@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.155.0 → 0.156.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +16 -0
- package/dist/8798.index.js +4 -2
- package/dist/agentic-security.mjs +3 -3
- package/dist/agentic-security.mjs.sha256 +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/language/haskell-guards.js +12 -5
- package/src/language/haskell-ir.js +8 -1
- package/src/language/haskell-models.js +8 -0
- package/src/language/haskell-security-rules.js +23 -2
- package/src/language/haskell-web.js +3 -0
- package/src/language/nix-secrets.js +2 -0
- package/src/language/nixos-hardening.js +32 -1
- package/src/language/support-registry.js +5 -1
- package/src/language/witness.js +4 -2
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71a2f80d8b60918125a14973bffd460f469848dc1b0aac126272864b539b61ce agentic-security.mjs
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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{
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"name": "@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner",
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"version": "0.
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"version": "0.156.0",
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"description": "Scanner engine for the agentic-security Claude Code plugin — SAST, SCA (function-level reachability + CISA KEV), secrets, IaC, prompt-injection, MCP/agent-tool audit, auth/authZ deep analysis, attack chains, PoC generation, business logic, toxic-combinations scoring, SBOM, pipeline integrity, compliance attestation, and more.",
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"type": "module",
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"main": "src/index.js",
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@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
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"test:server": "node --test test/server/graph-loader.test.js test/server/security.test.js test/server/routes.test.js test/server/http-server.test.js test/server/cmd-explore.test.js test/server/cmd-dataflow-export.test.js test/server/static-assets.test.js test/server/dataflow-scenario-cli.test.js test/server/dataflow-impact-cli.test.js",
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"test:haskell": "node --test test/haskell/haskell-injection.test.js test/haskell/haskell-ir.test.js test/haskell/haskell-manifests.test.js test/haskell/haskell-parser.test.js test/haskell/haskell-remediation.test.js test/haskell/haskell-resolved-graph.test.js test/haskell/haskell-sca.test.js test/haskell/haskell-security-rules.test.js test/haskell/haskell-taint.test.js",
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"test:nix": "node --test test/nix/nix-build-trust.test.js test/nix/nix-eval-isolation.test.js test/nix/nix-input-inventory.test.js test/nix/nix-parser-ir.test.js test/nix/nix-remediation.test.js test/nix/nix-resolved-closure.test.js test/nix/nix-sca-patches.test.js test/nix/nix-script-taint.test.js test/nix/nix-secrets-store.test.js test/nix/nixos-hardening.test.js test/nix/nixos-module-resolution.test.js",
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"test:language": "node --test test/language/capability-ledger.test.js test/language/language-accuracy-regression.test.js test/language/language-aibom.test.js test/language/language-assurance.test.js test/language/language-bom.test.js test/language/language-compliance.test.js test/language/language-contracts.test.js test/language/language-corpora-integrity.test.js test/language/language-discovery.test.js test/language/language-doc-coverage.test.js test/language/language-evidence-posture.test.js test/language/language-explorer.test.js test/language/language-governance.test.js test/language/language-integrations.test.js test/language/language-llm-agent.test.js test/language/language-local-ai.test.js test/language/language-polyglot-bridges.test.js test/language/language-privacy-lineage.test.js test/language/language-proof-remediation.test.js test/language/language-report-formats.test.js test/language/language-secrets.test.js test/language/language-trust-boundary.test.js",
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"test:language": "node --test test/language/capability-ledger.test.js test/language/language-accuracy-regression.test.js test/language/language-aibom.test.js test/language/language-assurance.test.js test/language/language-bom.test.js test/language/language-compliance.test.js test/language/language-contracts.test.js test/language/language-corpora-integrity.test.js test/language/language-discovery.test.js test/language/language-doc-coverage.test.js test/language/language-evidence-posture.test.js test/language/language-explorer.test.js test/language/language-gap-fixes.test.js test/language/language-governance.test.js test/language/language-integrations.test.js test/language/language-llm-agent.test.js test/language/language-local-ai.test.js test/language/language-polyglot-bridges.test.js test/language/language-privacy-lineage.test.js test/language/language-proof-remediation.test.js test/language/language-report-formats.test.js test/language/language-secrets.test.js test/language/language-trust-boundary.test.js",
