@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.136.2 → 0.136.9

package/dist/207.index.js

@@ -6,9 +6,10 @@ export const modules = {
 /***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
 
 /* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
-/* harmony export */   computeRunAttestation: () => (/* binding */ computeRunAttestation)
+/* harmony export */   computeRunAttestation: () => (/* binding */ computeRunAttestation),
+/* harmony export */   verifyRunAttestation: () => (/* binding */ verifyRunAttestation)
 /* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports ATTESTATION_CANONICALISATION, verifyRunAttestation */
+/* unused harmony export ATTESTATION_CANONICALISATION */
 /* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(7598);
 /* harmony import */ var _integrity_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(1130);
 // R4 — determinism as a contract.
@@ -202,11 +203,11 @@ function verifyRunAttestation(attestation, inputs = {}) {
   }
   if (attestation.signature) {
     let expected;
-    try { expected = signLastScan(attestation.digest); }
+    try { expected = (0,_integrity_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__/* .signLastScan */ .lU)(attestation.digest); }
     catch { return { ok: false, reason: 'signature present but no key material available to check it' }; }
     const a = Buffer.from(String(attestation.signature), 'hex');
     const b = Buffer.from(expected, 'hex');
-    if (a.length !== b.length || !crypto.timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {
+    if (a.length !== b.length || !node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {
       return { ok: false, reason: 'signature does not verify under this install key' };
     }
     return { ok: true, reason: 'digest and per-install signature verify' };

package/dist/238.index.js

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ function recordFixAttempt(scanRoot, record) {
   try {
     const dir = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__/* .stateDir */ .Pn)(scanRoot);
     if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.isSafeStateDir)(dir)) return false;
-    if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.stateWritesEnabled)()) return;
+    if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.stateWritesEnabled)()) return false;
   node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
     // One writeSync of one newline-terminated line: a concurrent reader sees
     // whole records or nothing, and a torn tail is dropped on read.

package/dist/317.index.js

@@ -123,12 +123,25 @@ function ensureKeyPair(dir = keyDir()) {
     return { privateKeyPem, publicKeyPem, created: true, ...p };
   } catch (e) {
     if (e.code !== 'EEXIST') throw e;
-    return {
-      privateKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.privateKey, 'utf8'),
-      publicKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.publicKey, 'utf8'),
-      created: false,
-      ...p,
-    };
+    // We lost the race on the private key — someone else's 'wx' won.
+    // Their public-key write follows immediately after their private-key
+    // write but is not itself atomic with it, so it may not have landed
+    // yet: a bare read here would throw an uncaught ENOENT on a genuinely
+    // transient state, not a real error. Retry briefly rather than crash.
+    const sleepBuf = new Int32Array(new SharedArrayBuffer(4));
+    for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
+      try {
+        return {
+          privateKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.privateKey, 'utf8'),
+          publicKeyPem: node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.readFileSync(p.publicKey, 'utf8'),
+          created: false,
+          ...p,
+        };
+      } catch (readErr) {
+        if (readErr.code !== 'ENOENT' || attempt >= 50) throw readErr;
+        Atomics.wait(sleepBuf, 0, 0, 10); // 10ms; ~500ms total budget
+      }
+    }
   }
 }
 
@@ -246,9 +259,26 @@ function signEvidenceBundle(bundle, privateKeyPem) {
  * Returns {ok, reason}. Never throws — a malformed bundle from an untrusted
  * source is an expected input, not an exceptional one.
  */
+// The complete set of top-level keys a legitimately-built, signed bundle can
+// carry — buildEvidenceBundle's six plus signEvidenceBundle's `signature`.
+// EA-03 (Stage-0 audit, 2026): canonicalBytes SIGNS an allowlist of fields;
+// verifyEvidenceBundle never checked for keys OUTSIDE that allowlist, so a
+// bundle with a fabricated `verdict`/`proofLevel`/anything-else stapled on
+// after signing verified as authentic — the signature simply never covered
+// those bytes. Rejecting unknown keys here closes that; it must exactly match
+// what buildEvidenceBundle+signEvidenceBundle actually produce, or a
+// legitimate bundle would start failing verification.
+const BUNDLE_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS = new Set([
+  'schema', 'finding', 'evidence', 'engine', 'proves', 'doesNotProve', 'signature',
+]);
+
 function verifyEvidenceBundle(bundle, publicKeyPem) {
   if (!bundle || typeof bundle !== 'object') return { ok: false, reason: 'bundle is not an object' };
   if (bundle.schema !== BUNDLE_SCHEMA) return { ok: false, reason: `unrecognised schema: ${bundle.schema}` };
+  const unknownKeys = Object.keys(bundle).filter(k => !BUNDLE_TOP_LEVEL_KEYS.has(k));
+  if (unknownKeys.length) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: `unrecognised top-level key(s) not covered by the signature: ${unknownKeys.join(', ')}` };
+  }
   const sig = bundle.signature;
   if (!sig?.value) return { ok: false, reason: 'bundle is unsigned' };
   if (sig.algorithm !== 'ed25519') return { ok: false, reason: `unsupported algorithm: ${sig.algorithm}` };

