@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.144.0 → 0.147.0

package/dist/317.index.js

@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-export const id = 317;
-export const ids = [317];
-export const modules = {
-
-/***/ 8317:
-/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
-
-/* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   buildEvidenceBundle: () => (/* binding */ buildEvidenceBundle),
-/* harmony export */   ensureKeyPair: () => (/* binding */ ensureKeyPair),
-/* harmony export */   keyPaths: () => (/* binding */ keyPaths),
-/* harmony export */   signEvidenceBundle: () => (/* binding */ signEvidenceBundle),
-/* harmony export */   verifyEvidenceBundle: () => (/* binding */ verifyEvidenceBundle)
-/* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports BUNDLE_SCHEMA, canonicalBytes, canonicalJson */
-/* harmony import */ var node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(3024);
-/* harmony import */ var node_os__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(8161);
-/* harmony import */ var node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__ = __webpack_require__(6760);
-/* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__ = __webpack_require__(7598);
-// Per-finding evidence bundles, signed so a THIRD PARTY can verify them.
-// PRD Phase 2 / D2.
-//
-// WHAT WAS MISSING
-// ----------------
-// `attestation.js` already turns a run into a checkable digest, and it is
-// explicit about its own ceiling: the signature is a per-install SYMMETRIC HMAC,
-// so it is "tamper-evidence for the operator, not third-party non-repudiation."
-// Anyone who can verify it can also forge it. That is fine for detecting local
-// corruption and useless for handing a finding to somebody else.
-//
-// This module closes that gap for the artefact that actually travels: a single
-// finding plus the evidence behind it. A buyer, an auditor, or a downstream
-// consumer can check the bundle with the PUBLIC key alone, having never had
-// access to ours.
-//
-// WHY A SEPARATE MODULE RATHER THAN EXTENDING attestation.js
-// ----------------------------------------------------------
-// They answer different questions and must not be conflated. A run attestation
-// says "this set of findings came from this engine, ruleset and bundle". An
-// evidence bundle says "THIS finding is backed by THIS evidence, and here is
-// proof the claim was not edited after the fact." One is about reproducibility,
-// the other about portability. Merging them would produce an artefact that is
-// worse at both.
-//
-// WHAT A BUNDLE PROVES, AND WHAT IT DOES NOT
-// -------------------------------------------
-// PROVES — the bundle's contents are exactly what the holder of the signing key
-// attested, unmodified. Nothing in it has been added, removed, or edited since.
-//
-// DOES NOT PROVE — that the finding is real. A signature is an integrity claim,
-// never a correctness claim. An `unproven` finding in a signed bundle is still
-// an unproven finding; the signature only stops someone silently upgrading the
-// word `unproven` to `execution-proven` in transit. Both statements are carried
-// INSIDE the bundle so they travel with it and cannot be dropped by a
-// summariser.
-//
-// The evidence chain is deliberately the honest one this engine already
-// computes: the proof tier, what the sandbox observed, which backend ran it, the
-// taint path if there is one. A bundle for a regex finding says so plainly
-// rather than dressing it up.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-const BUNDLE_SCHEMA = 'agentic-security/finding-evidence@1';
-
-/** Where the Ed25519 signing key lives. Mirrors integrity.js's key handling. */
-function keyDir() {
-  const xdg = process.env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME || node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.join(node_os__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__.homedir(), '.config');
-  return node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.join(xdg, 'agentic-security');
-}
-const PRIVATE_KEY_FILE = 'attest-key.pem';
-const PUBLIC_KEY_FILE = 'attest-key.pub.pem';
-
-function keyPaths(dir = keyDir()) {
-  return {
-    privateKey: node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.join(dir, PRIVATE_KEY_FILE),
-    publicKey: node_path__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.join(dir, PUBLIC_KEY_FILE),
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Load the signing key pair, generating one on first use.
- *
- * Ed25519 from node:crypto — no new dependency, and deliberately not a
- * transparency-log scheme: those need a network round trip, and this project
- * does not make runtime cloud calls. A log-backed option can layer on later
- * without changing the bundle format.
- */
-function ensureKeyPair(dir = keyDir()) {
-  const p = keyPaths(dir);
-
-  // NO existsSync-then-read. This project's own scanner flagged the first
-  // version of this function for TOCTOU (CWE-367) and it was right: between an
-  // existence check and the read, an attacker who can write this directory can
-  // swap the file, and the thing being swapped is a SIGNING KEY. Winning that
-  // race means we sign with a key the attacker controls, which defeats the
-  // entire point of the module. Read first and treat absence as the exceptional
-  // case — there is then no window between the check and the use, because there
-  // is no check.
