@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.174.0 → 0.176.0

package/dist/5817.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+export const id = 5817;
+export const ids = [5817,2199];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 95817:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+// ESM COMPAT FLAG
+__webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
+
+// EXPORTS
+__webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+  cmdProof: () => (/* binding */ cmdProof),
+  cmdProve: () => (/* binding */ cmdProve),
+  resolveReproducer: () => (/* binding */ resolveReproducer)
+});
+
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:fs"
+var external_node_fs_ = __webpack_require__(73024);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:os"
+var external_node_os_ = __webpack_require__(48161);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:path"
+var external_node_path_ = __webpack_require__(76760);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/state-dir.js
+var state_dir = __webpack_require__(31174);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/orchestrator.js
+var orchestrator = __webpack_require__(3740);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/store.js
+var store = __webpack_require__(62199);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/runner.js + 1 modules
+var runner = __webpack_require__(23081);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/reproducer.js
+var proof_fabric_reproducer = __webpack_require__(37055);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:module"
+var external_node_module_ = __webpack_require__(98995);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./node_modules/@babel/parser/lib/index.js
+var lib = __webpack_require__(46411);
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/generate.js
+// Reproducer generation from a finding's own evidence (PRD 1: `triage exploit --prove` with no hand-written reproducer).
+//
+// What this is: a DETERMINISTIC harness builder for the cases where a harness can be built from the source alone. It reads the
+// flagged file, finds the function around the flagged line, decides how that function is reached, picks the payload for the
+// weakness class, and emits an ordinary reproducer, which then goes through exactly the same runner, oracle, 3-of-3 repetition and
+// independent replay as any other. A generated reproducer is not a verdict; it is a proposal that is either confirmed by execution
+// or not.
+//
+// What this is not: a general exploit generator. It handles JavaScript only, and only code the proof environment can actually load:
+// the file's imports must be Node built-ins or relative files inside the repository (a package from node_modules is not there in
+// the sandbox, so a handler that needs `express` is refused, with the package named). Anything outside that returns `{ ok: false }`
+// with the reason, and nothing is executed.
+//
+// Two shapes:
+//   script    the file reads `process.argv[2]`: it is run with the payload as its argument;
+//   function  the file exports (or declares at top level and exports) the function around the flagged line: a generated harness
+//             loads it and calls it, filling the tainted parameter with the payload. A parameter that is a request-like object
+//             (`req`) gets a stand-in whose `body`/`query`/`params` answer every property with the payload.
+//
+// Weakness classes with a payload and an oracle that can SEE the effect: CWE-78 (a canary file created by the injected command),
+// CWE-22 (a write that lands outside the working directory, only for write sinks), CWE-918 (a request reaching the runner's loopback
+// listener). Others (injection into a database, deserialization, memory safety) need an environment or a native harness this does not
+// build, and are refused by name rather than approximated.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+const CLASSES = {
+  'CWE-78': { name: 'command-injection', payload: 'x; touch {{CANARY:command}}', oracle: { type: 'command_execution', params: { canary: 'command' } } },
+  'CWE-22': { name: 'path-traversal', payload: '../escaped.txt', oracle: { type: 'filesystem_mutation', params: { canary: 'fs' } }, watch: { fs: 'escaped.txt' }, needs: /\b(?:writeFile|writeFileSync|appendFile|appendFileSync|createWriteStream)\b/ },
+  'CWE-918': { name: 'ssrf', payload: '{{CALLBACK_URL}}', oracle: { type: 'outbound_callback' }, network: 'callback' },
+};
+const MAX_SOURCE = 256 * 1024;
+const MAX_FILES = 8;
+const EXTS = ['', '.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '/index.js'];
+const BUILTINS = new Set(external_node_module_.builtinModules.flatMap((m) => [m, `node:${m}`]));
+const MODULE_SYNTAX = /^\s*(?:import\s[^('"]|import\s*['"{*]|export\s)/m;
+
+const fail = (reason, extra = {}) => ({ ok: false, reason, ...extra });
+const normCwe = (c) => { const m = /(\d{1,5})/.exec(String(c ?? '')); return m ? `CWE-${Number(m[1])}` : null; };
+
+function inside(root, rel) {
+  if (typeof rel !== 'string' || !rel || rel.includes('\0')) return null;
+  let real;
+  try { real = external_node_fs_.realpathSync(external_node_path_.resolve(root, rel)); } catch { return null; }
+  const base = external_node_fs_.realpathSync(root);
+  return real === base || real.startsWith(base + external_node_path_.sep) ? real : null;
+}
+
