@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.181.0 → 0.183.1

package/dist/5616.index.js

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ __webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
 
 // EXPORTS
 __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+  HUNT_EXIT: () => (/* binding */ HUNT_EXIT),
   cmdDnr: () => (/* binding */ cmdDnr)
 });
 
@@ -900,8 +901,34 @@ const SHA_RE = /^[0-9a-f]{7,64}$/i;
 const ts = (v) => { if (v == null) return null; const t = Date.parse(v); return Number.isNaN(t) ? null : t; };
 const iso = (t) => (t == null ? null : new Date(t).toISOString());
 
-/** Parse a deployment-history file. Returns {deployments, problems}. Unusable entries are listed, never silently dropped. */
-function loadDeployments(file, { environment = null } = {}) {
+/**
+ * Which source commit each artifact digest was built from, read from artifact provenance graphs (`provenance trace` output, or the
+ * graph alone). The commit is whatever the graph's build label declared: a graph whose commit is unknown contributes nothing, and a
+ * digest named by two graphs that disagree is listed as a conflict and resolves to neither.
+ * Returns { commits: Map<digest, sha>, problems }.
+ */
+function artifactCommitMap(graphs) {
+  const commits = new Map(); const conflicts = new Set(); const problems = [];
+  (graphs || []).forEach((doc, i) => {
+    const g = doc?.artifactProvenanceGraph ?? doc;
+    if (!g || !Array.isArray(g.nodes) || !Array.isArray(g.edges)) { problems.push(`artifact graph ${i}: not an artifact provenance graph`); return; }
+    const digest = g.nodes.find((n) => n && n.kind === 'ociDigest' && typeof n.digest === 'string')?.digest;
+    const commit = g.nodes.find((n) => n && n.kind === 'gitCommit' && n.known === true && typeof n.sha === 'string' && SHA_RE.test(n.sha))?.sha?.toLowerCase();
+    if (!digest) { problems.push(`artifact graph ${i}: no image digest`); return; }
+    if (!commit) { problems.push(`artifact graph ${i}: the image declares no source commit, so ${digest.slice(0, 19)} cannot be placed in history`); return; }
+    if (commits.has(digest) && commits.get(digest) !== commit) { conflicts.add(digest); return; }
+    commits.set(digest, commit);
+  });
+  for (const d of conflicts) { commits.delete(d); problems.push(`artifact graphs disagree about the source commit of ${d.slice(0, 19)}; it resolves to neither`); }
+  return { commits, problems };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse a deployment-history file. Returns {deployments, problems}. Unusable entries are listed, never silently dropped.
+ * With `artifactCommits` (from artifactCommitMap), a deployment that names only an artifact digest is placed at the commit the image
+ * declares, and one that names both is refused when they disagree: the record cannot be trusted over the build label or the reverse.
+ */
+function loadDeployments(file, { environment = null, artifactCommits = null } = {}) {
   const problems = [];
   let raw;
   try { raw = JSON.parse(external_node_fs_.readFileSync(file, 'utf8')); } catch (e) { return { deployments: [], problems: [`could not read deployment history: ${e.code || e.message}`] }; }
@@ -911,10 +938,17 @@ function loadDeployments(file, { environment = null } = {}) {
   const deployments = [];
   list.slice(0, MAX_DEPLOYMENTS).forEach((d, i) => {
     if (!d || typeof d !== 'object') { problems.push(`deployment ${i}: not an object`); return; }
-    if (typeof d.commit !== 'string' || !SHA_RE.test(d.commit)) { problems.push(`deployment ${i}: commit must be a hex sha`); return; }
+    const digest = typeof d.artifactDigest === 'string' ? d.artifactDigest.slice(0, 80) : null;
+    const fromGraph = digest && artifactCommits ? artifactCommits.get(digest) ?? null : null;
+    let commit = typeof d.commit === 'string' && SHA_RE.test(d.commit) ? d.commit.toLowerCase() : null;
+    let commitSource = 'deployment-record';
+    if (!commit && d.commit !== undefined && d.commit !== null) { problems.push(`deployment ${i}: commit must be a hex sha`); return; }
+    if (commit && fromGraph && !(fromGraph.startsWith(commit) || commit.startsWith(fromGraph))) { problems.push(`deployment ${i}: the record says commit ${commit.slice(0, 12)} but the image ${digest.slice(0, 19)} declares ${fromGraph.slice(0, 12)}; it was not used`); return; }
+    if (!commit && fromGraph) { commit = fromGraph; commitSource = 'artifact-provenance-graph'; }
+    if (!commit) { problems.push(digest && artifactCommits ? `deployment ${i}: commit must be a hex sha, and image ${digest.slice(0, 19)} is not in the artifact graphs` : `deployment ${i}: commit must be a hex sha`); return; }
     if (ts(d.deployedAt) == null) { problems.push(`deployment ${i}: deployedAt is not a date`); return; }
     if (environment && d.environment !== environment) return;
-    deployments.push({ commit: d.commit.toLowerCase(), deployedAt: iso(ts(d.deployedAt)), environment: typeof d.environment === 'string' ? d.environment.slice(0, 40) : null, artifactDigest: typeof d.artifactDigest === 'string' ? d.artifactDigest.slice(0, 80) : null });
+    deployments.push({ commit, commitSource, deployedAt: iso(ts(d.deployedAt)), environment: typeof d.environment === 'string' ? d.environment.slice(0, 40) : null, artifactDigest: digest });
   });
   return { deployments, problems };
 }
@@ -994,9 +1028,9 @@ function computeExposureWindow({ finding, repo, deployments: rawDeployments = []
   return {
     schema: 'agentic-security/exposure-window', version: 1, findingId: finding?.stableId ?? finding?.id ?? null, status,
     vulnerabilityIntroduced: introducedAt ? { at: introducedAt, commit: introCommit, source: 'finding-provenance' } : null,
-    firstVulnerableDeployment: firstVulnerable ? { at: firstVulnerable.deployedAt, commit: firstVulnerable.commit, environment: firstVulnerable.environment, artifactDigest: firstVulnerable.artifactDigest } : null,
+    firstVulnerableDeployment: firstVulnerable ? { at: firstVulnerable.deployedAt, commit: firstVulnerable.commit, commitSource: firstVulnerable.commitSource ?? 'deployment-record', environment: firstVulnerable.environment, artifactDigest: firstVulnerable.artifactDigest } : null,
