const replayed = yield* require_Path.runCollect(sources.replayEvents(afterSequence));
+	return replayCatchUp(Array.from(replayed), afterSequence);
+});
+function makeThreadSubscriptionStream(input, sources) {
+	return require_Path.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const liveEvents = yield* sources.subscribeLiveEvents;
+		const catchUp = yield* buildCatchUp(input, sources);
+		const marker = input.requestCompletionMarker === true ? [{ kind: "synchronized" }] : [];
+		return require_Path.concat(require_Path.fromArray([...catchUp.items, ...marker]), liveEvents.pipe(require_Path.filter((event) => event.sequence > catchUp.watermark), require_Path.map((event) => ({
+			kind: "event",
+			event
+		}))));
+	}));
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region src/orchestration/bootstrapCommandCoordinator.ts
 const MAX_COMPLETED_COMMANDS_PER_ENGINE = 256;
 const commandsByEngine = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
@@ -97628,6 +98279,26 @@ function serializeNativeToolActivity(activity) {
 		}
 	};
 }
+function serializeWorktreeLaunchActivity(activity) {
+	if (decodeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(activity.kind) === null) return null;
+	const summary = text(activity.summary, 4e3);
+	if (summary === null) return null;
+	return {
+		sourceSequence: null,
+		event: {
+			eventId: `activity:${activity.id}`,
+			occurredAt: canonicalRuntimeEventTimestamp(activity.createdAt),
+			...eventTurn(activity.turnId),
+			kind: "tool_call",
+			summary,
+			status: "completed",
+			payload: encodeCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityPayload(activity.kind, activity.payload)
+		}
+	};
+}
+function decodeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) {
+	return isCmmdRuntimeWorktreeLaunchActivityKind(kind) ? kind : null;
+}
 function isReplicatedFailureActivity(activity) {
 	return activity.kind === "runtime.error" || activity.kind.startsWith("provider.") && activity.kind.endsWith(".failed");
 }
@@ -98008,12 +98679,17 @@ function serializeRuntimeThreadEvents(thread) {
 		const event = serializeNativeToolActivity(activity);
 		return event === null ? [] : [event];
 	});
+	const worktreeLaunchActivities = thread.activities.flatMap((activity) => {
+		const event = serializeWorktreeLaunchActivity(activity);
+		return event === null ? [] : [event];
+	});
 	const recordedTurns = serializeRecordedTurns(thread);
 	const textGenerations = serializeTextGenerations(thread);
 	return [
 		...messages,
 		...replicaActivities,
 		...toolActivities,
+		...worktreeLaunchActivities,
 		...failureActivities,
 		...recordedTurns,
 		...textGenerations
@@ -102295,7 +102971,7 @@ function claudeReadinessReasonCode(reason) {
 //#endregion
 //#region src/egress/providerDeliveryReceipt.ts
 const PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY$2 = /^pai_v1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
-const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+const UUID$1 = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
 const RFC3339$1 = /^(\d{4})-(\d{2})-(\d{2})T(?:[01]\d|2[0-3]):[0-5]\d:[0-5]\d(?:\.\d+)?(?:Z|[+-](?:[01]\d|2[0-3]):[0-5]\d)$/;
 const RECEIPT_KEYS = new Set([
 	"receiptId",
@@ -102378,7 +103054,7 @@ function claudeAccountFields(value) {
 }
 function parseClaudeDeliveryIdentity(value) {
 	const account = claudeAccountFields(value.providerAccountIdentity);
-	if (!account || !hasAllowedKeys(value, CLAUDE_IDENTITY_KEYS, CLAUDE_IDENTITY_OPTIONAL_KEYS) || value.kind !== "credential_generation" || value.provider !== "claude" || typeof value.credentialGenerationId !== "string" || !UUID.test(value.credentialGenerationId)) return null;
+	if (!account || !hasAllowedKeys(value, CLAUDE_IDENTITY_KEYS, CLAUDE_IDENTITY_OPTIONAL_KEYS) || value.kind !== "credential_generation" || value.provider !== "claude" || typeof value.credentialGenerationId !== "string" || !UUID$1.test(value.credentialGenerationId)) return null;
 	return {
 		kind: "credential_generation",
 		provider: "claude",
@@ -103145,7 +103821,10 @@ function extractClaudeProviderAccountId(response) {
 	if (typeof response !== "object" || response === null || !("data" in response)) return null;
 	const data = response.data;
 	if (typeof data !== "object" || data === null) return null;
-	if ("connected" in data && data.connected === true) return extractClaudeCredentialGenerationId(response);
+	if ("connected" in data && data.connected === true) {
+		if ("providerAccountId" in data) return asNonEmptyString$1(data.providerAccountId) ?? null;
+		return extractClaudeCredentialGenerationId(response);
+	}
 	if (!("account" in data)) return null;
 	const account = data.account;
 	if (typeof account !== "object" || account === null || !("providerAccountId" in account) || typeof account.providerAccountId !== "string") return null;
@@ -106121,6 +106800,14 @@ function makeRelayCommandInboxRepository(sql) {
 function isThreadDetailEvent(event) {
 	return event.type === "thread.message-sent" || event.type === "thread.proposed-plan-upserted" || event.type === "thread.activity-appended" || event.type === "thread.turn-diff-completed" || event.type === "thread.reverted" || event.type === "thread.session-set" || event.type === "thread.rate-limit-set";
 }
+/**
+* Narrows the domain-event feed to one thread's stream-visible events. The same
+* predicate guards the live feed and the resume replay, so a subscriber cannot
+* be handed a different set of events depending on which path served it.
+*/
+function isThreadDetailEventFor(threadId) {
+	return (event) => event.aggregateKind === "thread" && event.aggregateId === threadId && isThreadDetailEvent(event);
+}
 const PROVIDER_STATUS_DEBOUNCE_MS = 200;
 function streamBoundedText(contents) {
 	if (Buffer.byteLength(contents, "utf8") > 16777216) return require_Schema$1.fail(new BulkTransferError({
@@ -106166,6 +106853,39 @@ function loadInitialShellSnapshot(input) {
 		return yield* input.projectionSnapshotQuery.getShellSnapshot();
 	});
 }
+/**
+* The thread snapshot a subscription falls back to, windowed when the
+* subscriber asked for a window. A missing thread is a failure rather than an
+* empty snapshot: the subscriber asked about a thread this server does not
+* have, and saying so is the only honest answer.
+*
+* Also the read behind `getThreadDetailPage`, the socket RPC a relay-only
+* connection uses for "load earlier turns" in place of the HTTP snapshot
+* route: same window, same pure `windowThreadDetail`, so the two reads cannot
+* disagree about what a page is.
+*/
+function loadThreadDetailSnapshot(input) {
+	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const [threadDetail, snapshotSequence] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([input.projectionSnapshotQuery.getThreadDetailById(input.threadId).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+			message: `Failed to load thread ${input.threadId}`,
+			cause
+		}))), input.orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence))]);
+		if (require_Schema$1.isNone(threadDetail)) return yield* new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+			message: `Thread ${input.threadId} was not found`,
+			cause: input.threadId
+		});
+		const windowed = windowThreadDetail({
+			thread: threadDetail.value,
+			window: input.window,
+			snapshotSequence
+		});
+		return {
+			snapshotSequence,
+			thread: windowed.thread,
+			...windowed.page === void 0 ? {} : { page: windowed.page }
+		};
+	});
+}
 function makeSnapshotThenLiveStream(input) {
 	return require_Path.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const liveEvents = yield* input.subscribeLiveEvents;
@@ -106413,6 +107133,9 @@ const makeWsRpcLayer = (currentSessionId, currentUserId) => WsRpcGroup.toLayer(r
 				shellRevealInFileManager: true,
 				shellRevealInFileManagerKind: fileManagerRevealKind
 			},
+			threadResumeCompletionMarker: true,
+			threadSnapshotPagination: true,
+			threadDetailPageRpc: true,
 			observability: {
 				logsDirectoryPath: config.logsDir,
 				localTracingEnabled: true,
@@ -106510,26 +107233,28 @@ const makeWsRpcLayer = (currentSessionId, currentUserId) => WsRpcGroup.toLayer(r
 				projectionSnapshotQuery
 			})), require_Path.flatMap((event) => require_Schema$1.isSome(event) ? require_Path.succeed(event.value) : require_Path.empty))))
 		})), { "rpc.aggregate": "orchestration" }),
-		[ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread]: (input) => observeRpcStreamEffect(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread, require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-			const [threadDetail, snapshotSequence] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([projectionSnapshotQuery.getThreadDetailById(input.threadId).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
-				message: `Failed to load thread ${input.threadId}`,
+		[ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread]: (input) => observeRpcStreamEffect(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.subscribeThread, require_Schema$1.succeed(makeThreadSubscriptionStream(input, {
+			subscribeLiveEvents: orchestrationEngine.subscribeDomainEvents().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((events) => events.pipe(require_Path.filter(isThreadDetailEventFor(input.threadId))))),
+			currentSequence: orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence)),
+			loadSnapshot: loadThreadDetailSnapshot({
+				threadId: input.threadId,
+				window: input.turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit: input.turnLimit },
+				projectionSnapshotQuery,
+				orchestrationEngine
+			}),
+			replayEvents: (afterSequence) => orchestrationEngine.readEvents(afterSequence).pipe(require_Path.filter(isThreadDetailEventFor(input.threadId)), require_Path.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+				message: `Failed to replay thread ${input.threadId}`,
 				cause
-			}))), orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence))]);
-			if (require_Schema$1.isNone(threadDetail)) return yield* new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
-				message: `Thread ${input.threadId} was not found`,
-				cause: input.threadId
-			});
-			const liveStream = orchestrationEngine.streamDomainEvents.pipe(require_Path.filter((event) => event.aggregateKind === "thread" && event.aggregateId === input.threadId && isThreadDetailEvent(event)), require_Path.map((event) => ({
-				kind: "event",
-				event
-			})));
-			return require_Path.concat(require_Path.make$1({
-				kind: "snapshot",
-				snapshot: {
-					snapshotSequence,
-					thread: threadDetail.value
-				}
-			}), liveStream);
+			})))
+		})), { "rpc.aggregate": "orchestration" }),
+		[ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage]: (input) => observeRpcEffect(ORCHESTRATION_WS_METHODS.getThreadDetailPage, loadThreadDetailSnapshot({
