@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.195.10 → 0.195.12

package/dist/agentic-security.mjs.sha256

@@ -1 +1 @@
-4104b02904216922e410b459fcde235a0bf73ec5b3515a3bc07acec62312fe65  agentic-security.mjs
+a5a29b34945782b9200c9eb7e7733f276e168ba3c4a8a4033bc4e4dd3d8b1877  agentic-security.mjs

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner",
-  "version": "0.195.10",
+  "version": "0.195.12",
   "description": "Scanner engine for the agentic-security Claude Code plugin: SAST, SCA with reachability and CISA KEV, secrets, IaC, Haskell and Nix/NixOS, prompt-injection, MCP/agent-tool audit, authZ analysis, SBOM, compliance attestation, and more.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "src/index.js",
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
     "node": ">=24.0.0"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@babel/core": "^8.0.10",
+    "@babel/core": "^8.1.0",
     "@babel/preset-react": "^8.0.1",
     "@babel/preset-typescript": "^8.0.1",
     "js-yaml": "^5.5.0",
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
     "test:lineage": "node --test test/lineage/analysis-completion.test.js test/lineage/schema.test.js test/lineage/ids.test.js test/lineage/protection.test.js test/lineage/classification.test.js test/lineage/validate.test.js test/lineage/json-schema-parity.test.js test/lineage/flagship-fixture.test.js test/lineage/flagship-fixture-semantics.test.js test/lineage/field-identity.test.js test/lineage/engine-expr-resolver.test.js test/lineage/engine-walker.test.js test/lineage/engine-integration.test.js test/lineage/engine-receiver-identity.test.js test/lineage/summaries.test.js test/lineage/driver.test.js test/lineage/engine-provenance.test.js test/lineage/engine-provenance-interprocedural.test.js test/lineage/path-store.test.js test/lineage/path-query.test.js test/lineage/flow-grade.test.js test/lineage/source-registry.test.js test/lineage/sink-registry.test.js test/lineage/transform-catalog.test.js test/lineage/handling-analyzer.test.js test/lineage/registry-real-code.test.js test/lineage/source-seeding.test.js test/lineage/graph-builder.test.js test/lineage/coverage.test.js test/lineage/resolve-destination.test.js test/lineage/queue-detail.test.js test/lineage/index.test.js test/lineage/obligation-mapping.test.js test/lineage/obligation-predicates.test.js test/lineage/obligation-predicates-walkthrough.test.js test/lineage/transit-protection.test.js test/lineage/at-rest-protection.test.js test/lineage/protection-summary.test.js test/lineage/ac01-multi-sink.test.js test/lineage/policy-verdict.test.js test/lineage/governance-refs.test.js test/lineage/export-privacy.test.js test/lineage/export-json.test.js test/lineage/export-csv.test.js test/lineage/decision-story.test.js test/lineage/export-briefing.test.js test/lineage/graph-snapshot.test.js test/lineage/graph-diff.test.js test/lineage/drift-policy.test.js test/lineage/recipient-profile.test.js test/lineage/recipient-registry.test.js test/lineage/recipient-wiring.test.js test/lineage/redact-graph.test.js test/lineage-scan-wiring.test.js test/lineage-artifact-write.test.js test/bench-data-lineage-runner.test.js test/bundle-frontend.test.js test/bundle-frontend-golden.test.js test/generate-html-report.test.js test/export-image.test.js test/lineage/scenario.test.js test/lineage/scenario-engine.test.js test/lineage/scenario-diff.test.js test/lineage/scenario-no-obligation-wiring.test.js test/lineage/impact-assessment.test.js test/lineage/impact-engine.test.js test/lineage/impact-no-obligation-wiring.test.js test/lineage/governance-edit.test.js test/lineage/remediation.test.js test/lineage/runtime-observation.test.js test/lineage/observation-correlation.test.js test/lineage/observation-adapters.test.js test/lineage/observation-store.test.js test/lineage/runtime-corroboration-wiring.test.js test/lineage/cross-repo-link.test.js test/lineage/federation-loader.test.js test/lineage/cross-repo-link-wiring.test.js test/lineage/runtime-assurance.test.js test/lineage/runtime-edge-states.test.js test/lineage/runtime-explorer-view.test.js test/cli/runtime-explorer-cli.test.js test/cli/runtime-identity-cli.test.js test/cli/runtime-twin-cli.test.js test/lineage/cut-planner.test.js test/lineage/scc.test.js test/lineage/scc-solver.test.js test/graph/graph-views.test.js test/lineage/dag07-completion.test.js test/lineage/owned-build.test.js test/dataflow/boundary-propagation.test.js test/lineage/boundary-contract.test.js test/lineage/correlation-v2.test.js test/lineage/path-control-evidence.test.js test/lineage/smt-z3-backend.test.js test/cli/dag-commands.test.js",
     "test:bench-modules": "node --test test/phase4-harness.test.js test/pipeline.test.js test/proof-corpus-lib.test.js test/proof-corpus-runner.test.js",
     "test:server": "node --test test/server/graph-loader.test.js test/server/security.test.js test/server/routes.test.js test/server/http-server.test.js test/server/cmd-explore.test.js test/server/cmd-dataflow-export.test.js test/server/static-assets.test.js test/server/dataflow-scenario-cli.test.js test/server/dataflow-impact-cli.test.js",
-    "test:haskell": "node --test test/haskell/haskell-reachability.test.js test/haskell/haskell-real-code-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-unseen-v5-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-unseen-v4-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-alias-taint.test.js test/haskell/haskell-weak-hash-names.test.js test/haskell/haskell-models-extended.test.js test/haskell/haskell-rules-extended.test.js test/haskell/haskell-injection.test.js test/haskell/haskell-ir.test.js test/haskell/haskell-manifests.test.js test/haskell/haskell-parser.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-0190.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-kdf.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-html-text.test.js test/haskell/haskell-resolved-graph.test.js test/haskell/haskell-sca.test.js test/haskell/haskell-sca-severity.test.js test/haskell/haskell-web-guards.test.js test/haskell/haskell-advisory-feed.test.js test/haskell/haskell-security-rules.test.js test/haskell/haskell-taint.test.js test/haskell/haskell-boundaries.test.js test/haskell/haskell-live-feed-scan.test.js test/haskell/haskell-supply-bounds.test.js test/haskell/haskell-ir-scaling.test.js test/haskell/haskell-boundary-propagation.test.js test/haskell/haskell-generalization.test.js test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary.test.js test/haskell/haskell-comment-invariance.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-classes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary-frameworks.test.js test/haskell/haskell-generic-detectors.test.js",
+    "test:haskell": "node --test test/haskell/haskell-reachability.test.js test/haskell/haskell-real-code-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-unseen-v5-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-unseen-v4-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-alias-taint.test.js test/haskell/haskell-weak-hash-names.test.js test/haskell/haskell-models-extended.test.js test/haskell/haskell-rules-extended.test.js test/haskell/haskell-injection.test.js test/haskell/haskell-ir.test.js test/haskell/haskell-manifests.test.js test/haskell/haskell-parser.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-0190.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-kdf.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-html-text.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-scotty-body.test.js test/haskell/haskell-taint-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-real-advisory-shapes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-resolved-graph.test.js test/haskell/haskell-sca.test.js test/haskell/haskell-sca-severity.test.js test/haskell/haskell-web-guards.test.js test/haskell/haskell-advisory-feed.test.js test/haskell/haskell-security-rules.test.js test/haskell/haskell-taint.test.js test/haskell/haskell-boundaries.test.js test/haskell/haskell-live-feed-scan.test.js test/haskell/haskell-supply-bounds.test.js test/haskell/haskell-ir-scaling.test.js test/haskell/haskell-boundary-propagation.test.js test/haskell/haskell-generalization.test.js test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary.test.js test/haskell/haskell-comment-invariance.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation-classes.test.js test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary-frameworks.test.js test/haskell/haskell-generic-detectors.test.js",
     "test:nix": "node --test test/nix/nix-option-types.test.js test/nix/nix-development-shapes.test.js test/nix/nixos-hardening-daemon.test.js test/nix/nixos-hardening-extended.test.js test/nix/nix-build-trust.test.js test/nix/nix-eval-isolation.test.js test/nix/nix-input-inventory.test.js test/nix/nix-parser-ir.test.js test/nix/nix-remediation.test.js test/nix/nix-resolved-closure.test.js test/nix/nix-sca-patches.test.js test/nix/nix-sca-severity.test.js test/nix/nix-haskell-closure-names.test.js test/nix/nix-script-taint.test.js test/nix/nix-secrets-store.test.js test/nix/nixos-hardening.test.js test/nix/nixos-module-resolution.test.js test/nix/nix-fix-multifile.test.js test/nix/nixos-evaluator-forms.test.js test/nix/nix-advisory-feed.test.js test/nix/nix-fix-prewrite.test.js test/nix/nix-boundary-scope.test.js",
     "test:language": "node --test test/bench-haskell-precision.test.js test/bench-independent-haskell-panel.test.js test/language/capability-ledger.test.js test/language/language-accuracy-regression.test.js test/language/language-aibom.test.js test/language/language-assurance.test.js test/language/language-bom.test.js test/language/language-compliance.test.js test/language/language-contracts.test.js test/language/language-corpora-integrity.test.js test/language/language-discovery.test.js test/language/language-doc-coverage.test.js test/language/language-evidence-posture.test.js test/language/language-explorer.test.js test/language/frozen-splits.test.js test/language/language-gap-fixes.test.js test/language/language-gap-fixes-2.test.js test/language/language-governance.test.js test/language/language-integrations.test.js test/language/language-llm-agent.test.js test/language/language-local-ai.test.js test/language/language-parity-haskell.test.js test/language/language-polyglot-bridges.test.js test/language/language-privacy-lineage.test.js test/language/language-proof-remediation.test.js test/language/language-report-formats.test.js test/language/language-secrets.test.js test/language/language-trust-boundary.test.js",
     "test:language-stress": "node --test --test-concurrency=1 test/language/language-stress-offline.test.js",