     fixCommitted: fixAt ? { at: fixAt, commit: fixCommit } : null,
-    fixDeployed: fixDeployedAt ? { at: fixDeployedAt.deployedAt, commit: fixDeployedAt.commit, environment: fixDeployedAt.environment, artifactDigest: fixDeployedAt.artifactDigest } : null,
+    fixDeployed: fixDeployedAt ? { at: fixDeployedAt.deployedAt, commit: fixDeployedAt.commit, commitSource: fixDeployedAt.commitSource ?? 'deployment-record', environment: fixDeployedAt.environment, artifactDigest: fixDeployedAt.artifactDigest } : null,
     stillExposed: stillExposed(deployments, vulnerable),
     telemetryWindow: telStart != null && telEnd != null ? { start: iso(telStart), end: iso(telEnd) } : null,
     observableWindow: observable, unobservableBefore, unresolvedDeployments: unresolved, deploymentProblems, unknowns,
@@ -1189,10 +1223,19 @@ async function cmdDnr(args, root) {
   }
 
   if (sub === 'window') {
-    if (!flags.deployments) { console.error('dnr window needs --deployments <file> (a JSON list of {commit, deployedAt, environment?}). Nothing was computed.'); return 4; }
+    if (!flags.deployments) { console.error('dnr window needs --deployments <file> (a JSON list of {commit, deployedAt, environment?}; with --artifact-graph, {artifactDigest, deployedAt} is enough). Nothing was computed.'); return 4; }
     const finding = loadFindingFromLastScan(root, id);
     if (!finding) { console.error(`Finding ${id} not found in the last scan.`); return 4; }
-    const { deployments, problems } = loadDeployments(external_node_path_.resolve(String(flags.deployments)), { environment: flags.environment ?? null });
+    let artifactCommits = null; const graphProblems = [];
+    if (flags['artifact-graph']) {
+      const docs = [];
+      for (const f of String(flags['artifact-graph']).split(',').filter(Boolean)) {
+        try { docs.push(JSON.parse(external_node_fs_.readFileSync(external_node_path_.resolve(f), 'utf8'))); } catch (e) { graphProblems.push(`artifact graph ${f}: could not be read (${e.code || 'not JSON'})`); }
+      }
+      const map = artifactCommitMap(docs); artifactCommits = map.commits; graphProblems.push(...map.problems);
+    }
+    const loaded = loadDeployments(external_node_path_.resolve(String(flags.deployments)), { environment: flags.environment ?? null, artifactCommits });
+    const deployments = loaded.deployments; const problems = [...loaded.problems, ...graphProblems];
     const hunt = (0,dnr_store.latestRecord)(root, id, 'hunt')?.record ?? null;
     const telemetry = flags['telemetry-start'] && flags['telemetry-end'] ? { start: flags['telemetry-start'], end: flags['telemetry-end'] } : hunt?.window ?? null;
     const w = computeExposureWindow({ finding, repo: root, deployments, deploymentProblems: problems, fixCommit: flags['fix-commit'] ?? null, telemetry });

package/dist/5620.index.js

@@ -1413,7 +1413,7 @@ function blastRadius(graph, repoId) {
 /* harmony export */   Cb: () => (/* binding */ loadFleetManifest),
 /* harmony export */   yr: () => (/* binding */ starterManifestYaml)
 /* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports ENVIRONMENTS, parseDuration, validateFleetManifest */
+/* unused harmony exports FLEET_MANIFEST_SCHEMA_KEYS, REPO_KEYS, RESOURCE_KEYS, REPO_KINDS, RESOURCE_KINDS, ENVIRONMENTS, parseDuration, validateFleetManifest */
 /* harmony import */ var node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(73024);
 /* harmony import */ var node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(76760);
 /* harmony import */ var _util_yaml_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__ = __webpack_require__(82340);

package/dist/9441.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+export const id = 9441;
+export const ids = [9441];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 99441:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+// ESM COMPAT FLAG
+__webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
+
+// EXPORTS
+__webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+  cmdMetrics: () => (/* binding */ cmdMetrics)
+});
+
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:fs"
+var external_node_fs_ = __webpack_require__(73024);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:path"
+var external_node_path_ = __webpack_require__(76760);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/state-dir.js
+var state_dir = __webpack_require__(31174);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/integrity.js
+var integrity = __webpack_require__(71130);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/fix-metrics.js
+var fix_metrics = __webpack_require__(32238);
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/strategic-metrics.js
+// Strategic metrics: three numbers a scan, its findings and its fix attempts already carry the inputs for, each reported with its numerator
+// and denominator and the basis it was counted on. Pure: no fs, no clock.
+//
+//   Assurance Coverage       of the analysis the scan was asked to do, how much finished (scanHealth files and analyzers)
+//   Evidence Conversion      of the findings, how many reached an evidence state stronger than one analyzer's say-so
+//   Verified Remediation     of the fix attempts, how many reached the strongest verification tier
+//
+// A fourth, the Security Learning Rate, is reported as not measured: nothing measures it independently of the rule compiler's own corpus.
+//
+// The rules that keep these honest:
+//   - a figure never appears without its numerator and denominator, and an empty denominator is `null`, not 0% or 100%;
+//   - a quantity the scan did not report (`expected: null`) makes that component `unmeasured`, never zero;
+//   - the headline of Assurance Coverage is the LOWER of its two components, so a complete analyzer set cannot hide unread files;
+//   - Evidence Conversion counts a state only when its evidence is present on the finding, and names the state each finding reached;
+//   - Verified Remediation is a lower bound where the strongest tier does not apply to a class, and says so.
