@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.134.0 → 0.136.9

package/src/posture/compliance-frameworks/owasp-asvs-5.json

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
       "category": "Malicious Code",
       "summary": "Verify the application does not include known-malicious or compromised dependencies.",
       "evidence": [".agentic-security/sbom-history snapshots clean.", "No dependency-confusion or dependency-drift findings."],
-      "mapsTo": ["family:vulnerable-dependency", "family:dependency-confusion", "family:dependency-drift"]
+      "mapsTo": ["family:vulnerable-dep", "family:dependency-confusion", "family:dependency-drift"]
     },
     {
       "id": "V14.1",

package/src/posture/compliance-policy.js

@@ -40,11 +40,13 @@
 import * as fs from 'node:fs';
 import * as path from 'node:path';
 import * as yaml from '../util/yaml.js';
+import { statePath, safeWriteState } from './state-dir.js';
+import { SCANNER_VERSION } from './version.js';
 
 const POLICY_FILE = 'compliance.policy.yml';
 
 export function loadPolicy(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', POLICY_FILE);
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, POLICY_FILE);
   if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return null;
   try {
     const raw = fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8');
@@ -105,7 +107,7 @@ function _runCheck(check, ctx) {
   }
   if (check['sca-policy-has-entry']) {
     const type = check['sca-policy-has-entry'];
-    const policyPath = path.join(ctx.scanRoot, '.agentic-security', 'sca-policy.yml');
+    const policyPath = statePath(ctx.scanRoot, 'sca-policy.yml');
     if (!fs.existsSync(policyPath)) return { passed: false, reason: 'sca-policy.yml not found' };
     try {
       const policy = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(policyPath, 'utf8'));
@@ -127,7 +129,29 @@ function _runCheck(check, ctx) {
  * Run all controls in the policy and emit a verification report.
  */
 export function verifyPolicy(policy, ctx) {
+  // CMP-5: loadPolicy() reports a parse failure as { _error }, which has no
+  // `.controls` — the same shape as "no policy file at all". Distinguishing
+  // them matters: a customer who typo'd their YAML deserves a loud error,
+  // not a report that silently treats their (unparsed) policy as having no
+  // controls to check.
+  if (policy && policy._error) return { controls: [], status: 'error', error: policy._error };
   if (!policy || !policy.controls) return { controls: [], status: 'no-policy' };
+  // CMP-5: a finding-family check must see every channel a real scan
+  // produces (findings=SAST, secrets, logicVulns, supplyChain=SCA) — the
+  // caller (engine.js) hands last-scan.json's own channel split through
+  // ctx, so a control checking family:hardcoded-secret or
+  // family:vulnerable-dep isn't blind to 3 of the engine's 4 finding types.
+  // Family defaults mirror report/index.js's normalizeFindings so the two
+  // modules can't drift apart on what family an untagged finding belongs to.
+  ctx = {
+    ...ctx,
+    findings: [
+      ...(ctx.findings || []),
+      ...(ctx.secrets || []).map(s => ({ ...s, family: s.family || 'hardcoded-secret' })),
+      ...(ctx.logicVulns || []),
+      ...(ctx.supplyChain || []).map(sc => ({ ...sc, family: sc.family || 'vulnerable-dep' })),
+    ],
+  };
   const results = [];
   for (const control of policy.controls) {
     if (control.not_applicable) {
@@ -165,6 +189,13 @@ export function emitEvidenceJsonLd(report, scanRoot) {
     framework: report.framework,
     version: report.version,
     generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    // CMP-5: this artifact is fed to GRC tooling (Vanta/Drata/SecureFrame) and
+    // auditors largely unread by a human — the same reason
+    // auditor-walkthrough.js's narrative carries this disclaimer verbatim.
+    // Without it here, a machine-consumed "ComplianceEvidence" document reads
+    // as an attestation, not a scanner's automated observation.
+    disclaimer: 'This artifact organizes automated scanner evidence into a structured report. It does not certify compliance. A licensed assessor (CPA / auditor / DPO) is responsible for the final attestation.',
+    provenance: { engineVersion: SCANNER_VERSION },
     summary: report.summary,
     controls: report.controls.map(c => ({
       '@type': 'Control',
@@ -178,10 +209,9 @@ export function emitEvidenceJsonLd(report, scanRoot) {
       narrative_evidence: c.evidence || [],
     })),
   };
-  try {
-    fs.mkdirSync(path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security'), { recursive: true });
-    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', 'compliance-evidence.json'), JSON.stringify(jsonld, null, 2));
-  } catch {}
+  // Through the seam — see the note in pqc-migration-plan.js. The report is
+  // still returned when writing is off; only the artifact is withheld.
+  safeWriteState(statePath(scanRoot, 'compliance-evidence.json'), JSON.stringify(jsonld, null, 2));
   return jsonld;
 }
 
