@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.185.0 → 0.186.2

package/dist/6560.index.js

@@ -1,645 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 6560;
-export const ids = [6560,9292,119,9692];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 69292:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   ImageArchiveError: () => (/* binding */ ImageArchiveError),
-/* harmony export */   t: () => (/* binding */ parseImageArchive)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(77598);
-/* harmony import */ var _safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(30119);
-// Parses a Docker-save ("docker-archive") or OCI-layout ("oci-archive") tar
-// into one normalized shape, without executing or daemon-mounting the image
-// (PRD 5 Safety Requirements: "OCI inspection should not require executing
-// the image"). Built entirely on `safe-tar.js` — every byte read here passes
-// through the same entry-count/size/path/decompression guards.
-
-
-
-class ImageArchiveError extends Error {
-  constructor(message, code) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = 'ImageArchiveError';
-    this.code = code;
-  }
-}
-
-function safeJsonParse(buf, what) {
-  try {
-    return JSON.parse(buf.toString('utf8'));
-  } catch (err) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError(`${what} is not valid JSON: ${err.message}`, 'malformed_manifest');
-  }
-}
-
-function readOuterEntries(buf, limits) {
-  const outer = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(buf, limits);
-  const byName = new Map();
-  const unsafeEntries = [];
-  for (const e of (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .readTarEntries */ .ET)(outer, limits)) {
-    if (e.unsafe) {
-      unsafeEntries.push({ name: e.name });
-      continue;
-    }
-    byName.set(e.name, e);
-  }
-  return { byName, unsafeEntries };
-}
-
-function extractConfigShape(configObj) {
-  const cfg = (configObj && configObj.config) || {};
-  return {
-    architecture: configObj.architecture || null,
-    os: configObj.os || null,
-    labels: (cfg.Labels && typeof cfg.Labels === 'object') ? { ...cfg.Labels } : {},
-    entrypoint: Array.isArray(cfg.Entrypoint) ? [...cfg.Entrypoint] : null,
-    cmd: Array.isArray(cfg.Cmd) ? [...cfg.Cmd] : null,
-    history: Array.isArray(configObj.history)
-      ? configObj.history.map((h) => ({ createdBy: h.created_by || null, created: h.created || null, emptyLayer: !!h.empty_layer }))
-      : [],
-    rootfsDiffIds: (configObj.rootfs && Array.isArray(configObj.rootfs.diff_ids)) ? [...configObj.rootfs.diff_ids] : [],
-  };
-}
-
-function parseDockerArchive(byName, outerUnsafe, limits) {
-  const manifestEntry = byName.get('manifest.json');
-  const manifestArr = safeJsonParse(manifestEntry.data, 'manifest.json');
-  if (!Array.isArray(manifestArr) || manifestArr.length === 0) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError('manifest.json contains no images', 'empty_manifest');
-  }
-  if (manifestArr.length > 1) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json describes ${manifestArr.length} images; image scan expects exactly one`, 'multi_image_archive');
-  }
-  const m = manifestArr[0];
-  if (typeof m.Config !== 'string' || !Array.isArray(m.Layers)) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError('manifest.json entry is missing Config or Layers', 'malformed_manifest');
-  }
-  const configEntry = byName.get(m.Config);
-  if (!configEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json references missing config "${m.Config}"`, 'missing_blob');
-  const configObj = safeJsonParse(configEntry.data, m.Config);
-  const configDigest = `sha256:${node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.createHash('sha256').update(configEntry.data).digest('hex')}`;
-
-  const layers = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < m.Layers.length; i++) {
-    const layerPath = m.Layers[i];
-    const entry = byName.get(layerPath);
-    if (!entry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest.json references missing layer "${layerPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
-    const tar = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(entry.data, limits);
-    layers.push({ index: i, path: layerPath, diffId: configObj?.rootfs?.diff_ids?.[i] || null, tar, sizeBytes: entry.size });
-  }
-
-  return {
-    format: 'docker-archive',
-    digest: configDigest,
-    digestKind: 'config',
-    repoTags: Array.isArray(m.RepoTags) ? m.RepoTags : [],
-    config: extractConfigShape(configObj),
-    layers,
-    unsafeEntries: outerUnsafe,
-  };
-}
-
-function parseOciArchive(byName, outerUnsafe, limits) {
-  const indexObj = safeJsonParse(byName.get('index.json').data, 'index.json');
-  const manifests = Array.isArray(indexObj.manifests) ? indexObj.manifests : [];
-  if (manifests.length === 0) throw new ImageArchiveError('index.json lists no manifests', 'empty_manifest');