package/src/dataflow/CLAUDE.md

@@ -196,4 +196,4 @@ member-based: `hs-src-caller-controlled-param` (a text parameter of an exported
 catalog entries and requires a markup literal for `htmlSkeleton` sinks. Pinned counts in the lineage registry tests change
 deliberately when the model registry grows. Details: `scanner/src/language/CLAUDE.md`.
 
-Three Haskell-scoped behaviours live in `engine.js` (all guarded by `_currentFile` being a `.hs`/`.lhs` file, so no other language changes): a `union` (the branches of an `if`, a `case`, guards) handed to another call as an argument (`get "/p" $ do .. case m of A -> sink x`) or bound as a statement is a sink site in EACH branch (`_nestedSinkFindings`; the `assign` case); `exprTaint` of a `member` whose object is a call result (the elements of `words s`) is the object's taint; and the catalog gains four annotation sources, `hs-src-handler-param-<framework>` (a text parameter of an exported function that returns a Scotty/Yesod/Servant/WAI handler value: request input, provenance `url-param`), beside the weaker `hs-src-caller-controlled-param`.
+Four Haskell-scoped behaviours live in `engine.js` (all guarded by `_currentFile` being a `.hs`/`.lhs` file, so no other language changes): a `union` (the branches of an `if`, a `case`, guards) handed to another call as an argument (`get "/p" $ do .. case m of A -> sink x`) or bound as a statement is a sink site in EACH branch (`_nestedSinkFindings`; the `assign` case); a tuple or constructor application (an `array` with `hs.tuple`/`hs.con`) handed to a call is walked like an argument list, so a sink built inside `return (settings, Con (sink ..))` is a site (found on keter, `bench/cve-replay/real-haskell-advisories.md`); `exprTaint` of a `member` whose object is a call result (the elements of `words s`) is the object's taint; and the catalog gains four annotation sources, `hs-src-handler-param-<framework>` (a text parameter of an exported function that returns a Scotty/Yesod/Servant/WAI handler value: request input, provenance `url-param`), beside the weaker `hs-src-caller-controlled-param`.

package/src/dataflow/catalog-expanded.js

@@ -329,7 +329,11 @@ const JAVA_SHELL = [
 const JAVA_URL_PATH_REGEX = [
   san('java', 'url',     'URLEncoder.encode',           ['url']),
   san('java', 'uri',     'URI',                         ['url']),
-  san('java', 'nio',     'Paths.get',                   ['path']),
+  // `Paths.get` only BUILDS a Path: a `..` segment in its argument survives into the file operation, so it neutralises nothing. It was
+  // listed as a path sanitizer, which made the engine PROVE the Spring path traversal `CVE-2018-1271-java-path-traversal` clean ("sanitized
+  // via Paths.get"); that false proof was hidden while the corpus scored a proven-clean finding as a detection, and showed the moment
+  // `posture/corpus-match.js` stopped counting refuted findings. (`Path.normalize` alone does not contain a path either, but with a
+  // `startsWith` check it is the guard `dropGuardedFindings` recognises; it stays listed, demoting only.)
   san('java', 'nio',     'Path.normalize',              ['path']),
   san('java', 'regex',   'Pattern.quote',               ['regex']),
 ];

package/src/dataflow/engine.js

@@ -1443,6 +1443,13 @@ function _nestedSinkFindings(argExprs, state, callContext, line) {
       findings.push(..._nestedSinkFindings(leaves, state, callContext, line));
       continue;
     }
+    // Haskell: a tuple or a constructor application is an `array` (`hs.tuple` / `hs.con`); a call built inside it runs when the value is built,
+    // so `return (settings, WPRResponse (responseBuilder .. body))` carries the sink in its second component (real code, keter: the reverse
+    // proxy's unknown-host page). The elements are walked like arguments; the other IRs never put a sink call inside an array literal this way.
+    if (arg && arg.kind === 'array' && arg.hs && (arg.hs.tuple || arg.hs.con) && /\.(?:hs|lhs)$/i.test(_currentFile || '')) {
+      findings.push(..._nestedSinkFindings(arg.elements, state, callContext, line));
+      continue;
+    }
     if (!arg || arg.kind !== 'call') continue;
     const { cat, argTaints } = _matchCallCatalog(arg.callee, arg.args, state, callContext);
     const at = _sinkLine(arg, line);

package/src/engine.js

@@ -317,6 +317,7 @@ import {
 import { SCANNER_VERSION as _ENGINE_VERSION } from './posture/version.js';
 import { isLanguageSource, isLanguageExcludedPath, withLanguageClosure } from './language/discovery.js';
 import { annotateHaskellFindings } from './language/haskell-findings.js';
+import { stripComments as stripHaskellComments } from './language/haskell-comments.js';
 import { annotateHaskellLlm, analyzeHaskellLlmRules } from './language/haskell-llm.js';
 import { languagePragmaOnLine as _languagePragmaOnLine, languagePragmaSuppresses as _languagePragmaSuppresses } from './language/pragma.js';
 import { applyHaskellGuards, consolidateFlowSinks } from './language/haskell-guards.js';
@@ -364,6 +365,10 @@ function _commentLangFor(fp) {
   if (_ALL_COMMENT_EXTS.has(ext)) return 'php';
   if (_RUBY_COMMENT_EXTS.has(ext)) return 'rb';
   if (_HASH_COMMENT_EXTS.has(ext)) return 'py';
+  // Haskell: `--` lines and nesting `{- -}` blocks (language/haskell-comments.js, the same lexer the Haskell findings' snippets use). The
+  // language-neutral detectors that read the comment-blanked view (ciphers, protocol shapes, structural patterns) fired on API names quoted
+  // in a Haskell doc comment; a comment is never a call. Literate `.lhs` is left to the Haskell parser (its prose is not a comment form).
+  if (ext === '.hs') return 'hs';
   return undefined; // C-family default: `//` and `/* */` only, `#` left alone.
 }
 // Single-entry memo for the comment-blanked view.
@@ -383,7 +388,7 @@ function _commentLangFor(fp) {
 let _blankMemoSrc = null, _blankMemoLang, _blankMemoOut = null;
 function _blankCached(src, lang) {
   if (src === _blankMemoSrc && lang === _blankMemoLang) return _blankMemoOut;
-  const out = blankComments(src, lang);
+  const out = lang === 'hs' ? stripHaskellComments(src) : blankComments(src, lang);
   _blankMemoSrc = src; _blankMemoLang = lang; _blankMemoOut = out;
   return out;
 }