@@ -192,7 +222,9 @@ export function emitEvidenceMarkdown(report, scanRoot) {
   const lines = [];
   lines.push(`# Compliance evidence — ${report.framework}`);
   lines.push('');
-  lines.push(`Generated by agentic-security on ${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.`);
+  lines.push(`Generated by agentic-security (engine ${SCANNER_VERSION}) on ${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.`);
+  lines.push('');
+  lines.push('> This document organizes automated scanner evidence into a structured report. It does not certify compliance. A licensed assessor (CPA / auditor / DPO) is responsible for the final attestation.');
   lines.push('');
   lines.push(`Compliant: **${report.summary.compliant}** / Non-compliant: **${report.summary.nonCompliant}** / Not applicable: **${report.summary.notApplicable}** of ${report.summary.total} controls.`);
   lines.push('');
@@ -209,9 +241,7 @@ export function emitEvidenceMarkdown(report, scanRoot) {
     }
     lines.push('');
   }
-  try {
-    fs.writeFileSync(path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', 'compliance-evidence.md'), lines.join('\n'));
-  } catch {}
+  safeWriteState(statePath(scanRoot, 'compliance-evidence.md'), lines.join('\n'));
   return lines.join('\n');
 }
 

package/src/posture/confidence.js

@@ -47,19 +47,53 @@ export function annotateConfidence(findings) {
       if (f.routeRooted) conf = Math.min(1, conf + 0.05);
       if (f.guards && f.guards.length) conf *= 0.80;
       if (f.reachable === false) conf *= 0.55;
+      // f.unvalidated is set later in the pipeline (llm-validator/index.js,
+      // invoked well after this first confidence pass), so it's never true
+      // here on a finding's first computation — see applyUnvalidatedPenalty
+      // below, the real enforcement point, run after validation. Kept here
+      // too so a caller that builds a synthetic finding with
+      // unvalidated:true pre-set still gets it applied in one pass.
       if (f.unvalidated) conf *= 0.85;   // LLM validator unavailable
-      if (f.llmOnly) conf *= 0.70;       // LLM-only finding, no Layer-2 path
+      // f.llmOnly: currently unreachable — no producer anywhere in this
+      // codebase ever sets it (grepped). Documented as a no-op rather than
+      // silently deleted, since the intent ("LLM-only finding, no Layer-2
+      // path") is a real, plausible signal that just isn't wired yet.
+      if (f.llmOnly) conf *= 0.70;
     }
     conf = Math.max(0, Math.min(1, conf));
     f.confidence = Math.round(conf * 1000) / 1000;
-    // Premortem 3R-15: derive tier from the 2-decimal display value so a
-    // finding reported as "0.75" never lands in two tiers depending on the
-    // viewer's rounding. Add a +0.005 epsilon to anchor cutoffs to the
-    // displayed rounded value (3-decimal raw 0.745 → 2-decimal 0.75 → high).
-    const display = Math.round(f.confidence * 100) / 100;
-    if (display >= 0.75) f.confidenceTier = 'high';
-    else if (display >= 0.50) f.confidenceTier = 'medium';
-    else if (display >= 0.25) f.confidenceTier = 'low';
-    else f.confidenceTier = 'very-low';
+    f.confidenceTier = _tierFor(f.confidence);
+  }
+}
+
+// Premortem 3R-15: derive tier from the 2-decimal display value so a
+// finding reported as "0.75" never lands in two tiers depending on the
+// viewer's rounding (3-decimal raw 0.745 → 2-decimal 0.75 → high).
+function _tierFor(confidence) {
+  const display = Math.round(confidence * 100) / 100;
+  if (display >= 0.75) return 'high';
+  if (display >= 0.50) return 'medium';
+  if (display >= 0.25) return 'low';
+  return 'very-low';
+}
+
+// Retroactively applies the unvalidated penalty to findings whose
+// confidence was already computed by annotateConfidence BEFORE
+// f.unvalidated could be known — annotateConfidence only computes from
+// scratch when f.confidence is still null (so hand-tuned detector
+// confidences survive untouched), and f.unvalidated is set by
+// llm-validator/index.js, which runs well after the pipeline's first
+// annotateConfidence pass. Call this once, immediately after LLM
+// validation runs (or is skipped). Idempotent: a finding is only
+// adjusted once, tracked via f._unvalidatedPenaltyApplied.
+export function applyUnvalidatedPenalty(findings) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(findings)) return;
+  for (const f of findings) {
+    if (!f || typeof f !== 'object') continue;
+    if (f._unvalidatedPenaltyApplied) continue;
+    f._unvalidatedPenaltyApplied = true;
+    if (!f.unvalidated || typeof f.confidence !== 'number') continue;
+    f.confidence = Math.round(Math.max(0, Math.min(1, f.confidence * 0.85)) * 1000) / 1000;
+    f.confidenceTier = _tierFor(f.confidence);
   }
 }