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"test:language-stress": "node --test --test-concurrency=1 test/language/language-stress-offline.test.js",
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"test:language-tools": "node --test test/haskell/haskell-web-auth.test.js test/haskell/haskell-support-gate.test.js",
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"bench:language-support:check": "node ../bench/language-support/check.mjs",
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@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ function identNames(e, out = new Set(), depth = 0) {
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const mentions = (e, vars) => { for (const n of identNames(e)) if (vars.has(n)) return true; return false; };
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/** Classify a condition over the value `vars`. -> {safeWhen, kind, families, needsCanon?, subject} | null */
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export function classifyCondition(c, vars) {
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export function classifyCondition(c, vars, derived = new Set()) {
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if (!c || typeof c !== 'object') return null;
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if (c.kind === 'binary') {
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if (c.op === '&&') { const a = classifyCondition(c.left, vars); const b = classifyCondition(c.right, vars); return [a, b].find((x) => x && x.safeWhen === true) || null; }
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if (c.op === '||') { const a = classifyCondition(c.left, vars); const b = classifyCondition(c.right, vars); return [a, b].find((x) => x && x.safeWhen === false) || null; }
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if (c.op === '&&') { const a = classifyCondition(c.left, vars, derived); const b = classifyCondition(c.right, vars, derived); return [a, b].find((x) => x && x.safeWhen === true) || null; }
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if (c.op === '||') { const a = classifyCondition(c.left, vars, derived); const b = classifyCondition(c.right, vars, derived); return [a, b].find((x) => x && x.safeWhen === false) || null; }
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if (c.op === '==' || c.op === '===') {
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const pair = (l, r) => l && l.kind === 'call' && /(?:^|\.)takeFileName$/.test(l.callee || '') && l.args && l.args[0] && r && r.kind === 'ident' && l.args[0].kind === 'ident' && l.args[0].name === r.name && vars.has(r.name);
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if (pair(c.left, c.right) || pair(c.right, c.left)) return { safeWhen: true, kind: 'bare-filename', families: ['path'], subject: (c.left.kind === 'ident' ? c.left : c.right).name };
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@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ export function classifyCondition(c, vars) {
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if (c.kind !== 'call') return null;
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const name = c.callee || '';
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const a = c.args || [];
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if (name === 'not' || name === 'Prelude.not') { const inner = classifyCondition(a[0], vars); return inner ? { ...inner, safeWhen: !inner.safeWhen } : null; }
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if (name === 'not' || name === 'Prelude.not') { const inner = classifyCondition(a[0], vars, derived); return inner ? { ...inner, safeWhen: !inner.safeWhen } : null; }
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if (name === 'Data.List.isInfixOf' && isStr(a[0]) && a[0].value.includes('..') && a[1] && a[1].kind === 'ident' && vars.has(a[1].name)) {
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return { safeWhen: false, kind: 'traversal-check', families: ['path'], subject: a[1].name };
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}
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@@ -70,6 +70,12 @@ export function classifyCondition(c, vars) {
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if ((IS_ELEM.has(name) || NOT_ELEM.has(name)) && isStr(a[0]) && a[0].value === '..' && a[1] && a[1].kind === 'call' && /(?:^|\.)(?:splitDirectories|splitPath)$/.test(a[1].callee || '') && a[1].args && a[1].args[0] && a[1].args[0].kind === 'ident' && vars.has(a[1].args[0].name)) {
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return { safeWhen: NOT_ELEM.has(name), kind: 'traversal-check', families: ['path'], subject: a[1].args[0].name };
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}
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// `uriRegName a `elem` ["api.example.com"]` where `a` was parsed from the checked URL: the host is on an allow-list, which is the
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// URL family's control. Only a HOST accessor over a value derived from the checked one counts (a path or query allow-list does not).