package/src/language/CLAUDE.md

@@ -65,15 +65,19 @@ or a capability.** Product-facing guides: `docs/guides/haskell.md`, `docs/guides
 - **A numeric annotation is a clean constant to the taint engine and still an expression to the rules.** `read s :: Int` and `readMaybe s :: Maybe Int` parse to a `typed` node (`NUMERIC_TYPE` in `haskell-syntax.js`, nothing else is kept) which lowers to a literal whose `hs.inner` carries the lowered expression; `haskell-security-rules.js` and `haskell-web.js` walk `hs.inner` (as they walk `hs.selector`), so an unsafe coercion in it and the request id it names stay visible. It is deliberately NOT a call of a sanitizer: the engine's sanitizer label is per expression, so a number in `"kill " ++ show n ++ name` would mark the tainted `name` sanitized.
 - **Guards are recognised by what they do.** `haskell-guards.js`: a project function is an HTML escaper when it (or its local helpers) spells out the entities for `<`, `>` and `&` (`htmlEscapers`; never by name), and it neutralises a CWE-79 flow only when EVERY use of the value in the sink argument is under such a call (`allUsesEscaped`); a host allow-list may be a named constant and may sit in an `&&`; `sh -c SCRIPT arg0 arg1` is shell injection only when the SCRIPT is built from the value, and tainted positional parameters are data when the constant script expands them only inside double quotes after `--` (`quotedPositionals`, which decodes the Haskell string escapes the IR keeps raw).
 - **Handlers named by the framework's convention are routes.** `haskell-web.js` adds `getFooR`/`postFooR`/`handleFooR` functions whose signature mentions `Handler` in a module importing Yesod when no route table in an analysed file names them (the table usually lives in `config/routes`). Scotty's rejection order is judged by `inlineOrder` as well as by line: a `case` lists the success branch first, so `status 40x >> finish` in the LAST alternative guards it (a bare `status` with no halting call does not).
+- **A project definition of a modelled name keeps the registry's meaning (since 0.195.11).** `haskell-ir.js` `applyVar`/`lowerVarValue`: a resolution to a project `def` whose module-qualified name `isKnownApi` (the project IS the framework, or vendors it) is lowered as the LIBRARY call (`hs.status: 'external'`, `hs.modelledDefinition: qid`) and the definition is still referenced (`noteRef(..., 'modelled-definition')`, so it is never an uncalled entry point). Before this, IHP's own `IHP.Controller.Param.param` shadowed the catalog when IHP scanned itself, and a request parameter reaching `Process.system` through a helper was not reported (four lost true positives on the fresh set). A test stub named like a catalog module gets the same treatment, which is why the html-text remediation test keeps its scotty stub out of the scan. Pinned both ways in `test/haskell/haskell-taint-shapes.test.js`, with the three shapes below.
+- **Shapes from the real code behind published advisories (since 0.195.12; `bench/cve-replay/real-haskell-advisories.md`, pinned in `test/haskell/haskell-real-advisory-shapes.test.js`).** `haskell-syntax.js`: a record pattern accepts whitespace before its brace (`Con {..}`; a `{` after a constructor inside a pattern is always a record pattern), a top-level `|` after an `of`, a `\case` or a multiway `if` inside a list literal is that construct's guard and not a comprehension bar, a `$(..)`/`$$(..)`/`$name` in prefix position is one `splice` token when the module's LANGUAGE pragma enables TemplateHaskell (`TH_PRAGMA`; a cabal `default-extensions` entry is not seen, a stated limit) and `aexp` reads it as an opaque `{t:'splice'}` atom (the IR lowers it to an unknown value without a lowering-gap diagnostic, the parser's `th-splice` boundary already discloses it), and `var@Pat = ..` in a declaration is a pattern binding, not a function named by the variable. `haskell-parser.js`: the Hamlet replacement closes its parenthesis at the `|]` (it used to go after the last `}`, a newline when the interpolation ended its line, so the paren was lost and the function failed to parse). `haskell-ir.js`: `fieldFunctionCandidates(con, field)` (the project class) indexes the function values every construction of `con` stores in `field` (`Con { f = g }`, `Con{..}` with `f <- pure g` / `f = g` in the building clause, `case`/`if` branches, `pure`/`return` peeled, `const <$> e` / `fmap const e` / `const e` as `ignores`; a lambda or anything else is `opaque`); a record-pattern-bound variable remembers its field (`{kind:'local', field:{con,name}}`, set in `bindPattern`) and `applyFieldCandidates` lowers the application as the union over the candidates (names applied in the module of the construction, `ignores` as an unknown value not derived from the arguments), only when NO candidate is opaque. `dataflow/engine.js` `_nestedSinkFindings` walks the elements of a Haskell tuple or constructor `array` (`hs.tuple`/`hs.con`) like arguments, so a sink built inside `return (a, Con (sink ..))` is a site. `haskell-guards.js` `waiHtmlContext` returns `redirect` for a header list with `Location` and no content type and the finding is lowered to info (`redirect-response-body`). `haskell-models.js`: blaze-builder's HTML escapers are xss sanitizers (names read from the Hackage index, `tested: ['0.4.4']`). `posture/corpus-match.js` scores neither a `proven-*` finding nor an `info` finding with a `guardNote` (see `bench/cve-replay/CONTRIBUTING.md`).
+- **Mutable cells, instance dispatch, functions in record fields (since 0.195.11).** `haskell-ir.js`: `CELL_OPS` lowers `writeIORef ref v` (MVar, TVar, STRef alike) to an assignment of the cell's local variable, a read to that variable, `modifyIORef ref f` to `ref = f ref` (`lowerCellOp`; only a cell held in a local variable, never across functions, disclosed in the guide). `dispatchInstance`: a class-method call with a constructor argument of a type that has exactly one visible instance resolves to that instance method (`hs.status: 'resolved'`, `hs.dispatchedOn`); instance functions are now named `Mod.$inst.Class.Type.method` (`instanceMeta`, `instanceTypeOf` reads the instance head) so two instances of one class resolve to different functions by name, which the dataflow engine needs because it resolves callees by name. `heldFieldFunction`: `exec ops x` with `ops` a top-level constant record literal applies the field's expression (lambda or name), lowered in the constant's module with the arguments lowered in the caller's. The cell and STM names are in `HS_RULE_APIS` so wildcard imports qualify them.
 - **IR idioms that must keep the action.** `m >>= \_ -> k` and `f <$> m` RUN `m` even when the lambda ignores its result (`betaReduce`, `via`); `maybe d f m` / `either f g e` are a two-way branch on the scrutinee (so the scrutinee is still examined); `\case` applied by `>>=` is a case run in place; `foldM`, `zipWithM_`, `uncurry`, `fst`/`snd`/`const` of a written-out tuple, `filter isAlphaNum`, and a let-bound lambda (`let go = \x -> ..`, treated as `go x = ..`) are lowered so their sinks are reached. The taint engine (`dataflow/engine.js`) is Haskell-scoped for three of these: a `union` handed to a combinator or bound as a statement is a sink site in each branch (`_nestedSinkFindings`, the `assign` case), and a `member` whose object is a call (the elements of `words s`) carries its object's taint.
 - **A Haskell taint finding says who controls its input.** `haskell-trust.js` `applyTrustBoundary` (run in `engine.js` right after `applyHaskellGuards`) reads the origins the engine recorded (`sourceRoots`, or the evidence chain) and stamps `trustBoundary {verdict, reason, role, roots}`. Verdicts: `attacker-reachable` (request, socket, header, cookie, remote response; never lowered), `operator-controlled` (cli/env roots, and file-read roots in a command-line program; also an EMPTY origin in a command-line program, marked `inferred: true`), `api-contract` (a bare/whole-handoff parameter of an uncalled exported function reaching a process or, since 0.195.9, a path operation: CWE-78/88/22), `entry-parameter`, `data-input`, `unattributed`. `operator-controlled` and `api-contract` are lowered to `info` (never dropped; `originalSeverity`, `controls`, `guardNote` kept), the same convention `haskell-guards.js` uses. **Standard input is covered by the command-line rule only for a path operation** (since 0.195.9: a command-line program reading a file NAME from its standard input is the operator naming a file, 14 of the 29 flagged path sites on the real-code sets; `getLine >>= callCommand` in `main` stays reported, pinned in `test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary.test.js`). **Path wrappers became `api-contract` in 0.195.9**: `withFile name WriteMode` on a caller-named file is the vulnerable shape of three synthetic development splits and of no real-code true positive, while `renderFile path = responseFile .. path` was a flagged false positive on every real project that had it; the parameter under a fixed directory (`"/srv/" ++ name`) is still `entry-parameter` and still a finding. That is a decision against the synthetic labels, taken on the real-code sets; the development-set numbers that moved are recorded in the changelog. The role is `fn.hs.entryRole` from `assignEntryRoles` in `haskell-ir.js`: `cli` (reached only from `main`s whose reachable modules import no server framework or socket library), `service`, or `library` (no `main` reaches it; an incomplete call graph therefore yields `library`, never `cli`). Pinned both ways in `test/haskell/haskell-trust-boundary.test.js`.