+
+const STRATEGIC_METRICS_SCHEMA = 'agentic-security/strategic-metrics';
+const STRATEGIC_METRICS_VERSION = 1;
+
+/** Evidence states, weakest first. A finding is counted at the strongest state it has evidence for. */
+const EVIDENCE_STATES = Object.freeze(['single-signal', 'corroborated', 'taint-confirmed', 'execution-proven']);
+
+const rate = (n, d) => ({ numerator: n, denominator: d, percent: d > 0 ? Math.round((n / d) * 1000) / 10 : null });
+const isNum = (v) => typeof v === 'number' && Number.isFinite(v) && v >= 0;
+
+/** Of the analysis requested, how much finished. `scanHealth` is the scan's own record. */
+function assuranceCoverage(scanHealth) {
+  if (!scanHealth || typeof scanHealth !== 'object') {
+    return { status: 'unmeasured', reason: 'the scan carries no scan health record', files: null, analyzers: null, percent: null, scanStatus: null };
+  }
+  const f = scanHealth.files || {};
+  const a = scanHealth.analyzers || {};
+  const files = isNum(f.expected) && isNum(f.scanned)
+    ? { ...rate(Math.max(0, Math.min(f.scanned, f.expected) - (isNum(f.timedOut) ? f.timedOut : 0)), f.expected), skipped: isNum(f.skipped) ? f.skipped : 0, unanalysed: isNum(f.unanalysed) ? f.unanalysed : 0, timedOut: isNum(f.timedOut) ? f.timedOut : 0 }
+    : null;
+  const analyzers = isNum(a.expected) && isNum(a.completed)
+    ? { ...rate(Math.min(a.completed, a.expected), a.expected), failed: isNum(a.failed) ? a.failed : 0, timedOut: isNum(a.timedOut) ? a.timedOut : 0, skippedByPolicy: isNum(a.skippedByPolicy) ? a.skippedByPolicy : 0 }
+    : null;
+  const parts = [files, analyzers].filter((p) => p && p.percent !== null);
+  const percent = parts.length ? Math.min(...parts.map((p) => p.percent)) : null;
+  const missing = [!files && 'files', !analyzers && 'analyzers'].filter(Boolean);
+  return {
+    status: parts.length === 2 ? 'measured' : parts.length === 1 ? 'partial' : 'unmeasured',
+    ...(missing.length ? { reason: `the scan did not report the expected count for: ${missing.join(', ')}` } : {}),
+    files, analyzers, percent, scanStatus: typeof scanHealth.status === 'string' ? scanHealth.status : null,
+  };
+}
+
+/** The strongest evidence state a finding has evidence for. */
+function evidenceStateOf(f) {
+  if (!f || typeof f !== 'object') return 'single-signal';
+  const proof = f.proof && typeof f.proof.verdict === 'string' ? f.proof.verdict : null;
+  if (f.proofTier === 'execution-proven' || (proof && /^(proven|confirmed|exploit-confirmed|still-exploitable)$/i.test(proof))) return 'execution-proven';
+  if (f.parser === 'IR-TAINT' || f.proofTier === 'taint-proven' || f.proofTier === 'taint-confirmed') return 'taint-confirmed';
+  const by = f.corroboration && Array.isArray(f.corroboration.by) ? new Set(f.corroboration.by).size : (Number(f.corroborationCount) || 0);
+  if (by >= 2) return 'corroborated';
+  return 'single-signal';
+}
+
+/** Of the findings, how many reached a state stronger than one analyzer's say-so. */
+function evidenceConversion(findings) {
+  const list = Array.isArray(findings) ? findings.filter((f) => f && typeof f === 'object') : [];
+  const byState = Object.fromEntries(EVIDENCE_STATES.map((s) => [s, 0]));
+  for (const f of list) byState[evidenceStateOf(f)]++;
+  const converted = list.length - byState['single-signal'];
+  return { ...rate(converted, list.length), byState, basis: 'findings that reached corroborated or stronger, over all findings' };
+}
+
+const strongest = (a) => {
+  if (typeof a.verifiedFull === 'boolean') return a.verifiedFull;
+  const disappeared = a.rescanOk === true || (a.ok === true && a.rescanOk !== false);
+  return disappeared && a.testsRan === true && a.testsOk !== false && a.pocOk === true;
+};
+
+/** Of the fix attempts, how many reached the strongest verification tier. A lower bound: some classes have no independent proof to run. */
+function verifiedRemediationRate(attempts) {
+  const list = Array.isArray(attempts) ? attempts.filter((a) => a && typeof a === 'object') : [];
+  const full = list.filter(strongest).length;
+  const disappearedOnly = list.filter((a) => typeof a.verifiedFull !== 'boolean' && (a.rescanOk === true || (a.ok === true && a.rescanOk !== false)) && !(a.testsRan === true && a.testsOk !== false) && a.pocOk !== true).length;
+  return {
+    ...rate(full, list.length),
+    disappearedOnly,
+    basis: 'attempts that passed the re-scan, the project tests and the independent attack replay, over all attempts. A lower bound where a class has no replay',
+  };
+}
+
+/** Nothing measures it independently of the rule compiler's own corpus, so it is reported as not measured. */
+function securityLearningRate() {
+  return { status: 'not-measured', reason: 'the rule compiler grades its rules against a corpus built from the same finding; no independent measurement of novel weaknesses converted into reusable knowledge exists' };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} o
+ * @param {object} [o.scan] a scan result (`scanHealth`, `findings`)
+ * @param {object[]} [o.fixAttempts] fix verification attempts
+ */
+function computeStrategicMetrics({ scan = null, fixAttempts = [] } = {}) {
+  return {
+    schema: STRATEGIC_METRICS_SCHEMA, version: STRATEGIC_METRICS_VERSION,
+    assuranceCoverage: assuranceCoverage(scan && scan.scanHealth),
+    evidenceConversion: evidenceConversion(scan && scan.findings),
+    verifiedRemediationRate: verifiedRemediationRate(fixAttempts),
+    securityLearningRate: securityLearningRate(),
+  };
+}
+
+const pc = (r) => (r && r.percent !== null && r.percent !== undefined ? `${r.percent}%` : 'not measurable');
+
+function renderStrategicMetrics(m) {
+  const ac = m.assuranceCoverage; const ec = m.evidenceConversion; const vr = m.verifiedRemediationRate;
+  const L = [];
+  L.push(`Assurance Coverage: ${ac.percent === null ? 'not measurable' : `${ac.percent}% (the lower of the two components)`}${ac.scanStatus ? `; scan ${ac.scanStatus}` : ''}`);
+  if (ac.files) L.push(`  files: ${ac.files.numerator} of ${ac.files.denominator} completed (${pc(ac.files)}); ${ac.files.skipped} skipped, ${ac.files.unanalysed} not analysed, ${ac.files.timedOut} timed out`);
+  if (ac.analyzers) L.push(`  analyzers: ${ac.analyzers.numerator} of ${ac.analyzers.denominator} completed (${pc(ac.analyzers)}); ${ac.analyzers.failed} failed, ${ac.analyzers.timedOut} timed out`);
+  if (ac.reason) L.push(`  ${ac.reason}`);
+  L.push(`Evidence Conversion: ${ec.numerator} of ${ec.denominator} findings reached corroborated or stronger (${pc(ec)})`);
+  L.push(`  ${EVIDENCE_STATES.map((s) => `${s} ${ec.byState[s]}`).join(', ')}`);
+  L.push(`Verified Remediation Rate: ${vr.numerator} of ${vr.denominator} fix attempts reached the strongest verification tier (${pc(vr)})${vr.denominator ? '; a lower bound where a class has no attack replay' : ''}`);
+  if (vr.disappearedOnly) L.push(`  ${vr.disappearedOnly} satisfied only the re-scan, which is also what deleting the code produces`);
+  L.push(`Security Learning Rate: not measured. ${m.securityLearningRate.reason}`);
+  return L.join('\n');
+}
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/strategic-metrics-cli.js
+// `agentic-security metrics [path] [--format text|json]`: the strategic metrics for the last scan and the recorded fix attempts.