package/dist/384.index.js

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ export const modules = {
 /* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
 /* harmony export */   scanCredentials: () => (/* reexport safe */ _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.Sv)
 /* harmony export */ });
-/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(2912);
+/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(2739);
 // Secrets submodule view of the engine — credential + entropy + TODO scanning.
 
 

package/dist/435.index.js

@@ -124,6 +124,32 @@ const PATTERNS = [
   [/rk_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, 'stripe-restricted-key'],
   [/SG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}/g, 'sendgrid-key'],
   [/AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g, 'google-api-key'],
+  // Stage 4 correctness audit (coverage breadth, AI security): this list
+  // only covered a small subset of what the scanner's OWN credential
+  // detector (engine.js's CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS, 40+ provider shapes) finds
+  // — a Shopify/Telegram/Twilio/Discord-webhook/Square/Google-OAuth/JDBC
+  // secret detected and reported by a scan reached explain_finding's
+  // output completely unredacted, because none of those shapes were in
+  // THIS separate, narrower list. Reusing the same regex bodies as
+  // engine.js's CREDENTIAL_PATTERNS for the shapes verified to leak
+  // (rather than importing engine.js itself, which would pull its entire
+  // multi-thousand-line module graph into the MCP server's dependency
+  // surface for a handful of consts).
+  [/ya29\.[0-9A-Za-z_-]{20,}/g, 'google-oauth-token'],
+  [/shp(?:at|ss|ca|pa)_[a-fA-F0-9]{32}/g, 'shopify-token'],
+  [/(?<![0-9])[0-9]{8,10}:AA[0-9A-Za-z_-]{33}(?![A-Za-z0-9_])/g, 'telegram-bot-token'],
+  [/twilio.{0,20}SK[0-9a-fA-F]{32}/gi, 'twilio-api-key'],
+  [/sq0atp-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{22}/g, 'square-access-token'],
+  [/sq0csp-[0-9A-Za-z_-]{43}/g, 'square-oauth-secret'],
+  [/access_token\$production\$[0-9a-z]{16}\$[0-9a-f]{32}/g, 'paypal-braintree-token'],
+  [/https:\/\/(?:discordapp|discord)\.com\/api\/webhooks\/[0-9]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+/g, 'discord-webhook'],
+  [/https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T[a-zA-Z0-9_]{8}\/B[a-zA-Z0-9_]{8,12}\/[a-zA-Z0-9_]{24}/g, 'slack-webhook'],
+  [/https:\/\/outlook\.office\.com\/webhook\/[A-Za-z0-9\-@]+\/IncomingWebhook\/[A-Za-z0-9-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9-]+/g, 'teams-webhook'],
+  [/https:\/\/(?:www\.)?hooks\.zapier\.com\/hooks\/catch\/[A-Za-z0-9]+\/[A-Za-z0-9]+\//g, 'zapier-webhook'],
+  // JDBC connection string carrying a password: only redact when password
+  // evidence is actually on the line (matches engine.js's own ctx gate),
+  // so a credential-free JDBC URL in docs isn't needlessly mangled.
+  [/jdbc:[a-z:]+:\/\/[A-Za-z0-9.\-_:;=/@?,&]*(?:@|password=|passwd=|pwd=)[A-Za-z0-9.\-_:;=/@?,&]*/gi, 'jdbc-connection-string'],
   // JWT — three dot-separated b64url segments starting with eyJ
   [/eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}/g, 'jwt'],
   // PEM-encoded private keys
@@ -171,6 +197,8 @@ function redactArgsBlob(s) {
   return redactString(s);
 }
 