 - **Origins are recorded, not guessed** (`dataflow/engine.js`). The engine records a source only against the variable a source call was assigned to; three additions make an evidence chain begin at the real origin: a value derived from a source inherits its records (`_inheritSources`), a callee analysed under an entry-taint state names its tainted parameters with placeholder records (`_paramPlaceholders`) that `_mergeSummaryFindings` resolves to the sources of the arguments at the merging call site (`_resolveParams`), and a function return keeps the sources behind it (`returnSources`, followed through `from` into `sourceRoots`). A parameter annotated as a source (`hs:caller-controlled`, `hs:handler-param:*`) is recorded too (`matchAnnotationParamSources`, `source.kind: 'parameter'` so stable ids do not change). This is language-neutral (`test/dataflow-source-attribution.test.js` pins it on JavaScript). `System.IO.hGetContents`/`hGetLine`/`hGetChar` (and the Text/ByteString forms) are modelled as `file-read`, not `stdin`: they read whatever handle they are given.
 - **Reachability must survive platform variants.** An import two modules both satisfy (the Posix and Windows variants behind an undecided CPP conditional) resolves to `unknown: ambiguous-import` with its `candidates`; `haskell-ir.js` records each candidate as a reference of the caller, so neither is an "uncalled entry point" whose parameters are caller-controlled. Without it every function of the platform module that was not chosen was reported.
 - **"No caller can exist" is a verdict with preconditions, and `null !== false`.** `haskell-ir.js` `projectReachability` stamps `fn.hs.reachability {status, rootKind, holeReason}` (`entrypoint-reachable | unreachable-in-project | external-api | unknown`); `haskell-reachability.js` `applyHaskellReachability` copies it onto each IR-TAINT finding as `f.reachability {status, reason, premise, roots, holeReason}`, a record SEPARATE from `trustBoundary` (that one says who controls the input, this one whether a caller can exist; either may be `unknown`). `unreachable-in-project` needs ALL of: `completeScan` (runScan/engine thread it; a changed-file, PR, subdirectory or caller-supplied scan is a subset, under which every export looks uncalled), no `policy-excluded`/`size-skipped` Haskell, `entrypointCount > 0` (a `main`; the sealed single-file corpora have none, so the rule is structurally inert on them), `exposedModules !== null` (`haskell-manifests.js` `exposedModuleIndex`: cabal `exposed-modules`, or hpack `exposed-modules`; an hpack library that exposes everything, `-main-is`, `-F/-pgmF`, a plugin, a non-test `build-tool-depends`, a foreign library, Backpack signatures are all `null`), the function's module not exposed (re-exports count: `reexportClosure`), not an instance method (instance methods are ROOTS, so what they call is reached, but their own verdict is `unknown/instance-method`), and not reached from a root. Roots: every `main`, framework-handler-typed functions (`hs.entryHandler`), `foreign export`s, instance methods, exported functions of exposed modules, and `withheld-caller` roots. Gaps are bounded where they can be and global where they cannot: Template Haskell/quasi-quotes the allow-lists did not accept (`preprocessForSyntaxInfo(...).opaque`), a foreign export, the function cap, an unresolved name nothing defines = global holes; a declaration the parser withheld or an expression it could not lower makes that module's own functions and the exported functions of every module it can name (re-export closure) roots, because withheld code can call only what its module can see. A call through a function VALUE is not a gap (its callee was mentioned in value position, which is a reference the walk follows). Holes are `unknown`, never `unreachable`; the order of `holeReason` is `HOLE_PRIORITY`. Pinned in `test/haskell/haskell-reachability.test.js`; the pin at `haskell-trust-boundary.test.js` (a lone `Svc.hs`) asserts `unknown/no-entrypoint`. **Severity:** only `unreachable-in-project` with `premise === 'caller-controlled-parameter'` (every recorded origin is the weak parameter label) is lowered to `info` (`lowerFinding`, guard `_reachLowered`, composes with `_trustLowered`); a finding with a recorded read keeps its severity and may only rank lower (`posture/relevance.js` `languageVerdict`). The verdict is recomputed in place per context (`buildHaskellIR(files, {manifests, completeScan, scanHoles})`; the BUILD cache is keyed by sources alone and the manifests are parsed once per context, counted by `EXPOSED_INDEX_WORK`). `fn.hs.reachedBy` and `fn.hs.paramEntry` record how a function was reached and what its parameters were before `paramAnnotations` is removed; the removal itself is unchanged. `callersUnknown(fn)` (`haskell-security-rules.js`) reads the verdict for the partial-function and unbounded-read rules; `external-api` is deliberately answered as before (turning it on added seven flagged sites and no true positive on the development set). Nothing reads a comment, a name or a path. Measured effect on real code is in `bench/dag/dev-haskell/results/README.md` (it changed no severity there) and the recorded baseline is gated by `bench/haskell-precision`.
+- **The language-neutral detectors see Haskell comments blanked (since 0.195.11).** `engine.js` `_commentLangFor` maps `.hs` to `'hs'` and `_blankCached` uses `haskell-comments.js` `stripComments` for it: the cipher, protocol-shape and structural text detectors read the comment-blanked view, and under the C-family view an API name quoted in a Haskell doc comment (a Node MD5 hash call, a JWT verify that accepts the unsigned algorithm) was reported as a call. (This file is in the self-scan's targets too: do not quote such a call here verbatim, the generic detectors read a guide as code.) Pinned both ways in `test/haskell/haskell-generic-detectors.test.js`. `.lhs` is left alone (its prose is not a comment form).
 - **Comments never change a verdict, an id or a cluster.** `haskell-comments.js` finds Haskell comments lexically; a finding's `snippet` is `codeOfLine(line)` (code only), because the snippet feeds the stable id and the clone-shape hash, and both changed when someone edited a trailing comment. `test/haskell/haskell-comment-invariance.test.js` scans the examples and corpus-shaped cases as written, with every comment blanked, and with every comment (and a trailing comment on every line) replaced by text that lies in each direction; `bench/dag/dev-haskell/comment-invariance.mjs` does the same to a real project. An engine that varies is wrong.
-- **Rules that read the function around a call** (`haskell-security-rules.js`): `hs-weak-hash` is a vulnerability only where `weakDigestUse` finds a use that depends on the digest's strength (compared, hashed secret, credential-shaped binding or function, handed to a signing/verifying call); otherwise it is emitted at `info`. `hs-unbounded-input-read` needs a socket handle, or standard input in a function nothing calls (`readsOutsideInput`). Partial-function and allocation rules use a parameter as caller-supplied only for a framework-handler parameter or an uncalled function (`fn.hs.reached`). A salt is not an unpredictability-sensitive value. A cookie whose whole value is constant is not a credential. Own-property lookups only (`Object.hasOwn`): `constructor` and `toString` are legal Haskell names and were reported as "Unsafe boundary: function Object() { [native code] }".
+- **Rules that read the function around a call** (`haskell-security-rules.js`): `hs-weak-hash` is a vulnerability only where `weakDigestUse` finds a use that depends on the digest's strength (compared, hashed secret, credential-shaped binding or function, handed to a signing/verifying call); otherwise it is emitted at `info`. `hs-unbounded-input-read` needs a socket handle, or standard input in a function nothing calls (`readsOutsideInput`). Partial-function and allocation rules use a parameter as caller-supplied only for a framework-handler parameter or an uncalled function (`fn.hs.reached`), and, since 0.195.11, for a parameter a CALLER fills with request-derived text (`requestTextParams`: a pre-pass over the resolved call edges, including the edges of inlined helpers, which now carry their lowered arguments; one hop per round, four rounds). `list !! tableId` with a caller-supplied INDEX is reported like a caller-supplied list (a relational test on the index covers it); the partial-function emits carry `inlineCtx`, so the copy at an inlined call site is dropped when the helper reports it. A scotty `body` read is bounded by `setMaxRequestBodySize` in the same function or in a ScottyM function that references the handler (`scottyLimitFor`, certain, `controls` kind `scotty-body-limit`); a limit elsewhere in the project keeps the finding at `low` with the reach stated as unverified. A salt is not an unpredictability-sensitive value. A cookie whose whole value is constant is not a credential. Own-property lookups only (`Object.hasOwn`): `constructor` and `toString` are legal Haskell names and were reported as "Unsafe boundary: function Object() { [native code] }".