+// Exit codes: 0 reported; 1 the last scan failed its integrity check; 2 no scan to report on, or a usage problem.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+async function cmdMetrics(args, io = {}) {
+  const out = io.out || ((s) => process.stdout.write(s));
+  const err = io.err || ((s) => console.error(s));
+  const root = external_node_path_.resolve(args._[1] || '.');
+  const format = String(args.flags.format || 'text');
+  if (!['text', 'json'].includes(format)) { err('Unknown --format. Use text or json.'); return 2; }
+  const file = (0,state_dir.statePath)(root, 'last-scan.json');
+  let body;
+  try { body = external_node_fs_.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'); } catch { err(`No scan found at ${file}. Run a scan first.`); return 2; }
+  if ((0,integrity/* verifyLastScan */.Ef)(body, file + '.sig') === false) { err('The last scan failed its integrity check, so no metric is reported from it.'); return 1; }
+  let scan;
+  try { scan = JSON.parse(body); } catch { err('The last scan is not valid JSON.'); return 1; }
+  const m = computeStrategicMetrics({ scan, fixAttempts: (0,fix_metrics/* loadFixAttempts */.sU)(root) });
+  out(format === 'json' ? JSON.stringify(m, null, 2) + '\n' : renderStrategicMetrics(m) + '\n');
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/9614.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+export const id = 9614;
+export const ids = [9614];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 618:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   D: () => (/* binding */ releaseVerdict),
+/* harmony export */   s: () => (/* binding */ verifyStatedVerdict)
+/* harmony export */ });
+// The release verdict (E7-08): a deterministic function from a release package to one of three answers, with every reason in plain words.
+//
+//   not_deployable   a condition the policy treats as blocking is present: an unfinished scan, files that were not scanned, an analyzer that timed out or failed,
+//                    a fix that was claimed and not verified, an open finding that is proven exploitable, an open high or critical finding
+//   needs_review     nothing blocks, but something is unknown and a person has to decide: a signal the context analysis could not settle, runtime evidence that
+//                    came from a different build, a finding of unproven exploitability that is high or critical
+//   deployable       none of the above. This is NOT a statement that the release is safe; it says no blocking or unknown condition was found in the evidence the package holds
+//
+// The word "safe" is never produced. The verdict is a function of the package alone (no clock, no environment), so the same package gives the same verdict and the same
+// reasons in the same order, and a stated verdict that differs from the one recomputed here is refused (`verifyStatedVerdict`).
+//
+// WHAT COUNTS AS A BLOCKER is the policy below, not a judgement made per release. Waived findings (a waiver the package lists as honoured) do not block but are listed.
+const SEV_BLOCK = new Set(['critical', 'high']);
+
+const asArray = (v) => (Array.isArray(v) ? v : []);
+const by = (pkg, kind) => asArray(pkg && pkg.evidence).filter((e) => e && e.ref && e.ref.kind === kind);
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} pkg a release package
+ * @param {{waivedIds?:string[]}} [opts] finding ids covered by an honoured waiver
+ * @returns {{verdict:'not_deployable'|'needs_review'|'deployable', blockers:{code:string, message:string, evidence:string[]}[], unknowns:{code:string, message:string, evidence:string[]}[], waived:string[], statement:string}}
+ */
+function releaseVerdict(pkg, { waivedIds = [] } = {}) {
+  const blockers = []; const unknowns = [];
+  const block = (code, message, evidence = []) => blockers.push({ code, message, evidence });
+  const unk = (code, message, evidence = []) => unknowns.push({ code, message, evidence });
+  const waived = new Set(waivedIds);
+
+  // ---- the scan itself
+  const health = by(pkg, 'scan-health')[0];
+  if (!health) block('NO_SCAN_HEALTH', 'the package holds no scan health, so nothing says the scan finished');
+  else {
+    const h = health.payload || {}; const ev = [health.ref.digest];
+    if (h.status !== 'complete') block('SCAN_INCOMPLETE', `the scan did not finish cleanly (status ${JSON.stringify(h.status ?? 'unknown')}): ${asArray(h.conditions).join('; ') || 'no reason was recorded'}`, ev);
+    const f = h.files || {};
+    if (Number.isFinite(f.expected) && Number.isFinite(f.scanned) && f.scanned < f.expected) block('FILES_NOT_SCANNED', `${f.expected - f.scanned} of ${f.expected} files were not scanned`, ev);
+    else if (Number.isFinite(f.unanalysed) ? f.unanalysed > 0 : (Number.isFinite(f.skipped) && f.skipped > 0)) block('FILES_SKIPPED', `${Number.isFinite(f.unanalysed) ? f.unanalysed : f.skipped} file(s) were skipped (too large or too dense to analyse)`, ev);
+    if (Number.isFinite(f.timedOut) && f.timedOut > 0) block('FILES_TIMED_OUT', `${f.timedOut} file(s) exceeded the per-file analysis time`, ev);
+    const a = h.analyzers || {};
+    if (Number.isFinite(a.timedOut) && a.timedOut > 0) block('ANALYZER_TIMED_OUT', `${a.timedOut} analyzer(s) timed out, so what they would have found is not in this result`, ev);
+    if (Number.isFinite(a.failed) && a.failed > 0 && !(Number.isFinite(a.timedOut) && a.failed === a.timedOut)) block('ANALYZER_FAILED', `${a.failed} analyzer(s) failed, so what they would have found is not in this result`, ev);