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/report/index.js + 2 modules
+var report = __webpack_require__(3550);
 // EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/posture/state-dir.js
 var state_dir = __webpack_require__(1174);
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/agents-memory.js
@@ -470,6 +498,7 @@ const cve_lookup_internals = { CACHE_DIR, CVE_RE, _stalenessTier };
 
 
 
+
 // Lazy-loaded: these transitively pull in npm packages (@babel/core and
 // friends) that aren't available in the plugin-cache install path
 // (no node_modules). Deferring keeps the MCP server bootable everywhere;
@@ -600,8 +629,13 @@ function _validateScratchpadPath(relPath) {
   return { ok: true, agent, session, fileParts };
 }
 
+// Routes through the same lstat+realpath confinement every other write/
+// path-taking tool uses (OWASP MCP05) — a lexical prefix/charset check
+// alone doesn't stop a pre-planted symlink at any path component from
+// relocating the write/read outside the session root. Throws on escape;
+// callers must catch (see append_scratchpad / read_scratchpad).
 function _scratchpadAbs(sessionRoot, relPath) {
-  return external_node_path_.resolve(sessionRoot, relPath.replace(/\\/g, '/'));
+  return _confine(sessionRoot, relPath.replace(/\\/g, '/'), 'scratchpad path');
 }
 