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if ((IS_ELEM.has(name) || NOT_ELEM.has(name)) && a[0] && a[0].kind === 'call' && /(?:^|\.)(?:uriRegName|uriAuthority|getHost)$/.test(a[0].callee || '') && a[0].args && a[0].args[0] && a[0].args[0].kind === 'ident'
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&& (vars.has(a[0].args[0].name) || derived.has(a[0].args[0].name)) && a[1] && a[1].kind === 'array' && a[1].elements.length && a[1].elements.every(isStr)) {
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return { safeWhen: IS_ELEM.has(name), kind: 'host-allow-list', families: ['url'], subject: a[0].args[0].name };
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}
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if ((IS_ELEM.has(name) || NOT_ELEM.has(name)) && a[0] && a[0].kind === 'ident' && vars.has(a[0].name) && !mentions(a[1], vars)) {
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return { safeWhen: IS_ELEM.has(name), kind: 'allow-list', families: ['*'], subject: a[0].name };
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}
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@@ -280,10 +286,11 @@ export function judgeFinding(f, perFile) {
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// The sink argument may be a value BUILT from the checked one (`req <- parseUrlThrow target; httpLbs req m`): the
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// guard names the original, so the origins of the argument count as its subject too.
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for (const v of originsOf(fn, vars)) vars.add(v);
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const derived = derivedFrom(fn, vars); // values built FROM the checked one (`a` in `Just a <- parseURI url`)
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const facts = [...site.facts, ...cfgBranchFacts(fn, site.nodeId), ...exitGuardFacts(fn, site.nodeId)];
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let refuted = null;
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for (const fact of facts) {
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const cls = classifyCondition(fact.cond, vars);
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const cls = classifyCondition(fact.cond, vars, derived);
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if (!cls || cls.safeWhen !== fact.when) continue;
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if (!(cls.families.includes('*') || cls.families.includes(fam))) continue; // wrong-context control
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if (cls.needsCanon && !isCanonical(fn, cls.subject)) { weak = { kind: cls.kind, line: fact.line || fn.line, reason: 'containment check on a path that was not canonicalised' }; continue; }
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const mem = { kind: 'member', object: obj, prop: r.name };
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return argAsts.length === 1 ? mem : { kind: 'call', callee: '<indirect>', args: [mem, ...argAsts.slice(1).map((a) => this.lowerExpr(a, ln))], hs: { status: 'unknown', reason: 'field-applied' } };
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}
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let args = argAsts.map((a) => this.lowerExpr(a, ln));
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// `lookup key table` returns an element OF the table: the key chooses which, it is not where the value comes from. Only the table
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// flows to the result, so a constant table gives a constant result however tainted the key is.
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let selector = null;
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if (f.name === 'lookup' && args.length === 2 && (r.kind === 'builtin' || r.kind === 'external')) { selector = args[0]; args = [args[1]]; }
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const hs = { via };
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// The key stays on the call as `hs.selector`: taint ignores it (it only chooses), but a rule asking "does caller text decide whether
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// this fails" (fromJust (lookup key t)) still sees it.
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if (selector) hs.selector = selector;
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let callee = f.qual ? `${f.qual}.${f.name}` : f.name;
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const arity = (r.kind === 'def' && r.def.kind === 'fun') ? r.def.arity : (r.kind === 'localfn' ? r.arity : -1);
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if ((r.kind === 'def' && r.def.kind === 'fun') || r.kind === 'localfn') {
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@@ -163,6 +163,14 @@ san('Text.Blaze', ['toMarkup', 'toValue', 'text', 'string', 'lazyText'], ['xss']
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san('Lucid', ['toHtml', 'toHtmlRaw_'], ['xss'], 'Lucid.toHtml escapes');
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san('System.FilePath', ['takeFileName', 'takeBaseName'], ['path'], 'drops every directory component');
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san('System.FilePath.Posix', ['takeFileName', 'takeBaseName'], ['path'], 'drops every directory component');
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// A function whose result is a number or a boolean cannot carry caller text: nothing of the argument survives (`show (length x)`).