+function readSource(root, rel) {
+  const real = inside(root, rel);
+  if (!real) return null;
+  const st = external_node_fs_.statSync(real);
+  if (!st.isFile() || st.size > MAX_SOURCE) return null;
+  return { real, text: external_node_fs_.readFileSync(real, 'utf8') };
+}
+
+function parseSource(text) {
+  try { return (0,lib/* parse */.qg)(text, { sourceType: 'unambiguous', errorRecovery: false, plugins: ['topLevelAwait'], allowReturnOutsideFunction: true }); } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+function* walk(node, parent = null) {
+  if (!node || typeof node !== 'object') return;
+  if (Array.isArray(node)) { for (const n of node) yield* walk(n, parent); return; }
+  if (typeof node.type !== 'string') return;
+  yield { node, parent };
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(node)) if (k !== 'loc' && k !== 'leadingComments' && k !== 'trailingComments' && v && typeof v === 'object') yield* walk(v, node);
+}
+
+/** Every module this file loads: built-ins pass, relative files are collected, anything else is a dependency the proof cannot provide. */
+function dependencies(ast) {
+  const specs = [];
+  for (const { node } of walk(ast.program)) {
+    if (node.type === 'ImportDeclaration' || ((node.type === 'ExportNamedDeclaration' || node.type === 'ExportAllDeclaration') && node.source)) specs.push(node.source.value);
+    else if (node.type === 'CallExpression' && node.callee.type === 'Identifier' && node.callee.name === 'require' && node.arguments[0]?.type === 'StringLiteral') specs.push(node.arguments[0].value);
+    else if (node.type === 'ImportExpression' && node.source?.type === 'StringLiteral') specs.push(node.source.value);
+  }
+  return specs;
+}
+
+/** Every function that contains the line, innermost first: the flagged call is often inside a callback of the function that can be called. */
+function functionsAround(ast, line) {
+  const all = [];
+  for (const { node, parent } of walk(ast.program)) {
+    if (!/^(?:FunctionDeclaration|FunctionExpression|ArrowFunctionExpression|ObjectMethod|ClassMethod)$/.test(node.type)) continue;
+    if (node.loc && node.loc.start.line <= line && node.loc.end.line >= line) all.push({ node, parent });
+  }
+  return all.sort((a, b) => (a.node.loc.end.line - a.node.loc.start.line) - (b.node.loc.end.line - b.node.loc.start.line) || (b.node.loc.start.line - a.node.loc.start.line));
+}
+
+const paramNames = (fn) => fn.params.map((p) => (p.type === 'Identifier' ? p.name : p.type === 'AssignmentPattern' && p.left.type === 'Identifier' ? p.left.name : null));
+
+/** How the function is reachable from outside: its exported name, or null. */
+function exportName(ast, fnInfo) {
+  const { node, parent } = fnInfo;
+  const idName = node.id?.name ?? (parent?.type === 'VariableDeclarator' && parent.id.type === 'Identifier' ? parent.id.name : null);
+  let found = null;
+  for (const { node: n } of walk(ast.program)) {
+    if (n.type === 'ExportNamedDeclaration' && n.declaration) {
+      if (n.declaration === node || (n.declaration.type === 'FunctionDeclaration' && n.declaration.id?.name === idName)) found = { kind: 'named', name: idName };
+      if (n.declaration.type === 'VariableDeclaration' && n.declaration.declarations.some((d) => d.init === node)) found = { kind: 'named', name: n.declaration.declarations.find((d) => d.init === node).id.name };
+    }
+    if (n.type === 'ExportNamedDeclaration' && n.specifiers?.length && idName) for (const s of n.specifiers) if (s.local?.name === idName) found = { kind: 'named', name: s.exported.name };
+    if (n.type === 'ExportDefaultDeclaration' && (n.declaration === node || n.declaration?.name === idName)) found = { kind: 'default' };
+    if (n.type === 'AssignmentExpression' && n.left.type === 'MemberExpression') {
+      const l = n.left; const obj = l.object; const prop = l.property?.name ?? l.property?.value;
+      const isModuleExports = obj.type === 'Identifier' && obj.name === 'module' && prop === 'exports';
+      if (isModuleExports && (n.right === node || (n.right.type === 'Identifier' && n.right.name === idName))) found = { kind: 'module' };
+      if (isModuleExports && n.right.type === 'ObjectExpression') for (const p of n.right.properties) if ((p.value === node || p.value?.name === idName || (p.shorthand && p.key.name === idName)) && p.key) found = { kind: 'named', name: p.key.name ?? p.key.value };
+      const isExportsProp = (obj.type === 'Identifier' && obj.name === 'exports') || (obj.type === 'MemberExpression' && obj.object?.name === 'module' && obj.property?.name === 'exports');
+      if (isExportsProp && prop && (n.right === node || (n.right.type === 'Identifier' && n.right.name === idName))) found = { kind: 'named', name: prop };
+    }
+  }
+  return found;
+}
+
+function harness({ esm, entry, exp, args }) {
+  const load = esm ? `const mod = await import('./${entry}');` : `import { createRequire } from 'node:module';\nconst require = createRequire(import.meta.url);\nconst mod = require('./${entry}');`;
+  const pick = exp.kind === 'named' ? `mod[${JSON.stringify(exp.name)}] ?? mod.default?.[${JSON.stringify(exp.name)}]` : exp.kind === 'default' ? 'mod.default ?? mod' : 'typeof mod === \'function\' ? mod : mod.default';
+  return `// Generated by the proof fabric from the finding's own evidence. It loads the flagged function and calls it with the payload.
