@cloudbase/cloudbase-mcp 2.17.0 → 2.18.0

package/README.md

@@ -118,15 +118,22 @@ AI 编程工具（如 OpenClaw、Cursor、CodeBuddy）解决了**代码生成**
 }
 ```
 
-**托管模式可选：通过 URL 控制启用哪些插件**
+**托管模式可选：通过 URL 控制插件启用范围**
 
-在 `url` 里加上 query 参数可禁用指定插件，例如禁用 `rag` 和 `env`：
+在 `url` 里可通过 query 参数控制插件启用范围：
+
+- `enable_plugins`：仅启用指定插件，多个插件使用逗号分隔，例如只启用 `env` 和 `database`
+- `disable_plugins`：从默认插件集合中禁用指定插件，多个插件使用逗号分隔，例如禁用 `rag` 和 `env`
 
 ```
-https://tcb-api.cloud.tencent.com/mcp/v1?env_id=YOUR_ENV_ID&disable_plugins=rag&disable_plugins=env
+# 只启用指定插件
+https://tcb-api.cloud.tencent.com/mcp/v1?env_id=YOUR_ENV_ID&enable_plugins=env,database
+
+# 禁用指定插件
+https://tcb-api.cloud.tencent.com/mcp/v1?env_id=YOUR_ENV_ID&disable_plugins=rag,env
 ```
 
-当前可配置的插件名：`env`, `database`, `functions`, `hosting`, `storage`, `setup`, `rag`, `cloudrun`, `gateway`, `download`, `security-rule`, `invite-code`, `capi`。
+当前可配置的插件名以 `mcp/src/server.ts` 为准，建议优先使用 canonical 名称：`env`, `database`, `functions`, `hosting`, `storage`, `setup`, `rag`, `download`, `gateway`, `cloudrun`, `app-auth`, `permissions`, `logs`, `agents`, `invite-code`, `capi`, `apps`。
 
 > [!TIP]
 > **推荐使用 CloudBase AI CLI**
@@ -431,9 +438,9 @@ CodeBuddy 已内置 CloudBase MCP，无需配置即可使用。
 | **官方文档** | [查看文档](https://docs.cloudbase.net/) | 完整的云开发文档 |
 | **Issue 反馈** | [提交问题](https://github.com/TencentCloudBase/CloudBase-AI-ToolKit/issues) | Bug 反馈和功能请求 |
 
-## Star History
+## 项目活跃度
 
-[![Star History Chart](https://api.star-history.com/svg?repos=TencentCloudBase/CloudBase-AI-ToolKit&type=Timeline)](https://github.com/TencentCloudBase/CloudBase-AI-ToolKit)
+![Repo Activity](https://repobeats.axiom.co/api/embed/6cd6ed00da4384e43b24805c197f584626946dda.svg "Repobeats analytics image")
 
 ## Contributors
 

package/dist/341.index.js

@@ -26,6 +26,85 @@ function isVSCodeEnvironment() {
         process.env.VSCODE_PID ||
         process.env.TERM_PROGRAM === "vscode");
 }
+/**
+ * Validates that a URL is safe to open, blocking SSRF targets.
+ * Only allows http/https schemes and rejects private/reserved IP ranges
+ * and sensitive hostnames.
+ */
+function isUrlSafeToOpen(url) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { safe: false, reason: "Invalid URL format" };
+    }
+    // Only allow http and https schemes
+    if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Unsupported scheme: ${parsed.protocol}` };
+    }
+    const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
+    // Block common sensitive / internal hostnames
+    const blockedHostnames = [
+        "localhost",
+        "localhost.localdomain",
+        "ip6-localhost",
+        "ip6-loopback",
+        "metadata.google.internal",
+        "metadata.internal",
+    ];
+    if (blockedHostnames.includes(hostname)) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Blocked hostname: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // Block hostnames ending with .internal or .local
+    if (hostname.endsWith(".internal") || hostname.endsWith(".local")) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Blocked internal hostname: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // Block IP addresses in private/reserved ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, etc.)