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const ALL_FAMILIES = ['*'];
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san('Prelude', ['length', 'null', 'fromEnum'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number or boolean: no caller text survives');
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san('Data.List', ['length', 'genericLength'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number: no caller text survives');
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san('Data.Foldable', ['length', 'null'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number or boolean: no caller text survives');
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san('Data.Text', ['length'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number: no caller text survives');
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san('Data.ByteString', ['length'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number: no caller text survives');
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san('Data.Char', ['ord'], ALL_FAMILIES, 'returns a number: no caller text survives');
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san('Database.PostgreSQL.Simple', ['Only'], [], 'binds a parameter; it is a safe argument position, not a query-text sanitizer');
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export const HS_SOURCES = Object.freeze(SRC);
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@@ -57,10 +57,14 @@ const STRONG_KDF = /^(?:Crypto\.KDF\.BCrypt\.|Crypto\.Argon2\.|Crypto\.Scrypt\.|
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const UNSAFE_CALLS = { 'System.IO.Unsafe.unsafePerformIO': 'unsafePerformIO', 'System.IO.Unsafe.unsafeInterleaveIO': 'unsafeInterleaveIO', 'System.IO.Unsafe.unsafeDupablePerformIO': 'unsafeDupablePerformIO', 'Unsafe.Coerce.unsafeCoerce': 'unsafeCoerce' };
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const TIME_SOURCES = new Set(['Data.Time.Clock.POSIX.getPOSIXTime', 'Data.Time.Clock.getCurrentTime', 'System.CPUTime.getCPUTime']);
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const
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const SECURITY_FN_SUBSTR = /(?:token|nonce|secret|otp|csrf|session|salt|apikey|resetcode|passcode|verification)/i;
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// Short credential words that would over-match as substrings (`spin`, `mapping`, `keyboard`): matched as whole camelCase / snake_case words.
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const SECURITY_WORDS = new Set(['pin', 'password', 'passwd', 'credential', 'credentials']);
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const SECURITY_FN = { test: (name) => SECURITY_FN_SUBSTR.test(name) || String(name).replace(/([a-z0-9])([A-Z])/g, '$1_$2').toLowerCase().split(/[^a-z0-9]+/).some((w) => SECURITY_WORDS.has(w)) };
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const INPUT_READS = new Set(['Prelude.getContents', 'System.IO.getContents', 'System.IO.hGetContents', 'Data.ByteString.getContents', 'Data.ByteString.hGetContents', 'Data.ByteString.Char8.getContents', 'Data.ByteString.Char8.hGetContents', 'Data.ByteString.Lazy.getContents', 'Data.ByteString.Lazy.hGetContents', 'Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8.getContents', 'Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8.hGetContents', 'Data.Text.IO.getContents', 'Data.Text.IO.hGetContents', 'Data.Text.Lazy.IO.getContents', 'Data.Text.Lazy.IO.hGetContents']);
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const BOUNDING = /(?:^|\.)(?:take|hGetSome|hGet|splitAt|limit|limitedRead)$/;
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// `replicateM n getLine` reads n lines: the count is an allocation (and an input loop) sized by whoever supplied n.