-  if (manifests.length > 1) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError(`index.json describes ${manifests.length} manifests; image scan expects exactly one`, 'multi_image_archive');
-  }
-  const manifestDigest = manifests[0].digest;
-  if (typeof manifestDigest !== 'string' || !manifestDigest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError('index.json manifest entry has no sha256 digest', 'malformed_manifest');
-  }
-  const manifestBlobPath = `blobs/sha256/${manifestDigest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
-  const manifestEntry = byName.get(manifestBlobPath);
-  if (!manifestEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`index.json references missing manifest blob "${manifestBlobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
-  const manifestObj = safeJsonParse(manifestEntry.data, manifestBlobPath);
-
-  const configDigest = manifestObj.config && manifestObj.config.digest;
-  if (typeof configDigest !== 'string' || !configDigest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
-    throw new ImageArchiveError('image manifest has no config digest', 'malformed_manifest');
-  }
-  const configBlobPath = `blobs/sha256/${configDigest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
-  const configEntry = byName.get(configBlobPath);
-  if (!configEntry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest references missing config blob "${configBlobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
-  const configObj = safeJsonParse(configEntry.data, configBlobPath);
-
-  const layerDescs = Array.isArray(manifestObj.layers) ? manifestObj.layers : [];
-  const layers = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < layerDescs.length; i++) {
-    const d = layerDescs[i];
-    if (typeof d.digest !== 'string' || !d.digest.startsWith('sha256:')) {
-      throw new ImageArchiveError(`layer ${i} has no sha256 digest`, 'malformed_manifest');
-    }
-    const blobPath = `blobs/sha256/${d.digest.slice('sha256:'.length)}`;
-    const entry = byName.get(blobPath);
-    if (!entry) throw new ImageArchiveError(`manifest references missing layer blob "${blobPath}"`, 'missing_blob');
-    const tar = (0,_safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .decompressIfGzip */ .zr)(entry.data, limits);
-    layers.push({ index: i, path: blobPath, diffId: d.digest, mediaType: d.mediaType || null, tar, sizeBytes: entry.size });
-  }
-
-  return {
-    format: 'oci-archive',
-    digest: manifestDigest,
-    digestKind: 'manifest',
-    repoTags: [],
-    config: extractConfigShape(configObj),
-    layers,
-    unsafeEntries: outerUnsafe,
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Parses an in-memory tar buffer (already read from disk/stdin by the
- * caller — this module never touches the filesystem or network) as either a
- * `docker save`-shaped archive or an OCI-layout archive. Throws
- * ImageArchiveError for anything it cannot recognize or whose manifest
- * references a blob that isn't present — never guesses or substitutes a
- * default.
- */
-function parseImageArchive(buf, limits = _safe_tar_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .DEFAULT_LIMITS */ .dR) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new ImageArchiveError('image archive input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
-  const { byName, unsafeEntries } = readOuterEntries(buf, limits);
-  if (byName.has('manifest.json')) return parseDockerArchive(byName, unsafeEntries, limits);
-  if (byName.has('index.json') && byName.has('oci-layout')) return parseOciArchive(byName, unsafeEntries, limits);
-  throw new ImageArchiveError(
-    'archive is neither a docker-archive (manifest.json) nor an oci-archive (oci-layout + index.json)',
-    'unrecognized_format',
-  );
-}
-
-
-/***/ }),
-
-/***/ 46560:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-
-// EXPORTS
-__webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-  buildImageInventory: () => (/* binding */ buildImageInventory)
-});
-
-// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/artifact/image-archive.js
-var image_archive = __webpack_require__(69292);
-// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/artifact/safe-tar.js
-var safe_tar = __webpack_require__(30119);
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/artifact/filesystem.js
-// Merges an image's layers (in order) into one virtual filesystem view,
-// applying AUFS/overlay whiteout semantics (`.wh.<name>` deletes a file,
-// `.wh..wh..opq` makes a directory opaque to everything below it in earlier
-// layers). Nothing here ever writes to a real filesystem path — the merged
-// view is an in-memory Map keyed by the tar entry's (already path-safety-
-// checked) name, which is what makes this immune to zip-slip by construction
-// rather than by convention.