+    const ipv4Regex = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
+    const match = ipv4Regex.exec(hostname);
+    if (match) {
+        const octets = [parseInt(match[1], 10), parseInt(match[2], 10), parseInt(match[3], 10), parseInt(match[4], 10)];
+        // Loopback: 127.0.0.0/8
+        if (octets[0] === 127) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked loopback IP address" };
+        }
+        // Link-local: 169.254.0.0/16
+        if (octets[0] === 169 && octets[1] === 254) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked link-local IP address" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 10.0.0.0/8
+        if (octets[0] === 10) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (10.x.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 172.16.0.0/12
+        if (octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (172.16-31.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 192.168.0.0/16
+        if (octets[0] === 192 && octets[1] === 168) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (192.168.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // Broadcast: 0.0.0.0
+        if (octets[0] === 0 && octets[1] === 0 && octets[2] === 0 && octets[3] === 0) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked broadcast address" };
+        }
+    }
+    // Block IPv6 loopback and link-local
+    if (hostname.startsWith("[") && hostname.endsWith("]")) {
+        const ipv6 = hostname.slice(1, -1).toLowerCase();
+        if (ipv6 === "::1" || ipv6 === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" || ipv6 === "::" || ipv6 === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0") {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 loopback/reserved address" };
+        }
+        if (ipv6.startsWith("fe80:")) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 link-local address" };
+        }
+        if (ipv6.startsWith("fc") || ipv6.startsWith("fd")) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 unique-local address" };
+        }
+    }
+    return { safe: true };
+}
 function parseBrowserCommand(browser) {
     const parts = browser.match(/(?:[^\s"]+|"[^"]*")+/g) || [];
     return parts.map((item) => item.replace(/^"(.*)"$/, "$1"));
@@ -249,6 +328,17 @@ class InteractiveServer {
                 res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: "URL is required" });
                 return;
             }
+            if (typeof url !== "string") {
+                res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: "URL must be a string" });
+                return;
+            }
+            // Validate URL to prevent SSRF
+            const validation = isUrlSafeToOpen(url);
+            if (!validation.safe) {
+                (0, logger_js_1.warn)(`Blocked open-url request for unsafe URL: ${url} (${validation.reason})`);
+                res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: `URL not allowed: ${validation.reason}` });
+                return;
+            }
             (0, logger_js_1.info)("Received open URL request", { url });
             try {
                 // Pass mcpServer directly - it's an ExtendedMcpServer instance with server property
@@ -427,8 +517,8 @@ class InteractiveServer {
                         reject(err);
                     }
                 };
-                // Host: default 0.0.0.0 so Cloud IDE / VSCode Remote port-forward can connect; set INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST=127.0.0.1 for local-only
-                const host = process.env.INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST ?? "0.0.0.0";
+                // Host: default 127.0.0.1 for security (prevents SSRF from remote access); set INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0 to allow remote connections
+                const host = process.env.INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST ?? "127.0.0.1";
                 // 设置成功监听处理
                 const listeningHandler = () => {
                     const address = this.server.address();

package/dist/602.index.cjs

@@ -1429,6 +1429,85 @@ function isVSCodeEnvironment() {
         process.env.VSCODE_PID ||
         process.env.TERM_PROGRAM === "vscode");
 }
+/**
+ * Validates that a URL is safe to open, blocking SSRF targets.
+ * Only allows http/https schemes and rejects private/reserved IP ranges
+ * and sensitive hostnames.