+    if (h.deepAnalysis && Array.isArray(h.deepAnalysis.incomplete) && h.deepAnalysis.incomplete.length) unk('DEEP_ANALYSIS_INCOMPLETE', `deep analysis stopped short: ${h.deepAnalysis.incomplete.map((x) => `${x.reason} x${x.count}`).join(', ')}`, ev);
+  }
+
+  // ---- findings and fixes
+  const fixes = by(pkg, 'fix-verification');
+  const fixFor = (id) => fixes.filter((x) => x.payload && (x.payload.findingStableId === id || x.payload.findingId === id));
+  for (const e of by(pkg, 'finding')) {
+    const f = e.payload || {}; const id = e.ref.payloadId || f.stableId || f.id; const ev = [e.ref.digest];
+    const triage = f.triage && f.triage.state;
+    const falsePositive = triage === 'false_positive' || f.falsePositive === true;
+    const myFixes = fixFor(id); const fixed = myFixes.find((x) => x.payload.verifiedFull === true);
+    if (waived.has(id)) continue;
+    if (falsePositive) {
+      if (!(f.triage && f.triage.by && f.triage.reason)) unk('FALSE_POSITIVE_UNJUSTIFIED', `finding ${id} is marked a false positive without a named person and a reason`, ev);
+      continue;
+    }
+    for (const x of myFixes) if (x.payload.verifiedFull !== true) block('FIX_NOT_VERIFIED', `a fix for ${id} is claimed but was not fully verified (${asArray(x.payload.degradedLegs).map((d) => (typeof d === 'string' ? d : d && d.leg)).filter(Boolean).join(', ') || 'checks did not all pass'})`, [...ev, x.ref.digest]);
+    if (fixed) continue;
+    const sev = String(f.severity || 'info'); const tier = typeof f.proofTier === 'string' ? f.proofTier : 'unproven';
+    const ci = f.contextIntelligence && (f.contextIntelligence.counterexample && f.contextIntelligence.counterexample.state || f.contextIntelligence.state);
+    if (tier === 'execution-proven') block('PROVEN_OPEN_FINDING', `finding ${id} (${sev}) is proven exploitable and is open`, ev);
+    else if (SEV_BLOCK.has(sev)) {
+      if (ci === 'unresolved' || ci === 'plausible') unk('CONTEXT_SIGNAL_UNSETTLED', `finding ${id} (${sev}) rests on a context signal the analysis could not settle (${ci}); a person has to decide whether it is real`, ev);
+      else block('OPEN_HIGH_FINDING', `finding ${id} is open at severity ${sev}`, ev);
+    } else if (ci === 'unresolved' || ci === 'plausible') unk('CONTEXT_SIGNAL_UNSETTLED', `finding ${id} rests on a context signal the analysis could not settle (${ci})`, ev);
+  }
+
+  // ---- runtime evidence from another build
+  for (const e of by(pkg, 'runtime-explanation')) {
+    const edges = asArray(e.payload && e.payload.runtime && e.payload.runtime.edges); const bad = edges.filter((x) => Number(x.mismatchedRecords) > 0);
+    if (bad.length) unk('RUNTIME_BUILD_MISMATCH', `runtime records for ${bad.length} edge(s) of ${e.ref.payloadId || 'a finding'} came from a different build than the one released, so they say nothing about this release and are not counted as corroboration`, [e.ref.digest]);
+    const miss = asArray(e.payload && e.payload.runtime && e.payload.runtime.missingObservations);
+    if (!bad.length && miss.length && e.payload.compare && e.payload.compare.state !== 'corroborated') unk('RUNTIME_NOT_CORROBORATED', `runtime evidence for ${e.ref.payloadId || 'a finding'} does not corroborate the path: ${miss[0]}`, [e.ref.digest]);
+  }
+
+  blockers.sort((a, b) => (a.code + a.message < b.code + b.message ? -1 : 1)); unknowns.sort((a, b) => (a.code + a.message < b.code + b.message ? -1 : 1));
+  const verdict = blockers.length ? 'not_deployable' : unknowns.length ? 'needs_review' : 'deployable';
+  const statement = verdict === 'deployable'
+    ? 'No blocking or unknown condition was found in the evidence this package holds. That is not a statement that the release is safe.'
+    : verdict === 'needs_review' ? `Nothing blocks the release, but ${unknowns.length} thing(s) are unknown and a person has to decide.` : `${blockers.length} condition(s) block the release.`;
+  return { verdict, blockers, unknowns, waived: [...waived].sort(), statement };
+}
+
+/** Is the verdict a package states the one its own contents give? @returns {{ok:boolean, stated:string|null, computed:string, message:string|null}} */
+function verifyStatedVerdict(pkg, opts) {
+  const computed = releaseVerdict(pkg, opts).verdict;
+  const decisions = asArray(pkg && pkg.policy && pkg.policy.decisions);
+  const d = decisions.find((x) => x && x.id === 'release-verdict');
+  const stated = d ? d.outcome : null;
+  if (stated === null) return { ok: false, stated, computed, message: 'the package states no release verdict' };
+  if (stated !== computed) return { ok: false, stated, computed, message: `the package states "${stated}" but its own contents give "${computed}"` };
+  return { ok: true, stated, computed, message: null };
+}
+
+
+/***/ }),
+
+/***/ 29614:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   buildViews: () => (/* binding */ buildViews),
+/* harmony export */   renderHtml: () => (/* binding */ renderHtml),
+/* harmony export */   renderText: () => (/* binding */ renderText)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony export buildCanonicalFindings */
+/* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(77598);
+/* harmony import */ var _posture_assurance_release_verdict_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(618);
+// Three views of one release (E7-07): what a developer needs, what a CISO needs, what an auditor needs, all built from the SAME canonical list of findings so they
+// cannot disagree.