-
-
-const DEFAULT_FS_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
-  maxFileBytes: 1 * 1024 * 1024, // per-file materialization cap
-  maxMaterializedTotalBytes: 256 * 1024 * 1024, // total content kept in memory
-});
-
-/**
- * Reads every layer's tar into per-layer entry lists (bounded by the same
- * safe-tar limits as the outer archive) without merging — the raw, ordered
- * per-layer view that layer-secrets.js needs to see what a LATER layer
- * deleted while it was still present in an EARLIER one.
- */
-function readLayers(layers, tarLimits = safe_tar/* DEFAULT_LIMITS */.dR) {
-  const result = [];
-  const unsafeEntries = [];
-  for (const layer of layers) {
-    const entries = [];
-    for (const e of (0,safe_tar/* readTarEntries */.ET)(layer.tar, tarLimits)) {
-      if (e.unsafe) {
-        unsafeEntries.push({ layerIndex: layer.index, name: e.name });
-        continue;
-      }
-      entries.push(e);
-    }
-    result.push({ layerIndex: layer.index, entries });
-  }
-  return { layers: result, unsafeEntries };
-}
-
-/**
- * Merges the per-layer entry lists (from readLayers) into one final
- * filesystem view, applying whiteouts in layer order. Returns:
- *   - `files`: Map<path, { sizeBytes, sourceLayerIndex, typeflag }> — every
- *     surviving path, metadata only.
- *   - `fileContents`: { path: string } — decoded text content, capped per
- *     file and in total (see DEFAULT_FS_LIMITS); large/binary files are
- *     present in `files` but absent here.
- *   - `deletedPaths`: [{ path, deletedAtLayer, opaque }] — every whiteout
- *     seen, in order, regardless of whether the path ever existed.
- *   - `materializationTruncated`: true once the total content cap was hit —
- *     disclosed, not silent.
- */
-function mergeLayers(readLayersResult, fsLimits = DEFAULT_FS_LIMITS) {
-  const files = new Map(); // path -> { sizeBytes, sourceLayerIndex, typeflag, data }
-  const deletedPaths = [];
-  let materializedTotal = 0;
-  let materializationTruncated = false;
-
-  for (const { layerIndex, entries } of readLayersResult.layers) {
-    const opaqueDirs = [];
-    for (const e of entries) {
-      if ((0,safe_tar/* isWhiteoutName */.l0)(e.name)) {
-        const wh = (0,safe_tar/* whiteoutTarget */.Jn)(e.name);
-        if (wh.opaque) {
-          opaqueDirs.push(wh.dir);
-          deletedPaths.push({ path: wh.dir, deletedAtLayer: layerIndex, opaque: true });
-          for (const existing of [...files.keys()]) {
-            if (existing === wh.dir || existing.startsWith(`${wh.dir}/`)) files.delete(existing);
-          }
-        } else {
-          deletedPaths.push({ path: wh.path, deletedAtLayer: layerIndex, opaque: false });
-          files.delete(wh.path);
-        }
-        continue;
-      }
-      // An opaque marker earlier in THIS layer hides any further entry in
-      // this same layer that would resurrect something under that dir —
-      // real overlay semantics scope opaque to "everything from layers
-      // BELOW this one", so same-layer adds after the marker still apply.