package/src/posture/corpus-enroll.js

@@ -296,8 +296,12 @@ function _stripState(dir) {
   }
 }
 
-// `scoreCandidate` is deliberately NOT exported: an external caller could
-// score a candidate and then write it by some other route, which is exactly
-// the unscored-write path this module exists to make unavailable. Enrolment
-// scores and writes as one operation or not at all.
-export const _internals = { DEFAULT_TIER, scoreCandidate, _languageOf, _escapeRegex, _stripState };
+// `scoreCandidate` is deliberately NOT exported — not even via _internals,
+// the test-only-helpers convention used elsewhere in this codebase: an
+// external caller could score a candidate and then write it by some other
+// route, which is exactly the unscored-write path this module exists to
+// make unavailable. Enrolment scores and writes as one operation or not at
+// all. Keep it out of this object even though every other _internals
+// export in this codebase is a harmless pure helper — this one specific
+// function is the security boundary, not test plumbing.
+export const _internals = { DEFAULT_TIER, _languageOf, _escapeRegex, _stripState };

package/src/posture/corpus-match.js

@@ -54,6 +54,25 @@ function _matches(f, manifest, matcher) {
     (manifest?.cwe ? f.cwe === manifest.cwe || matcher.test(f.cwe || '') : true);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Every finding, across every channel, that scores this entry.
+ *
+ * Third caller of the ONE predicate (gate, enrollment, and now the per-layer
+ * recall instrument in `bench/layer-recall/`). That instrument needs to know
+ * WHICH findings matched so it can attribute them to the analysis layer that
+ * produced them; re-deriving the predicate there is precisely the drift this
+ * module was extracted to prevent, so it reuses `_matches` instead.
+ */
+export function matchingFindings(scan, manifest, matcher = matcherFor(manifest)) {
+  const out = [];
+  for (const channel of CHANNELS) {
+    const arr = scan?.[channel];
+    if (!Array.isArray(arr)) continue;
+    for (const f of arr) if (_matches(f, manifest, matcher)) out.push(f);
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 /** Did the vulnerable (`pre/`) tree produce a matching finding? */
 export function preHit(scan, manifest, matcher = matcherFor(manifest)) {
   return _any(scan, f => _matches(f, manifest, matcher));