+${load}
+const payload = process.argv[2] ?? '';
+const P = new Proxy({}, { get: (_t, k) => (k === Symbol.toPrimitive ? () => payload : k === 'toString' ? () => payload : payload), has: () => true });
+const res = new Proxy(function () {}, { get: () => res, apply: () => res });
+const fn = ${pick};
+if (typeof fn !== 'function') { console.error('the exported value is not a function'); process.exit(3); }
+try { await Promise.race([Promise.resolve(fn(${args.join(', ')})), new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 5000))]); } catch (e) { console.error('target threw:', String(e && e.message).slice(0, 200)); }
+`;
+}
+
+function generateReproducer({ finding, root }) {
+  const cwe = normCwe(finding?.cwe);
+  const cls = CLASSES[cwe];
+  if (!cls) return fail(`no payload and oracle exist for ${cwe ?? 'this finding'}; supported: ${Object.keys(CLASSES).join(', ')} (others need a database, a deserializer or a native harness)`);
+  const rel = String(finding?.file ?? '');
+  if (!/\.(?:js|mjs|cjs)$/i.test(rel)) return fail(`no harness builder for ${external_node_path_.extname(rel) || 'this file type'}; JavaScript only`);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(finding?.line)) return fail('the finding has no line number');
+  const src = readSource(root, rel);
+  if (!src) return fail('the flagged file is missing, outside the repository, or too large');
+  const ast = parseSource(src.text);
+  if (!ast) return fail('the flagged file could not be parsed');
+  const lines = src.text.split('\n');
+  const sinkLine = lines[finding.line - 1] ?? '';
+  if (cls.needs && !cls.needs.test(sinkLine) && !cls.needs.test(lines.slice(Math.max(0, finding.line - 3), finding.line + 2).join('\n'))) return fail(`${cls.name}: the flagged code is not a write, and the oracle can only observe a write (a read leaves no trace unless the program prints it)`);
+
+  // dependencies the sandbox can satisfy
+  const sources = {}; const external = [];
+  const entryDir = external_node_path_.dirname(src.real);
+  const rootReal = external_node_fs_.realpathSync(root); // the repository root as the filesystem names it (a temp dir can sit behind a symlink)
+  const collect = (realFile, ast0, count) => {
+    for (const spec of dependencies(ast0)) {
+      if (BUILTINS.has(spec)) continue;
+      if (!spec.startsWith('.')) { external.push(spec); continue; }
+      let found = null;
+      for (const e of EXTS) { const cand = inside(root, external_node_path_.relative(rootReal, external_node_path_.resolve(external_node_path_.dirname(realFile), spec + e))); if (cand && external_node_fs_.statSync(cand).isFile()) { found = cand; break; } }
+      if (!found) return fail(`the relative import "${spec}" was not found inside the repository`);
+      const destRel = external_node_path_.relative(entryDir, found);
+      if (destRel.startsWith('..')) return fail(`"${spec}" lives outside the flagged file's directory, which a proof workspace cannot mirror`);
+      if (sources[destRel] || found === src.real) continue;
+      if (Object.keys(sources).length >= MAX_FILES) return fail(`the file pulls in more than ${MAX_FILES} repository files`);
+      const dep = readSource(root, external_node_path_.relative(rootReal, found));
+      if (!dep) return fail(`"${spec}" is too large or unreadable`);
+      sources[destRel] = external_node_path_.relative(rootReal, found);
+      const depAst = parseSource(dep.text);
+      if (!depAst) return fail(`"${spec}" could not be parsed`);
+      const r = collect(found, depAst, count + 1); if (r) return r;
+    }
+    return null;
+  };
+  const bad = collect(src.real, ast, 0);
+  if (bad) return bad;
+  if (external.length) return fail(`the flagged code needs ${[...new Set(external)].slice(0, 4).join(', ')}, which is not installed in the proof environment; only Node built-ins and repository files can be loaded`, { missing: [...new Set(external)] });
+
+  const esm = MODULE_SYNTAX.test(src.text) || external_node_path_.extname(rel).toLowerCase() === '.mjs';
+  const entry = `target${esm ? '.mjs' : '.cjs'}`;
+  sources[entry] = rel;
+  const assumptions = [];
+  const base = { schema: 'agentic-security/reproducer', version: 1, findingId: String(finding.stableId ?? finding.id ?? 'generated'), lang: 'javascript', oracle: cls.oracle, network: cls.network ?? 'none', ...(cls.watch ? { watch: cls.watch } : {}) };
+  if (cls.watch) assumptions.push('the write target is assumed to be one directory below the working directory (the payload is ../escaped.txt); if the code uses another base, the proof will not confirm');
+
+  // shape 1: a script that reads its payload from argv
+  if (/process\.argv\s*\[\s*2\s*\]|process\.argv\.slice\(\s*2\s*\)/.test(src.text) && !/\bmodule\.exports\b|^\s*export\s/m.test(src.text)) {
+    const reproducer = { ...base, sources, run: ['{{NODE}}', entry, cls.payload] };
+    const errs = (0,proof_fabric_reproducer/* validateReproducer */.mC)(reproducer);
+    return errs.length ? fail(`the generated reproducer is invalid: ${errs[0]}`) : { ok: true, reproducer, basis: { shape: 'script', class: cls.name, entry: rel, line: finding.line, assumptions } };
+  }
+
+  // shape 2: an exported function around the flagged line
+  const candidates = functionsAround(ast, finding.line);
+  if (!candidates.length) return fail('the flagged line is not inside a function, and the file does not read its payload from process.argv[2]');
+  let around = null; let exp = null;
+  for (const c of candidates) { const e = exportName(ast, c); if (e) { around = c; exp = e; break; } }
+  if (!around) return fail('the function around the flagged line is not exported, so nothing outside the file can call it');
+  const names = paramNames(around.node);
+  if (!names.length) return fail('the function around the flagged line takes no parameters, so the payload has no way in');
+  const window = lines.slice(Math.max(0, around.node.loc.start.line - 1), Math.min(lines.length, finding.line + 1)).join('\n');
+  const requestLike = names.findIndex((n) => n && /^(?:req|request)$/.test(n) && new RegExp(`\\b${n}\\.(?:body|query|params)\\b`).test(sinkLine));
+  const direct = requestLike >= 0 ? -1 : names.findIndex((n) => n && new RegExp(`\\b${n}\\b`).test(sinkLine));
+  const fallback = direct < 0 && requestLike < 0 ? names.findIndex((n) => n && new RegExp(`\\b${n}\\b`).test(window)) : -1;
+  const idx = requestLike >= 0 ? requestLike : direct >= 0 ? direct : fallback;
+  if (idx < 0) return fail('none of the function\'s parameters appears in the flagged code, so there is no tainted parameter to fill');
+  if (fallback >= 0) assumptions.push(`the tainted parameter "${names[idx]}" was chosen because it appears in the function body near the flagged line, not on the line itself`);
+  const args = names.map((_, i) => (i !== idx ? (/^(?:res|response)$/.test(names[i] ?? '') ? 'res' : 'undefined') : requestLike >= 0 ? '{ body: P, query: P, params: P, headers: P, cookies: P }' : 'payload'));
+  const files = { 'harness.mjs': harness({ esm, entry, exp, args }) };
+  const reproducer = { ...base, sources, files, run: ['{{NODE}}', 'harness.mjs', cls.payload] };
+  const errs = (0,proof_fabric_reproducer/* validateReproducer */.mC)(reproducer);
+  return errs.length ? fail(`the generated reproducer is invalid: ${errs[0]}`) : { ok: true, reproducer, basis: { shape: 'function', class: cls.name, entry: rel, line: finding.line, function: names.length ? `${exp.kind === 'named' ? exp.name : exp.kind}(${names.join(', ')})` : exp.kind, taintedParameter: names[idx], requestLike: requestLike >= 0, assumptions } };
+}
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/proof-fabric/cli.js
+// CLI surface for the proof fabric: `proof show|replay|doctor`, `triage exploit|validate`. Non-interactive by design: no
+// command reads stdin, every run is bounded by the policy timeouts, and a missing reproducer is a typed exit code, not a
+// prompt. Exit codes: 0 confirmed/ok, 1 not confirmed (any reason), 4 usage/precondition.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+function loadFinding(root, id) {
+  const p = (0,state_dir.statePath)(root, 'last-scan.json');
+  if (!external_node_fs_.existsSync(p)) return null;
+  const last = JSON.parse(external_node_fs_.readFileSync(p, 'utf8'));
+  return (last.findings || []).find((f) => f.id === id || f.stableId === id) ?? null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The reproducer for a finding: the one the person or agent supplied (or stored), else one built from the finding's own evidence.