+			threadId: input.threadId,
+			window: {
+				...input.turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit: input.turnLimit },
+				...input.beforeCursor === void 0 ? {} : { beforeCursor: input.beforeCursor }
+			},
+			projectionSnapshotQuery,
+			orchestrationEngine
 		}), { "rpc.aggregate": "orchestration" }),
 		[WS_METHODS.serverGetConfig]: (_input) => observeRpcEffect(WS_METHODS.serverGetConfig, loadServerConfig, { "rpc.aggregate": "server" }),
 		[WS_METHODS.serverRefreshProviders]: (_input) => observeRpcEffect(WS_METHODS.serverRefreshProviders, providerRegistry.refresh().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((providers) => ({ providers }))), { "rpc.aggregate": "server" }),
@@ -118006,8 +118731,8 @@ require_Schema$1.effectDiscard(runMigrations());
 //#endregion
 //#region src/persistence/Layers/Sqlite.ts
 const defaultSqliteClientLoaders = {
-	bun: () => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./SqliteClient-bo7iui1t.cjs")),
-	node: () => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeSqliteClient-CyJvo9y9.cjs"))
+	bun: () => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./SqliteClient-O1ABIngw.cjs")),
+	node: () => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeSqliteClient-CfsdC3AB.cjs"))
 };
 const makeRuntimeSqliteLayer = require_Schema$1.fn("makeRuntimeSqliteLayer")(function* (config) {
 	const loader = defaultSqliteClientLoaders[process.versions.bun !== void 0 ? "bun" : "node"];
@@ -178324,7 +179049,7 @@ function em(e) {
 		BO ??= new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4)), Atomics.wait(BO, 0, 0, SY);
 	}
 }
-function rm$6(e, t) {
+function rm$7(e, t) {
 	let n = (0, path.resolve)(t).toLowerCase(), r = (0, path.dirname)((0, path.resolve)(e)).toLowerCase();
 	if (r === n || KO(r, n) || qO(r, n, "lexical")) return !0;
 	let o = em(t)?.toLowerCase();
@@ -191174,7 +191899,7 @@ function Wo() {
 }
 function sle(e) {
 	let t = process.cwd();
-	return e.filter((n) => !rm$6(n, t));
+	return e.filter((n) => !rm$7(n, t));
 }
 function ZU(e) {
 	let t = Bun.which(e);
@@ -212600,6 +213325,8 @@ const PUBLIC_PROVIDER_LEAK_PATTERNS = [
 	/\bCURSOR_API_KEY\b/,
 	/\bOPENCODE_API_KEY\b/,
 	/\bforge_proxy_[A-Za-z0-9._-]+\b/,
+	/\bProviderValidationError\b/,
+	/\/forge-server\/node_modules\//,
 	/https?:\/\/[^\s'"<>)]*\/api\/provider-egress\/[^\s'"<>)]*/i,
 	/https?:\/\/[^\s'"<>)]*(?:apex|deepseek|moonshot|kimi)[^\s'"<>)]*/i
 ];
@@ -212609,6 +213336,12 @@ function isProviderRateOrQuotaError(message) {
 	const normalized = message.toLowerCase();
 	return /\b(rate[\s-]?limit|too\s+many\s+requests|usage[ _-]limit|usage_limit_reached|quota|insufficient_quota)\b/.test(normalized) || /\b429\b/.test(normalized);
 }
+function providerLifecycleOrAccountCopy(message) {
+	if (/\bbound to provider account\b/.test(message) && /\bcannot use provider account\b/.test(message)) return "Forge could not switch this conversation to the selected AI account. Retry the account switch.";
+	if (/\bforge_runtime_repairing\b/.test(message) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment is being repaired\b/.test(message)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment is being repaired. Retry after the repair finishes.";
+	if (/\bforge_runtime_stopped\b/.test(message) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped\b/.test(message)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped. Start the environment and retry.";
+	return null;
+}
 /**
 * Infer a SAFE, clearer failure category from a (possibly leaky) provider error.
 *
@@ -212621,7 +213354,8 @@ function isProviderRateOrQuotaError(message) {
 function categorizePublicProviderError(message) {
 	if (!message) return null;
 	const m = message.toLowerCase();
-	if (/\bforge_runtime_stopped\b/.test(m) || /\bthis turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped\b/.test(m)) return "This turn was interrupted because the environment was stopped. Start the environment and retry.";
+	const lifecycleOrAccountCopy = providerLifecycleOrAccountCopy(m);
+	if (lifecycleOrAccountCopy !== null) return lifecycleOrAccountCopy;
 	if (/\bforge_provider_model_not_allowed\b/.test(m) || /\bnot\s+scoped\s+to\s+the\s+requested\s+model\b/.test(m)) return "The workspace AI credential does not cover the model this turn asked for. Retry, or pick that model for the thread.";
 	if (/\bmodel\b[\s\S]*\b(not\s+(found|available|supported)|does\s+not\s+exist|unsupported|invalid|unknown)\b/.test(m) || /\b(unsupported|unknown|invalid)\b[\s\S]*\bmodel\b/.test(m) || /\b(model_not_found|invalid_model|model_not_supported)\b/.test(m)) return "The selected model isn't available right now. Pick a different model and retry.";
 	if (isProviderRateOrQuotaError(m)) return "The AI service is rate-limited or out of quota. Wait a moment and retry.";
@@ -212687,60 +213421,14 @@ function hasConfiguredApexCredential(profiles) {
 }
 //#endregion
 //#region src/provider/claudeCredentialDirectory.ts
-/**
-* Per-account credential directories for Claude turns.
-*
-* Claude Code keeps conversation transcripts under
-* `${CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR}/projects/<cwd-slug>/<sessionId>.jsonl` and its login
-* under `.credentials.json`. `CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR` moves only the
-* credential file, so each Provider Account can hold its own login while every
-* session file stays in one place and `--resume` keeps finding its target. See
-* `docs/adr/claude-accounts-split-credentials-not-sessions.md`.
-*
-* That variable is not documented. Under
-* `docs/adr/unpublished-provider-surface-needs-a-fallback.md` the dependency is
-* only allowed because absence degrades to a named behaviour that already
-* works: a thread with no account runs on the Environment's own login. This
-* module sets the variable only when the resolved directory holds a credential
-* the CLI can use, because a missing file, or one whose access token a refusal
-* has blanked, makes the CLI report logged out and a live turn would fail.
-*
-* Nothing writes these directories yet. #3049 adds the writer and keys each
-* directory on the account identity CMMD writes on the delivery receipt it
-* signs (`docs/adr/provider-account-identity-is-issued-by-cmmd.md`). Until then
-* every runtime takes the `no-account` skip.
-*
-* Free of Effect services on purpose, for the same reason as
-* `claudeCredentialContainment.ts`: ClaudeAdapter drags in Effect platform
-* services, the browser manager and the server config, so a unit test that
-* imports it cannot run in a worktree. This rule decides which account pays for
-* a turn, so it has to stay directly testable.
-*/
+/** Per-account credentials share the existing Claude transcript directory. */
 /** Repoints `.credentials.json` without moving the transcripts. */
 const CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV = "CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR";
 /** The one file Claude Code writes into the credential directory. */
 const CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME = ".credentials.json";
-/**
-* Runtime env var naming the Provider Account this runtime's Claude turns
-* belong to. Nothing in Forge or CMMD sets it, so no runtime names an account
-* and each keeps its one login.
-*
-* It is a bridge that will not get a writer. #3073 settled the key in
-* `docs/adr/provider-account-identity-is-issued-by-cmmd.md`: the directory name
-* comes from the identity CMMD issues and writes on the delivery receipt it
-* signs, and this variable goes away. #3049 makes that change. The credential
-* generation was ruled out as a key: it rotates on every reconnect, and CMMD
-* uses it as the primary account's id, so keying on it would strand every
-* thread pinned to that account on a directory that stops receiving deliveries.
-*
-* Tests reach the `credentialDirectory` parameter on
-* `ClaudeAdapter.buildClaudeQueryEnv` directly.
-*/
-const CLAUDE_PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY_ENV = "FORGE_CLAUDE_PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY";
 /** Directory under the server's base directory that holds one directory per account. */
 const CREDENTIAL_ROOT_DIRECTORY_NAME = "claude-credentials";
 const DEFAULT_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRECTORY_NAME = ".claude";
-const MAX_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY_LENGTH = 256;
 const DIRECTORY_NAME_HASH_LENGTH = 32;
 /**
 * Directory name for an account. A hash, so no email or display name reaches a
@@ -212749,11 +213437,12 @@ const DIRECTORY_NAME_HASH_LENGTH = 32;
 function claudeCredentialDirectoryName(accountIdentity) {
 	return `account-${(0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(accountIdentity, "utf8").digest("hex").slice(0, DIRECTORY_NAME_HASH_LENGTH)}`;
 }
-/** The account this runtime's Claude turns belong to, or null while the variable is unset. */
-function resolveClaudeProviderAccountIdentity(env) {
-	const identity = env[CLAUDE_PROVIDER_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY_ENV]?.trim();
-	if (!identity || identity.length > MAX_ACCOUNT_IDENTITY_LENGTH) return null;
-	return identity;
+/** Only a matching CMMD delivery can select a credential directory. */
+function resolveSelectedClaudeAccountIdentity(selectedAccountId, binding) {
+	if (selectedAccountId === void 0) return null;
+	const identity = binding?.identity;
+	if (identity?.kind !== "credential_generation" || identity.provider !== "claude" || identity.providerAccountIdentity !== selectedAccountId) throw new Error("The selected Claude account has no matching credential delivery. Reconnect that account and try again.");
+	return identity.providerAccountIdentity;
 }
 /**
 * Where per-account credential directories live: `claude-credentials` under the
@@ -212780,29 +213469,19 @@ function resolveClaudeCredentialDirectory(input) {
 	if (!root) return null;
 	return (0, node_path.join)(root, claudeCredentialDirectoryName(input.accountIdentity));
 }
-/**
-* Decide whether this turn may point at a per-account credential directory.
-*
-* The cheap checks run first and the capability probe runs last, so a runtime
-* with no usable credential never spawns the CLI. The probe's error channel is
-* empty, so nothing here catches.
-*
-* A skip is not a fallback onto the default account. With no account the turn
-* runs on the Environment's own login, unchanged. A thread pinned to an account
-* whose credential is missing is refused by name under
-* `docs/adr/provider-account-identity-is-issued-by-cmmd.md`, and #3049 turns
-* `no-usable-credential`, and `capability-not-supported` for a pinned account,
-* into those refusals. Until #3049 nothing names an account, so `no-account` is
-* the only skip a runtime sees.