-  try {
-    const privateKeyPem = node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.privateKey, 'utf8');
-    const publicKeyPem = node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.publicKey, 'utf8');
-    if (privateKeyPem && publicKeyPem) {
-      return { privateKeyPem, publicKeyPem, created: false, ...p };
-    }
-  } catch { /* missing or unreadable — fall through and generate */ }
-
-  const { privateKey, publicKey } = node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__.generateKeyPairSync('ed25519');
-  const privateKeyPem = privateKey.export({ type: 'pkcs8', format: 'pem' });
-  const publicKeyPem = publicKey.export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' });
-  node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-
-  // `wx` — exclusive create. If another process generated a key between our
-  // failed read and this write, we must NOT clobber it: every bundle already
-  // signed with that key would silently stop verifying. On collision, re-read
-  // and use the winner's key.
-  try {
-    node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.writeFileSync(p.privateKey, privateKeyPem, { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' });
-    node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.writeFileSync(p.publicKey, publicKeyPem, { mode: 0o644, flag: 'w' });
-    return { privateKeyPem, publicKeyPem, created: true, ...p };
-  } catch (e) {
-    if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw e;
-    // We lost the race on the private key — someone else's 'wx' won.
-    // Their public-key write follows immediately after their private-key
-    // write but is not itself atomic with it, so it may not have landed
-    // yet: a bare read here would throw an uncaught ENOENT on a genuinely
-    // transient state, not a real error. Retry briefly rather than crash.
-    const sleepBuf = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4));
-    for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
-      try {
-        return {
-          privateKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.privateKey, 'utf8'),
-          publicKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.publicKey, 'utf8'),
-          created: false,
-          ...p,
-        };
-      } catch (readErr) {
-        if (readErr.code !== 'ENOENT' || attempt >= 50) throw readErr;
-        Atomics.wait(sleepBuf, 0, 0, 10); // 10ms; ~500ms total budget
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Canonical bytes for signing.
- *
- * An ALLOWLIST, exactly as attestation.js canonicalises: a field that is not
- * named here is not signed, so a future addition cannot silently enter the
- * signed surface. Sorted keys, so serialisation order cannot change the
- * signature.
- */
-function canonicalBytes(bundle) {
-  const signed = {
-    schema: bundle.schema,
-    finding: bundle.finding,
-    evidence: bundle.evidence,
-    engine: bundle.engine,
-    proves: bundle.proves,
-    doesNotProve: bundle.doesNotProve,
-  };
-  return Buffer.from(canonicalJson(signed), 'utf8');
-}
-
-/**
- * Deterministic JSON: keys sorted at EVERY level, arrays order-preserving.
- *
- * Written by hand rather than using JSON.stringify's replacer argument, and the
- * reason matters. The first version of this function did
- * `JSON.stringify(signed, Object.keys(signed).sort())`, believing the array
- * argument was a top-level field allowlist. It is not — a replacer ARRAY is a
- * key filter applied at every nesting depth, so every nested object serialised
- * as `{}` and the signature covered nothing but the two prose strings. A bundle
- * whose severity was edited from `high` to `critical` verified as authentic.
- *
- * That is the worst possible failure for this module: a security feature that
- * appears to work, produces a valid-looking signature, and protects nothing. It
- * was caught by tampering with a bundle and expecting verification to fail —
- * which is why the tamper cases in the test file are not optional extras.
- */
-function canonicalJson(value) {
-  if (value === null || typeof value !== 'object') return JSON.stringify(value ?? null);
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJson).join(',')}]`;
-  const keys = Object.keys(value).sort();
-  return `{${keys.map(k => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${canonicalJson(value[k])}`).join(',')}}`;
-}
-
-const PROVES =
-  'The contents of this bundle are exactly what the signer attested, unmodified.';
-const DOES_NOT_PROVE =
-  'That the finding is real. A signature is an integrity claim, never a correctness ' +
-  'claim — read `evidence.proofTier` for how well-supported the finding actually is. ' +
-  'An unproven finding in a signed bundle is still an unproven finding.';
-
-/**
- * Build an unsigned bundle from a finding.
- *
- * Everything here is copied from what the engine already computed. Nothing is
- * inferred, and a missing field stays missing rather than being defaulted into
- * something more confident-looking than the truth.