 function _scratchpadTotalBytes(sessionRoot) {
@@ -785,12 +819,22 @@ const scan_diff = {
     const wantSet = new Set(Object.keys(fileContents));
     const sevRank = { info: 0, low: 1, medium: 2, high: 3, critical: 4 };
     const min = sevRank[severity] ?? 0;
-    const findings = (result.scan.findings || [])
+    // Stage 6 correctness audit: this only ever read result.scan.findings
+    // (the SAST channel) — scan.secrets and scan.logicVulns are separate
+    // arrays on the raw runScan() result (report/index.js's normalizeFindings
+    // is what merges all four channels, and that merge hasn't run yet here).
+    // A file containing a bare hardcoded credential reported findingCount: 0
+    // through a tool whose own description promises "Use BEFORE writing a
+    // Write/Edit to disk so the agent can self-correct". Also reused
+    // _remediationOf so a fix-string detector (the majority of engine.js's
+    // own, ~127 call sites) doesn't silently report an empty `description`
+    // the way reading only `.remediation` did.
+    const findings = [...(result.scan.findings || []), ...(result.scan.secrets || []), ...(result.scan.logicVulns || [])]
       .filter(f => wantSet.has(String(f.file || '').replace(/\\/g, '/')) && (sevRank[f.severity] ?? 0) >= min)
       .map(f => redactFinding({
         id: f.id, severity: f.severity, file: f.file, line: f.line,
         title: f.title || f.vuln, cwe: f.cwe,
-        description: f.description, remediation: f.remediation,
+        description: f.description, remediation: (0,report/* _remediationOf */.uV)(f),
       }));
     // Harness-anatomy #1: offload when the result exceeds OFFLOAD_THRESHOLD.
     // The agent gets a head+tail preview plus a path it can page through;
@@ -953,10 +997,40 @@ const apply_fix = {
         additionalProperties: { type: 'string', maxLength: 500_000 },
         minProperties: 1, maxProperties: 8,
       },
+      // Stage 6 correctness audit: same gap and same fix as verify_fix — the
+      // honesty gate is reachable but was never wired to any real caller.
+      // Here it's stronger than advisory: the inline re-verify below already
+      // gates the WRITE on `verdict.ok`, and verifyFixCore's own `ok`
+      // formula already folds in `honesty.ok` when fixMeta is supplied — so
+      // passing it through here makes a dishonest fixMeta (hand-wave
+      // residual, uncited false-positive verdict) block the write itself,
+      // not just report a verdict.
+      fixMeta: {
+        type: 'object',
+        additionalProperties: false,
+        properties: {
+          residual: { type: 'string', maxLength: 2000 },
+          verdict: { type: 'string', maxLength: 64 },
+          evidence: { type: 'array', items: { type: 'string', maxLength: 500 }, maxItems: 20 },
+          signals: {
+            type: 'object',
+            additionalProperties: false,
+            properties: {
+              sinkSignatureChanged: { type: 'boolean' },
+              allCallersRouted: { type: 'boolean' },
+              testDiscriminates: { type: 'boolean' },
+              rateLimitOnly: { type: 'boolean' },
+              docsOnly: { type: 'boolean' },
+              logOnlyNoReject: { type: 'boolean' },
+              partialSanitization: { type: 'boolean' },
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
     },
     required: ['finding_id', 'confirm'],
   },
-  async handler({ finding_id, confirm, dry_run = false, patch = null }, ctx) {
+  async handler({ finding_id, confirm, dry_run = false, patch = null, fixMeta = null }, ctx) {
     if (confirm !== true) {
       return { _meta: META, applied: false, reason: 'apply_fix requires confirm: true.' };
     }
@@ -1012,6 +1086,7 @@ const apply_fix = {
             scanRoot: ctx.sessionRoot,
             originalFindingStableId: f.stableId,
             files: _files,
+            fixMeta,
           });
         }
       } catch (e) {
@@ -1021,7 +1096,7 @@ const apply_fix = {
         return {
           _meta: META, applied: false,
           reason: `patch rejected by verifier: ${verdict.summary || verdict.rescan?.reason || 'did not verify'}`,
-          verify: { rescan: verdict.rescan, lint: { runner: verdict.lint?.runner, ok: verdict.lint?.ok } },
+          verify: { rescan: verdict.rescan, lint: { runner: verdict.lint?.runner, ok: verdict.lint?.ok }, honesty: verdict.honesty || null },
         };
       }
       if (dry_run) {
@@ -1033,7 +1108,7 @@ const apply_fix = {
           const originalContent = external_node_fs_.existsSync(v.abs) ? await promises_.readFile(v.abs, 'utf8') : '';
           const entry = await (0,fix_history/* applyFix */.oM)({
             scanRoot: ctx.sessionRoot, file: rel, originalContent, newContent: v.content,
-            findingId: f.id, stableId: f.stableId, ruleId: f.rule || null, vuln: f.vuln || f.title || null,
+            findingId: f.id, stableId: f.stableId, ruleId: f.ruleId || f.cwe || f.family || null, vuln: f.vuln || f.title || null,
           });
           written.push({ file: rel, historyId: entry.id, backupPath: entry.backupPath });