+ */
+function isUrlSafeToOpen(url) {
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(url);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { safe: false, reason: "Invalid URL format" };
+    }
+    // Only allow http and https schemes
+    if (parsed.protocol !== "http:" && parsed.protocol !== "https:") {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Unsupported scheme: ${parsed.protocol}` };
+    }
+    const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
+    // Block common sensitive / internal hostnames
+    const blockedHostnames = [
+        "localhost",
+        "localhost.localdomain",
+        "ip6-localhost",
+        "ip6-loopback",
+        "metadata.google.internal",
+        "metadata.internal",
+    ];
+    if (blockedHostnames.includes(hostname)) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Blocked hostname: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // Block hostnames ending with .internal or .local
+    if (hostname.endsWith(".internal") || hostname.endsWith(".local")) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: `Blocked internal hostname: ${hostname}` };
+    }
+    // Block IP addresses in private/reserved ranges (RFC 1918, loopback, link-local, etc.)
+    const ipv4Regex = /^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/;
+    const match = ipv4Regex.exec(hostname);
+    if (match) {
+        const octets = [parseInt(match[1], 10), parseInt(match[2], 10), parseInt(match[3], 10), parseInt(match[4], 10)];
+        // Loopback: 127.0.0.0/8
+        if (octets[0] === 127) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked loopback IP address" };
+        }
+        // Link-local: 169.254.0.0/16
+        if (octets[0] === 169 && octets[1] === 254) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked link-local IP address" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 10.0.0.0/8
+        if (octets[0] === 10) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (10.x.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 172.16.0.0/12
+        if (octets[0] === 172 && octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <= 31) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (172.16-31.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // RFC 1918 private: 192.168.0.0/16
+        if (octets[0] === 192 && octets[1] === 168) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked private IP address (192.168.x.x)" };
+        }
+        // Broadcast: 0.0.0.0
+        if (octets[0] === 0 && octets[1] === 0 && octets[2] === 0 && octets[3] === 0) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked broadcast address" };
+        }
+    }
+    // Block IPv6 loopback and link-local
+    if (hostname.startsWith("[") && hostname.endsWith("]")) {
+        const ipv6 = hostname.slice(1, -1).toLowerCase();
+        if (ipv6 === "::1" || ipv6 === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:1" || ipv6 === "::" || ipv6 === "0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0") {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 loopback/reserved address" };
+        }
+        if (ipv6.startsWith("fe80:")) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 link-local address" };
+        }
+        if (ipv6.startsWith("fc") || ipv6.startsWith("fd")) {
+            return { safe: false, reason: "Blocked IPv6 unique-local address" };
+        }
+    }
+    return { safe: true };
+}
 function parseBrowserCommand(browser) {
     const parts = browser.match(/(?:[^\s"]+|"[^"]*")+/g) || [];
     return parts.map((item) => item.replace(/^"(.*)"$/, "$1"));
@@ -1652,6 +1731,17 @@ class InteractiveServer {
                 res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: "URL is required" });
                 return;
             }
+            if (typeof url !== "string") {
+                res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: "URL must be a string" });
+                return;
+            }
+            // Validate URL to prevent SSRF
+            const validation = isUrlSafeToOpen(url);
+            if (!validation.safe) {
+                (0, logger_js_1.warn)(`Blocked open-url request for unsafe URL: ${url} (${validation.reason})`);
+                res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: `URL not allowed: ${validation.reason}` });
+                return;
+            }
             (0, logger_js_1.info)("Received open URL request", { url });
             try {
                 // Pass mcpServer directly - it's an ExtendedMcpServer instance with server property
@@ -1830,8 +1920,8 @@ class InteractiveServer {
                         reject(err);
                     }
                 };
-                // Host: default 0.0.0.0 so Cloud IDE / VSCode Remote port-forward can connect; set INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST=127.0.0.1 for local-only
-                const host = process.env.INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST ?? "0.0.0.0";
+                // Host: default 127.0.0.1 for security (prevents SSRF from remote access); set INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0 to allow remote connections
+                const host = process.env.INTERACTIVE_SERVER_HOST ?? "127.0.0.1";
                 // 设置成功监听处理
                 const listeningHandler = () => {
                     const address = this.server.address();