- */
-function buildEvidenceBundle(finding, { engineVersion, rulesetVersion, bundleSha, commit } = {}) {
-  if (!finding || typeof finding !== 'object') return null;
-  return {
-    schema: BUNDLE_SCHEMA,
-    finding: {
-      id: finding.id ?? null,
-      stableId: finding.stableId ?? null,
-      severity: finding.severity ?? null,
-      file: finding.file ?? null,
-      line: finding.line ?? null,
-      vuln: finding.vuln ?? null,
-      cwe: finding.cwe ?? null,
-      family: finding.family ?? null,
-      parser: finding.parser ?? null,
-    },
-    evidence: {
-      // The honest chain, in the vocabulary the engine already uses.
-      proofTier: finding.proofTier ?? null,
-      proofEvidence: finding.proofEvidence ?? null,
-      confidence: finding.confidence ?? null,
-      exploitability: finding.exploitability ?? null,
-      unreachable: finding.unreachable ?? null,
-      // Present only for the layers that produce them; absent means absent.
-      taintPath: finding.pathSteps ?? finding.exampleFlows ?? null,
-      discovery: finding.discovery ?? null,
-    },
-    engine: {
-      engineVersion: engineVersion ?? null,
-      rulesetVersion: rulesetVersion ?? null,
-      bundleSha: bundleSha ?? null,
-      commit: commit ?? null,
-    },
-    proves: PROVES,
-    doesNotProve: DOES_NOT_PROVE,
-  };
-}
-
-/** Sign a bundle. Returns a new object; the input is not mutated. */
-function signEvidenceBundle(bundle, privateKeyPem) {
-  const sig = node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__.sign(null, canonicalBytes(bundle), privateKeyPem);
-  return {
-    ...bundle,
-    signature: {
-      algorithm: 'ed25519',
-      canonicalisation: BUNDLE_SCHEMA,
-      value: sig.toString('base64'),
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Verify a bundle with a PUBLIC key. This is the whole point: the verifier
- * never needs, and never had, the signing key.
- *
- * Returns {ok, reason}. Never throws — a malformed bundle from an untrusted
- * source is an expected input, not an exceptional one.
- */
-// The complete set of top-level keys a legitimately-built, signed bundle can
-// carry — buildEvidenceBundle's six plus signEvidenceBundle's `signature`.
-// EA-03 (Stage-0 audit, 2026): canonicalBytes SIGNS an allowlist of fields;
-// verifyEvidenceBundle never checked for keys OUTSIDE that allowlist, so a
-// bundle with a fabricated `verdict`/`proofLevel`/anything-else stapled on
-// after signing verified as authentic — the signature simply never covered
-// those bytes. Rejecting unknown keys here closes that; it must exactly match
-// what buildEvidenceBundle+signEvidenceBundle actually produce, or a
-// legitimate bundle would start failing verification.
-const BUNDLE_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = new Set([
-  'schema', 'finding', 'evidence', 'engine', 'proves', 'doesNotProve', 'signature',
-]);
-
-function verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, publicKeyPem) {
-  if (!bundle || typeof bundle !== 'object') return { ok: false, reason: 'bundle is not an object' };
-  if (bundle.schema !== BUNDLE_SCHEMA) return { ok: false, reason: `unrecognised schema: ${bundle.schema}` };
-  const unknownKeys = Object.keys(bundle).filter(k => !BUNDLE_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS.has(k));
-  if (unknownKeys.length) {
-    return { ok: false, reason: `unrecognised top-level key(s) not covered by the signature: ${unknownKeys.join(', ')}` };
-  }
-  const sig = bundle.signature;
-  if (!sig?.value) return { ok: false, reason: 'bundle is unsigned' };
-  if (sig.algorithm !== 'ed25519') return { ok: false, reason: `unsupported algorithm: ${sig.algorithm}` };
-  if (!publicKeyPem) return { ok: false, reason: 'no public key supplied' };
-  let ok = false;
-  try {
-    ok = node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_3__.verify(null, canonicalBytes(bundle), publicKeyPem, Buffer.from(sig.value, 'base64'));
-  } catch (e) {
-    return { ok: false, reason: `verification error: ${e.message}` };
-  }
-  return ok
-    ? { ok: true, reason: null }
-    : { ok: false, reason: 'signature does not match the bundle contents — it was modified after signing' };
-}
-
-
-/***/ })
-
-};