+ * A generated reproducer is a proposal; it earns nothing until it is executed, and the result says it was generated.
+ */
+function resolveReproducer(root, finding, flagPath) {
+  const supplied = loadReproducer(root, finding.stableId ?? finding.id, flagPath) ?? (finding.stableId && finding.id !== finding.stableId ? loadReproducer(root, finding.id, flagPath) : null);
+  if (supplied) return { ...supplied, generated: null };
+  const g = generateReproducer({ finding, root });
+  if (!g.ok) return { reproducer: null, reason: g.reason };
+  return { reproducer: g.reproducer, file: null, generated: g.basis };
+}
+
+function loadReproducer(root, id, flagPath) {
+  const candidates = [flagPath && external_node_path_.resolve(String(flagPath)), (0,state_dir.statePath)(root, 'reproducers', `${(0,store.findingKey)(id)}.json`)].filter(Boolean);
+  for (const c of candidates) {
+    try { return { reproducer: JSON.parse(external_node_fs_.readFileSync(c, 'utf8')), file: c }; } catch { /* next */ }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function formatResult(r) {
+  const env = r.environment ? `${r.environment.mode} (${r.environment.assurance} assurance)` : 'none';
+  return [
+    `Finding: ${r.findingId}`,
+    `Evidence: ${r.state}`,
+    `Oracle: ${r.oracle}`,
+    `Reproductions: ${r.attempts?.successes ?? 0}/${r.attempts?.run ?? 0} (required ${r.attempts?.required})`,
+    `Independent replay: ${r.independentReplay?.status ?? 'not-run'}`,
+    `Environment: ${env}`,
+    `Completeness: ${r.completeness}`,
+    `Duration: ${(r.timing.proofMs / 1000).toFixed(1)}s`,
+    ...(r.degradation?.length ? [`Degraded: ${r.degradation.join(', ')}`] : []),
+    ...(r.note ? [`Note: ${r.note}`] : []),
+  ].join('\n');
+}
+
+async function cmdProve(args, root, { json = false } = {}) {
+  const id = String(args._[2] ?? '');
+  if (!id) { console.error('usage: triage exploit <finding-id> --prove [--reproducer file] [--attempts N] [--required N]'); return 4; }
+  const finding = loadFinding(root, id);
+  if (!finding) { console.error(`Finding ${id} not found in last scan.`); return 4; }
+  const loaded = resolveReproducer(root, finding, args.flags.reproducer);
+  if (!loaded.reproducer) { console.error(`No reproducer for ${id}, and none could be generated from the finding: ${loaded.reason}. Supply one with --reproducer <file> or place it at .agentic-security/reproducers/. Nothing was executed.`); return 4; }
+  if (loaded.generated) console.error(`Generated a reproducer from the finding (${loaded.generated.shape}, ${loaded.generated.class}). It is a proposal: it counts only if executing it confirms the exploit.`);
+  const errs = (0,proof_fabric_reproducer/* validateReproducer */.mC)(loaded.reproducer);
+  if (errs.length) { console.error(`Invalid reproducer: ${errs.join('; ')}`); return 4; }
+  const policy = {};
+  if (args.flags.attempts) policy.attempts = Number(args.flags.attempts);
+  if (args.flags.required) policy.required = Number(args.flags.required);
+  if (args.flags.timeout) policy.timeoutMs = Number(args.flags.timeout) * 1000;
+  if (args.flags['require-container']) policy.requireContainer = true;
+  const ac = new AbortController();
+  const onSig = () => ac.abort();
+  process.once('SIGINT', onSig);
+  let result;
+  try { result = await (0,orchestrator/* proveFinding */.kO)({ finding, reproducer: loaded.reproducer, revision: args.flags.revision ?? null, policy, signal: ac.signal, sourceRoot: root }); } finally { process.off('SIGINT', onSig); }
+  const saved = (0,store.saveProof)(root, { ...result, reproducer: loaded.reproducer, ...(loaded.generated ? { generatedFrom: loaded.generated } : {}) });
+  // Printed output gets the same secret-scrubbing pass as what is persisted (defense in depth: a free-text reason/note
+  // field that captured something from stdout/stderr should never reach a terminal unredacted either).