-      files.set(e.name, { sizeBytes: e.size, sourceLayerIndex: layerIndex, typeflag: e.typeflag, data: e.data });
-    }
-  }
-
-  const fileContents = {};
-  for (const [path, meta] of files) {
-    if (meta.typeflag !== '0' && meta.typeflag !== '') continue; // only regular files get content
-    if (meta.sizeBytes > fsLimits.maxFileBytes) continue;
-    if (materializedTotal + meta.sizeBytes > fsLimits.maxMaterializedTotalBytes) {
-      materializationTruncated = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-    fileContents[path] = meta.data.toString('utf8');
-    materializedTotal += meta.sizeBytes;
-  }
-
-  const fileMeta = new Map();
-  for (const [path, meta] of files) {
-    fileMeta.set(path, { sizeBytes: meta.sizeBytes, sourceLayerIndex: meta.sourceLayerIndex, typeflag: meta.typeflag });
-  }
-
-  return { files: fileMeta, fileContents, deletedPaths, materializationTruncated };
-}
-
-// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/sca/image-packages.js
-var image_packages = __webpack_require__(99692);
-;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/artifact/inventory.js
-// PRD 5 P0 §1-2 — OCI image scanning + inventory. Ties image-archive.js
-// (manifest/config/layer parsing) and filesystem.js (whiteout-aware layer
-// merge) into the single inventory shape the PRD names: digest, OS, OS
-// packages, application packages, architecture, base image, layers,
-// entrypoint, build labels.
-
-
-
-
-
-// Buildkit/Docker provenance convention — not an OCI spec requirement, so
-// its absence is reported as "not declared", never guessed from layer
-// heuristics (no base-image fingerprint table exists in this codebase, and
-// inventing one would produce a confident-looking wrong answer, which is the
-// one failure mode PRD 5's own Safety Requirements single out by name for
-// signature state — the same discipline applies here).
-const BASE_IMAGE_NAME_LABEL = 'org.opencontainers.image.base.name';
-const BASE_IMAGE_DIGEST_LABEL = 'org.opencontainers.image.base.digest';
-
-/**
- * `buf` is an already-read image archive buffer (tar, optionally
- * gzip-wrapped). `manifestParser` is the engine's existing
- * `parseManifests(allFileContents)` (injected, mirroring
- * `src/posture/secret-history.js`'s detectFn injection, so this module never
- * imports `engine.js` directly and `src/sca/index.js` stays the one seam).
- * Returns `{ image, inventory }` where `image` is the raw parsed archive
- * (image-archive.js's shape, kept for callers that need layer tars — vuln
- * correlation, signature verification) and `inventory` is the PRD-named
- * report.
- */
-function buildImageInventory(buf, { manifestParser, tarLimits = safe_tar/* DEFAULT_LIMITS */.dR, fsLimits = DEFAULT_FS_LIMITS } = {}) {
-  if (typeof manifestParser !== 'function') throw new TypeError('buildImageInventory requires manifestParser(allFileContents)');
-  const image = (0,image_archive/* parseImageArchive */.t)(buf, tarLimits);
-  const rl = readLayers(image.layers, tarLimits);
-  const merged = mergeLayers(rl, fsLimits);
-
-  const osPackages = (0,image_packages.extractImagePackages)(merged.fileContents);
-  let appPackages = [];
-  try {
-    appPackages = manifestParser(merged.fileContents) || [];
-  } catch {
-    appPackages = []; // a parser failure on hostile layer content must never abort inventory extraction
-  }
-
-  const labels = image.config.labels || {};
-  const baseImage = labels[BASE_IMAGE_NAME_LABEL]
-    ? { name: labels[BASE_IMAGE_NAME_LABEL], digest: labels[BASE_IMAGE_DIGEST_LABEL] || null, source: 'label' }
-    : null;
-
-  const inventory = {
-    digest: image.digest,
-    digestKind: image.digestKind,
-    repoTags: image.repoTags,
-    os: image.config.os,
-    architecture: image.config.architecture,
-    baseImage,
-    osPackages,
-    appPackages,
-    layers: image.layers.map((l) => ({ index: l.index, sizeBytes: l.sizeBytes, diffId: l.diffId || null })),
-    entrypoint: image.config.entrypoint,
-    cmd: image.config.cmd,
-    buildLabels: { ...labels },
-    history: image.config.history,
-    unsafeEntries: [...image.unsafeEntries, ...rl.unsafeEntries],
-    materializationTruncated: merged.materializationTruncated,
-  };
-
-  return { image, inventory, mergedFilesystem: merged, readLayersResult: rl };
-}
-
-
-/***/ }),
-
-/***/ 30119:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   ET: () => (/* binding */ readTarEntries),
-/* harmony export */   Jn: () => (/* binding */ whiteoutTarget),
-/* harmony export */   TarSafetyError: () => (/* binding */ TarSafetyError),
-/* harmony export */   dR: () => (/* binding */ DEFAULT_LIMITS),
-/* harmony export */   l0: () => (/* binding */ isWhiteoutName),
-/* harmony export */   zr: () => (/* binding */ decompressIfGzip)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony export isSafeEntryName */
-/* harmony import */ var node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(38522);
-// Hand-rolled, hardened POSIX/GNU tar reader for OCI/Docker image archives.