 - **Fixes name the library the file uses.** `sqlDriverOf` picks `Database.PostgreSQL.Simple` or `Database.SQLite.Simple` from the file's own imports and refuses anything else; `hs-html-escape` needs blaze-html or a re-exporter; `hs-hash-sha256` refuses when the algorithm is named on another line (a type); `hs-path-takefilename` rewrites only a String/FilePath parameter spliced under a fixed directory in a FILE operation. Classes with no safe rewrite refuse with a class-level reason (`CLASS_REASONS`), `proposal: 'model-assisted'`, `tier: 'guidance-only'`, and every reason ends `The decision needed: ...` (returned as `decision`). Never invent a library API: the TLS, cookie, entropy and wai shapes were written against the package documentation and their tests type-check against DECLARED STUBS of that API shape, which proves coherence with the documented shape, not a build against the real package.
-- **Haskell plans carry `tier`, `consequences` and (for attribute fixes) `expectEffective`.** `planHaskellFix` returns `tier: 'full-source-edit'` and a `consequences` array for every plan (a patch that changes behavior must say how: stored digests, rejected connections, HTTP-only cookies, a request-body limit), the way `nix-fix.js` does. Ten fixers: the six rewrites above plus `hs-tls-validate` (CWE-295, the `connection` package's `TLSSettingsSimple` literal `True` to `False`; OpenSSL `VerifyNone` refused), `hs-cookie-attributes` (CWE-1004, four framework shapes; the scotty helper is written out as the record update because the wrapped form is invisible to the rule), `hs-random-os-entropy` (CWE-338, only `name = randomIO` of type `IO <fixed-width integer>` in a file that already imports `System.Entropy`) and `hs-request-body-bound` (CWE-770, a MITIGATION: wai `strictRequestBody` becomes a bounded reader defined in the file, with a 1 MiB limit that is a declared default, not a measured need). Two more since 0.195.10, both MITIGATIONS written against the real-code true positives: `hs-html-escape-text` (CWE-79: scotty's `html $ mconcat ["<h1>", v, "</h1>"]`, or `html` of one literal-free expression, gets an escaper DEFINED IN THE FILE on every non-literal part; `htmlEscapers` recognises it by its entities, so the rescan goes quiet for the right reason; only with `Web.Scotty` and `Data.Text.Lazy` imported, never a nested construction or a renderer) and `hs-password-kdf-migrate` (CWE-916: the migration story the old refusal asked for, written out in the file: the old pure one-line `name salt password` of one text type is kept as `nameLegacy` for verification, `name` becomes PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a tag in front of the hex, `nameNeedsRehash` reads the tag, `nameVerify stored salt password` checks either form, every `stored == name salt password` in the file calls it, an export list gains the helpers; only with a cryptonite/crypton module imported, and REFUSED when another file compares with the function, because that comparison would lock those users out). `haskell-security-rules.js` `legacyVerifierOnly` then reports the kept weak hash at `info`: every use of the function, in every file, is an operand of an equality and one of those functions also calls a password KDF within one project hop (the migration shape, decided from the IR; `register salt pw = oldHash salt pw` or a comparison beside no KDF keeps the full finding). `defaultRescan` drops a finding the engine LOWERED to `info` for a stated reason (`originalSeverity`, or the legacy-verifier evidence) as it drops `proven-*` ones, so a patch that earns such a lowering passes the "original gone" gate; a finding that is `info` in its own right (an MD5 with no visible use) is still counted, so fixing it can still be shown to remove it. SSRF, argument injection, missing auth and hard-coded secrets keep refusing and name the decision. The compile-gated remediation suites set `GHC_ENVIRONMENT=-` in their own process: a host's package environment file (`cabal install --lib`) hid `bytestring` under the recorded GHC and turned every stub compile into not-run.
+- **Haskell plans carry `tier`, `consequences` and (for attribute fixes) `expectEffective`.** `planHaskellFix` returns `tier: 'full-source-edit'` and a `consequences` array for every plan (a patch that changes behavior must say how: stored digests, rejected connections, HTTP-only cookies, a request-body limit), the way `nix-fix.js` does. Ten fixers: the six rewrites above plus `hs-tls-validate` (CWE-295, the `connection` package's `TLSSettingsSimple` literal `True` to `False`; OpenSSL `VerifyNone` refused), `hs-cookie-attributes` (CWE-1004, four framework shapes; the scotty helper is written out as the record update because the wrapped form is invisible to the rule), `hs-random-os-entropy` (CWE-338, only `name = randomIO` of type `IO <fixed-width integer>` in a file that already imports `System.Entropy`) and `hs-request-body-bound` (CWE-770, a MITIGATION: wai `strictRequestBody` becomes a bounded reader defined in the file, with a 1 MiB limit that is a declared default, not a measured need). Two more since 0.195.10, both MITIGATIONS written against the real-code true positives: `hs-html-escape-text` (CWE-79: scotty's `html $ mconcat ["<h1>", v, "</h1>"]`, or `html` of one literal-free expression, gets an escaper DEFINED IN THE FILE on every non-literal part; `htmlEscapers` recognises it by its entities, so the rescan goes quiet for the right reason; only with `Web.Scotty` and `Data.Text.Lazy` imported, never a nested construction or a renderer) and `hs-password-kdf-migrate` (CWE-916: the migration story the old refusal asked for, written out in the file: the old pure one-line `name salt password` of one text type is kept as `nameLegacy` for verification, `name` becomes PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with a tag in front of the hex, `nameNeedsRehash` reads the tag, `nameVerify stored salt password` checks either form, every `stored == name salt password` in the file calls it, an export list gains the helpers; only with a cryptonite/crypton module imported, and REFUSED when another file compares with the function, because that comparison would lock those users out). `haskell-security-rules.js` `legacyVerifierOnly` then reports the kept weak hash at `info`: every use of the function, in every file, is an operand of an equality and one of those functions also calls a password KDF within one project hop (the migration shape, decided from the IR; `register salt pw = oldHash salt pw` or a comparison beside no KDF keeps the full finding). `defaultRescan` drops a finding the engine LOWERED to `info` for a stated reason (`originalSeverity`, or the legacy-verifier evidence) as it drops `proven-*` ones, so a patch that earns such a lowering passes the "original gone" gate; a finding that is `info` in its own right (an MD5 with no visible use) is still counted, so fixing it can still be shown to remove it. Since 0.195.11, `hs-scotty-body-limit` (CWE-770, MITIGATION): scotty's `body` has no per-read bound, so `setMaxRequestBodySize agenticRequestBodyLimitKb` (1024 KB, a declared default) is inserted as the first statement of the ScottyM block that contains the read or names the handler (`scottyBlocksOf`: `scotty <port> $ do` lines, or `name :: ScottyM ()` with `name = do`), with a qualified import under `AgenticScotty`; refused when the block is in another file, when `scottyBoundExcludesLimit` finds a cabal bound admitting no scotty version from 0.12 on, or when a name is taken; the effective check (`scotty-body-limit`) requires exactly one added call at the planned line and unchanged body reads. SSRF, argument injection, missing auth and hard-coded secrets keep refusing and name the decision. The compile-gated remediation suites set `GHC_ENVIRONMENT=-` in their own process: a host's package environment file (`cabal install --lib`) hid `bytestring` under the recorded GHC and turned every stub compile into not-run.
 - **The effective-change check is not the rescan.** `haskellEffectiveCheck` (wired as the lifecycle's `effectiveCheck`) re-reads the intended attribute from the patched file with readers independent of the editor (`tlsSettingsOf`, `cookieSitesOf`, call counts) and fails when the planned site did not change or another site did. A cookie renamed to a non-session name silences the rule without adding an attribute; the check says so (`haskell-remediation-0190.test.js`).
 - **The compile gate is requested by the preview.** `languageFixPreview` passes `compile: true` (`compile: false` opts out). `compileGate` type-checks only the patched file(s) (`targets`; local imports found through the `module` header's source root) and takes the original tree as `baseline`: a project that does not type-check on this host (a package it lacks), or a patch that imports a module this host lacks, is `{ran:false, ok:null}` (not-run), a patch that breaks a compiling file is `{ran:true, ok:false}`. A missing GHC is not-run, never a pass. `requireCompile` turns not-run into a block.
 - **Witnesses.** `witness.js` `haskellFixWitness(finding)` runs the original and the patched file under `ghc -e ':load *File' -e 'fn "<payload>"'` in the sandbox and judges them with `judgeFixWitness`. It is built only for command-injection fixes in a top-level `String -> IO` function whose file imports only `bootModuleSet` modules; every other class returns `verified: false` with the reason (a TLS peer, a framework response header, a database, a digest, a distribution cannot be shown by a program GHC runs alone). Opt in with `languageFixPreview(..., { witness: true })`.
@@ -143,7 +147,7 @@ Pinned both ways in `test/nix/nix-option-types.test.js`.
 