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const ALLOCATORS = new Set(['replicate', 'Prelude.replicate', 'Data.List.replicate', 'Data.ByteString.replicate', 'Data.ByteString.Char8.replicate', 'Data.ByteString.Lazy.replicate', 'Data.Text.replicate', 'Data.Vector.replicate', 'Control.Monad.replicateM', 'Control.Monad.replicateM_', 'Data.Vector.replicateM', 'Data.List.genericReplicate']);
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const CLAMPS = /^(?:(?:Prelude|Data\.Ord)\.)?(?:min|clamp)$/;
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const PARTIALS = new Set(['read', 'Prelude.read', 'head', 'Prelude.head', 'Data.List.head', 'tail', 'Prelude.tail', 'Data.List.tail', 'last', 'Prelude.last', 'Data.List.last', 'init', 'Prelude.init', 'Data.List.init', 'Data.Maybe.fromJust', 'fromJust']);
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const SESSION_COOKIE = /(?:sess|sid|token|tok|auth|jwt|csrf|login|remember|secret)/i;
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@@ -77,6 +81,7 @@ const kids = (e) => {
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for (const k of ['left', 'right', 'object', 'value', 'callee']) if (e[k] && typeof e[k] === 'object') out.push(e[k]);
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for (const k of ['args', 'elements', 'branches', 'parts']) if (Array.isArray(e[k])) out.push(...e[k]);
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if (Array.isArray(e.props)) for (const p of e.props) if (p && p.value) out.push(p.value);
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if (e.hs && e.hs.selector && typeof e.hs.selector === 'object') out.push(e.hs.selector); // `lookup key t`: the key decides the outcome
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return out;
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};
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@@ -210,6 +215,11 @@ export function analyzeHaskellRules(files, opts = {}) {
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}
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continue;
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}
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// `xs !! n` raises on a short list: a partial function, written as an operator, applied to caller-supplied text
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if (e.kind === 'binary' && e.op === '!!' && e.left && mentionsText(e.left)) {
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emit('hs-partial-function-on-input', file, e.line || node.line, { detail: '!! on a caller-supplied list', evidence: { partial: '!!' } });
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continue;
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}
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if (e.kind !== 'call' || typeof e.callee !== 'string') continue;
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const c = e.callee;
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const line = e.line || node.line;
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@@ -301,7 +311,18 @@ export function analyzeHaskellRules(files, opts = {}) {
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// a file append is a log only when its path says so (a log, audit or trace file)
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if (sink.channel === 'file') { const p = (e.args || [])[0]; if (!(p && p.kind === 'literal' && /(?:log|audit|trace|journal)/i.test(String(p.value)))) continue; }
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let hit = null;
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// a labelled value: a literal that names a credential ("token=", "password: ") followed by a non-literal operand
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if (!hit) {
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for (const x of walk(arg)) {
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if (x.kind === 'binary' && x.hs && x.hs.concat && x.left && x.left.kind === 'literal' && typeof x.left.value === 'string' && /^\s*[\w .-]*(?:pass(?:word|wd|phrase)?|pwd|secret|token|api_?key|authorization|bearer|private_?key|session_?id)[\w .-]*\s*[=:]\s*$/i.test(x.left.value) && x.right && x.right.kind !== 'literal') {
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const lab = x.left.value.replace(/[=:\s]+$/, '').trim();
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hit = { name: lab, low: LOW_ENTROPY.test(lab), hashed: false, var: lab };
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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324
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for (const n of names(arg)) {
|
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if (hit) break;
|
|
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|
const bare = n.replace(/^\./, '');
|
|
306
327
|
if (sensitive.has(n)) hit = { ...sensitive.get(n), var: n };
|
|
307
328
|
else if (SENSITIVE.test(bare) && !/^[A-Z][A-Za-z0-9_.]*\./.test(n)) hit = { name: bare, low: LOW_ENTROPY.test(bare), hashed: false, var: n };
|
|
@@ -201,6 +201,9 @@ function handlerFacts(ctx, fn) {
|
|
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201
201
|
if (e.kind === 'union' && e.hs && e.hs.branchConds) for (const bc of e.hs.branchConds) conds.push(bc.cond);
|
|
202
202
|
}
|
|
203
203
|
}
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|
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|
+
// Program order is SOURCE order. A wrapper guard (`guarded $ do ...`) encloses the statements it protects, but the lowering emits
|
|
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+
// those statements as earlier control-flow nodes than the call that contains them, so node order would make the guard look late.