-*/
+/** Refuse selected accounts that cannot use their own credential directory. */
 function decideClaudeCredentialDirectory(input) {
 	return require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (!input.accountIdentity) return skip("no-account");
-		if (input.env["CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR"]?.trim()) return skip("operator-override");
+		if (input.env["CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR"]?.trim()) return refuse("operator-override");
 		const directory = resolveClaudeCredentialDirectory(input);
-		if (!directory) return skip("no-root");
-		if (!holdsUsableCredential(directory)) return skip("no-usable-credential");
-		return (yield* input.probeSupport) === "supported" ? set(directory) : skip("capability-not-supported");
+		if (!directory) return refuse("no-root");
+		if (!holdsUsableCredential(directory)) return refuse("no-usable-credential");
+		if ((yield* input.probeSupport) === "supported") return set(directory);
+		return input.primaryCredentialMatchesSelected === true ? {
+			outcome: "skipped",
+			reason: "same-primary-account"
+		} : refuse("capability-not-supported");
 	});
 }
 /**
@@ -212841,6 +213520,12 @@ function skip(reason) {
 		reason
 	};
 }
+function refuse(reason) {
+	return {
+		outcome: "refused",
+		reason
+	};
+}
 function claudeConfigDirectory(env) {
 	const configured = env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim();
 	if (configured) return configured;
@@ -212850,6 +213535,24 @@ function claudeConfigDirectory(env) {
 		return null;
 	}
 }
+/**
+* The fallback is allowed only when the primary on-disk credential is
+* byte-identical to what CMMD prepared for the selected account. A ticket's
+* `credentialRevisionHash` cannot express that: it hashes the encrypted row
+* CMMD stores, not the decrypted bytes this process ever sees. Comparing
+* files directly is the only check that means what the fallback needs.
+*/
+function primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesPrepared(env, preparedDirectory) {
+	const directory = claudeConfigDirectory(env);
+	if (!directory) return false;
+	try {
+		const primary = (0, node_fs.readFileSync)((0, node_path.join)(directory, CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME), "utf8");
+		const prepared = (0, node_fs.readFileSync)((0, node_path.join)(preparedDirectory, CLAUDE_CREDENTIAL_FILE_NAME), "utf8");
+		return hasAccessToken(JSON.parse(primary)) && (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(primary).digest("hex") === (0, node_crypto.createHash)("sha256").update(prepared).digest("hex");
+	} catch {
+		return false;
+	}
+}
 //#endregion
 //#region src/provider/personalClaudeInVm.ts
 /**
@@ -212982,13 +213685,106 @@ function withoutInheritedAnthropicCredentials(env, options) {
 * marker CMMD writes on disk (#3081), so a Sprite switched on in place, which
 * has the marker and no env var until it restarts, drops the override too.
 */
-function claudeSubscriptionChildEnv(processEnv, credentialDirectory) {
+function claudeSubscriptionChildEnv(processEnv, credentialDirectory, selectedSubscription = false) {
 	return {
-		...withoutInheritedAnthropicCredentials(scrubForgeProviderChildEnvSecrets(processEnv), { stripEndpointOverride: personalClaudeInVmEnabled(processEnv) }),
+		...withoutInheritedAnthropicCredentials(scrubForgeProviderChildEnvSecrets(processEnv), { stripEndpointOverride: selectedSubscription || credentialDirectory !== null || personalClaudeInVmEnabled(processEnv) }),
 		...credentialDirectory ? { [CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV]: credentialDirectory } : {}
 	};
 }
 //#endregion
+//#region src/provider/claudeSelectedCredentialStore.ts
+async function ensurePrivateDirectory(path) {
+	await (0, node_fs_promises.mkdir)(path, {
+		recursive: true,
+		mode: 448
+	});
+	const info = await (0, node_fs_promises.lstat)(path);
+	if (!info.isDirectory() || info.isSymbolicLink()) throw new Error("Unsafe credential directory.");
+	await (0, node_fs_promises.chmod)(path, 448);
+}
+async function makeCapacity(root, target, active, maximum) {
+	const entries = (await (0, node_fs_promises.readdir)(root, { withFileTypes: true })).filter((entry) => entry.isDirectory() && /^account-[a-f0-9]{32}$/.test(entry.name));
+	if (entries.some((entry) => (0, node_path.join)(root, entry.name) === target)) return;
+	const candidates = await Promise.all(entries.filter((entry) => !active.has((0, node_path.join)(root, entry.name))).map(async (entry) => ({
+		path: (0, node_path.join)(root, entry.name),
+		modified: (await (0, node_fs_promises.lstat)((0, node_path.join)(root, entry.name))).mtimeMs
+	})));
+	candidates.sort((a, b) => a.modified - b.modified);
+	const required = entries.length - maximum + 1;
+	if (required > candidates.length) throw new Error("All Claude credential slots are active. Stop a session before choosing another account.");
+	for (const candidate of candidates.slice(0, Math.max(0, required))) await (0, node_fs_promises.rm)(candidate.path, { recursive: true });
+}
+function createClaudeSelectedCredentialStore(baseDir, options = {}) {
+	const sessions = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+	const maximum = options.maxAccounts ?? 8;
+	if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maximum) || maximum < 1) throw new Error("Invalid credential capacity.");
+	let queue = Promise.resolve();
+	async function install(threadId, acquired) {
+		if (acquired.claims.threadId !== threadId) throw new Error("Credential thread mismatch.");
+		const directory = resolveClaudeCredentialDirectory({
+			env: process.env,
+			baseDir,
+			accountIdentity: acquired.claims.providerAccountId
+		});
+		if (!directory) throw new Error("Unsafe credential directory.");
+		const binding = {
+			runtimeId: acquired.claims.runtimeId,
+			machineId: acquired.claims.machineId,
+			credentialEpoch: acquired.claims.credentialEpoch,
+			identity: {
+				kind: "credential_generation",
+				provider: "claude",
+				credentialGenerationId: acquired.claims.generationId,
+				providerAccountIdentity: acquired.claims.providerAccountId
+			}
+		};
+		for (const prepared of sessions.values()) if (prepared.directory === directory && (!providerDeliveryBindingsEqual(prepared.binding, binding) || prepared.credentialRevisionHash !== acquired.claims.credentialRevisionHash)) throw new Error("The Claude account has an active session. Stop it before replacing its credentials.");
+		const root = (0, node_path.dirname)(directory);
+		await ensurePrivateDirectory(root);
+		await makeCapacity(root, directory, new Set([...sessions.values()].map((entry) => entry.directory)), maximum);
+		await ensurePrivateDirectory(directory);
+		const temporary = (0, node_path.join)(directory, `.credential-${(0, node_crypto.randomUUID)()}.tmp`);
+		try {
+			await (0, node_fs_promises.writeFile)(temporary, acquired.credentialJson, {
+				mode: 384,
+				flag: "wx"
+			});
+			await (0, node_fs_promises.rename)(temporary, (0, node_path.join)(directory, ".credentials.json"));
+		} finally {
+			await (0, node_fs_promises.rm)(temporary, { force: true });
+		}
+		sessions.set(threadId, {
+			directory,
+			binding,
+			accountKind: acquired.claims.accountKind,
+			credentialRevisionHash: acquired.claims.credentialRevisionHash
+		});
+		return binding;
+	}
+	return {
+		prepare(threadId, acquired) {
+			const operation = queue.then(() => install(threadId, acquired));
+			queue = operation.then(() => void 0, () => void 0);
+			return operation;
+		},
+		read(threadId, binding) {
+			const prepared = sessions.get(threadId);
+			return prepared && providerDeliveryBindingsEqual(prepared.binding, binding) ? prepared : null;
+		},
+		release(threadId) {
+			sessions.delete(threadId);
+		}
+	};
+}
+const stores = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+function selectedClaudeCredentialStore(baseDir) {
+	const existing = stores.get(baseDir);
+	if (existing) return existing;
+	const store = createClaudeSelectedCredentialStore(baseDir);
+	stores.set(baseDir, store);
+	return store;
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region src/provider/claudeCredentialDirectoryProbe.ts
 /**
 * Capability probe for `CLAUDE_SECURESTORAGE_CONFIG_DIR`.
@@ -215033,7 +215829,8 @@ function claudeForgeAttributionPrompt() {
 * turn, an API key is, so pointing the variable there would add a second source
 * of truth that a later reader has to rule out.