 The `unseen` split (unseen-v3) is a **DEVELOPMENT set since 2026-10-26**: its failures were read and the engine was changed for their causes (provenance.json, `unseen-v3-development`; manifest `role: development`). `measure.mjs` records `splitRole` with every result, the registry labels the column "DEVELOPMENT set", and a generalisation claim needs an unseen set no engine change has been motivated by.
 
-**Frozen splits (`bench/language-support/corpora/unseen-v4`, `unseen-v5`, ...).** Each is 78 single-flaw Haskell forms (13 families, 3 vulnerable and 3 safe) written blind to the engine and to every earlier set, frozen by digest (`corpora/frozen-split.mjs` is the shared builder, loader and summariser; `test/language/frozen-splits.test.js` checks every split on every run), measured once before the engine work that follows, and governed by its `USE-LOG.md`: reading its failures to change a rule turns it into a development set (`manifest.json` `role: development`, `developmentSince`), and the next generalisation claim needs the next split, written the same way (a separate agent session that cannot see the repository). **unseen-v4 and unseen-v5 are DEVELOPMENT sets since 2026-11-01** and **unseen-v6 is the Haskell generalisation measure; unseen-nix-v1 is the first Nix one** (the builder takes `eco`, a split's manifest records `ecosystem`, and a Nix form's marker is `#@@`). The lesson of 0.195.8 is the reason the discipline exists: the unseen-v4 misses were fixed (F1 64.7% to 94.9% on v4) and unseen-v5 moved from F1 63.8% to 65.7%, so most of those fixes answered v4's shapes, not Haskell's. 0.195.9 read unseen-v5 after freezing unseen-v6: v5 went from F1 65.7% to 84.1% and v6 from 62.9% to 72.5%, so this time part of it generalised (the Servant pairing from the end, the fixed-host request judgement, the credential header names, the harness's proven-clean rule). The Nix development set (unseen-v3) went to 100% and unseen-nix-v1 stayed at F1 71.0%: none of that generalised. Measure a new split before reading the old one; quote both numbers.
+**Frozen splits (`bench/language-support/corpora/unseen-v4`, `unseen-v5`, ...).** Each is 78 single-flaw Haskell forms (13 families, 3 vulnerable and 3 safe) written blind to the engine and to every earlier set, frozen by digest (`corpora/frozen-split.mjs` is the shared builder, loader and summariser; `test/language/frozen-splits.test.js` checks every split on every run), measured once before the engine work that follows, and governed by its `USE-LOG.md`: reading its failures to change a rule turns it into a development set (`manifest.json` `role: development`, `developmentSince`), and the next generalisation claim needs the next split, written the same way (a separate agent session that cannot see the repository). **unseen-v4 and unseen-v5 are DEVELOPMENT sets since 2026-11-01** and **unseen-v6 is the Haskell generalisation measure; unseen-nix-v1 is the first Nix one** (the builder takes `eco`, a split's manifest records `ecosystem`, and a Nix form's marker is `#@@`). The lesson of 0.195.8 is the reason the discipline exists: the unseen-v4 misses were fixed (F1 64.7% to 94.9% on v4) and unseen-v5 moved from F1 63.8% to 65.7%, so most of those fixes answered v4's shapes, not Haskell's. 0.195.9 read unseen-v5 after freezing unseen-v6: v5 went from F1 65.7% to 84.1% and v6 from 62.9% to 72.5%, so this time part of it generalised (the Servant pairing from the end, the fixed-host request judgement, the credential header names, the harness's proven-clean rule). The Nix development set (unseen-v3) went to 100% and unseen-nix-v1 stayed at F1 71.0%: none of that generalised. Measure a new split before reading the old one; quote both numbers. 0.195.11 measured unseen-v6 once more after the taint shapes found by self-written probes and the real-code sets (its USE-LOG): identical, F1 72.5%, taint families 66.7%; those shapes are not the ones the split exercises, and that is the recorded reading.
 