+//
+//   developer  where the problem is, why it is one, how to fix it, and whether a fix was verified
+//   CISO       what is proven and what is not, what changed since the previous release, how risky and how complete
+//   auditor    for each assertion and each unknown, the evidence it rests on (by digest) and why anything is unknown; the issuer and what the signature does not prove
+//
+// One list, three projections. `canonicalFindings` is computed once from the release package; every view only selects and arranges its fields, and each entry
+// carries the same finding id, status, evidence hash and confidence wherever it appears. Nothing is recomputed per view.
+//
+// The package is DATA from a repository we do not control: every string is escaped before it reaches HTML, the page loads nothing from anywhere and runs no script, and a
+// content security policy says so.
+
+
+
+const esc = (v) => String(v ?? '').replace(/[&<>"'`]/g, (c) => ({ '&': '&amp;', '<': '&lt;', '>': '&gt;', '"': '&quot;', "'": '&#39;', '`': '&#96;' }[c]));
+const sevRank = { critical: 4, high: 3, medium: 2, low: 1, info: 0 };
+
+function confidenceOf(f) {
+  if (typeof f.confidence === 'number') return f.confidence >= 0.8 ? 'high' : f.confidence >= 0.5 ? 'medium' : 'low';
+  return typeof f.confidenceTier === 'string' ? f.confidenceTier : 'unknown';
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} pkg a release package (E7-03). It is assumed to have been verified by the caller; the views carry `verification` as the caller states it.
+ * @param {{previous?:object, ranking?:object, verification?:{ok:boolean, errors?:object[]}}} opts `previous` is the previous release's package; `ranking` is a result of rankFleetExposure
+ */
+function buildCanonicalFindings(pkg) {
+  const entries = Array.isArray(pkg && pkg.evidence) ? pkg.evidence : [];
+  const byKind = (k) => entries.filter((e) => e.ref && e.ref.kind === k);
+  const fixes = byKind('fix-verification');
+  const out = [];
+  for (const e of byKind('finding')) {
+    const f = e.payload || {};
+    const id = e.ref.payloadId || f.stableId || f.id;
+    const fixesFor = fixes.filter((x) => x.payload && (x.payload.findingStableId === id || x.payload.findingId === id || x.payload.findingId === f.id) );
+    const fix = fixesFor.find((x) => x.payload.verifiedFull === true) || fixesFor[0] || null;
+    const status = !fix ? 'open' : fix.payload.verifiedFull === true ? 'fix-verified' : 'fix-unverified';
+    out.push({
+      id, evidenceHash: e.ref.digest, status, confidence: confidenceOf(f), severity: f.severity || 'info', proofTier: typeof f.proofTier === 'string' ? f.proofTier : 'unproven',
+      where: { file: f.file ?? null, line: Number.isInteger(f.line) ? f.line : null }, title: f.vuln || f.title || 'finding', cwe: f.cwe || null,
+      why: f.description || f.reason || null, how: f.remediation || null,
+      fix: fix ? { evidenceHash: fix.ref.digest, verifiedFull: fix.payload.verifiedFull === true, completeness: fix.payload.fixCompleteness || null, degradedLegs: Array.isArray(fix.payload.degradedLegs) ? fix.payload.degradedLegs.map((d) => (typeof d === 'string' ? d : d && d.leg) ).filter(Boolean) : [] } : null,
+    });
+  }
+  return out.sort((a, b) => (sevRank[b.severity] - sevRank[a.severity]) || (a.id < b.id ? -1 : a.id > b.id ? 1 : 0));
+}
+
+function buildViews(pkg, { previous = null, ranking = null, verification = null } = {}) {
+  const findings = buildCanonicalFindings(pkg);
+  const packageDigest = `sha256:${(0,node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.createHash)('sha256').update(JSON.stringify(pkg && pkg.lineageOrder || [])).digest('hex')}`;
+  const prev = previous ? buildCanonicalFindings(previous) : null;
+  const prevById = prev ? new Map(prev.map((f) => [f.id, f])) : null;
+  const ids = new Set(findings.map((f) => f.id));
+  const change = prev ? {
+    new: findings.filter((f) => !prevById.has(f.id)).map((f) => f.id),
+    resolved: prev.filter((f) => !ids.has(f.id)).map((f) => f.id),
+    statusChanged: findings.filter((f) => prevById.has(f.id) && prevById.get(f.id).status !== f.status).map((f) => ({ id: f.id, from: prevById.get(f.id).status, to: f.status })),
+    unchanged: findings.filter((f) => prevById.has(f.id) && prevById.get(f.id).status === f.status).length,
+  } : null;
+  const rankById = ranking ? new Map(ranking.ranked.map((r) => [r.id, r])) : null;
+  const tier = (t) => findings.filter((f) => f.proofTier === t).length;
+  const completeness = pkg && pkg.completeness ? { verdict: pkg.completeness.verdict, scanStatus: pkg.completeness.scanStatus, conditions: pkg.completeness.conditions || [] } : { verdict: 'unknown', scanStatus: 'unknown', conditions: [] };
+  const unknowns = [];
+  if (completeness.verdict !== 'complete') for (const c of completeness.conditions.length ? completeness.conditions : ['the scan did not report that it finished']) unknowns.push({ about: 'scan completeness', reason: c, evidence: pkg.completeness && pkg.completeness.source ? [pkg.completeness.source] : [] });
+  for (const a of (pkg && pkg.assertions) || []) if (a.status !== 'supported') unknowns.push({ about: a.text, reason: a.reason || `the assertion is ${a.status}`, evidence: a.evidence || [] });
+  for (const f of findings) if (f.proofTier !== 'execution-proven') unknowns.push({ about: `exploitability of ${f.id}`, reason: `proof tier is ${f.proofTier}: it has not been shown to be exploitable`, evidence: [f.evidenceHash] });
+