|
|
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|
+
ordered.sort((a, b) => (Number.isFinite(a.line) && Number.isFinite(b.line) ? a.line - b.line : 0));
|
|
204
207
|
const isGuardCall = (c) => {
|
|
205
208
|
if (GUARD_PRIMITIVES.has(c.callee)) return true;
|
|
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209
|
if (c.hs && c.hs.status === 'resolved' && c.hs.target) return guardSummary(ctx, ctx.fnByQid.get(c.hs.target)).auth;
|
|
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ export function plausibleSecret(v) {
|
|
|
67
67
|
if (/^\/(?:run|var|etc|nix|home|usr|opt|tmp)\//.test(t) || /^\.{0,2}\//.test(t)) return false;
|
|
68
68
|
if (/^(?:https?|file|unix):\/\/[^:@\s]*$/.test(t)) return false;
|
|
69
69
|
if (/^\$\{|^\$[A-Za-z_]/.test(t)) return false;
|
|
70
|
+
// wpa_supplicant's `ext:NAME` is a REFERENCE to a variable supplied at runtime (networking.wireless.environmentFile), not a value
|
|
71
|
+
if (/^ext:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/.test(t)) return false;
|
|
70
72
|
return true;
|
|
71
73
|
}
|
|
72
74
|
|
|
@@ -140,6 +140,31 @@ const hasPathNode = (n, depth = 0) => {
|
|
|
140
140
|
for (const k of Object.keys(n)) { const v = n[k]; if (Array.isArray(v)) { if (v.some((x) => hasPathNode(x, depth + 1))) return true; } else if (v && typeof v === 'object' && hasPathNode(v, depth + 1)) return true; }
|
|
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141
|
return false;
|
|
142
142
|
};
|
|
143
|
+
// An expression that CREATES a store file from its arguments (`pkgs.writeText "k" "…"`): used as a key/cert option it puts the secret in the store
|
|
144
|
+
// exactly as a path literal does.
|
|
145
|
+
const STORE_WRITERS = new Set(['writeText', 'writeTextFile', 'writeTextDir', 'writeScript', 'writeScriptBin', 'toFile', 'copyPathToStore', 'runCommand', 'runCommandLocal']);
|
|
146
|
+
const isStoreCopy = (n, depth = 0) => {
|
|
147
|
+
if (!n || typeof n !== 'object' || depth > 12) return false;
|
|
148
|
+
if (n.type === 'app') { let h = n; while (h && h.type === 'app') h = h.fn; return !!h && ((h.type === 'select' && h.attrpath && h.attrpath.length && STORE_WRITERS.has(h.attrpath[h.attrpath.length - 1].name)) || (h.type === 'ident' && STORE_WRITERS.has(h.name))); }
|
|
149
|
+
return false;
|
|
150
|
+
};
|
|
151
|
+
const strOf = (n) => (n && n.type === 'string' && typeof n.literal === 'string' ? n.literal : null);
|
|
152
|
+
// sudo `extraRules`: a rule is NOPASSWD for ALL when one of its `commands` is ALL (or a {command = "ALL"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]}) with the NOPASSWD tag.