-//
-// Why hand-rolled instead of a dependency: this repo has no tar library (see
-// `src/artifact/CLAUDE.md`), and PRD 5's own Safety Requirements ask for exact
-// control over the failure modes a generic tar library treats as implementation
-// detail: malicious entry paths, decompression bombs, giant layers, oversized
-// archives. Rolling it ourselves means every one of those limits is a named,
-// tested constant in this file rather than a library default we'd have to audit.
-//
-// Scope: ustar + GNU longname ('L' typeflag) + base-256 size fields. PAX extended
-// headers ('x'/'g') and GNU longlink ('K') are structurally skipped (their data
-// block is consumed so offsets stay correct, but their content is not applied) —
-// a disclosed limitation, not a silent one. Real docker-save/oci-archive output
-// from Go's archive/tar for images in this size/complexity class essentially
-// never needs them; synthetic fixtures in this codebase never emit them either.
-
-
-const BLOCK = 512;
-
-const DEFAULT_LIMITS = Object.freeze({
-  maxEntries: 200_000,
-  maxEntrySize: 512 * 1024 * 1024, // 512MB per tar entry
-  maxTotalSize: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // 4GB per archive (sum of entry sizes)
-  maxGunzipOutput: 4 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024, // decompression-bomb guard
-});
-
-class TarSafetyError extends Error {
-  constructor(message, code) {
-    super(message);
-    this.name = 'TarSafetyError';
-    this.code = code;
-  }
-}
-
-function parseSizeField(buf) {
-  if (buf[0] & 0x80) {
-    // GNU base-256 extension for sizes that don't fit in octal-ASCII.
-    let n = 0n;
-    for (let i = 1; i < buf.length; i++) n = (n << 8n) | BigInt(buf[i]);
-    return Number(n);
-  }
-  const s = buf.toString('ascii').replace(/\0.*$/, '').trim();
-  if (!s) return 0;
-  const n = parseInt(s, 8);
-  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : 0;
-}
-
-function cstr(buf) {
-  return buf.toString('utf8').replace(/\0.*$/, '');
-}
-
-// A tar entry name is unsafe when it would escape a virtual extraction root:
-// absolute paths, `..` segments, embedded NULs, or an unreasonable length.
-// Because this module never writes to a real filesystem path (every caller
-// keeps extracted content in an in-memory Map keyed by this string), the
-// classic zip-slip *write* vulnerability cannot occur here — but a hostile
-// name must still never be silently treated as an ordinary path by downstream
-// manifest/package-DB matching, so unsafe entries are flagged, never dropped
-// silently and never accepted as-is.
-function isSafeEntryName(name) {
-  if (typeof name !== 'string' || name.length === 0 || name.length > 4096) return false;
-  if (name.includes('\0')) return false;
-  const norm = name.replace(/\\/g, '/');
-  if (norm.startsWith('/')) return false;
-  if (norm.split('/').some((p) => p === '..')) return false;
-  return true;
-}
-
-function isWhiteoutName(name) {
-  return (name.split('/').pop() || '').startsWith('.wh.');
-}
-
-// Resolves a whiteout entry name to what it deletes. `.wh..wh..opq` marks a
-// directory as "opaque" (everything from earlier layers under it is hidden,
-// not individually deleted) — reported distinctly so callers don't conflate
-// it with a single-file deletion.