+  const developer = findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, severity: f.severity, where: f.where, why: f.why, how: f.how, title: f.title, cwe: f.cwe, fix: f.fix }));
+  const verdict = (0,_posture_assurance_release_verdict_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .releaseVerdict */ .D)(pkg);
+  const ciso = {
+    verdict: { verdict: verdict.verdict, statement: verdict.statement, blockers: verdict.blockers.map((b) => b.message), unknowns: verdict.unknowns.map((u) => u.message) },
+    verified: verification ? verification.ok === true : null,
+    scan: completeness,
+    proven: { executionProven: tier('execution-proven'), taintProven: tier('taint-proven'), unproven: findings.length - tier('execution-proven') - tier('taint-proven'), total: findings.length },
+    bySeverity: Object.fromEntries(['critical', 'high', 'medium', 'low', 'info'].map((s) => [s, findings.filter((f) => f.severity === s).length])),
+    fixes: { verified: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'fix-verified').length, unverified: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'fix-unverified').length, open: findings.filter((f) => f.status === 'open').length },
+    changeSinceLast: change,
+    risk: ranking ? { byPriority: ranking.summary.byPriority, incompleteCoverage: ranking.summary.incompleteCoverage, top: ranking.ranked.slice(0, 5).map((r) => ({ id: r.id, priority: r.priority, rule: r.rule })) } : null,
+    findings: findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, severity: f.severity, proofTier: f.proofTier, priority: rankById && rankById.get(f.id) ? rankById.get(f.id).priority : null })),
+  };
+  const auditor = {
+    package: { lineageDigest: packageDigest, snapshot: pkg && pkg.snapshot ? { commit: pkg.snapshot.commit, immutable: pkg.snapshot.immutable, digest: pkg.snapshot.digest } : null },
+    issuer: pkg && pkg.issuance ? { trustBasis: pkg.issuance.trustBasis, independentlyCertified: pkg.issuance.independentlyCertified, keyFingerprint: pkg.issuance.issuer && pkg.issuance.issuer.keyFingerprint } : null,
+    verification: verification ? { ok: verification.ok === true, errors: (verification.errors || []).map((e) => `${e.code}: ${e.message}`) } : { ok: null, errors: ['no verification was performed by this view'] },
+    proves: pkg && pkg.proves || null, doesNotProve: pkg && pkg.doesNotProve || null,
+    assertions: ((pkg && pkg.assertions) || []).map((a) => ({ id: a.id, text: a.text, status: a.status, evidence: a.evidence || [], reason: a.reason || null })),
+    unknowns,
+    findings: findings.map((f) => ({ id: f.id, evidenceHash: f.evidenceHash, status: f.status, confidence: f.confidence, proofTier: f.proofTier, fixEvidence: f.fix ? f.fix.evidenceHash : null })),
+    policyDecisions: (pkg && pkg.policy && pkg.policy.decisions) || [],
+  };
+  return { canonical: findings, developer, ciso, auditor };
+}
+
+// ---- text ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function renderText(views, view = 'all') {
+  const L = [];
+  const dev = () => { L.push('DEVELOPER VIEW'); for (const f of views.developer) { L.push(`  [${f.severity}] ${f.title}  ${f.where.file ?? '?'}:${f.where.line ?? '?'}  id=${f.id}  status=${f.status}  confidence=${f.confidence}  evidence=${f.evidenceHash.slice(0, 19)}`); if (f.why) L.push(`      why: ${String(f.why).slice(0, 300)}`); if (f.how) L.push(`      fix: ${String(f.how).slice(0, 300)}`); if (f.fix) L.push(`      fix check: ${f.fix.verifiedFull ? 'verified' : 'not fully verified'}${f.fix.degradedLegs.length ? ` (not passed: ${f.fix.degradedLegs.join(', ')})` : ''}`); } if (!views.developer.length) L.push('  no findings'); };
+  const ciso = () => { const c = views.ciso; L.push('CISO VIEW'); L.push(`  release verdict: ${c.verdict.verdict}. ${c.verdict.statement}`); for (const b of c.verdict.blockers) L.push(`    blocks: ${b}`); for (const u of c.verdict.unknowns) L.push(`    unknown: ${u}`); L.push(`  scan: ${c.scan.verdict} (${c.scan.scanStatus})${c.scan.conditions.length ? ' - ' + c.scan.conditions.join('; ') : ''}`); L.push(`  proven: ${c.proven.executionProven} executed, ${c.proven.taintProven} taint path, ${c.proven.unproven} unproven, of ${c.proven.total}`); L.push(`  fixes: ${c.fixes.verified} verified, ${c.fixes.unverified} unverified, ${c.fixes.open} open`); if (c.changeSinceLast) L.push(`  since last release: ${c.changeSinceLast.new.length} new, ${c.changeSinceLast.resolved.length} resolved, ${c.changeSinceLast.statusChanged.length} changed status`); else L.push('  since last release: no previous release was supplied'); if (c.risk) L.push(`  risk: ${JSON.stringify(c.risk.byPriority)}; ${c.risk.incompleteCoverage} with incomplete coverage`); L.push(`  verification: ${c.verified === null ? 'not performed here' : c.verified ? 'signature and contents verified' : 'FAILED'}`); };
+  const aud = () => { const a = views.auditor; L.push('AUDITOR VIEW'); L.push(`  snapshot: ${a.package.snapshot ? `${a.package.snapshot.commit ?? 'no commit'} (${a.package.snapshot.immutable ? 'immutable' : 'NOT immutable'})` : 'none'}`); L.push(`  issuer: ${a.issuer ? `${a.issuer.trustBasis}, independently certified: ${a.issuer.independentlyCertified}` : 'none'}`); L.push(`  verification: ${a.verification.ok === null ? 'not performed here' : a.verification.ok ? 'ok' : 'FAILED: ' + a.verification.errors.join('; ')}`); for (const x of a.assertions) L.push(`  assertion ${x.id} [${x.status}]: ${x.text}  evidence=${x.evidence.map((d) => d.slice(0, 19)).join(',') || 'none'}`); for (const u of a.unknowns) L.push(`  unknown: ${u.about} - ${u.reason}`); L.push(`  does not prove: ${a.doesNotProve}`); };