 */
-function buildClaudeQueryEnv(baseProcessEnv, endpointProfile, claudeSettings, providerProxyCredential, credentialDirectory) {
+function buildClaudeQueryEnv(baseProcessEnv, endpointProfile, claudeSettings, providerProxyCredential, credentialDirectory, selectedSubscription = false) {
+	if (selectedSubscription) return claudeSubscriptionChildEnv(baseProcessEnv, credentialDirectory, true);
 	const baseEnv = scrubForgeProviderChildEnvSecrets(baseProcessEnv);
 	const effectiveBaseUrl = resolveClaudeQueryBaseUrl(endpointProfile, claudeSettings, providerProxyCredential);
 	if (!effectiveBaseUrl) return claudeSubscriptionChildEnv(baseProcessEnv, credentialDirectory);
@@ -216947,6 +217744,7 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 		if (streamFiber && streamFiber.pollUnsafe() === void 0) yield* require_Path.interrupt(streamFiber);
 		try {
 			context.query.close();
+			selectedClaudeCredentialStore(serverConfig.baseDir).release(context.session.threadId);
 		} catch (cause) {
 			yield* emitRuntimeError(context, "Failed to close Claude runtime query.", cause);
 		}
@@ -217258,6 +218056,43 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 			sessionId: existingResumeSessionId ?? newSessionId
 		};
 	});
+	const resolveSelectedCredentialDirectory = require_Schema$1.fn("resolveSelectedCredentialDirectory")(function* (input, resumeState, claudeBinaryPath) {
+		const requestedAccountId = input.modelSelection?.provider === "claudeAgent" ? input.modelSelection.providerAccountId : void 0;
+		const selectedAccountIdentity = yield* require_Schema$1.try_({
+			try: () => resolveSelectedClaudeAccountIdentity(requestedAccountId, resumeState?.providerDeliveryBinding),
+			catch: () => new ProviderAdapterValidationError({
+				provider: PROVIDER$11,
+				operation: "startSession",
+				issue: `The selected Claude account ${requestedAccountId} has no matching credential delivery. Reconnect that account and try again.`
+			})
+		});
+		const preparedCredential = resumeState?.providerDeliveryBinding ? selectedClaudeCredentialStore(serverConfig.baseDir).read(input.threadId, resumeState.providerDeliveryBinding) : null;
+		if (selectedAccountIdentity !== null && preparedCredential === null) return yield* new ProviderAdapterValidationError({
+			provider: PROVIDER$11,
+			operation: "startSession",
+			issue: `The selected Claude account ${selectedAccountIdentity} has no prepared credential. Try again to reconnect it.`
+		});
+		const credentialDirectoryDecision = yield* decideClaudeCredentialDirectory({
+			env: process.env,
+			baseDir: serverConfig.baseDir,
+			accountIdentity: selectedAccountIdentity,
+			probeSupport: claudeCredentialDirectoryProbeFor(claudeBinaryPath).support,
+			primaryCredentialMatchesSelected: preparedCredential?.accountKind === "primary" && primaryClaudeCredentialMatchesPrepared(process.env, preparedCredential.directory)
+		});
+		if (credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "refused") return yield* new ProviderAdapterValidationError({
+			provider: PROVIDER$11,
+			operation: "startSession",
+			issue: `The selected Claude account ${selectedAccountIdentity} cannot run on this environment: ${credentialDirectoryDecision.reason}. Reconnect the account or choose another environment.`
+		});
+		if (credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "skipped") {
+			const skipLine = `Claude credential directory skipped: ${credentialDirectoryDecision.reason}`;
+			yield* credentialDirectoryDecision.reason === "no-account" ? require_Schema$1.logDebug(skipLine) : require_Schema$1.logWarning(skipLine);
+		}
+		return {
+			selectedAccountIdentity,
+			claudeCredentialDirectory: credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "set" ? credentialDirectoryDecision.directory : null
+		};
+	});
 	const startSession = require_Schema$1.fn("startSession")(function* (input) {
 		const sessionProvider = yield* validateClaudeStartSessionProvider(input.provider);
 		const startedAt = yield* nowIso;
@@ -217318,19 +218153,14 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 		})));
 		const claudeSettings = serverSettings.providers.claudeAgent;
 		const claudeBinaryPath = claudeSettings.binaryPath;
-		const credentialDirectoryDecision = yield* decideClaudeCredentialDirectory({
-			env: process.env,
-			baseDir: serverConfig.baseDir,
-			accountIdentity: resolveClaudeProviderAccountIdentity(process.env),
-			probeSupport: claudeCredentialDirectoryProbeFor(claudeBinaryPath).support
-		});
-		if (credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "skipped") {
-			const skipLine = `Claude credential directory skipped: ${credentialDirectoryDecision.reason}`;
-			yield* credentialDirectoryDecision.reason === "no-account" ? require_Schema$1.logDebug(skipLine) : require_Schema$1.logWarning(skipLine);
-		}
-		const claudeCredentialDirectory = credentialDirectoryDecision.outcome === "set" ? credentialDirectoryDecision.directory : null;
+		const { selectedAccountIdentity, claudeCredentialDirectory } = yield* resolveSelectedCredentialDirectory(input, resumeState, claudeBinaryPath);
 		const modelConfig = resolveClaudeSessionModelConfig(input.modelSelection, claudeSettings.endpointProfiles);
-		const providerProxyCredential = yield* issueClaudeProviderProxyCredential(modelConfig.endpointProfile, modelConfig.modelSlug ?? modelConfig.effectiveApiModelId ?? "unknown", threadId);
+		if (selectedAccountIdentity !== null && modelConfig.endpointProfile !== void 0) return yield* new ProviderAdapterValidationError({
+			provider: PROVIDER$11,
+			operation: "startSession",
+			issue: "The selected Claude account cannot be used with a custom API endpoint. Choose a subscription model."
+		});
+		const providerProxyCredential = selectedAccountIdentity !== null ? null : yield* issueClaudeProviderProxyCredential(modelConfig.endpointProfile, modelConfig.modelSlug ?? modelConfig.effectiveApiModelId ?? "unknown", threadId);
 		const permissionMode = permissionModeForRuntimeMode(input.runtimeMode);
 		const settings = claudeQuerySettings(modelConfig.thinking, modelConfig.fastMode);
 		const workspacePreflight = input.cwd ? formatWorkspaceEnvironmentPreflightForAgent(runWorkspaceEnvironmentPreflight({ cwd: input.cwd })) : void 0;
@@ -217353,7 +218183,7 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 			existingResumeSessionId,
 			newSessionId,
 			canUseTool,
-			env: buildClaudeQueryEnv(process.env, modelConfig.endpointProfile, claudeSettings, providerProxyCredential, claudeCredentialDirectory),
+			env: buildClaudeQueryEnv(process.env, modelConfig.endpointProfile, claudeSettings, providerProxyCredential, claudeCredentialDirectory, selectedAccountIdentity !== null),
 			browserManager,
 			threadId,
 			browserToolEnvironmentId,
@@ -217405,7 +218235,9 @@ const makeClaudeAdapter = require_Schema$1.fn("makeClaudeAdapter")(function* (op
 		});
 		attachClaudeStreamFiber(context$4, runFork);
 		return { ...session };
-	});
+	}, (effect, input) => effect.pipe(require_Schema$1.onExit((exit) => require_Schema$1.sync(() => {
+		if (exit._tag === "Failure") selectedClaudeCredentialStore(serverConfig.baseDir).release(input.threadId);
+	}))));
 	const sendTurn = require_Schema$1.fn("sendTurn")(function* (input) {
 		const context = yield* requireSession(input.threadId);
 		const modelSelection = input.modelSelection?.provider === "claudeAgent" || input.modelSelection?.provider === "apex" || input.modelSelection?.provider === "cmmd" ? input.modelSelection : void 0;
@@ -231714,6 +232546,9 @@ const ProviderRollbackConversationInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	threadId: ThreadId,
 	numTurns: NonNegativeInt
 });
+function selectedAccountGuardFields(providerAccountId) {
+	return providerAccountId === void 0 ? {} : { providerAccountId };
+}
 function cursorRecord(value) {
 	return typeof value === "object" && value !== null && !Array.isArray(value) ? { ...value } : {};
 }
@@ -231806,9 +232641,13 @@ const makeProviderService = require_Schema$1.fn("makeProviderService")(function*
 	const runtimeEventPubSub = yield* require_Path.unbounded$1();
 	const assertProviderExecutable = options?.assertProviderExecutable ?? (() => require_Schema$1.succeed(null));
 	const assertCurrentProviderDelivery = require_Schema$1.fn("assertCurrentProviderDelivery")(function* (input) {
-		const currentBinding = yield* assertProviderExecutable(input);
-		if (!currentBinding) return;
 		const persistedBinding = require_Schema$1.getOrUndefined$1(yield* directory.getBinding(input.threadId));
+		const providerAccountId = readPersistedProviderAccountId(persistedBinding?.runtimePayload);
+		const currentBinding = yield* assertProviderExecutable({
+			...input,
+			...selectedAccountGuardFields(providerAccountId)
+		});
+		if (!currentBinding) return;
 		if (!persistedBinding || persistedBinding.provider !== input.provider) return yield* toValidationError(input.operation, `Cannot verify the delivered provider identity for thread '${input.threadId}'.`);
 		yield* bindProviderDeliveryToResumeCursor({
 			operation: input.operation,
@@ -231864,10 +232703,12 @@ const makeProviderService = require_Schema$1.fn("makeProviderService")(function*
 			if (!hasResumeCursor) return yield* toValidationError(input.operation, `Cannot recover thread '${input.binding.threadId}' because no provider resume state is persisted.`);
 			const persistedCwd = readPersistedCwd(input.binding.runtimePayload);
 			const persistedModelSelection = readPersistedModelSelection(input.binding.runtimePayload);
+			const persistedProviderAccountId = readProviderAccountIdFromModelSelection(persistedModelSelection);
 			const currentDeliveryBinding = yield* assertProviderExecutable({
 				threadId: input.binding.threadId,
 				provider: input.binding.provider,
-				operation: input.operation
+				operation: input.operation,
+				...selectedAccountGuardFields(persistedProviderAccountId)
 			});
 			const boundResumeCursor = yield* bindProviderDeliveryToResumeCursor({
 				operation: input.operation,
@@ -231993,7 +232834,8 @@ const makeProviderService = require_Schema$1.fn("makeProviderService")(function*
 				currentBinding: yield* assertProviderExecutable({
 					threadId,
 					provider: effectiveProvider,
-					operation: "ProviderService.startSession"
+					operation: "ProviderService.startSession",
+					...selectedAccountGuardFields(requestedAccountId)
 				})
 			});
 			const session = yield* adapter.startSession({
@@ -232059,6 +232901,8 @@ const makeProviderService = require_Schema$1.fn("makeProviderService")(function*
 				allowRecovery: true
 			});
 			const persistedBinding = require_Schema$1.getOrUndefined$1(yield* directory.getBinding(input.threadId));
+			const persistedModelSelection = readPersistedModelSelection(persistedBinding?.runtimePayload);
+			const nextModelSelection = input.modelSelection ?? persistedModelSelection;
 			yield* assertProviderAccountBoundary({
 				operation: "ProviderService.sendTurn",
 				threadId: input.threadId,
@@ -232083,7 +232927,7 @@ const makeProviderService = require_Schema$1.fn("makeProviderService")(function*
 				status: "running",
 				...turn.resumeCursor !== void 0 ? { resumeCursor: turn.resumeCursor } : {},
 				runtimePayload: {
-					...input.modelSelection !== void 0 ? { modelSelection: input.modelSelection } : {},
+					...nextModelSelection !== void 0 ? { modelSelection: nextModelSelection } : {},
 					activeTurnId: turn.turnId,
 					lastRuntimeEvent: "provider.sendTurn",
 					lastRuntimeEventAt: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()
@@ -232340,6 +233184,201 @@ function makeProviderServiceLive(options) {
 	return require_Schema$1.effect(ProviderService, makeProviderService(options));
 }
 //#endregion
+//#region src/runtimeAuth/cmmdClaudeSelectedTicket.ts
+const ACCOUNT = /^pai_v1_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/;
+const UUID = /^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[1-8][0-9a-f]{3}-[89ab][0-9a-f]{3}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i;