+  if (json || args.flags.json) console.log(JSON.stringify((0,store.scrubDeep)({ ...result, stored: saved.ok ? saved.file : null }), null, 2));
+  else { console.log(formatResult(result)); if (!saved.ok) console.log(`(proof not stored: ${saved.reason})`); }
+  return result.state === 'EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED' ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+async function cmdProof(args, root) {
+  const sub = args._[1];
+  if (sub === 'doctor') return doctor(args);
+  if (sub === 'generate') {
+    const gid = String(args._[2] ?? '');
+    const finding = gid ? loadFinding(root, gid) : null;
+    if (!finding) { console.error(gid ? `Finding ${gid} not found in last scan.` : 'usage: proof generate <finding-id> [--out file]'); return 4; }
+    const g = generateReproducer({ finding, root });
+    if (!g.ok) { console.error(`No reproducer could be generated: ${g.reason}`); return 1; }
+    const text = JSON.stringify({ ...g.reproducer, findingId: gid }, null, 2);
+    if (args.flags.out) { external_node_fs_.writeFileSync(external_node_path_.resolve(String(args.flags.out)), `${text}\n`); console.log(`Wrote ${external_node_path_.resolve(String(args.flags.out))} (${g.basis.shape}, ${g.basis.class}). Nothing was executed.`); } else console.log(text);
+    for (const a of g.basis.assumptions) console.error(`assumption: ${a}`);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  const id = String(args._[2] ?? '');
+  if (!id) { console.error('usage: proof show <finding-id> | proof replay <finding-id> | proof generate <finding-id> | proof doctor'); return 4; }
+  if (sub === 'show') {
+    const all = (0,store.listProofs)(root, id);
+    if (!all.length) { console.error(`No stored proof for ${id}.`); return 4; }
+    const latest = all.find((p) => p.record);
+    if (all.some((p) => p.tampered)) console.error(`WARNING: ${all.filter((p) => p.tampered).length} stored record(s) failed their integrity check and are not trusted.`);
+    const good = all.find((p) => p.record && !p.tampered);
+    if (!good) { console.error('No intact proof record.'); return 1; }
+    if (args.flags.json) console.log(JSON.stringify(good.record, null, 2)); else console.log(formatResult(good.record));
+    // the detection generated from this finding's proof (detection-and-response loop), when there is one
+    try {
+      const det = (await __webpack_require__.e(/* import() */ 8551).then(__webpack_require__.bind(__webpack_require__, 58551))).latestRecord(root, id, 'detection');
+      if (det && !args.flags.json) console.log(`Detection: ${det.record.ir?.id ?? 'unknown'} (${det.record.validation?.status ?? 'not validated'}${det.record.enabled ? ', enabled' : ''})`);
+    } catch { /* the proof output does not depend on it */ }
+    void latest;
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (sub === 'replay') {
+    const stored = (0,store.latestProof)(root, id);
+    if (!stored?.record?.reproducer) { console.error(`No stored reproducer for ${id}.`); return 4; }
+    const tmpDir = external_node_fs_.mkdtempSync(external_node_path_.join(external_node_os_.tmpdir(), 'proof-replay-'));
+    const tmp = external_node_path_.join(tmpDir, 'reproducer.json');
+    external_node_fs_.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(stored.record.reproducer));
+    args.flags.reproducer = tmp;
+    args._ = ['triage', 'exploit', id];
+    try { return await cmdProve(args, root); } finally { external_node_fs_.rmSync(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); }
+  }
+  console.error('usage: proof show|replay <finding-id> | proof doctor');
+  return 4;
+}
+
+function doctor(args) {
+  const tools = (0,runner/* hostTools */.qV)();
+  const rows = proof_fabric_reproducer/* LANGUAGES */.Yj.map((l) => ({ lang: l, ...(0,runner/* languageSupport */.ql)(l, tools) }));
+  const envs = ['javascript', 'python'].map((l) => ({ lang: l, ...(0,runner/* selectEnvironment */.aP)({ lang: l }) }));
+  if (args.flags.json) { console.log(JSON.stringify({ tools, languages: rows, environments: envs }, null, 2)); return 0; }
+  console.log('Proof fabric doctor');
+  for (const r of rows) console.log(`  ${r.lang.padEnd(11)} ${r.supported ? 'supported' : `unsupported (${r.reason})`}`);
+  for (const e of envs) console.log(`  environment for ${e.lang}: ${e.mode}, ${e.assurance} assurance${e.reason ? ` (${e.reason})` : ''}${e.containerSkipped ? `; container skipped: ${e.containerSkipped}` : ''}`);
+  const usable = envs.some((e) => e.mode !== 'unavailable');
+  if (!usable) console.log('  RESULT: no execution environment available; proofs will report blocked, never clean.');
+  return usable ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+
+/***/ }),
+
+/***/ 3740:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   kO: () => (/* binding */ proveFinding)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony exports independentVerify, applySeverityPolicy, _newRunId */
+/* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(77598);
+/* harmony import */ var _states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(12090);
+/* harmony import */ var _runner_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__ = __webpack_require__(23081);
+/* harmony import */ var _reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__ = __webpack_require__(37055);
+/* harmony import */ var _proof_tier_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_4__ = __webpack_require__(40216);
+// Proof orchestration: finding + revision + reproducer + policy -> structured evidence.
+//
+// Rules that make this safe to trust:
+//  * The model may propose a reproducer and select an oracle. The oracle (oracles.js) judges. Never a model.
+//  * An attempt that did not complete (timeout, build failure, blocked, unsupported, error) is NOT a negative and NOT a
+//    positive: it is degraded evidence, it never advances the state, and it makes the result INCOMPLETE.
+//  * EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED needs `required` successes in `attempts` completed attempts AND a pass from an independent
+//    verifier that receives only {revision, reproducer, findingId, oracle} in a fresh environment.