         }
@@ -1091,7 +1166,7 @@ const apply_fix = {
         newContent: f.fix.replacement,
         findingId: f.id,
         stableId: f.stableId || null,   // premortem 4R-8
-        ruleId: f.rule || null,
+        ruleId: f.ruleId || f.cwe || f.family || null,
         vuln: f.vuln || f.title || null,
       });
     } catch (e) {
@@ -1128,7 +1203,7 @@ const apply_fix = {
 // proceed with apply_fix.
 const verify_fix = {
   name: 'verify_fix',
-  description: 'Verify a proposed patch before applying. Re-scans the patched files in memory and runs the project linter. Returns { ok, rescan, lint, summary }. No filesystem writes.',
+  description: 'Verify a proposed patch before applying. Re-scans the patched files in memory, runs the project linter, runs the project test suite, checks fix honesty (FULL/MITIGATION/WORKAROUND) when fixMeta is supplied, and re-runs the PoC when one exists. Returns { ok, rescan, lint, tests, honesty, poc, summary }. Does not write to the target project’s own files, but DOES append one record per attempt to .agentic-security/fix-metrics.jsonl for the measured fix-loop.',
   inputSchema: {
     type: 'object',
     additionalProperties: false,
@@ -1140,10 +1215,41 @@ const verify_fix = {
         minProperties: 1,
         maxProperties: 8,
       },
+      // Stage 6 correctness audit: posture/fix-honesty-gate.js's deterministic
+      // honesty checks (vague-assurance residual prose, unbacked false-
+      // positive verdicts, tier/residual consistency) were fully built and
+      // fix-verify.js already consulted them when given a `fixMeta` — but
+      // this schema never had a `fixMeta` property, so no call through the
+      // MCP surface could ever supply one. The gate can only run against
+      // claims the AGENT self-reports (residual risk, verdict, evidence,
+      // completeness signals) — nothing here is server-computable — so
+      // fixing this meant exposing the property, not inventing a lookup.
+      fixMeta: {
+        type: 'object',
+        additionalProperties: false,
+        properties: {
+          residual: { type: 'string', maxLength: 2000 },
+          verdict: { type: 'string', maxLength: 64 },
+          evidence: { type: 'array', items: { type: 'string', maxLength: 500 }, maxItems: 20 },
+          signals: {
+            type: 'object',
+            additionalProperties: false,
+            properties: {
+              sinkSignatureChanged: { type: 'boolean' },
+              allCallersRouted: { type: 'boolean' },
+              testDiscriminates: { type: 'boolean' },
+              rateLimitOnly: { type: 'boolean' },
+              docsOnly: { type: 'boolean' },
+              logOnlyNoReject: { type: 'boolean' },
+              partialSanitization: { type: 'boolean' },
+            },
+          },
+        },
+      },
     },
     required: ['stable_id', 'files'],
   },
-  async handler({ stable_id, files }, ctx) {
+  async handler({ stable_id, files, fixMeta }, ctx) {
     // Confine every file path before passing to the verifier.
     const confined = {};
     for (const [relPath, content] of Object.entries(files || {})) {
@@ -1155,17 +1261,48 @@ const verify_fix = {
       confined[relPath] = String(content);
     }
     try {
+      // The PoC-re-check leg (verifyFixCore's `pocLeg`) needs a `poc` param
+      // to do anything — until now nothing supplied one, so it always
+      // reported {status:'not-requested'} through this surface (see
+      // posture/CLAUDE.md's disclosure). Rather than widening inputSchema
+      // to make the CALLER pass PoC data back, look it up server-side: the
+      // scan pipeline already attaches an HTTP-shaped f.poc to matching
+      // findings by default (engine.js's annotatePocs), and last-scan.json
+      // already carries it under the same stableId this handler receives.
+      // Best-effort: a missing/unsigned/tampered scan just means no PoC is
+      // available to re-check, not a verify_fix failure — the rescan/lint/
+      // tests legs below are independent of this and still apply.
+      let poc = null;
+      try {
+        const { scan: lastScan } = _readLastScanVerified(ctx.sessionRoot, { allowUnsigned: true });
+        const orig = lastScan && (lastScan.findings || []).find(f => f.stableId === stable_id);
+        if (orig && orig.poc && orig.poc.code) poc = { ...orig.poc, finding: orig };
+      } catch { /* best-effort lookup; poc stays null */ }
+
       const verifyFixCore = await getVerifyFixCore();
       const r = await verifyFixCore({
         scanRoot: ctx.sessionRoot,
         originalFindingStableId: stable_id,
         files: confined,
+        poc,
+        fixMeta,
       });
       return {
         _meta: META,
         ok: r.ok,
         rescan: { ok: r.rescan.ok, reason: r.rescan.reason, introduced: r.rescan.introduced || [] },
         lint: { runner: r.lint.runner, ok: r.lint.ok, skipped: r.lint.skipped || false, output: redactString(r.lint.output || '').slice(0, 1500) },
+        // verifyFix computes five legs, not two — tests/honesty/poc were