package/src/posture/csharp-analysis.js

@@ -101,6 +101,49 @@ function isSanitizedExpr(text) {
   return false;
 }
 
+// For each SANITIZER_PATTERNS match in `text`, find the nearest `(...)` call
+// span after the match and return its [start, end) bounds. Used to tell
+// "the sanitizer call actually wraps the tainted value" (HtmlEncode(x)) apart
+// from "the sanitizer pattern matched something unrelated elsewhere in a
+// compound expression" (comment + (IsNullOrEmpty(flag) ? ... : ...)) — a
+// common .NET idiom that combines a tainted value with an unrelated validity
+// check in the same expression.
+function _sanitizerCallSpans(text) {
+  const spans = [];
+  for (const re of SANITIZER_PATTERNS) {
+    const g = new RegExp(re.source, re.flags.includes('g') ? re.flags : re.flags + 'g');
+    let m;
+    while ((m = g.exec(text))) {
+      const openIdx = text.indexOf('(', g.lastIndex - 1);
+      if (openIdx !== -1 && openIdx - g.lastIndex < 3) {
+        let depth = 1, j = openIdx + 1;
+        while (j < text.length && depth > 0) {
+          if (text[j] === '(') depth++;
+          else if (text[j] === ')') depth--;
+          j++;
+        }
+        spans.push([openIdx, j]);
+      }
+      if (g.lastIndex === m.index) g.lastIndex++; // avoid infinite loop on zero-width matches
+    }
+  }
+  return spans;
+}
+
+// Is `ref` tainted-and-NOT-neutralized by an enclosing sanitizer call in
+// `text`? True when every occurrence of `ref` as a whole word sits outside
+// every sanitizer call span (i.e. no sanitizer actually wraps it).
+function _refEscapesSanitizers(text, ref, spans) {
+  if (!spans.length) return true;
+  const re = new RegExp(`\\b${ref.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\b`, 'g');
+  let m, sawAny = false;
+  while ((m = re.exec(text))) {
+    sawAny = true;
+    if (!spans.some(([s, e]) => m.index >= s && m.index < e)) return true;
+  }
+  return !sawAny;
+}
+
 // Walk a single method's body and compute per-variable type + taint.
 // Returns { typeMap, taintMap, sourceLines } where sourceLines records the
 // declaration line at which each variable first became tainted.
@@ -296,12 +339,22 @@ export function receiverIsType(method, flow, receiver, typePattern) {
 // for short expressions but unsafe for arbitrary string-containing text.
 export function expressionIsTainted(flow, text, idents = null) {
   if (!text && !idents) return false;
+  // Check known-tainted variable references that ESCAPE every sanitizer
+  // call span first — a whole-expression sanitizer-pattern match (below)
+  // must not clear a tainted variable the sanitizer doesn't actually wrap.
+  // `HtmlEncode(x)` genuinely neutralizes `x` (inside the call's parens);
+  // `comment + (string.IsNullOrEmpty(flag) ? ... : ...)` does not neutralize
+  // `comment` just because an unrelated sanitizer pattern matched `flag`
+  // elsewhere in the same compound expression.
+  const refs = idents || (text ? text.match(/\b[A-Za-z_]\w*\b/g) || [] : []);
+  const spans = text ? _sanitizerCallSpans(text) : [];
+  for (const r of refs) {
+    if (flow.taintMap.get(r) && (!text || _refEscapesSanitizers(text, r, spans))) return true;
+  }
   if (text) {
     if (isSourceExpr(text) && !isSanitizedExpr(text)) return true;
     if (isSanitizedExpr(text)) return false;
   }
-  const refs = idents || (text ? text.match(/\b[A-Za-z_]\w*\b/g) || [] : []);
-  for (const r of refs) if (flow.taintMap.get(r)) return true;
   return false;
 }
 
@@ -311,9 +364,15 @@ export function expressionIsTainted(flow, text, idents = null) {
 // not treated as code identifiers.
 export function argIsTainted(flow, arg) {
   if (!arg) return false;
+  // Same span-aware fix as expressionIsTainted: a tainted identifier that
+  // escapes every sanitizer call span wins over a whole-argument
+  // sanitizer-pattern match.
+  const spans = arg.text ? _sanitizerCallSpans(arg.text) : [];
+  for (const id of arg.idents || []) {
+    if (flow.taintMap.get(id) && (!arg.text || _refEscapesSanitizers(arg.text, id, spans))) return true;
+  }
   if (arg.text && isSanitizedExpr(arg.text)) return false;
   if (arg.text && isSourceExpr(arg.text)) return true;
-  for (const id of arg.idents || []) if (flow.taintMap.get(id)) return true;
   return false;
 }
 

package/src/posture/custom-rules.js

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import * as yaml from '../util/yaml.js';
 import { globFiles } from '../util/glob.js';
 import { loadTrustedKeys, verifyRulePack } from './rule-pack-signing.js';
 