-function whiteoutTarget(name) {
-  const parts = name.split('/');
-  const base = parts.pop();
-  if (base === '.wh..wh..opq') return { opaque: true, dir: parts.join('/') };
-  return { opaque: false, path: [...parts, base.slice(4)].join('/') };
-}
-
-// Decompresses a gzip member with a hard output-size cap (Node's native
-// ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE on overflow — no custom streaming counter needed).
-// Returns the input unchanged when it isn't gzip-magic (plain tar).
-function decompressIfGzip(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
-  if (buf.length >= 2 && buf[0] === 0x1f && buf[1] === 0x8b) {
-    try {
-      return node_zlib__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.gunzipSync(buf, { maxOutputLength: limits.maxGunzipOutput });
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err && err.code === 'ERR_BUFFER_TOO_LARGE') {
-        throw new TarSafetyError('decompressed layer exceeds the decompression-bomb guard', 'gunzip_too_large');
-      }
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`gzip stream is malformed: ${err.message}`, 'gunzip_malformed');
-    }
-  }
-  return buf;
-}
-
-/**
- * Reads a decompressed tar buffer and yields one record per entry:
- *   { name, size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe }
- * `data` is a Buffer view into `buf` (never copied) for safe entries, `null`
- * for unsafe ones. Throws TarSafetyError (never returns a partial result) the
- * moment any configured limit is exceeded.
- */
-function* readTarEntries(buf, limits = DEFAULT_LIMITS) {
-  if (!Buffer.isBuffer(buf)) throw new TarSafetyError('tar input must be a Buffer', 'bad_input');
-  let offset = 0;
-  let count = 0;
-  let totalSize = 0;
-  let pendingLongName = null;
-
-  while (offset + BLOCK <= buf.length) {
-    const header = buf.subarray(offset, offset + BLOCK);
-    if (header.every((b) => b === 0)) {
-      offset += BLOCK;
-      continue; // end-of-archive zero-fill padding
-    }
-
-    count += 1;
-    if (count > limits.maxEntries) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar archive has more than ${limits.maxEntries} entries`, 'too_many_entries');
-    }
-
-    let name = cstr(header.subarray(0, 100));
-    const typeflag = String.fromCharCode(header[156] || 0);
-    const linkname = cstr(header.subarray(157, 257));
-    const magic = header.subarray(257, 263).toString('ascii');
-    const prefix = magic.startsWith('ustar') ? cstr(header.subarray(345, 500)) : '';
-    if (prefix) name = `${prefix}/${name}`;
-    const size = parseSizeField(header.subarray(124, 136));
-
-    offset += BLOCK;
-
-    if (size < 0 || !Number.isFinite(size)) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" has an invalid size field`, 'bad_size');
-    }
-    if (size > limits.maxEntrySize) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" (${size} bytes) exceeds the per-entry size limit`, 'entry_too_large');
-    }
-    totalSize += size;
-    if (totalSize > limits.maxTotalSize) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError('tar archive exceeds the total-size limit', 'archive_too_large');
-    }
-
-    const dataBlocks = Math.ceil(size / BLOCK);
-    if (offset + size > buf.length) {
-      throw new TarSafetyError(`tar entry "${name}" claims more data than the archive contains`, 'truncated');
-    }
-    const data = size > 0 ? buf.subarray(offset, offset + size) : Buffer.alloc(0);
-    offset += dataBlocks * BLOCK;
-
-    const resolvedName = pendingLongName ? pendingLongName : name;
-    pendingLongName = null;
-
-    if (typeflag === 'L') {
-      // GNU longname: this entry's data IS the next entry's real name.
-      pendingLongName = cstr(data);
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (typeflag === 'K' || typeflag === 'x' || typeflag === 'g') {
-      // GNU longlink / PAX extended header — structurally skipped (see header comment).