+        // being silently dropped here, leaving an agent with no structured
+        // way to see WHY verification failed when the failure was in one
+        // of those three (only the free-text summary carried it).
+        // test-runner.js's runProjectTests never returns raw stdout/stderr,
+        // so no redaction is needed there; honesty.violations are static,
+        // code-generated strings; poc.reason is redacted defensively since
+        // it can echo proof-harness detail derived from scanned source.
+        tests: r.tests,
+        honesty: r.honesty,
+        poc: r.poc ? { ...r.poc, reason: r.poc.reason ? redactString(r.poc.reason) : r.poc.reason } : r.poc,
         summary: r.summary,
       };
     } catch (e) {
@@ -1249,7 +1386,13 @@ const synthesize_fix = {
       regression_test: f.regression_test || null,
       remediation: typeof fix.description === 'string' ? fix.description : (typeof fix === 'string' ? fix : null),
       patchBounds: { touchedFiles, locDelta, oversized },
-      recommendsFixPlan: oversized && !hasReplacement && !autofix,
+      // oversized can only be true when hasReplacement is true (locDelta is
+      // only computed in that branch, and touchedFiles never varies) — a
+      // `!hasReplacement` conjunct here was a structural contradiction that
+      // made this permanently false. The correct signal: the stored
+      // replacement itself is too big to trust auto-applying, and there's
+      // no safer deterministic alternative.
+      recommendsFixPlan: oversized && !autofix,
     };
   },
 };
@@ -1381,7 +1524,9 @@ const append_scratchpad = {
   async handler({ path: relPath, content }, ctx) {
     const v = _validateScratchpadPath(relPath);
     if (!v.ok) return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: v.reason };
-    const abs = _scratchpadAbs(ctx.sessionRoot, relPath);
+    let abs;
+    try { abs = _scratchpadAbs(ctx.sessionRoot, relPath); }
+    catch (e) { return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: `path-escape refused: ${e.message}` }; }
     const total = _scratchpadTotalBytes(ctx.sessionRoot);
     if (total + content.length > SCRATCHPAD_MAX_TOTAL_BYTES) {
       return {
@@ -1427,7 +1572,9 @@ const read_scratchpad = {
   async handler({ path: relPath, offset, limit }, ctx) {
     const v = _validateScratchpadPath(relPath);
     if (!v.ok) return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: v.reason };
-    const abs = _scratchpadAbs(ctx.sessionRoot, relPath);
+    let abs;
+    try { abs = _scratchpadAbs(ctx.sessionRoot, relPath); }
+    catch (e) { return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: `path-escape refused: ${e.message}` }; }
     if (!external_node_fs_.existsSync(abs)) return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: 'not-found' };
     let stat;
     try { stat = external_node_fs_.statSync(abs); } catch (e) { return { _meta: META, ok: false, reason: `stat-failed: ${e.message}` }; }
@@ -1523,7 +1670,20 @@ const query_triage_memory = {
   },
   async handler({ query }, ctx) {
     const { queryMemory } = await Promise.resolve(/* import() */).then(__webpack_require__.bind(__webpack_require__, 1905));
-    const results = queryMemory(ctx.sessionRoot, query || '');
+    const raw = queryMemory(ctx.sessionRoot, query || '');
+    // Stage 6 correctness audit: this returned queryMemory's output
+    // verbatim, with no redaction pass — every other tool that echoes
+    // scanned-source-derived text redacts it (mcp/CLAUDE.md's "Adding a new
+    // tool" step 3). Round-trip through redactString the same way
+    // redactFinding already does for its own opaque `.trace` field: results
+    // here mix shapes (a triage decision's free-text `reason`, a finding's
+    // `vuln`/`family`/file path), so scrubbing the whole serialized
+    // structure catches secret-shaped substrings regardless of which field
+    // they landed in, rather than hardcoding a field allowlist that could
+    // miss one.
+    let results;
+    try { results = JSON.parse(redactString(JSON.stringify(raw))); }
+    catch { results = raw; }
     return {
       _meta: META,
       count: results.length,
@@ -1551,7 +1711,16 @@ const query_findings_memory = {
   },
   async handler({ query }, ctx) {
     const { queryFindingsMemory } = await __webpack_require__.e(/* import() */ 839).then(__webpack_require__.bind(__webpack_require__, 3839));
-    return { _meta: META, ...queryFindingsMemory(ctx.sessionRoot, query || '') };
+    const raw = queryFindingsMemory(ctx.sessionRoot, query || '');
+    // Stage 6 correctness audit — same redaction gap and same fix as
+    // query_triage_memory just above: this mixes four differently-shaped
+    // result kinds (finding / triage / history / AGENTS.md text), so a
+    // whole-structure redactString round-trip is applied rather than a
+    // per-field allowlist that could miss one of the four shapes.
+    let body;
+    try { body = JSON.parse(redactString(JSON.stringify(raw))); }
+    catch { body = raw; }
+    return { _meta: META, ...body };
   },
 };
 