 **The detection suite scores `actionable` findings (since 0.195.9):** a finding at `info`, or one the engine PROVED clean or infeasible (`proof.verdict` `proven-*`: a catalog sanitizer of the sink's family on the path, a dominating guard), is not a detection, the same rule `bench/language-support/lib.mjs` `actionable` already applied elsewhere. Before, `renderHtml (toHtml name)` into a Scotty `html` sink was scored a false positive although the proof gate had labelled it proven-clean. **Disclosure:** while the real-code precision work of 0.195.9 was being investigated, two frozen-holdout path-traversal sources (shapes s0 and s1, both a parameter joined under a fixed directory) were printed and read; no rule was changed to them (both are still findings), but the holdout has been seen by the person who changed the path-wrapper policy, and a reader weighing the holdout's independence should know that.
 

package/src/language/haskell-fix.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
 import { parseHaskell } from './haskell-parser.js';
 import { SENSITIVE } from './haskell-security-rules.js';
 import { stripComments } from './haskell-comments.js';
-import { compareVersions, parseVersion } from './haskell-manifests.js';
+import { compareVersions, parseVersion, parseCabalFile, versionSatisfies } from './haskell-manifests.js';
 import { runFixLifecycle, unifiedDiff, writeWithBackup, undoFix } from './fix-lifecycle.js';
 
 export const HS_FIX_VERSION = 'haskell-fix/1';
@@ -920,7 +920,102 @@ function fixPasswordKdf(text, f) {
   };
 }
 
+// ── scotty request body limit (CWE-770) ───────────────────────────────────────
+// scotty's `body` reads the whole request body. The bound scotty offers is application-wide: `setMaxRequestBodySize :: Kilobytes -> ScottyM ()`
+// (scotty 0.12 and later; a request past it gets a 413 before any handler runs). The mitigation adds ONE call, as the first statement of the
+// ScottyM block that builds the application this handler belongs to: the block that contains the read (an inline route), or the block in this
+// file that names the handler function. The limit is a declared default (1 MiB) written as a named constant the operator must review. Refused:
+// a block in another file (the rule can then only say "a limit exists somewhere"), a `do` that keeps a statement on its own line, a name of ours
+// already taken, and a cabal file whose scotty bound excludes every version from 0.12 on.
+const SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB = 1024;
+const SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST = 'agenticRequestBodyLimitKb';
+const SCOTTY_LIMIT_ALIAS = 'AgenticScotty';
+const SCOTTY_LIMIT_DEF = `-- Upper bound, in kilobytes, for any request body this application accepts: a request past it is answered 413 before a handler runs. This is a default chosen by the fixer, not a measured need: set it for this service.
+${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST} :: Int
+${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST} = ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB}
+`;
+export { SCOTTY_LIMIT_DEF, SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB };
+const SCOTTY_VERSIONS_WITH_LIMIT = ['0.12', '0.12.1', '0.20', '0.21', '0.22', '0.30', '0.31'];
+const TOP_DECL = /^([a-z_][\w']*)\b/;
+const NOT_A_DEF = new Set(['import', 'module', 'data', 'type', 'newtype', 'class', 'instance', 'where', 'infix', 'infixl', 'infixr', 'foreign', 'default', 'deriving', 'pattern']);
+// The ScottyM blocks of a file: `main = scotty 3000 $ do`, `app = scottyOpts opts $ do`, or `app :: ScottyM ()` with `app = do`. Each block:
+// the top-level function that holds it, the line of its `do`, and the indentation of its first statement.
+function scottyBlocksOf(code) {
+  const ls = code.split('\n');
+  const starts = []; ls.forEach((l, i) => { const m = TOP_DECL.exec(l); if (m && !NOT_A_DEF.has(m[1])) starts.push({ line: i, name: m[1] }); });
+  const fnAt = (i) => { let cur = null; for (const s of starts) { if (s.line <= i) cur = s; else break; } return cur ? cur.name : null; };
+  const sigs = new Set(); ls.forEach((l) => { const m = /^([a-z_][\w']*)\s*::\s*ScottyM\s*\(\)\s*$/.exec(l); if (m) sigs.add(m[1]); });
+  const out = [];
+  ls.forEach((l, i) => {
+    const inline = /(?:^|[\s$(])(?:[A-Z][\w']*\.)?scotty(?:Opts|T|OptsT|App|AppT)?\b[^\n]*\$\s*do\s*$/.test(l);
+    const named = (() => { const m = /^([a-z_][\w']*)\s*=\s*do\s*$/.exec(l); return !!(m && sigs.has(m[1])); })();
+    if (!inline && !named) return;
+    let j = i + 1; while (j < ls.length && ls[j].trim() === '') j++;
+    if (j >= ls.length) return;
+    const indent = /^(\s*)/.exec(ls[j])[1];
+    if (!indent.length || ls[j].trim().startsWith('where')) return;
+    out.push({ fn: fnAt(i), doLine: i, firstStatement: j, indent });
+  });
+  return { blocks: out, fnAt };
+}
+// The scotty bound every cabal file in the tree declares, judged against the versions that have the limit: null when no bound is declared.
+function scottyBoundExcludesLimit(files) {
+  for (const [name, text] of Object.entries(files || {})) {
+    if (!/\.cabal$/i.test(name) || typeof text !== 'string') continue;
+    let parsed = null; try { parsed = parseCabalFile(text); } catch { parsed = null; }
+    for (const c of (parsed && parsed.components) || []) for (const d of c.dependencies || []) {
+      if (!d || d.name !== 'scotty' || !d.range) continue;
+      let admits = false;
+      for (const v of SCOTTY_VERSIONS_WITH_LIMIT) { try { if (versionSatisfies({ ok: true, ast: d.range }, v)) { admits = true; break; } } catch { admits = true; break; } }
+      if (!admits) return { file: name, rangeText: d.rangeText || '' };
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+function fixScottyBody(text, f) {
+  if (!/Web\.Scotty(?:\.Trans)?\.body\b/.test(String(f.description || f.detail || ''))) return null;
+  const trans = !importInfo(text, 'Web.Scotty') && importInfo(text, 'Web.Scotty.Trans');
+  if (!importInfo(text, 'Web.Scotty') && !trans) return null;
+  const code = stripComments(text);
+  if (new RegExp(`(?<![\\w'.])(?:${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST}|setMaxRequestBodySize)(?![\\w'])`).test(code) || new RegExp(`\\b${SCOTTY_LIMIT_ALIAS}\\b`).test(code)) return null;
+  const { blocks, fnAt } = scottyBlocksOf(code);
+  if (!blocks.length) return null;
+  const holder = fnAt(f.line - 1);
+  let block = blocks.find((b) => b.fn && b.fn === holder) || null;
+  if (!block && holder) {
+    const ls = code.split('\n');
+    const starts = []; ls.forEach((l, i) => { const m = TOP_DECL.exec(l); if (m && !NOT_A_DEF.has(m[1])) starts.push(i); });
+    const spanOf = (b) => { const s = b.doLine; let e = ls.length; for (const i of starts) if (i > s) { e = i; break; } return ls.slice(s, e).join('\n'); };
+    const naming = blocks.filter((b) => new RegExp(`(?<![\\w'.])${holder}(?![\\w'])`).test(spanOf(b)));
+    if (naming.length === 1) block = naming[0];
+  }
+  if (!block) return null;
+  const excluded = scottyBoundExcludesLimit(f._files);
+  if (excluded) return null;
+  const lines = text.split('\n');
+  const statement = `${block.indent}${SCOTTY_LIMIT_ALIAS}.setMaxRequestBodySize ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST}`;
+  lines.splice(block.firstStatement, 0, statement);
+  // the last import of the CODE: an `import` inside a block comment (a commented-out alternative main) is not one
+  let at = -1; stripComments(lines.join('\n')).split('\n').forEach((l, i) => { if (/^import\s/.test(l)) at = i; });
+  if (at < 0) return null;
+  lines.splice(at + 1, 0, `import qualified ${trans ? 'Web.Scotty.Trans' : 'Web.Scotty'} as ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_ALIAS}`);
+  const next = lines.join('\n').replace(/\n*$/, '\n') + '\n' + SCOTTY_LIMIT_DEF;
+  const insertedLine = block.firstStatement + 2;   // 1-based, after the import line added above it
+  const bound = (() => { for (const [name, t] of Object.entries(f._files || {})) if (/\.cabal$/i.test(name) && typeof t === 'string' && /\bscotty\b/.test(t)) return name; return null; })();
+  return {
+    ruleId: 'hs-scotty-body-limit', label: 'MITIGATION', text: next,
+    explanation: `Added setMaxRequestBodySize ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST} (${SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB} KB, a declared default, not a measured need) as the first statement of the ScottyM block in \`${block.fn || 'the application'}\`, which ${block.fn === holder ? 'contains this body read' : `registers \`${holder}\``}.`,
+    consequences: [
+      `Every route of the application built in \`${block.fn || 'this block'}\` now answers a request whose body exceeds ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB} KB with a 413 before the handler runs; legitimate large uploads are rejected until ${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST} is raised.`,
+      `Requires scotty 0.12 or later (setMaxRequestBodySize); ${bound ? `the bound declared in ${bound} admits such a version, and the build is not checked against it` : 'no cabal file in the tree declares a scotty bound, so the version is not checked'}.`,
+    ],
+    behavior: { kind: 'scotty-body-limit', fn: block.fn, kb: SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB, line: insertedLine },
+    expectEffective: { kind: 'scotty-body-limit', line: insertedLine, statement },
+  };
+}
+
 const FIXERS = [
+  { id: 'hs-scotty-body-limit', applies: (f) => f.rule === 'hs-unbounded-request-body' && /Web\.Scotty(?:\.Trans)?\.body\b/.test(String(f.description || f.detail || '')), run: fixScottyBody, reportedLineOnly: true },
   { id: 'hs-password-kdf-migrate', applies: (f) => f.cwe === 'CWE-916' && (f.rule === 'hs-fast-password-hash' || /fast general-purpose hash/i.test(String(f.vuln || ''))), run: fixPasswordKdf },
   { id: 'hs-tls-validate', applies: (f) => f.cwe === 'CWE-295' || f.rule === 'hs-tls-validation-disabled', run: fixTls, reportedLineOnly: true },
   { id: 'hs-cookie-attributes', applies: (f) => f.cwe === 'CWE-1004' || f.rule === 'hs-insecure-cookie', run: fixCookie, reportedLineOnly: true },
@@ -1010,7 +1105,7 @@ const CLASS_REASONS = Object.freeze({
   'CWE-338': 'a predictable generator is replaced by the operating system CSPRNG (System.Entropy or Crypto.Random), whose result type is bytes, not System.Random\'s: the surrounding code must change with it. Only a one-line action of type IO <fixed-width integer> equal to randomIO, in a file that already imports System.Entropy, is rewritten. The decision needed: the token\'s type and size (a 30-bit integer cannot be made unguessable by changing the generator) and the entropy library the project declares.',
   'CWE-1004': 'cookie attributes live in different places per framework. The recognised shapes are a Set-Cookie header string literal, a Web.Cookie SetCookie record update, servant-auth cookieIsSecure, and scotty setSimpleCookie/makeSimpleCookie; this is none of them, or an attribute is set from an expression. The decision needed: which attributes to send (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite) and whether this cookie must work over plain HTTP.',
   'CWE-306': 'a missing authentication check needs a policy; the scanner reports the handler and does not invent the guard. The decision needed: which credential authenticates this route (session, token, API key) and what an unauthenticated caller receives (401, a redirect to login).',
-  'CWE-770': 'a resource limit is a number only the operator can choose (how many bytes a body may have, how many requests, how large an allocation). The one recognised shape is wai strictRequestBody of a Request variable in a file importing Network.Wai and Data.ByteString.Lazy, which gets a bounded reader with a declared default; this is not that shape. The decision needed: the limit for this input, and what happens past it (reject with 413, truncate, spool to disk).',
+  'CWE-770': 'a resource limit is a number only the operator can choose (how many bytes a body may have, how many requests, how large an allocation). Two shapes are recognised, each with a declared default: wai strictRequestBody of a Request variable in a file importing Network.Wai and Data.ByteString.Lazy, which gets a bounded reader, and scotty body in a file whose ScottyM block contains the read or names the handler, which gets setMaxRequestBodySize as that block\'s first statement (scotty 0.12 and later; refused when the block is in another file or a cabal bound excludes those versions); this is neither shape. The decision needed: the limit for this input, and what happens past it (reject with 413, truncate, spool to disk).',
   'CWE-295': 'enabling certificate validation can break connections the project depends on. Only the connection package\'s TLSSettingsSimple with a literal True is flipped. The decision needed: the trust store (the system store, a pinned CA bundle, a private authority) and host-name verification; an OpenSSL VerifyNone is not rewritten because VerifyPeer verifies nothing until a CA bundle is loaded and does not check the host name.',
   'CWE-798': 'a hard-coded secret must be rotated and moved to a secret store; rewriting the line would leave the leaked value valid. The decision needed: where the secret is read from at run time (environment, a secrets manager, a file outside the repository) and rotating the exposed value, which no edit of this file can do.',
   'CWE-611': 'XML entity handling depends on the parser configuration in use. The decision needed: whether this document source is trusted and which entity and DTD features the parser may enable.',
@@ -1132,6 +1227,17 @@ export function haskellEffectiveCheck(plan, patched) {
     if (!new RegExp(`getEntropy\\s+${want.bytes}\\s*$`).test(d)) return { ok: false, ran: true, detail: `the action does not read ${want.bytes} entropy byte(s)` };
     return { ok: true, ran: true, detail: `${want.fn} reads ${want.bytes} byte(s) from getEntropy and no longer calls System.Random` };
   }
+  if (want.kind === 'scotty-body-limit') {
+    const count = (t, re) => (stripComments(t).match(re) || []).length;
+    const limits = (t) => count(t, /(?<![\w'])(?:[A-Z][\w']*\.)?setMaxRequestBodySize(?![\w'])/g);
+    const bodies = (t) => count(t, /(?<![\w'.])body(?![\w'])/g);
+    if (limits(after) !== limits(before) + 1) return { ok: false, ran: true, detail: 'exactly one setMaxRequestBodySize call should have been added' };
+    const ls = stripComments(after).split('\n');
+    if (ls[want.line - 1] !== want.statement) return { ok: false, ran: true, detail: `the limit is not the statement at line ${want.line} as planned` };
+    if (bodies(after) !== bodies(before)) return { ok: false, ran: true, detail: 'the body reads changed; the patch should only add the limit' };
+    if (!new RegExp(`^${SCOTTY_LIMIT_CONST}\\s*=\\s*${SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB}\\b`, 'm').test(after)) return { ok: false, ran: true, detail: 'the declared limit is not the one the patch states' };
+    return { ok: true, ran: true, detail: `setMaxRequestBodySize is the first statement of the application block, with the declared constant (${SCOTTY_LIMIT_KB} KB), and no body read changed` };
+  }
   if (want.kind === 'body') {
     const count = (t, re) => (stripComments(t).match(re) || []).length;
     const calls = (t) => count(t, /(?<![\w'])(?:[A-Z][\w']*\.)?strictRequestBody(?![\w'])/g);