+//  * "Not reproduced" is reported as such; it is never reported as safe.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+const PROOF_POLICY_DEFAULTS = Object.freeze({ attempts: 3, required: 3, independentReplay: true, timeoutMs: 20_000, cpus: 1, memoryMb: 512, network: 'none', requireContainer: false });
+const RESULT_SCHEMA = 'agentic-security/proof-result';
+
+function normalizePolicy(p = {}) {
+  const x = { ...PROOF_POLICY_DEFAULTS, ...p };
+  x.attempts = Math.max(1, Math.min(10, Math.trunc(Number(x.attempts)) || PROOF_POLICY_DEFAULTS.attempts));
+  x.required = Math.max(1, Math.min(x.attempts, Math.trunc(Number(x.required)) || x.attempts));
+  x.timeoutMs = Math.max(1000, Math.min(120_000, Number(x.timeoutMs) || PROOF_POLICY_DEFAULTS.timeoutMs));
+  return x;
+}
+
+const summarize = (a) => ({ status: a.status, fired: a.oracle?.fired === true, inconclusive: a.oracle?.inconclusive === true, reason: a.oracle?.reason ?? a.reasons?.[0] ?? null, durationMs: a.durationMs, degraded: a.degraded });
+
+/**
+ * Independent verifier. Takes a verifierView ONLY; any extra property (a model's reasoning, prior results) is rejected so
+ * the isolation of its inputs is checkable rather than a convention.
+ */
+async function independentVerify(view, opts = {}) {
+  const allowed = new Set(['revision', 'reproducer', 'findingId', 'oracle']);
+  const extra = Object.keys(view || {}).filter((k) => !allowed.has(k));
+  if (extra.length) return { status: 'rejected', reason: `verifier input must be exactly revision, reproducer, findingId, oracle; got extra: ${extra.join(', ')}` };
+  const attempt = await (opts.attemptFn ?? _runner_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__/* .runAttempt */ .Tm)(structuredClone(view.reproducer), { ...opts, preferContainer: opts.preferContainer });
+  return { status: attempt.status === 'completed' ? (attempt.oracle?.fired ? 'confirmed' : 'not-reproduced') : 'incomplete', attempt: summarize(attempt), environment: attempt.environment ?? null };
+}
+
+/**
+ * @param {object} a
+ * @param {object} a.finding       the finding (id/stableId, severity, proofTier ...)
+ * @param {string} [a.revision]    commit the proof applies to
+ * @param {object} a.reproducer    serialized reproducer
+ * @param {object} [a.policy]
+ * @param {object} [a.deps]        test seams: { attemptFn }
+ */
+async function proveFinding({ finding, revision = null, reproducer, policy = {}, signal, deps = {}, sourceState = null, sourceRoot = null, overlay = null } = {}) {
+  const started = Date.now();
+  const pol = normalizePolicy(policy);
+  const attemptFn = deps.attemptFn ?? _runner_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__/* .runAttempt */ .Tm;
+  const findingId = finding?.stableId ?? finding?.id ?? reproducer?.findingId ?? 'unknown';
+  const degradation = [];
+  let state = sourceState ?? (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .fromProofTier */ .jn)((0,_proof_tier_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_4__/* .proofTierOf */ .gx)(finding || {}));
+  if (state === 'REPRODUCED') state = 'STATICALLY_CORROBORATED'; // an old single-run marker proof must be re-earned here
+  const startState = state;
+
+  const result = (extra) => ({
+    schema: RESULT_SCHEMA, version: 1, findingId, revision, startState, state, staticCorroboration: (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .stateRank */ .g3)(startState) >= 1, tier: (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .toProofTier */ .KF)(state),
+    oracle: reproducer?.oracle?.type ?? null, policy: pol,
+    reproducerDigest: reproducer ? safeDigest(reproducer) : null,
+    degradation, timing: { proofMs: Date.now() - started }, ...extra,
+  });
+
+  const errs = reproducer ? (0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .validateReproducer */ .mC)(reproducer) : ['no reproducer supplied'];
+  if (errs.length) { degradation.push('invalid-reproducer'); return result({ completeness: 'INCOMPLETE', outcome: 'invalid-reproducer', reasons: errs, attempts: { required: pol.required, run: 0, successes: 0, incomplete: 0 }, independentReplay: { status: 'not-run' } }); }
+
+  // A valid reproducer is itself the REPRODUCER_GENERATED rung. Static corroboration is recorded, not required: an exploit
+  // that reproduces under an independent oracle is deterministic corroboration in its own right, and a pattern-only finding
+  // must not be unable to earn proof merely because the taint engine never saw it. The record says which it was.
+  const staticCorroboration = (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .stateRank */ .g3)(startState) >= (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .stateRank */ .g3)('STATICALLY_CORROBORATED');
+  if (!staticCorroboration) degradation.push('no-static-corroboration');
+  state = 'REPRODUCER_GENERATED';
+
+  const attempts = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < pol.attempts; i++) {
+    if (signal?.aborted) { degradation.push('cancelled'); break; }
+    const a = await attemptFn(structuredClone(reproducer), { limits: { timeoutMs: pol.timeoutMs }, signal, requireContainer: pol.requireContainer, preferContainer: pol.preferContainer, force: pol.force, sourceRoot, overlay });
+    attempts.push(a);
+    // Stop early once the threshold can no longer be met only if every attempt is a decisive negative; incomplete runs continue.