+import { statePath, safeWriteState } from './state-dir.js';
 const LANG_EXTS = {
   javascript: ['.js', '.mjs', '.cjs', '.jsx'],
   typescript: ['.ts', '.tsx'],
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ const LANG_EXTS = {
 };
 
 function rulesDir(scanRoot) {
-  return path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', 'rules');
+  return statePath(scanRoot, 'rules');
 }
 
 export function loadCustomRules(scanRoot) {
@@ -318,10 +319,11 @@ export function applyCustomRules(scanRoot, fileContents) {
   }
   if (shadow.length) {
     try {
-      const stateDir = path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security');
-      fs.mkdirSync(stateDir, { recursive: true });
-      fs.writeFileSync(
-        path.join(stateDir, 'shadow-findings.json'),
+      // Through the seam, so a read-only scan cannot leave shadow findings
+      // behind. Shadow rules are excluded from gates by design, which made this
+      // the least likely write for anyone to notice. (PRD M1)
+      safeWriteState(
+        statePath(scanRoot, 'shadow-findings.json'),
         JSON.stringify({ generatedAt: new Date().toISOString(), findings: shadow }, null, 2),
       );
     } catch { /* non-fatal */ }

package/src/posture/cve-alert-daemon.js

@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
 import * as fs from 'node:fs';
 import * as path from 'node:path';
 
+import { statePath, stateWritesEnabled } from './state-dir.js';
 const OSV_API = 'https://api.osv.dev/v1/query';
-const CFG_PATH = '.agentic-security/cve-alerts.json';
-const STATE_PATH = '.agentic-security/cve-alerts-state.json';
+
 
 // Multi-ecosystem dep extraction. Each entry: { manifest filename → ecosystem }
 const ECOSYSTEM_BY_MANIFEST = {
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ export async function _queryOsvForDep({ name, ecosystem }, { fetchImpl = globalT
 // ─── State persistence ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 export function loadState(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, STATE_PATH);
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, 'cve-alerts-state.json');
   if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return { known: new Set(), lastRun: null };
   try {
     const j = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8'));
@@ -276,7 +276,8 @@ export function loadState(scanRoot) {
 }
 
 export function persistState(scanRoot, state) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, STATE_PATH);
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, 'cve-alerts-state.json');
+  if (!stateWritesEnabled()) return;
   fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(fp), { recursive: true });
   fs.writeFileSync(fp, JSON.stringify({
     known: [...state.known].sort(),
@@ -285,7 +286,7 @@ export function persistState(scanRoot, state) {
 }
 
 export function loadConfig(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, CFG_PATH);
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, 'cve-alerts.json');
   if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return null;
   try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8')); } catch { return null; }
 }

package/src/posture/dep-add-guard.js

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 import * as fs from 'node:fs';
 import * as path from 'node:path';
 
+import { statePath } from './state-dir.js';
 const CACHE = path.join(process.env.HOME || '/tmp', '.claude', 'agentic-security', 'osv-cache');
 const TYPOSQUAT_LEVENSHTEIN = 2;
 const NEW_PACKAGE_WINDOW_DAYS = 7;
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ function _loadPopular(ecosystem) {
 }
 
 function _loadPolicy(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', 'sca-policy.yml');
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, 'sca-policy.yml');
   if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return { deny: [] };
   try {
     const body = fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8');

package/src/posture/deploy-platform.js

@@ -4,7 +4,10 @@
 // returns platform-specific security findings: missing headers, public previews,
 // no health checks, unsafe infra settings.
 //
-// Platforms: Vercel, Railway, Fly.io, Render, Netlify, AWS Amplify, Cloudflare
+// Platforms: Vercel, Railway, Fly.io, Netlify, Cloudflare.
+// NOT implemented despite being previously listed here: Render, AWS Amplify
+// (found via Stage-0 doc audit, 2026 — grepped for any render/amplify config
+// path or platform key in this file; zero hits for either).
 