+const REVISION_HASH = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
+function hasValidTicketLifetime(claims, payload) {
+	const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
+	const issuedAt = payload.iat;
+	const notBefore = payload.nbf;
+	return typeof issuedAt === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(issuedAt) && issuedAt <= now + 5 && typeof notBefore === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(notBefore) && notBefore <= now && Number.isSafeInteger(claims.expiresAtSeconds) && claims.expiresAtSeconds - issuedAt <= 900;
+}
+function hasSelectedCredentialScope(claims) {
+	return claims.scope.length === 1 && claims.scope[0] === "claude-credential-read";
+}
+function hasExpectedSelectedBinding(payload, expected) {
+	return payload.provider_account_id === expected.providerAccountId && ACCOUNT.test(expected.providerAccountId) && payload.thread_id === expected.threadId && payload.operation_id === expected.operationId && UUID.test(expected.operationId);
+}
+function selectedCredentialClaims(payload) {
+	const jti = payload.jti;
+	const generationId = payload.credential_generation_id;
+	const credentialRevisionHash = payload.credential_revision_hash;
+	const accountKind = payload.account_kind;
+	if (typeof jti !== "string" || !jti.trim() || typeof generationId !== "string" || !UUID.test(generationId) || typeof credentialRevisionHash !== "string" || !REVISION_HASH.test(credentialRevisionHash) || accountKind !== "primary" && accountKind !== "linked") return null;
+	return {
+		jti,
+		generationId,
+		credentialRevisionHash,
+		accountKind
+	};
+}
+function verifyCmmdClaudeSelectedTicket(token, expected) {
+	const verified = require_runtimeControlAuthority.verifyCmmdScopedRuntimePayload(token, expected, "forge-claude-credential-read");
+	if (!verified) return null;
+	const { claims, payload } = verified;
+	if (!hasValidTicketLifetime(claims, payload)) return null;
+	if (!hasSelectedCredentialScope(claims)) return null;
+	if (!hasExpectedSelectedBinding(payload, expected)) return null;
+	const selected = selectedCredentialClaims(payload);
+	if (!selected) return null;
+	return {
+		...claims,
+		jti: selected.jti,
+		providerAccountId: expected.providerAccountId,
+		generationId: selected.generationId,
+		credentialRevisionHash: selected.credentialRevisionHash,
+		accountKind: selected.accountKind,
+		threadId: expected.threadId,
+		operationId: expected.operationId
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/provider/claudeSelectedCredentialAcquisition.ts
+function readToken(response) {
+	if (typeof response !== "object" || response === null || !("data" in response)) return null;
+	const data = response.data;
+	return typeof data === "object" && data !== null && "token" in data && typeof data.token === "string" ? data.token : null;
+}
+async function acquireSelectedClaudeCredential(expected, transport) {
+	try {
+		const token = readToken(await transport.requestTicket());
+		const claims = token === null ? null : verifyCmmdClaudeSelectedTicket(token, expected);
+		if (!token || !claims) throw new Error("invalid_ticket");
+		const credentialJson = await transport.readCredential(token);
+		if (Buffer.byteLength(credentialJson, "utf8") > 512e3 || !hasUsableClaudeCredentialBlob(credentialJson)) throw new Error("invalid_credential");
+		return {
+			claims,
+			credentialJson
+		};
+	} catch {
+		throw new Error("The selected Claude account could not be prepared. Reconnect the account and try again.");
+	}
+}
+//#endregion
+//#region src/provider/claudeSelectedCredentialPreparer.ts
+const REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS = 1e4;
+const OWNER_TICKET_PATH = "/api/forge/context/providers/claude/runtime-read-ticket";
+const CREDENTIAL_READ_PATH = "/api/forge/context/auth-runtime-claude-credential";
+function isRuntimeTicketSession$1(sessionId) {
+	return String(sessionId).startsWith("cmmd-runtime:");
+}
+function nonEmptyConfigString(value) {
+	return value?.trim() || null;
+}
+function selectedRuntimeStrings(config) {
+	const values = [
+		nonEmptyConfigString(config.forgeCmmdRuntimeId),
+		nonEmptyConfigString(config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMachineId),
+		nonEmptyConfigString(config.forgeCmmdRuntimeOrgId),
+		nonEmptyConfigString(config.forgeCmmdRuntimeUserId),
+		nonEmptyConfigString(config.forgeCmmdRuntimePublicKey)
+	];
+	if (values.includes(null)) return null;
+	return {
+		runtimeId: values[0],
+		machineId: values[1],
+		orgId: values[2],
+		userId: values[3],
+		publicKeyPem: values[4]
+	};
+}
+function selectedCredentialEpoch(config) {
+	const credentialEpoch = config.forgeCmmdRuntimeCredentialEpoch;
+	return typeof credentialEpoch === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(credentialEpoch) && credentialEpoch >= 0 ? credentialEpoch : null;
+}
+function selectedConfig(config) {
+	if (config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMode !== true) return null;
+	const strings = selectedRuntimeStrings(config);
+	const credentialEpoch = selectedCredentialEpoch(config);
+	if (strings === null || credentialEpoch === null) return null;
+	return {
+		...strings,
+		credentialEpoch
+	};
+}
+async function boundedRuntimeTicketRequest(grant, runtimeId, request) {
+	const response = await fetch(resolveCommandAppEndpoint(`/api/forge/runtimes/${encodeURIComponent(runtimeId)}/provider/claude/read-ticket`), {
+		method: "POST",
+		headers: {
+			authorization: `Bearer ${grant}`,
+			"content-type": "application/json"
+		},
+		body: JSON.stringify(request),
+		signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)
+	});
+	if (!response.ok) throw new Error("selected_ticket_unavailable");
+	return await response.json();
+}
+async function boundedCredentialRead(token) {
+	const response = await fetch(resolveCommandAppEndpoint(CREDENTIAL_READ_PATH), {
+		headers: {
+			authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,
+			accept: "application/json"
+		},
+		signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS)
+	});
+	if (!response.ok) throw new Error("selected_credential_unavailable");
+	return await response.text();
+}
+function missingAuthority() {
+	throw new Error("selected_authority_unavailable");
+}
+/**
+* Acquires one signed, account-scoped Claude credential for the thread that
+* selected it. Owner and runtime-ticket sessions use different CMMD lanes.
+*/
+function makeClaudeSelectedCredentialPreparer(config, dependencies) {
+	const readRuntimeAuthority = dependencies.readRuntimeAuthority ?? readRuntimeBrokerAuthority;
+	const requestOwnerTicket = dependencies.requestOwnerTicket ?? ((jwt, request) => proxyPost(jwt, OWNER_TICKET_PATH, request, void 0, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS) }));
+	const requestRuntimeTicket = dependencies.requestRuntimeTicket ?? boundedRuntimeTicketRequest;
+	const readCredential = dependencies.readCredential ?? boundedCredentialRead;
+	const prepare = dependencies.prepare ?? ((threadId, acquired) => {
+		if (!config.baseDir) return Promise.reject(/* @__PURE__ */ new Error("selected_store_unavailable"));
+		return selectedClaudeCredentialStore(config.baseDir).prepare(threadId, acquired);
+	});
+	const createOperationId = dependencies.createOperationId ?? node_crypto.randomUUID;
+	return async (input) => {
+		const sealed = selectedConfig(config);
+		const sessionId = input.executionSessionId ?? dependencies.readSessionId(input.threadId);
+		if (sealed === null || sessionId === null) return missingAuthority();
+		const operationId = createOperationId();
+		const request = {
+			providerAccountId: input.providerAccountId,
+			threadId: String(input.threadId),
+			operationId
+		};
+		const acquired = await acquireSelectedClaudeCredential({
+			...sealed,
+			providerAccountId: input.providerAccountId,
+			threadId: String(input.threadId),
+			operationId
+		}, {
+			requestTicket: async () => {
+				if (isRuntimeTicketSession$1(sessionId)) {
+					const grant = readRuntimeAuthority({
+						sessionId,
+						runtimeId: sealed.runtimeId,
+						machineId: sealed.machineId,
+						credentialEpoch: sealed.credentialEpoch,
+						requiredScope: "provider"
+					});
+					if (grant === null) return missingAuthority();
+					return { data: await requestRuntimeTicket(grant, sealed.runtimeId, request) };
+				}
+				const jwt = await dependencies.resolveJwt(sessionId, { forceRefresh: false });
+				if (jwt === null) return missingAuthority();
+				return await requestOwnerTicket(jwt, {
+					...request,
+					runtimeId: sealed.runtimeId
+				});
+			},
+			readCredential
+		});
+		return await prepare(String(input.threadId), acquired);
+	};
+}
+//#endregion
 //#region src/provider/claudeRuntimeReadinessGuard.ts
 const GENERATION_HASH_PATTERN = /^[a-f0-9]{64}$/;
 const RUNTIME_READINESS_TIMEOUT_MS$1 = 1e4;
@@ -232608,7 +233647,22 @@ function makeClaudeRuntimeReadinessGuard(config, dependencies) {
 	return (input) => claudeReadinessGuardEffect(config, dependencies, resolved, input);
 }
 function claudeReadinessGuardEffect(config, dependencies, resolved, input) {
-	if (!requiresNativeClaudeReadiness(config, input.provider)) return require_Schema$1.succeed(null);
+	if (!requiresNativeClaudeReadiness(config, input.provider, input.providerAccountId)) return require_Schema$1.succeed(null);
+	if (input.providerAccountId !== void 0) {
+		const prepareSelectedCredential = dependencies.prepareSelectedCredential ?? makeClaudeSelectedCredentialPreparer(config, {
+			resolveJwt: dependencies.resolveJwt,
+			readSessionId: resolved.readSessionId,
+			readRuntimeAuthority: resolved.readRuntimeAuthority
+		});
+		const selectedInput = {
+			...input,
+			providerAccountId: input.providerAccountId
+		};
+		return require_Schema$1.tryPromise({
+			try: () => prepareSelectedCredential(selectedInput),
+			catch: () => selectedCredentialValidationError(input.operation, selectedInput.providerAccountId)
+		});
+	}
 	const authority = resolveGuardAuthority(config, resolved.readSessionId, input);
 	if (authority === null) return invalidOwnerSessionEffect(input.operation);
 	return require_Schema$1.tryPromise({
@@ -232616,8 +233670,9 @@ function claudeReadinessGuardEffect(config, dependencies, resolved, input) {
 		catch: (cause) => readinessValidationError(input.operation, cause)
 	});
 }
-function requiresNativeClaudeReadiness(config, provider) {
-	return provider === "claudeAgent" && config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMode === true && personalClaudeInVmEnabled();
+function requiresNativeClaudeReadiness(config, provider, providerAccountId) {
+	if (provider !== "claudeAgent" || config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMode !== true) return false;
+	return providerAccountId !== void 0 || personalClaudeInVmEnabled();
 }
 function resolveGuardAuthority(config, readSessionId, input) {
 	const runtimeId = config.forgeCmmdRuntimeId?.trim();
@@ -232654,6 +233709,12 @@ async function verifyGuardAuthority(config, dependencies, resolved, authority) {
 		fetchReadiness: resolved.fetchReadiness
 	});
 }
+function selectedCredentialValidationError(operation, accountId) {
+	return new ProviderValidationError({
+		operation,
+		issue: `The selected Claude account ${accountId} could not be prepared. Reconnect the account and try again.`
+	});
+}
 function readinessValidationError(operation, cause) {
 	return new ProviderValidationError({
 		operation,
@@ -291409,6 +292470,10 @@ const make$8 = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 				shouldRestartForAccountChange,
 				hasResumeCursor: resumeCursor !== void 0
 			});
+			if (shouldRestartForAccountChange) yield* providerService.stopSession({
+				threadId,
+				preserveResumeState: true
+			});
 			const restartedSession = yield* startProviderSession(resumeCursor !== void 0 ? { resumeCursor } : void 0);
 			yield* require_Schema$1.logInfo("provider command reactor restarted provider session", {
 				threadId,
@@ -297393,7 +298458,7 @@ function resolveBuildCommitFromEnv(env) {
 * environment descriptor down instead of reporting an honest "unknown".