|
|
153
|
+
const sudoRulesNopasswdAll = (node) => {
|
|
154
|
+
if (!node || node.type !== 'list') return false;
|
|
155
|
+
for (const rule of node.items || []) {
|
|
156
|
+
const cmds = attrOf(rule, 'commands');
|
|
157
|
+
if (!cmds || !cmds.value || cmds.value.type !== 'list') continue;
|
|
158
|
+
for (const c of cmds.value.items || []) {
|
|
159
|
+
if (c.type !== 'attrset') continue;
|
|
160
|
+
const command = attrOf(c, 'command'); const options = attrOf(c, 'options');
|
|
161
|
+
const all = command && strOf(command.value) === 'ALL';
|
|
162
|
+
const nopass = options && options.value && options.value.type === 'list' && (options.value.items || []).some((x) => strOf(x) === 'NOPASSWD');
|
|
163
|
+
if (all && nopass) return true;
|
|
164
|
+
}
|
|
165
|
+
}
|
|
166
|
+
return false;
|
|
167
|
+
};
|
|
143
168
|
const attrOf = (set, name) => (set && set.type === 'attrset' ? (set.bindings || []).find((b) => b.kind === 'attr' && b.path && b.path.length === 1 && b.path[0].name === name) : null);
|
|
144
169
|
const isTrueNode = (n) => !!n && n.type === 'ident' && n.name === 'true';
|
|
145
170
|
|
|
@@ -291,6 +316,12 @@ export function analyzeNixosHardening(opts, extra = {}) {
|
|
|
291
316
|
}
|
|
292
317
|
}
|
|
293
318
|
|
|
319
|
+
const sudoRules = nixos('security.sudo.extraRules');
|
|
320
|
+
if (sudoRules && sudoState !== 'inactive' && sudoState !== 'unknown' && sudoRulesNopasswdAll(rhsNodeOf(sudoRules, opts.files))) {
|
|
321
|
+
addFinding('sudo-nopasswd-all', { anchor: anchorOf(sudoRules), scope: 'security.sudo.extraRules', state: sudoState === 'conditional' ? 'conditional' : 'active', uncertain: false, evidence: [evidenceOf(sudoRules)] });
|
|
322
|
+
entryPoints.push({ id: 'sudo-nopasswd-all', kind: 'sudo-nopasswd', state: sudoState === 'conditional' ? 'conditional' : 'active', privilege: 'root', evidence: [evidenceOf(sudoRules)] });
|
|
323
|
+
}
|
|
324
|
+
|
|
294
325
|
const doasEnable = nixos('security.doas.enable');
|
|
295
326
|
const doasState = stateOf(doasEnable);
|
|
296
327
|
const doasCfg = note(nixos('security.doas.extraConfig'), 'doas');
|
|
@@ -356,7 +387,7 @@ export function analyzeNixosHardening(opts, extra = {}) {
|
|
|
356
387
|
const st = nginxState === 'conditional' ? 'conditional' : 'active';
|
|
357
388
|
for (const o of cfg.options.filter((x) => x.namespace === 'nixos' && /^services\.nginx\.virtualHosts\..+\.(?:sslCertificateKey|sslTrustedCertificate)$/.test(x.path))) {
|
|
358
389
|
const node = rhsNodeOf(o, opts.files);
|
|
359
|
-
if (node && hasPathNode(node)) addFinding('tls-key-in-store', { anchor: anchorOf(o), scope: o.path, state: st, uncertain: false, evidence: [evidenceOf(o)] });
|
|
390
|
+
if (node && (hasPathNode(node) || isStoreCopy(node))) addFinding('tls-key-in-store', { anchor: anchorOf(o), scope: o.path, state: st, uncertain: false, evidence: [evidenceOf(o)] });
|
|
360
391
|
else if (view(o).state === 'known' && typeof view(o).value === 'string') controls.push({ control: 'tls-key-runtime-path', option: o.path, applies: true });
|
|
361
392
|
}
|
|
362
393
|
for (const o of cfg.options.filter((x) => x.namespace === 'nixos' && /^services\.nginx\.virtualHosts\..+\.forceSSL$/.test(x.path))) {
|
|
@@ -72,6 +72,10 @@ export function clopperPearson(k, n, alpha = 0.05) {
|
|
|
72
72
|
const upper = k === n ? 1 : bisect((p) => binomTail(p, k + 1) >= 1 - alpha / 2, 0, 1);
|
|
73
73
|
return [lower, upper];
|
|
74
74
|
}
|
|
75
|
+
// Every unseen shape is instantiated with TWO near-identical nouns, so those two cases are one observation, not two. The interval over
|
|
76
|
+
// cases would be too narrow; this one is over shapes (counts halved, rounded), and is labelled so.