+  if (view === 'developer' || view === 'all') dev();
+  if (view === 'ciso' || view === 'all') ciso();
+  if (view === 'auditor' || view === 'all') aud();
+  return L.join('\n') + '\n';
+}
+
+// ---- html ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** One self-contained page, no script, nothing loaded from elsewhere. Every value is escaped. */
+function renderHtml(views, { title = 'Release assurance report' } = {}) {
+  const c = views.ciso; const a = views.auditor;
+  const row = (f, cols) => `<tr data-finding="${esc(f.id)}" data-evidence="${esc(f.evidenceHash)}" data-status="${esc(f.status)}" data-confidence="${esc(f.confidence)}">${cols.map((x) => `<td>${x}</td>`).join('')}</tr>`;
+  return `<!doctype html>
+<html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8"><meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'; style-src 'unsafe-inline'; img-src data:">
+<title>${esc(title)}</title>
+<style>
+:root{--bg:#fff;--fg:#1a1a1a;--muted:#555;--line:#d0d0d0;--bad:#a40000;--ok:#0a6b2b}
+@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark){:root{--bg:#14161a;--fg:#e8e8e8;--muted:#a0a0a0;--line:#3a3d44;--bad:#ff8080;--ok:#6fd48e}}
+body{background:var(--bg);color:var(--fg);font:15px/1.5 system-ui,sans-serif;margin:0 auto;max-width:72rem;padding:1rem 16px}
+h1,h2{line-height:1.2}table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;overflow-wrap:anywhere}th,td{border:1px solid var(--line);padding:.35rem .5rem;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}
+code{font-family:ui-monospace,monospace;font-size:.9em}.muted{color:var(--muted)}.bad{color:var(--bad)}.ok{color:var(--ok)}details{margin:1rem 0}summary{cursor:pointer;font-weight:600}
+</style></head><body>
+<h1>${esc(title)}</h1>
+<p class="muted">Snapshot ${esc(a.package.snapshot ? a.package.snapshot.commit : 'none')} (${a.package.snapshot && a.package.snapshot.immutable ? 'immutable' : 'not immutable'}). Verification: <span class="${a.verification.ok === true ? 'ok' : 'bad'}">${esc(a.verification.ok === null ? 'not performed by this page' : a.verification.ok ? 'passed' : 'FAILED')}</span>.</p>
+<details open><summary>Developer: where, why, how to fix</summary>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Where</th><th>Why</th><th>How to fix</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${views.developer.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code> ${esc(f.title)}<br><span class="muted">${esc(f.severity)}${f.cwe ? ' ' + esc(f.cwe) : ''}</span>`, `<code>${esc(f.where.file ?? '?')}:${esc(f.where.line ?? '?')}</code>`, esc(f.why ?? ''), esc(f.how ?? ''), esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="6">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table></details>
+<details open><summary>CISO: what is proven, what changed, risk and coverage</summary>
+<p><strong>Release verdict: ${esc(c.verdict.verdict)}.</strong> ${esc(c.verdict.statement)}</p>
+<ul>${c.verdict.blockers.map((b) => `<li class="bad">Blocks: ${esc(b)}</li>`).join('')}${c.verdict.unknowns.map((u) => `<li>Unknown: ${esc(u)}</li>`).join('')}</ul>
+<p>Scan: <strong>${esc(c.scan.verdict)}</strong> (${esc(c.scan.scanStatus)}). ${c.scan.conditions.map((x) => esc(x)).join('; ')}</p>
+<p>Proven: ${esc(c.proven.executionProven)} by execution, ${esc(c.proven.taintProven)} by a taint path, ${esc(c.proven.unproven)} unproven, of ${esc(c.proven.total)}. Fixes: ${esc(c.fixes.verified)} verified, ${esc(c.fixes.unverified)} unverified, ${esc(c.fixes.open)} open.</p>
+<p>${c.changeSinceLast ? `Since the previous release: ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.new.length)} new, ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.resolved.length)} resolved, ${esc(c.changeSinceLast.statusChanged.length)} changed status.` : 'No previous release was supplied, so no change is reported.'}</p>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Severity</th><th>Proof</th><th>Priority</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${c.findings.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code>`, esc(f.severity), esc(f.proofTier), esc(f.priority ?? 'not ranked'), esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="6">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table></details>
+<details open><summary>Auditor: evidence behind each statement, and what is unknown</summary>
+<p>Issuer: ${esc(a.issuer ? a.issuer.trustBasis : 'none')}; independently certified: ${esc(a.issuer ? a.issuer.independentlyCertified : 'n/a')}.</p>
+<p class="muted">Proves: ${esc(a.proves)}<br>Does not prove: ${esc(a.doesNotProve)}</p>
+<table><thead><tr><th>Finding</th><th>Evidence hash</th><th>Fix evidence</th><th>Status</th><th>Confidence</th></tr></thead><tbody>
+${a.findings.map((f) => row(f, [`<code>${esc(f.id)}</code>`, `<code>${esc(f.evidenceHash)}</code>`, `<code>${esc(f.fixEvidence ?? 'none')}</code>`, esc(f.status), esc(f.confidence)])).join('\n') || '<tr><td colspan="5">No findings.</td></tr>'}
+</tbody></table>
+<h2>Assertions</h2><ul>${a.assertions.map((x) => `<li><strong>${esc(x.status)}</strong>: ${esc(x.text)} <span class="muted">(${x.evidence.length ? x.evidence.map((d) => `<code>${esc(d)}</code>`).join(', ') : 'no evidence cited'}${x.reason ? '; ' + esc(x.reason) : ''})</span></li>`).join('') || '<li>None.</li>'}</ul>
+<h2>Unknowns</h2><ul>${a.unknowns.map((u) => `<li>${esc(u.about)}: ${esc(u.reason)}</li>`).join('') || '<li>None.</li>'}</ul>
+</details></body></html>
+`;
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};