 */
 function readBakedBuildCommit() {
-	return "05d8568497fdceb5b5d827b142ea4c681bef25ce";
+	return "81ce9360f406bcb5ae9fbdc9f90dd55d33f25f0c";
 }
 async function resolveServerBuildCommit(input) {
 	if (isFullCommitSha(input.baked)) return input.baked;
@@ -298818,20 +299883,20 @@ const generatePairingToken = () => {
 	const randomBytes = crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(PAIRING_TOKEN_LENGTH));
 	return Array.from(randomBytes, (value) => PAIRING_TOKEN_ALPHABET[value & 31]).join("");
 };
+const invalidBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
+	message,
+	status: 401
+});
+const internalBootstrapCredentialError = (message, cause) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
+	message,
+	status: 500,
+	cause
+});
 const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const config = yield* ServerConfig;
 	const pairingLinks = yield* AuthPairingLinkRepository;
 	const seededGrantsRef = yield* require_HttpServer.make$3(/* @__PURE__ */ new Map());
 	const changesPubSub = yield* require_Path.unbounded$1();
-	const invalidBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
-		message,
-		status: 401
-	});
-	const internalBootstrapCredentialError = (message, cause) => new BootstrapCredentialError({
-		message,
-		status: 500,
-		cause
-	});
 	const seedGrant = (credential, grant) => require_HttpServer.update(seededGrantsRef, (current) => {
 		const next = new Map(current);
 		next.set(credential, grant);
@@ -298846,19 +299911,19 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		id
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.asVoid);
 	if (config.desktopBootstrapToken) {
-		const now$2 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const now$3 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
 		yield* seedGrant(config.desktopBootstrapToken, {
 			method: "desktop-bootstrap",
 			role: "owner",
 			subject: "desktop-bootstrap",
-			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.add(now$2, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DESKTOP_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_TTL) }),
+			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.add(now$3, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DESKTOP_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN_TTL) }),
 			remainingUses: "unbounded"
 		});
 	}
 	const toBootstrapCredentialError = (message) => (cause) => internalBootstrapCredentialError(message, cause);
 	const listActive = () => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		const now$5 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
-		return (yield* pairingLinks.listActive({ now: now$5 })).map((row) => row.label ? {
+		const now$2 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		return (yield* pairingLinks.listActive({ now: now$2 })).map((row) => row.label ? {
 			id: row.id,
 			credential: row.credential,
 			role: row.role,
@@ -298888,8 +299953,8 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const id = crypto.randomUUID();
 		const credential = generatePairingToken();
 		const ttl = input?.ttl ?? DEFAULT_ONE_TIME_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES;
-		const now$4 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
-		const expiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(now$4, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(ttl) });
+		const now$5 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const expiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(now$5, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(ttl) });
 		const issued = {
 			id,
 			credential,
@@ -298903,7 +299968,7 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: input?.role ?? "client",
 			subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token",
 			label: input?.label ?? null,
-			createdAt: now$4,
+			createdAt: now$5,
 			expiresAt
 		});
 		yield* emitUpsert({
@@ -298912,13 +299977,13 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: input?.role ?? "client",
 			subject: input?.subject ?? "one-time-token",
 			...input?.label ? { label: input.label } : {},
-			createdAt: now$4,
+			createdAt: now$5,
 			expiresAt
 		});
 		return issued;
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to issue pairing credential.")));
 	const consume = (credential) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
-		const now$3 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const now$4 = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
 		const seededResult = yield* require_HttpServer.modify(seededGrantsRef, (current) => {
 			const grant = current.get(credential);
 			if (!grant) return [{
@@ -298927,7 +299992,7 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 				error: invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.")
 			}, current];
 			const next = new Map(current);
-			if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$3, grant.expiresAt)) {
+			if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$4, grant.expiresAt)) {
 				next.delete(credential);
 				return [{
 					_tag: "error",
@@ -298956,8 +300021,8 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (seededResult.reason !== "not-found") return yield* seededResult.error;
 		const consumed = yield* pairingLinks.consumeAvailable({
 			credential,
-			consumedAt: now$3,
-			now: now$3
+			consumedAt: now$4,
+			now: now$4
 		});
 		if (require_Schema$1.isSome(consumed)) {
 			yield* emitRemoved(consumed.value.id);
@@ -298973,9 +300038,9 @@ const makeBootstrapCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (require_Schema$1.isNone(matching)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.");
 		if (matching.value.revokedAt !== null) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential is no longer available.");
 		if (matching.value.consumedAt !== null) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Unknown bootstrap credential.");
-		if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$3, matching.value.expiresAt)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential expired.");
+		if (require_Schema$1.isGreaterThanOrEqualTo$1(now$4, matching.value.expiresAt)) return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential expired.");
 		return yield* invalidBootstrapCredentialError("Bootstrap credential is no longer available.");
-	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof BootstrapCredentialError ? cause : internalBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to consume bootstrap credential.", cause)));
+	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof BootstrapCredentialError ? cause : internalBootstrapCredentialError("Failed to consume bootstrap credential.", cause)), require_Schema$1.tapError((error) => error.status === 401 ? require_Schema$1.logWarning("Rejected bootstrap credential exchange.", { reason: error.message }) : require_Schema$1.void_));
 	return {
 		issueOneTimeToken,
 		listActive,
@@ -299031,6 +300096,10 @@ const SetAuthSessionLastConnectedAtInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
 	sessionId: AuthSessionId,
 	lastConnectedAt: require_Schema$1.DateTimeUtcFromString
 });
+const ExtendAuthSessionExpiryInput = require_Schema$1.Struct({
+	sessionId: AuthSessionId,
+	expiresAt: require_Schema$1.DateTimeUtcFromString
+});
 var AuthSessionRepository = class extends require_Schema$1.Service()("forge/persistence/Services/AuthSessions/AuthSessionRepository") {};
 //#endregion
 //#region src/persistence/Layers/AuthSessions.ts
@@ -299182,6 +300251,17 @@ const makeAuthSessionRepository = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
         WHERE session_id = ${sessionId}
           AND revoked_at IS NULL
         RETURNING session_id AS "sessionId"
+      `
+	});
+	const extendSessionExpiryRows = findAll({
+		Request: ExtendAuthSessionExpiryInput,
+		Result: require_Schema$1.Struct({ sessionId: AuthSessionId }),
+		execute: ({ sessionId, expiresAt }) => sql`
+        UPDATE auth_sessions
+        SET expires_at = ${expiresAt}
+        WHERE session_id = ${sessionId}
+          AND revoked_at IS NULL
+        RETURNING session_id AS "sessionId"
       `
 	});
 	const revokeOtherSessionRows = findAll({
@@ -299204,13 +300284,15 @@ const makeAuthSessionRepository = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const revoke = (input) => revokeSessionRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.revoke:query", "AuthSessionRepository.revoke:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.length > 0));
 	const revokeAllExcept = (input) => revokeOtherSessionRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.revokeAllExcept:query", "AuthSessionRepository.revokeAllExcept:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.map((row) => row.sessionId)));
 	const setLastConnectedAt = (input) => setLastConnectedAtRow(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.setLastConnectedAt:query", "AuthSessionRepository.setLastConnectedAt:encodeRequest")));
+	const extendExpiry = (input) => extendSessionExpiryRows(input).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toPersistenceSqlOrDecodeError$3("AuthSessionRepository.extendExpiry:query", "AuthSessionRepository.extendExpiry:decodeRows")), require_Schema$1.map((rows) => rows.length > 0));
 	return {
 		create,
 		getById,
 		listActive,
 		revoke,
 		revokeAllExcept,
-		setLastConnectedAt
+		setLastConnectedAt,
+		extendExpiry
 	};
 });
 const AuthSessionRepositoryLive = require_Schema$1.effect(AuthSessionRepository, makeAuthSessionRepository);
@@ -299219,6 +300301,20 @@ const AuthSessionRepositoryLive = require_Schema$1.effect(AuthSessionRepository,
 const SIGNING_SECRET_NAME = "server-signing-key";
 const DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL = require_Schema$1.days(30);
 const DEFAULT_WEBSOCKET_TOKEN_TTL = require_Schema$1.minutes(5);
+/**
+* Whether a session presented at `nowMs` has used up half its own lifetime.
+*
+* A phone that opens the app daily should never hit the 30-day wall, but a
+* lost phone's session should still die on schedule if it is never presented
+* again. Sliding the expiry forward only when the session is already more
+* than half spent gives an active phone many chances to renew before expiry
+* while keeping a dormant session's remaining lifetime bounded by the last
+* time it was actually used.