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    if (!isSafeEntryName(resolvedName)) {
-      yield { name: resolvedName, size, typeflag, linkname, data: null, unsafe: true };
-      continue;
-    }
-
-    yield { name: resolvedName.replace(/\\/g, '/'), size, typeflag, linkname, data, unsafe: false };
-  }
-}
-
-
-/***/ }),
-
-/***/ 99692:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   extractImagePackages: () => (/* binding */ extractImagePackages)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports parseDpkgStatus, parseApkInstalled */
-// R8 (PRD §5) — container-image OS-package inventory.
-//
-// container.js reads the Dockerfile (FROM + apt/apk install lines). This reads
-// the ACTUAL installed-package databases from an extracted image filesystem
-// (or the host), catching packages baked into the base image that the
-// Dockerfile never names. Components flow into the existing OSV pipeline + SBOM.
-//
-// Pure parsers (unit-tested) + a path-matching extractor. No daemon; reads the
-// package-DB files that appear when an image layer/tarball is unpacked.
-
-// Debian/Ubuntu: /var/lib/dpkg/status — RFC822-style blocks separated by blank
-// lines. Only "install ok installed" entries count (not removed/config-files).
-function parseDpkgStatus(text) {
-  const out = [];
-  for (const block of String(text || '').split(/\n\s*\n/)) {
-    const name = (block.match(/^Package:\s*(.+)$/m) || [])[1];
-    const version = (block.match(/^Version:\s*(.+)$/m) || [])[1];
-    const status = (block.match(/^Status:\s*(.+)$/m) || [])[1] || '';
-    if (!name || !version) continue;
-    if (!/\binstalled\b/.test(status)) continue;
-    out.push({ name: name.trim(), version: version.trim(), ecosystem: 'Debian' });
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-// Alpine: /lib/apk/db/installed — blocks separated by blank lines; P:=name V:=version.
-function parseApkInstalled(text) {
-  const out = [];
-  for (const block of String(text || '').split(/\n\s*\n/)) {
-    const name = (block.match(/^P:(.+)$/m) || [])[1];
-    const version = (block.match(/^V:(.+)$/m) || [])[1];
-    if (!name || !version) continue;
-    out.push({ name: name.trim(), version: version.trim(), ecosystem: 'Alpine' });
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-const _PURL = { Debian: (n, v) => `pkg:deb/debian/${n}@${v}`, Alpine: (n, v) => `pkg:apk/alpine/${n}@${v}` };
-
-// File-path tells for an unpacked image. Match on path suffix so it works
-// whether the scan root is the rootfs or a subdirectory of it.
-function _dbKind(path) {
-  const p = path.replace(/\\/g, '/');
-  if (/(?:^|\/)var\/lib\/dpkg\/status$/.test(p)) return 'dpkg';
-  if (/(?:^|\/)lib\/apk\/db\/installed$/.test(p)) return 'apk';
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Extract OS-package components from any image package-DBs present in the scanned
- * files. Returns components in the engine's component shape so they ride the
- * existing OSV/SBOM pipeline. De-dups by ecosystem:name:version.
- */
-function extractImagePackages(fileContents) {
-  const comps = [];
-  const seen = new Set();
-  for (const [file, content] of Object.entries(fileContents || {})) {
-    const kind = _dbKind(file);
-    if (!kind) continue;
-    const pkgs = kind === 'dpkg' ? parseDpkgStatus(content) : parseApkInstalled(content);
-    for (const p of pkgs) {
-      const key = `${p.ecosystem}:${p.name}:${p.version}`;
-      if (seen.has(key)) continue;
-      seen.add(key);
-      comps.push({
-        name: p.name, version: p.version, group: '', ecosystem: p.ecosystem,
-        purl: (_PURL[p.ecosystem] || (() => null))(p.name, p.version),
-        filePath: file, isUnpinned: false, isTransitive: false, isOsPackage: true,
-        scope: 'required', reachable: true,
-      });
-    }
-  }
-  return comps;
-}
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};