package/dist/444.index.js

@@ -43,17 +43,26 @@ function scanHistoryDiff(diffText, commit, detectFn) {
   if (!added.trim()) return [];
   let findings = [];
   try { findings = detectFn(`git-history@${commit}`, added) || []; } catch { return []; }
-  return findings.map((f) => ({
-    ...f,
-    id: `secret-history:${commit}:${f.id || f.vuln || 'secret'}`,
-    file: `git-history@${commit}`,
-    line: 0,
-    commit,
-    _historical: true,
-    vuln: `${f.vuln || 'Hardcoded Secret'} (in git history)`,
-    description: `${f.description || 'A credential was committed.'} Found in commit ${commit}; even if removed from HEAD it remains recoverable from git and must be rotated.`,
-    remediation: 'Rotate the credential now, then purge it from history (git filter-repo / BFG) and move it to a secrets manager. Removing it from HEAD alone is insufficient.',
-  }));
+  return findings.map((f) => {
+    const remediation = 'Rotate the credential now, then purge it from history (git filter-repo / BFG) and move it to a secrets manager. Removing it from HEAD alone is insufficient.';
+    return {
+      ...f,
+      id: `secret-history:${commit}:${f.id || f.vuln || 'secret'}`,
+      file: `git-history@${commit}`,
+      line: 0,
+      commit,
+      _historical: true,
+      vuln: `${f.vuln || 'Hardcoded Secret'} (in git history)`,
+      description: `${f.description || 'A credential was committed.'} Found in commit ${commit}; even if removed from HEAD it remains recoverable from git and must be rotated.`,
+      remediation,
+      // report/index.js's _remediationOf checks `.fix` before `.remediation`
+      // — the underlying detector already set `.fix` to a generic "remove
+      // the line" string, which would otherwise silently shadow this
+      // history-specific instruction ("removing it from HEAD alone is
+      // insufficient") in every report format.
+      fix: remediation,
+    };
+  });
 }
 
 /**

package/dist/449.index.js

@@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ export const modules = {
 
 /* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
 /* harmony export */   buildBaselineMap: () => (/* binding */ buildBaselineMap),
+/* harmony export */   computeMTTR: () => (/* binding */ computeMTTR),
+/* harmony export */   fingerprintFinding: () => (/* binding */ fingerprintFinding),
 /* harmony export */   renderSlaSummary: () => (/* binding */ renderSlaSummary),
 /* harmony export */   stampFindingTimestamps: () => (/* binding */ stampFindingTimestamps)
 /* harmony export */ });
-/* unused harmony exports findingsExceedingSLA, computeMTTR */
+/* unused harmony export findingsExceedingSLA */
 /* harmony import */ var node_crypto__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(7598);
 // 0.8.0 Feat-11: MTTR / finding-age tracking — per-finding firstSeenAt/lastSeenAt with SLA breach detection.
 //
@@ -24,6 +26,11 @@ export const modules = {
 
 
 // Stable fingerprint for cross-scan finding identity. Mirrors the dedupe key.
+// Exported so a caller can compute the "removed since baseline" (i.e. fixed)
+// set that computeMTTR needs, using the exact same identity function
+// buildBaselineMap uses internally — a caller-side reimplementation would
+// risk drifting from this one and silently under/over-counting fixes.
+function fingerprintFinding(f) { return _fingerprint(f); }
 function _fingerprint(f) {
   const file = (f.file || '').split(' -> ').pop();
   const line = f.line || f.source?.line || f.sink?.line || 0;

package/dist/526.index.js

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ function recordFixAttempt(scanRoot, record) {
   try {
     const dir = (0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__/* .stateDir */ .Pn)(scanRoot);
     if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.isSafeStateDir)(dir)) return false;
-    if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.stateWritesEnabled)()) return;
+    if (!(0,_state_dir_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_2__.stateWritesEnabled)()) return false;
   node_fs__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
     // One writeSync of one newline-terminated line: a concurrent reader sees
     // whole records or nothing, and a torn tail is dropped on read.
@@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ var external_node_child_process_ = __webpack_require__(1421);
 var external_node_fs_ = __webpack_require__(3024);
 // EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:path"
 var external_node_path_ = __webpack_require__(6760);
-// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/engine.js + 499 modules
-var engine = __webpack_require__(2912);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/engine.js + 196 modules
+var engine = __webpack_require__(2739);
 ;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/fix-honesty-gate.js
 // Deterministic honesty gates on fix / finding output (#7).
 //

package/dist/637.index.js

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ export const modules = {
 /* harmony export */   renderPrDeltaText: () => (/* binding */ renderPrDeltaText)
 /* harmony export */ });
 /* harmony import */ var node_child_process__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(1421);
-/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(2912);
+/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(2739);
 // Shadowscan / security-DELTA on PR (v0.72).
 //
 // Most SAST PR-comment integrations show absolute counts — "12 findings