 import * as fs from 'node:fs';
 import * as path from 'node:path';

package/src/posture/deterministic.js

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import * as path from 'node:path';
 import * as crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { PACKS } from './rule-packs.js';
 
+import { stateDir, statePath } from './state-dir.js';
 export const SCANNER_VERSION = '0.39.2';
 const LOCK_FILE = 'rules.lock.json';
 
@@ -40,7 +41,7 @@ export function buildLockfile() {
 }
 
 export function writeLockfile(scanRoot) {
-  const dir = path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security');
+  const dir = stateDir(scanRoot);
   fs.mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
   const fp = path.join(dir, LOCK_FILE);
   const lock = buildLockfile();
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ export function writeLockfile(scanRoot) {
 }
 
 export function readLockfile(scanRoot) {
-  const fp = path.join(scanRoot, '.agentic-security', LOCK_FILE);
+  const fp = statePath(scanRoot, LOCK_FILE);
   if (!fs.existsSync(fp)) return null;
   try { return JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(fp, 'utf8')); } catch { return null; }
 }

package/src/posture/drift.js

@@ -8,7 +8,13 @@
 
 function _routeKey(r) { return `${r.method || 'ANY'} ${r.path || '(file)'} @ ${r.file}:${r.line}`; }
 function _depKey(c)   { return `${c.ecosystem}:${c.name}@${c.version}`; }
-function _findingKey(f) { return `${f.kind}:${f.file}:${f.line}:${(f.vuln||'').slice(0,80)}`; }
+// Prefer stableId (posture/stable-id.js) — it omits the exact source line by
+// design, so an unrelated edit that shifts a still-unfixed finding's line
+// number doesn't register as one "removed" + one "added" finding, inflating
+// drift tier and falsely flagging a PR as introducing/fixing something it
+// didn't touch. Falls back to the line-sensitive key only for finding shapes
+// that never got a stableId annotated.
+function _findingKey(f) { return f.stableId || `${f.kind}:${f.file}:${f.line}:${(f.vuln||'').slice(0,80)}`; }
 
 function _toMap(arr, keyFn) {
   const m = new Map();

package/src/posture/epss.js

@@ -6,10 +6,19 @@
 // from those attackers are actively weaponizing.
 //
 // Decoration shape (added to each SCA finding with a CVE):
-//   epss: 0.92345
+//   epssScore: 0.92345   (this comment previously said `epss:`; the code has
+//                         always written `epssScore` — the comment was wrong,
+//                         not the code)
 //   epssPercentile: 0.987
 //   exploitedNow: true   ← percentile >= 0.95
 //
+// ⚠ engine.js ALSO sets f.epssScore/f.epssPercentile directly (around line
+// 6451), independently of this module's fetchEPSS/decorate path — two
+// implementations of the same decoration. This module's own `fetchEPSS` has
+// no in-tree caller (allowlisted in no-dead-modules.test.js as future-public
+// API); the live path is the one in engine.js. Worth consolidating, not
+// resolved here.
+//
 // Source: https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-...,CVE-...
 // Cached on disk: ~/.claude/agentic-security/epss-cache/<sha256>.json
 // 24-hour TTL. Falls back gracefully when offline.
@@ -93,6 +102,9 @@ function cvesIn(finding) {
   const found = new Set();
   if (typeof finding.cve === 'string') found.add(finding.cve.toUpperCase());
   if (Array.isArray(finding.cves)) for (const c of finding.cves) found.add(String(c).toUpperCase());
+  // The actual field name every SCA finding in this codebase uses (src/sca/
+  // CLAUDE.md's documented shape; carried through by normalizeFindings).
+  if (Array.isArray(finding.cveAliases)) for (const c of finding.cveAliases) found.add(String(c).toUpperCase());
   if (Array.isArray(finding.vulnerabilities)) {
     for (const v of finding.vulnerabilities) {
       if (typeof v.id === 'string' && v.id.startsWith('CVE-')) found.add(v.id.toUpperCase());