+  }
+  const completed = attempts.filter((a) => a.status === 'completed' && !a.oracle?.inconclusive);
+  const successes = completed.filter((a) => a.oracle?.fired).length;
+  const incomplete = attempts.length - completed.length;
+  for (const a of attempts) for (const d of a.degraded || []) if (!degradation.includes(d)) degradation.push(d);
+  if (incomplete) degradation.push(`incomplete-attempts:${incomplete}`);
+  const env = attempts.find((a) => a.environment)?.environment ?? null;
+  const base = {
+    environment: env && { mode: env.mode, assurance: env.assurance, backend: env.backend ?? null, note: env.note ?? null },
+    build: attempts.some((a) => a.status === 'build-failed') ? 'failed' : attempts.length ? 'ok' : 'not-run',
+    attempts: { required: pol.required, run: attempts.length, successes, incomplete, detail: attempts.map(summarize) },
+    artifactHashes: { reproducer: safeDigest(reproducer), observations: (0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .sha256 */ .sc)((0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .canonicalize */ .dw)(attempts.map((a) => a.observation ?? null))) },
+  };
+
+  if (successes > 0) {
+    const r = (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .advance */ .np)(state, 'REPRODUCED'); if (r.ok) state = r.state;
+  }
+  if (!attempts.length) return result({ ...base, completeness: 'INCOMPLETE', outcome: 'not-run', independentReplay: { status: 'not-run' } });
+  if (successes === 0) {
+    const decisive = completed.length === attempts.length;
+    return result({ ...base, completeness: decisive ? 'FULL' : 'INCOMPLETE', outcome: decisive ? 'not-reproduced' : 'inconclusive', note: 'not reproduced is not proof of safety', independentReplay: { status: 'not-run' } });
+  }
+  if (successes < pol.required || incomplete) {
+    return result({ ...base, completeness: incomplete ? 'INCOMPLETE' : 'DEGRADED', outcome: 'reproduced-below-threshold', independentReplay: { status: 'not-run' } });
+  }
+
+  let independent = { status: 'skipped' };
+  if (pol.independentReplay) {
+    independent = await independentVerify((0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .verifierView */ .IW)({ revision, reproducer, findingId, oracle: reproducer.oracle }), { attemptFn, limits: { timeoutMs: pol.timeoutMs }, signal, requireContainer: pol.requireContainer, force: pol.force, sourceRoot, overlay });
+    if (independent.status !== 'confirmed') degradation.push(`independent-replay:${independent.status}`);
+  } else degradation.push('independent-replay-disabled');
+  if (independent.status === 'confirmed') {
+    const r = (0,_states_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .advance */ .np)(state, 'EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED'); if (r.ok) state = r.state;
+  }
+  const full = state === 'EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED' && base.environment?.assurance !== 'none';
+  return result({ ...base, independentReplay: independent, completeness: full ? (base.environment.assurance === 'lower' ? 'DEGRADED' : 'FULL') : 'INCOMPLETE', outcome: full ? 'exploit-confirmed' : 'reproduced-unverified' });
+}
+
+const safeDigest = (r) => { try { return (0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .reproducerDigest */ .we)(r); } catch { return null; } };
+
+/** Severity policy: optional, never on by default. Returns the finding unchanged unless the policy asks to demote. */
+function applySeverityPolicy(finding, evidenceState, policy) {
+  const req = policy?.criticalRequires;
+  if (!Array.isArray(req) || !req.length || finding?.severity !== 'critical') return finding;
+  const ok = req.some((s) => stateRankOf(evidenceState ?? 'CANDIDATE') >= stateRankOf(s));
+  return ok ? finding : { ...finding, severity: 'high', severityPolicy: { demotedFrom: 'critical', reason: `critical requires ${req.join(' or ')}; evidence state is ${evidenceState ?? 'CANDIDATE'}` } };
+}
+const _newRunId = () => randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
+
+
+/***/ }),
+
+/***/ 12090:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   KF: () => (/* binding */ toProofTier),
+/* harmony export */   g3: () => (/* binding */ stateRank),
+/* harmony export */   jn: () => (/* binding */ fromProofTier),
+/* harmony export */   np: () => (/* binding */ advance)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* unused harmony exports EVIDENCE_STATES, COMPLETENESS */
+// Evidence state ladder for the Universal Exploit Proof Fabric.
+//
+// Evidence state is SEPARATE from severity and confidence. It extends, never replaces, the vocabulary that already
+// exists: `proof-tier.js` (execution-proven / proof-failed / taint-proven / unproven) and the fix-verify legs
+// (`verifiedFull`, `degradedLegs`). `toProofTier` / `fromProofTier` are the explicit bridges.
+//
+// Transitions are guarded: a state can only be reached from the state directly before it (or by dropping back), so no
+// caller can jump a finding to EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED without passing REPRODUCED, or to FIX_VERIFIED without
+// FIX_REPLAY_BLOCKED. A degraded or incomplete run NEVER advances a state.
+const EVIDENCE_STATES = Object.freeze([
+  'CANDIDATE',
+  'STATICALLY_CORROBORATED',
+  'REPRODUCER_GENERATED',
+  'REPRODUCED',
+  'EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED',
+  'FIX_REPLAY_BLOCKED',
+  'FIX_VERIFIED',
+]);
+
+const stateRank = (s) => EVIDENCE_STATES.indexOf(s);
+
+const REQUIRES_PREDECESSOR = Object.freeze(Object.fromEntries(EVIDENCE_STATES.map((s, i) => [s, i === 0 ? null : EVIDENCE_STATES[i - 1]])));
+
+/**
+ * Advance `from` to `to`. Returns { ok, state, reason }. Moving up requires `to` to be exactly the next rung; moving
+ * down or staying is always allowed (evidence can be lost, never invented). Unknown states are rejected.
+ */
+function advance(from, to) {
+  if (!EVIDENCE_STATES.includes(from)) return { ok: false, state: 'CANDIDATE', reason: `unknown current state: ${String(from)}` };
+  if (!EVIDENCE_STATES.includes(to)) return { ok: false, state: from, reason: `unknown target state: ${String(to)}` };
+  if (stateRank(to) <= stateRank(from)) return { ok: true, state: to, reason: null };
+  if (REQUIRES_PREDECESSOR[to] !== from) return { ok: false, state: from, reason: `cannot reach ${to} from ${from}: ${REQUIRES_PREDECESSOR[to]} is required first` };
+  return { ok: true, state: to, reason: null };
+}
+
+// Bridges to the older vocabulary so existing consumers keep working.
+function toProofTier(state) {
+  const r = stateRank(state);
+  if (r >= stateRank('EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED')) return 'execution-proven';
+  if (r >= stateRank('STATICALLY_CORROBORATED')) return 'taint-proven';
+  return 'unproven';
+}
+
+function fromProofTier(tier) {
+  if (tier === 'taint-proven') return 'STATICALLY_CORROBORATED';
+  // execution-proven under the older single-run marker path is one run, not the 3/3 + independent replay the fabric
+  // requires, so it maps to REPRODUCED and never to EXPLOIT_CONFIRMED.