|
|
77
|
+
const SHAPE_CLUSTER = 2;
|
|
78
|
+
const ciShapes = (k, n) => { const r = clopperPearson(Math.round(k / SHAPE_CLUSTER), Math.max(1, Math.round(n / SHAPE_CLUSTER))); return r ? [Number(r[0].toFixed(4)), Number(r[1].toFixed(4))] : null; };
|
|
75
79
|
const ci = (k, n) => { const r = clopperPearson(k, n); return r ? [Number(r[0].toFixed(4)), Number(r[1].toFixed(4))] : null; };
|
|
76
80
|
const withInterval = (e) => (e && Number.isFinite(e.tp) ? { ...e, ci: { precision: ci(e.tp, e.tp + (e.fp || 0)), recall: ci(e.tp, e.tp + (e.fn || 0)), level: 0.95, method: 'Clopper-Pearson' } } : e);
|
|
77
81
|
const pct = (x) => (x == null ? 'not measured' : `${(x * 100).toFixed(1)}%`);
|
|
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@ export function evaluateSupport(language, input) {
|
|
|
230
234
|
if (!(u.precision >= TARGETS.precision)) shortfalls.push(`precision ${pct(u.precision)} < ${pct(TARGETS.precision)}`);
|
|
231
235
|
if (!(u.recall >= TARGETS.recall)) shortfalls.push(`recall ${pct(u.recall)} < ${pct(TARGETS.recall)}`);
|
|
232
236
|
if (!(u.f1 >= TARGETS.f1)) shortfalls.push(`F1 ${pct(u.f1)} < ${pct(TARGETS.f1)}`);
|
|
233
|
-
r.generalization = { status: shortfalls.length ? 'below-target' : 'meets-targets', shortfalls, cases: u.cases, tp: u.tp, fp: u.fp, fn: u.fn, tn: u.tn, precision: u.precision, recall: u.recall, f1: u.f1, strictPrecision: u.strict && u.strict.precision, ci: { precision:
|
|
237
|
+
r.generalization = { status: shortfalls.length ? 'below-target' : 'meets-targets', shortfalls, cases: u.cases, tp: u.tp, fp: u.fp, fn: u.fn, tn: u.tn, precision: u.precision, recall: u.recall, f1: u.f1, strictPrecision: u.strict && u.strict.precision, ci: { precision: ciShapes(u.tp, u.tp + u.fp), recall: ciShapes(u.tp, u.tp + u.fn), level: 0.95, method: `Clopper-Pearson over shapes (${SHAPE_CLUSTER} near-identical cases per shape)` } };
|
|
234
238
|
if (shortfalls.length) out.generalizationGaps.push(`${r.capability}: ${shortfalls.join(', ')}`);
|
|
235
239
|
}
|
|
236
240
|
// a capability whose tool is absent is blocked, not passed and not skipped
|
package/src/language/witness.js
CHANGED
|
@@ -146,8 +146,10 @@ export function judgeFixWitness(before, after) {
|
|
|
146
146
|
export function haskellRunner() {
|
|
147
147
|
const p = which('runghc') || which('runhaskell');
|
|
148
148
|
if (!p) return { available: false, reason: 'no Haskell toolchain (runghc) on PATH; witnesses for Haskell findings are unavailable here' };
|
|
149
|
-
|
|
150
|
-
|
|
149
|
+
// GHC's first start on a cold, loaded machine (a CI runner) has taken more than 10 s; a probe that gives up there reports a toolchain
|
|
150
|
+
// that is installed as absent, and the answer then differs between two calls in one run.
|
|
151
|
+
const v = spawnSync(p, ['--version'], { encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 60_000 });
|
|
152
|
+
return v.status === 0 ? { available: true, path: p, version: String(v.stdout || v.stderr).trim() } : { available: false, reason: v.error && v.error.code === 'ETIMEDOUT' ? 'the Haskell runner did not start within 60 s' : 'the Haskell runner did not start' };
|
|
151
153
|
}
|
|
152
154
|
|
|
153
155
|
/**
|