package/src/language/haskell-guards.js

@@ -549,6 +549,9 @@ export function waiHtmlContext(f, perFile) {
     const types = texts.filter((t) => /^(?:text|application|image|audio|video|multipart)\/[\w.+-]+/i.test(t.trim()));
     if (types.some((t) => /^text\/html/i.test(t.trim()))) return 'html';
     if (types.length) return 'other';
+    // A `Location` header and no content type: a redirect, whose body a browser never renders (keter's redirect helper echoes the target
+    // URL as the body of its 3xx response; that is a redirect finding's business, not an HTML injection).
+    if (texts.some((t) => /^location$/i.test(t.trim()))) return 'redirect';
     return 'unknown';
   }
   return 'unknown';
@@ -636,6 +639,13 @@ export function applyHaskellGuards(findings, perFile) {
         stats.weak++;
         continue;
       }
+      if (ctx === 'redirect' && !f._notHtmlContext) {
+        f._notHtmlContext = true; f.severity = 'info';
+        f.controls = [...(f.controls || []), { kind: 'redirect-response-body', evidenceKind: 'source' }];
+        f.guardNote = { kind: 'redirect-response-body', reason: 'the response headers written at this call set Location and no content type: a redirect, whose body a browser does not render' };
+        stats.weak++;
+        continue;
+      }
       if (ctx === 'unknown' && !f._htmlContextUnknown) { f._htmlContextUnknown = true; f.uncertainty = [...(f.uncertainty || []), { kind: 'unread-content-type', detail: 'the response headers at this call are not literal text, so whether the body is served as HTML was not read' }]; }
     } catch { /* judged below */ }
     try {