+*/
+function isPastHalfLife(input) {
+	const halfLifeMarkMs = input.issuedAtMs + (input.expiresAtMs - input.issuedAtMs) / 2;
+	return input.nowMs >= halfLifeMarkMs;
+}
 const toSessionCredentialError = (message) => (cause) => new SessionCredentialError({
 	message,
 	cause
@@ -299379,6 +300475,42 @@ const makeSessionCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			role: claims.role
 		};
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError(toSessionCredentialError("Failed to issue session credential.")));
+	/**
+	* Slide a session's expiry forward when the token it just verified is past
+	* half its own lifetime, so a phone that keeps using the app never runs
+	* into the 30-day wall.
+	*
+	* The session id, subject, role and method carry over unchanged — only the
+	* signature-bearing `iat`/`exp` differ — which is what lets the DB row be
+	* extended in place (`extendExpiry`) rather than replaced: everything keyed
+	* by session id, most importantly the `command_access_tokens` row holding
+	* this session's CMMD credential, needs no migration.
+	*/
+	const renewIfPastHalfLife = (input) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const nowMs = yield* require_Schema$1.currentTimeMillis;
+		if (!isPastHalfLife({
+			issuedAtMs: input.row.issuedAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			expiresAtMs: input.row.expiresAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			nowMs
+		})) return void 0;
+		const newIssuedAt = yield* require_Schema$1.now;
+		const newExpiresAt = require_Schema$1.add(newIssuedAt, { milliseconds: require_Schema$1.toMillis(DEFAULT_SESSION_TTL) });
+		const newClaims = {
+			...input.claims,
+			iat: newIssuedAt.epochMilliseconds,
+			exp: newExpiresAt.epochMilliseconds
+		};
+		const newEncodedPayload = base64UrlEncode(JSON.stringify(newClaims));
+		const newSignature = signPayload(newEncodedPayload, signingSecret);
+		if (!(yield* authSessions.extendExpiry({
+			sessionId: input.claims.sid,
+			expiresAt: newExpiresAt
+		}).pipe(require_Schema$1.orElseSucceed(() => false)))) return void 0;
+		return {
+			token: `${newEncodedPayload}.${newSignature}`,
+			expiresAt: newExpiresAt
+		};
+	});
 	const verify = (token) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		const [encodedPayload, signature] = token.split(".");
 		if (!encodedPayload || !signature) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Malformed session token." });
@@ -299393,14 +300525,19 @@ const makeSessionCredentialService = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		if (require_Schema$1.isSome(row)) {
 			if (row.value.revokedAt !== null) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Session token revoked." });
 		} else if (!(statelessCookieSessions && claims.method === "browser-session-cookie")) return yield* new SessionCredentialError({ message: "Unknown session token." });
+		const renewed = require_Schema$1.isSome(row) ? yield* renewIfPastHalfLife({
+			claims,
+			row: row.value
+		}) : void 0;
 		return {
 			sessionId: claims.sid,
 			token,
 			method: claims.method,
 			client: require_Schema$1.isSome(row) ? toClientMetadata(row.value.client) : createDefaultClientMetadata(),
-			expiresAt: require_Schema$1.makeUnsafe(claims.exp),
+			expiresAt: renewed?.expiresAt ?? require_Schema$1.makeUnsafe(claims.exp),
 			subject: claims.sub,
-			role: claims.role
+			role: claims.role,
+			...renewed ? { renewed } : {}
 		};
 	}).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => cause instanceof SessionCredentialError ? cause : new SessionCredentialError({
 		message: "Failed to verify session credential.",
@@ -299893,7 +301030,10 @@ const makeServerAuth = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		subject: session.subject,
 		method: session.method,
 		role: session.role,
-		...session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}
+		...session.renewed ? {
+			expiresAt: session.renewed.expiresAt,
+			renewedSessionToken: session.renewed.token
+		} : session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: session.expiresAt } : {}
 	})), require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new AuthError({
 		message: "Unauthorized request.",
 		status: 401,
@@ -299928,6 +301068,7 @@ const makeServerAuth = require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 		role: session.role,
 		sessionMethod: session.method,
 		...session.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: require_Schema$1.toUtc(session.expiresAt) } : {},
+		...session.renewedSessionToken ? { renewedSessionToken: session.renewedSessionToken } : {},
 		cmmdIdentity
 	})))), require_Schema$1.tapError((e) => {
 		if (e._tag === "AuthError" && (e.status ?? 500) < 500) return require_Schema$1.void_;
@@ -306307,6 +307448,82 @@ const orchestrationAutomationTerminalReconcileRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/o
 	}, { status: 200 });
 }).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("OrchestrationDispatchCommandError", respondToWorkRunEventError)));
 //#endregion
+//#region src/orchestration/threadSnapshotRoute.ts
+/**
+* `GET /api/orchestration/threads/:threadId`, one thread's detail snapshot,
+* optionally windowed to a page of recent turns.
+*
+* Forge never served this route. The mobile client has asked for it on every
+* thread open since it shipped, fell through to the socket-embedded snapshot on
+* the 404, and its "load earlier" control had nowhere to fetch from, so a long
+* thread was only ever loadable in full. Serving it here gives the initial read
+* a body the transport can gzip, off the RPC socket, and gives older turns a
+* cursor to arrive on.
+*
+* The window is applied by the same pure function the WebSocket fallback
+* snapshot uses, so the two reads cannot disagree about what a page is.
+*/
+/**
+* Reads the window out of the query string.
+*
+* Returns null for a malformed value rather than ignoring it. A client that
+* asked for 10 turns and silently received 4,000 has no way to tell, and the
+* failure would show up as a slow app rather than as an error.
+*/
+function parseThreadSnapshotWindow(searchParams) {
+	const rawTurnLimit = searchParams.get("turnLimit");
+	const rawBeforeCursor = searchParams.get("beforeCursor");
+	let turnLimit;
+	if (rawTurnLimit !== null) {
+		const parsed = Number(rawTurnLimit);
+		if (!Number.isSafeInteger(parsed) || parsed < 1) return null;
+		turnLimit = parsed;
+	}
+	let beforeCursor;
+	if (rawBeforeCursor !== null) {
+		const trimmed = rawBeforeCursor.trim();
+		if (trimmed.length === 0) return null;
+		beforeCursor = trimmed;
+	}
+	return {
+		...turnLimit === void 0 ? {} : { turnLimit },
+		...beforeCursor === void 0 ? {} : { beforeCursor }
+	};
+}
+const orchestrationThreadSnapshotRouteLayer = add$1("GET", "/api/orchestration/threads/:threadId", require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	const request = yield* require_HttpServer.HttpServerRequest;
+	yield* (yield* ServerAuth).authenticateHttpRequest(request);
+	const rawThreadId = (yield* params)["threadId"];
+	if (rawThreadId === void 0 || rawThreadId.length === 0) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Missing thread id." }, { status: 400 });
+	const url = require_HttpServer.toURL(request);
+	const window = require_Schema$1.isNone(url) ? {} : parseThreadSnapshotWindow(url.value.searchParams);
+	if (window === null) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Invalid turnLimit or beforeCursor." }, { status: 400 });
+	const threadId = ThreadId.make(decodeURIComponent(rawThreadId));
+	const projectionSnapshotQuery = yield* ProjectionSnapshotQuery;
+	const orchestrationEngine = yield* OrchestrationEngineService;
+	const [threadDetail, snapshotSequence] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([projectionSnapshotQuery.getThreadDetailById(threadId).pipe(require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new OrchestrationGetSnapshotError({
+		message: `Failed to load thread ${threadId}`,
+		cause
+	}))), orchestrationEngine.getReadModel().pipe(require_Schema$1.map((readModel) => readModel.snapshotSequence))]);
+	if (require_Schema$1.isNone(threadDetail)) return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: "Thread not found." }, { status: 404 });
+	const windowed = windowThreadDetail({
+		thread: threadDetail.value,
+		window,
+		snapshotSequence
+	});
+	return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({
+		snapshotSequence,
+		thread: windowed.thread,
+		...windowed.page === void 0 ? {} : { page: windowed.page }
+	}, { status: 200 });
+}).pipe(require_Schema$1.catchTag("AuthError", respondToAuthError), require_Schema$1.catchTag("OrchestrationGetSnapshotError", (error) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+	yield* require_Schema$1.logError("thread snapshot route failed", {
+		message: error.message,
+		cause: error.cause
+	});
+	return require_HttpServer.jsonUnsafe({ error: error.message }, { status: 500 });
+}))));
+//#endregion
 //#region src/localAutomations/scheduling.ts
 const MINUTE_MS = 6e4;
 const HOUR_MS = 60 * MINUTE_MS;
@@ -318217,7 +319434,7 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 		const sql = yield* require_SqlError.SqlClient;
 		const fetchFn = options.fetchFn ?? fetch;
 		const baseUrl = options.baseUrl ?? resolveCommandAppUrl();
-		const resolveStoredJwt = (forceRefresh) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
+		const resolveStoredJwt = (forceRefresh, staleJwt) => require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 			const owner = yield* readMostRecentOwnerCommandAuthSession.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideService(require_SqlError.SqlClient, sql), require_Schema$1.mapError((cause) => new ProjectLeadControllerClientError({
 				kind: "unavailable",
 				operation: "resolve-owner-session",
@@ -318231,7 +319448,8 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 				sessionId: owner.sessionId,
 				subject: owner.subject,
 				logPrefix: "project-lead-scheduler",
-				forceRefresh
+				forceRefresh,
+				staleAccessToken: staleJwt
 			}).pipe(require_Schema$1.provideService(require_SqlError.SqlClient, sql));
 			if (!jwt) return yield* new ProjectLeadControllerClientError({
 				kind: "unauthenticated",
@@ -318274,7 +319492,7 @@ function makeProjectLeadControllerClientLive(options = {}) {
 			}));
 			if (first._tag === "Success") return first.success;
 			if (first.failure.kind !== "unauthenticated") return yield* first.failure;
-			const refreshed = yield* resolveJwt(true);
+			const refreshed = yield* resolveJwt(true, jwt);
 			return yield* requestAttempt({
 				...input,
 				jwt: refreshed
@@ -320681,12 +321899,12 @@ const gitUrlCloneRouteLayer = add$1("POST", "/api/cloud/git/clone-url", require_
 //#region src/server.ts
 const PtyAdapterLive = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	if (typeof Bun !== "undefined") return (yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./BunPTY-uyreNRGp.cjs")))).layer;
-	else return (yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodePTY-UOaRyQsj.cjs")))).layer;
+	else return (yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodePTY-BehazUMi.cjs")))).layer;
 }));
 const HttpServerLive = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const config = yield* ServerConfig;
-	if (typeof Bun !== "undefined") return (yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./BunHttpServer-C7-1JJ7b.cjs")))).layer(bunHttpServerOptions(config));
-	const [NodeHttpServer, NodeHttp] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeHttpServer-Bi339XFk.cjs"))), require_Schema$1.promise(() => import("node:http"))]);
+	if (typeof Bun !== "undefined") return (yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./BunHttpServer-C0oPP_3A.cjs")))).layer(bunHttpServerOptions(config));
+	const [NodeHttpServer, NodeHttp] = yield* require_Schema$1.all([require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeHttpServer-Cjd3bFrD.cjs"))), require_Schema$1.promise(() => import("node:http"))]);