+  if (tier === 'execution-proven') return 'REPRODUCED';
+  return 'CANDIDATE';
+}
+
+// Completeness vocabulary shared with fix-verify: FULL only when nothing was skipped.
+const COMPLETENESS = Object.freeze(['FULL', 'DEGRADED', 'INCOMPLETE']);
+
+
+/***/ }),
+
+/***/ 62199:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+__webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
+/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+/* harmony export */   findingKey: () => (/* binding */ findingKey),
+/* harmony export */   latestProof: () => (/* binding */ latestProof),
+/* harmony export */   listProofs: () => (/* binding */ listProofs),
+/* harmony export */   saveProof: () => (/* binding */ saveProof),
+/* harmony export */   scrubDeep: () => (/* binding */ scrubDeep)
+/* harmony export */ });
+/* harmony import */ var node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(73024);
+/* harmony import */ var node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(76760);
+/* harmony import */ var _state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__ = __webpack_require__(31174);
+/* harmony import */ var _encryption_provider_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__ = __webpack_require__(39984);
+/* harmony import */ var _llm_validator_redact_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_4__ = __webpack_require__(65388);
+/* harmony import */ var _reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_5__ = __webpack_require__(37055);
+// Proof artifact store: `.agentic-security/proofs/<findingKey>/<recordDigest>.json`.
+//
+// Reuses the existing state machinery rather than adding another: `safeWriteState` (refuses unsafe dirs and symlinks),
+// `maybeEncryptForWrite` / `maybeDecryptForRead` (the `proofs` artifact is registered `confidential`), retention
+// (evidence class) and legal holds (a hold on `proofs` blocks purge). Nothing persisted contains a plaintext credential:
+// records are passed through a recursive secret filter first, and the runner never returns its per-run nonce or secrets.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+const PROOF_RECORD_SCHEMA = 'agentic-security/proof-record';
+const PROOFS_DIR = 'proofs';
+const MAX_RECORD_BYTES = 512 * 1024;
+
+const findingKey = (id) => `${String(id).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '_').slice(0, 80)}-${(0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_5__/* .sha256 */ .sc)(String(id)).slice(0, 8)}`;
+
+// The shared redactor catches key=value shapes; bare tokens need their own pass, so persisted evidence cannot carry one.
+const BARE_SECRET_RES = [
+  /\b(?:ghp|gho|ghu|ghs|ghr|github_pat)_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}\b/g, /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[A-Z0-9]{16}\b/g, /\bsk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g,
+  /\bxox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}\b/g, /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g,
+  /-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)/g, /\bSECRET-[0-9a-f]{24}-[a-z0-9_-]+\b/g,
+];
+function scrubString(text) {
+  let t = String(text);
+  try { t = (0,_llm_validator_redact_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_4__/* .redactSecrets */ .f)(t).text; } catch { return '[unredactable]'; }
+  for (const re of BARE_SECRET_RES) t = t.replace(re, '[REDACTED-SECRET]');
+  return t;
+}
+
+/** Deep-copy `v` with every string passed through the secret redactor. */
+function scrubDeep(v) {
+  if (typeof v === 'string') return scrubString(v);
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(scrubDeep);
+  if (v && typeof v === 'object') return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(v).map(([k, x]) => [k, scrubDeep(x)]));
+  return v;
+}
+
+function recordDigest(record) {
+  const { recordDigest: _omit, ...rest } = record;
+  return (0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_5__/* .sha256 */ .sc)((0,_reproducer_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_5__/* .canonicalize */ .dw)(rest));
+}
+
+function saveProof(scanRoot, record) {
+  const safe = scrubDeep(record);
+  safe.schema = PROOF_RECORD_SCHEMA;
+  safe.recordDigest = recordDigest(safe);
+  const text = JSON.stringify(safe, null, 2);
+  if (Buffer.byteLength(text) > MAX_RECORD_BYTES) return { ok: false, reason: 'proof record exceeds the size limit' };
+  if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.ensureStateDir)(scanRoot)) return { ok: false, reason: 'no safe state directory for this project' };
+  const enc = (0,_encryption_provider_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__/* .maybeEncryptForWrite */ .v2)(scanRoot, PROOFS_DIR, text);
+  if (!enc.ok) return { ok: false, reason: enc.reason };
+  const file = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.statePath)(scanRoot, PROOFS_DIR, findingKey(record.findingId), `${safe.recordDigest}.json`);
+  if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.safeWriteState)(file, enc.content)) return { ok: false, reason: 'state write refused' };
+  return { ok: true, file, digest: safe.recordDigest, encrypted: enc.encrypted };
+}
+
+function readRecord(file) {
+  const text = (0,_encryption_provider_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__.maybeDecryptForRead)(node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
+  const rec = JSON.parse(text);
+  // A record whose content no longer matches its own digest was modified after it was written.
+  if (rec.recordDigest !== recordDigest(rec)) return { tampered: true, record: rec };
+  return { tampered: false, record: rec };
+}
+
+/** Newest-first records for a finding. Tampered records are returned flagged, never silently dropped or trusted. */
+function listProofs(scanRoot, findingId) {
+  const dir = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.statePath)(scanRoot, PROOFS_DIR, findingKey(findingId));
+  let names = [];
+  try { names = node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readdirSync(dir).filter((n) => n.endsWith('.json')); } catch { return []; }
+  const out = [];
+  for (const n of names) {
+    const f = node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.join(dir, n);
+    try { const { tampered, record } = readRecord(f); out.push({ file: f, tampered, record, mtime: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.statSync(f).mtimeMs }); } catch { out.push({ file: f, tampered: true, record: null, mtime: 0 }); }
+  }
+  return out.sort((a, b) => b.mtime - a.mtime);
+}
+
+function latestProof(scanRoot, findingId) {
+  return listProofs(scanRoot, findingId).find((p) => p.record) ?? null;
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};