 	return NodeHttpServer.layer(NodeHttp.createServer, {
 		host: config.host,
 		port: config.port
@@ -320694,10 +321912,10 @@ const HttpServerLive = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* ()
 }));
 const PlatformServicesLive = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	if (typeof Bun !== "undefined") {
-		const { layer } = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./BunServices-Dl-3897e.cjs")));
+		const { layer } = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./BunServices-DkenwD7S.cjs")));
 		return layer;
 	} else {
-		const { layer } = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeServices-R0BZsZ72.cjs")));
+		const { layer } = yield* require_Schema$1.promise(() => Promise.resolve().then(() => require("./NodeServices-BvdIc9Vh.cjs")));
 		return layer;
 	}
 }));
@@ -320764,7 +321982,7 @@ const MiscRuntimeLayerLive = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(AnalyticsServiceLayerLive
 const RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive = ReactorLayerLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(CheckpointingLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(GitLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(OrchestrationLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProviderLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(TerminalLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(AgentBrowserManagerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(ThreadDevRuntimeLive, DevTunnelLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(ThreadDevRuntimeLive)))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(PersistenceLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(KeybindingsLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProviderRegistryLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(ServerSettingsLive, UsageServiceLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(ServerSettingsLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(UsageSessionLookupLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(UsageRecordedSourceLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(OrchestrationLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(RuntimeReplicationOutboxLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(ProviderSessionRuntimeRepositoryLive), require_Schema$1.provide$1(TextGenerationSessionRepositoryLive)))))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(WorkspaceLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(WorkspaceReadinessStateLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ProjectFaviconResolverLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RepositoryIdentityResolverLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ServerEnvironmentLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(AuthLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(ServerSecretStoreLayerLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(require_Schema$1.mergeAll(CloudRedisCoordinationLive, CloudStateSyncLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(PersistenceLayerLive)))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(MiscRuntimeLayerLive));
 const RuntimeDependenciesLive = pullRequestServiceFactoryLayer.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(cmmdProjectIdentityResolverLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(RuntimeDependenciesWithoutPullRequestsLive))), require_Schema$1.provideMerge(pullRequestProviderRuntimeLive));
 const RuntimeServicesLive = ServerRuntimeStartupLive.pipe(require_Schema$1.provideMerge(RuntimeDependenciesLive));
-const makeRoutesLayer = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(attachmentUploadRouteLayer, authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer, authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer, authWebSocketTicketRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer, authCmmdPasswordTokenRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeOthersRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeRouteLayer, authClientsRouteLayer, authLogoutRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRevokeRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRouteLayer, authPairingCredentialRouteLayer, authSessionRouteLayer, authWebSocketTokenRouteLayer, authWebLoginRouteLayer, authWebCallbackRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgePublishRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgeBootstrapRouteLayer, desktopRelayControlPlaneRouteLayer, apiDocsHtmlRouteLayer, apiDocsOpenApiRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateListRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateUpsertRouteLayer, cmmdProfileRouteLayer, ...cmmdProxyRouteLayers, cmmdWorkIntakeRouteLayer, cmmdWsTokenRouteLayer, cmmdGetProjectCommentsRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectCommentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectRouteLayer, cmmdUploadTaskAttachmentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateTaskCommentRouteLayer, cmmdListWorkspaceMembersRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectMemberRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectAgentMemberAvatarRouteLayer, runtimeReplicationStatusRouteLayer, cmmdRefreshProviderUsageRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsListRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesConnectRouteLayer, ownerRuntimeCodexReadinessRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStatusRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStartRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStopRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesRecycleRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesUpdateCommitRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesDestroyRouteLayer, mobileProviderCatalogRouteLayer, attachmentsRouteLayer, orchestrationDispatchRouteLayer, orchestrationCmmdWorkRunEventRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationStartThreadRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationRebindRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationTerminalReconcileRouteLayer, mobileGitRunStackedActionRouteLayer, pullRequestDiffRouteLayer, orchestrationSnapshotRouteLayer, localAutomationListRouteLayer, localAutomationCreateRouteLayer, localAutomationUpdateRouteLayer, localAutomationDeleteRouteLayer, localAutomationRunRouteLayer, otlpTracesProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelLocalPortProxyRouteLayer, projectFaviconRouteLayer, serverEnvironmentRouteLayer, browserWebRtcReadinessRouteLayer, staticAndDevRouteLayer, githubStatusRouteLayer, githubAuthorizeUrlRouteLayer, githubDisconnectRouteLayer, githubReposRouteLayer, githubCloneRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStartRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStatusRouteLayer, githubRefreshCredentialsRouteLayer, githubToolConfirmationApproveRouteLayer, projectLinkGetRouteLayer, projectLinkListRouteLayer, projectLinkSetRouteLayer, projectLinkDeleteRouteLayer, cmmdWorkspacesRouteLayer, cmmdCampaignsRouteLayer, cmmdProjectLinksRouteLayer, cmmdEnsureGitHubProjectContextRouteLayer, cmmdProjectRepositoryEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsGetRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsCreateRouteLayer, workspaceReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeLivenessRouteLayer, runtimeFilesystemHealthRouteLayer, claudeNativeGenerationProofRouteLayer, claudeUsageRouteLayer, codexRuntimeProviderReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeDiagnosticsRouteLayer, cloudFoldersRouteLayer, cloudProjectCreateRouteLayer, gitUrlCloneRouteLayer, websocketRpcRouteLayer).pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(browserApiCorsLayer));
+const makeRoutesLayer = require_Schema$1.mergeAll(attachmentUploadRouteLayer, authBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBearerBootstrapRouteLayer, authCommandBootstrapRouteLayer, authOAuthTokenExchangeRouteLayer, authWebSocketTicketRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthDeviceRouteLayer, authCmmdOAuthTokenRouteLayer, authCmmdPasswordTokenRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeOthersRouteLayer, authClientsRevokeRouteLayer, authClientsRouteLayer, authLogoutRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRevokeRouteLayer, authPairingLinksRouteLayer, authPairingCredentialRouteLayer, authSessionRenewRouteLayer, authSessionRouteLayer, authWebSocketTokenRouteLayer, authWebLoginRouteLayer, authWebCallbackRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgePublishRouteLayer, desktopLocalWebBridgeBootstrapRouteLayer, desktopRelayControlPlaneRouteLayer, apiDocsHtmlRouteLayer, apiDocsOpenApiRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateListRouteLayer, pulseSignalStateUpsertRouteLayer, cmmdProfileRouteLayer, ...cmmdProxyRouteLayers, cmmdWorkIntakeRouteLayer, cmmdWsTokenRouteLayer, cmmdGetProjectCommentsRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectCommentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectRouteLayer, cmmdUploadTaskAttachmentRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateTaskCommentRouteLayer, cmmdListWorkspaceMembersRouteLayer, cmmdAddProjectMemberRouteLayer, cmmdUpdateProjectAgentMemberAvatarRouteLayer, runtimeReplicationStatusRouteLayer, cmmdRefreshProviderUsageRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsListRouteLayer, cmmdForgeCloudProjectsEventsRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesConnectRouteLayer, ownerRuntimeCodexReadinessRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStatusRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStartRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesStopRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesRecycleRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesUpdateCommitRouteLayer, cmmdForgeRuntimesDestroyRouteLayer, mobileProviderCatalogRouteLayer, attachmentsRouteLayer, orchestrationDispatchRouteLayer, orchestrationCmmdWorkRunEventRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationStartThreadRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationRebindRouteLayer, orchestrationAutomationTerminalReconcileRouteLayer, mobileGitRunStackedActionRouteLayer, pullRequestDiffRouteLayer, orchestrationSnapshotRouteLayer, orchestrationThreadSnapshotRouteLayer, localAutomationListRouteLayer, localAutomationCreateRouteLayer, localAutomationUpdateRouteLayer, localAutomationDeleteRouteLayer, localAutomationRunRouteLayer, otlpTracesProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelProxyRouteLayer, devTunnelLocalPortProxyRouteLayer, projectFaviconRouteLayer, serverEnvironmentRouteLayer, browserWebRtcReadinessRouteLayer, staticAndDevRouteLayer, githubStatusRouteLayer, githubAuthorizeUrlRouteLayer, githubDisconnectRouteLayer, githubReposRouteLayer, githubCloneRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStartRouteLayer, githubCloneJobStatusRouteLayer, githubRefreshCredentialsRouteLayer, githubToolConfirmationApproveRouteLayer, projectLinkGetRouteLayer, projectLinkListRouteLayer, projectLinkSetRouteLayer, projectLinkDeleteRouteLayer, cmmdWorkspacesRouteLayer, cmmdCampaignsRouteLayer, cmmdProjectLinksRouteLayer, cmmdEnsureGitHubProjectContextRouteLayer, cmmdProjectRepositoryEnsureRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsGetRouteLayer, cmmdProjectsCreateRouteLayer, workspaceReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeLivenessRouteLayer, runtimeFilesystemHealthRouteLayer, claudeNativeGenerationProofRouteLayer, claudeUsageRouteLayer, codexRuntimeProviderReadinessRouteLayer, runtimeDiagnosticsRouteLayer, cloudFoldersRouteLayer, cloudProjectCreateRouteLayer, gitUrlCloneRouteLayer, websocketRpcRouteLayer).pipe(require_Schema$1.provide$1(browserApiCorsLayer));
 const makeServerLayer = require_Schema$1.unwrap(require_Schema$1.gen(function* () {
 	const config = yield* ServerConfig;
 	fixPath({ preferProcessPath: config.forgeCmmdRuntimeMode === true });