@clear-capabilities/agentic-security-scanner 0.127.0 → 0.130.0

package/dist/526.index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
+export const id = 526;
+export const ids = [526];
+export const modules = {
+
+/***/ 3526:
+/***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
+
+// ESM COMPAT FLAG
+__webpack_require__.r(__webpack_exports__);
+
+// EXPORTS
+__webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {
+  runProjectLinter: () => (/* binding */ runProjectLinter),
+  verifyFix: () => (/* binding */ verifyFix),
+  verifyPatch: () => (/* binding */ verifyPatch)
+});
+
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:child_process"
+var external_node_child_process_ = __webpack_require__(1421);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:fs"
+var external_node_fs_ = __webpack_require__(3024);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: external "node:path"
+var external_node_path_ = __webpack_require__(6760);
+// EXTERNAL MODULE: ./src/engine.js + 595 modules
+var engine = __webpack_require__(4660);
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/fix-honesty-gate.js
+// Deterministic honesty gates on fix / finding output (#7).
+//
+// The project's verification discipline (scanner/CLAUDE.md) exists because
+// several releases shipped broken or false because work was reported as done
+// without confirming the artifact changed. Two of those failure modes are
+// *textual* — they live in the prose an agent emits alongside a fix — and can
+// be caught deterministically, with no LLM and no network:
+//
+//   1. Hand-wave residual-risk prose. "The input is adequately handled",
+//      "future work", "tbd", "later" — vague assurances that claim safety
+//      without naming a concrete remaining vector. A residual you can't name
+//      is a residual you're guessing about; reject the guess.
+//
+//   2. An unbacked "this is a false positive / provably safe" verdict. Marking
+//      a finding safe is a coverage *reduction* — it must cite a `file:line`
+//      that shows why, exactly like the rules-override gate refuses to silently
+//      shrink coverage.
+//
+// Plus a conservative fix-tier classifier so a partial remediation can never be
+// labelled FULL: any workaround-only signal (rate-limit, docs, log-without-
+// reject) is WORKAROUND; anything short of (sink signature changed + all callers
+// routed + a discriminating test) is at most MITIGATION; only the full set with
+// no partial-sanitization caveat earns FULL.
+//
+// Pure functions, no side effects, no throwing — safe to call from a command,
+// a hook, or the MCP verify_fix path.
+
+// Vague-assurance phrases that a real residual must never hide behind. Matched
+// case-insensitively with word boundaries so "later" doesn't trip on
+// "collateral" and "tbd" doesn't trip on a longer token.
+const BANNED_RESIDUAL_PHRASES = Object.freeze([
+  'adequately handled',
+  'adequately handles',
+  'properly validated',
+  'properly handled',
+  'handled properly',
+  'handled safely',
+  'future work',
+  'more work needed',
+  'to be done',
+  'tbd',
+  'later',
+]);
+
+// A citation shaped like `file:line` — one or more non-space, non-colon chars,
+// a colon, then digits. Unanchored: it need only appear somewhere in the item.
+const CITATION_RE = /[^\s:]+:\d+/;
+
+// Verdicts that assert the finding is not real and therefore demand a citation.
+// Compared after normalizing separators (`_`/space → `-`) and lowercasing, so
+// FALSE_POSITIVE, false-positive, and "provably safe" all land here.
+const FP_VERDICTS = Object.freeze(new Set(['false-positive', 'provably-safe', 'safe']));
+
+function _escapeRe(s) {
+  return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reject vague-assurance / hand-wave residual-risk prose.
+ *
+ * An empty or whitespace-only residual is ok — there is no residual to lie
+ * about. A non-empty residual is rejected when it contains any banned phrase;
+ * each match yields one violation naming the offending phrase.
+ *
+ * @param {string} residualText
+ * @returns {{ ok: boolean, violations: string[] }}
+ */
+function checkResidualHonesty(residualText) {
+  const text = typeof residualText === 'string' ? residualText : '';
+  if (text.trim() === '') return { ok: true, violations: [] };
+
+  const violations = [];
+  for (const phrase of BANNED_RESIDUAL_PHRASES) {
+    const re = new RegExp(`\\b${_escapeRe(phrase)}\\b`, 'i');
+    if (re.test(text)) {
+      violations.push(`vague-assurance phrase: "${phrase}"`);
+    }
+  }
+  return { ok: violations.length === 0, violations };
+}
+
+function _isCitation(item) {
+  if (typeof item === 'string') return CITATION_RE.test(item);
+  if (item && typeof item === 'object' && typeof item.location === 'string') {
+    return CITATION_RE.test(item.location);
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+function _normalizeVerdict(verdict) {
+  return String(verdict).trim().toLowerCase().replace(/[_\s]+/g, '-');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Require a file:line citation behind a "this is not real" verdict.
+ *
+ * For a false-positive / provably-safe / safe verdict (case-insensitive; also
+ * accepts FALSE_POSITIVE), at least one evidence item must be a `file:line`
+ * citation — either a string matching /[^\s:]+:\d+/ or an object
+ * `{ location: "file:line" }`. Any other verdict passes unconditionally.
+ *
+ * @param {string} verdict
+ * @param {Array|string|object} evidence
+ * @returns {{ ok: boolean, violations: string[] }}
+ */
+function requireCitedEvidence(verdict, evidence) {
+  if (typeof verdict !== 'string' || !FP_VERDICTS.has(_normalizeVerdict(verdict))) {
+    return { ok: true, violations: [] };
+  }
+  const items = Array.isArray(evidence)
+    ? evidence
+    : evidence == null
+      ? []
+      : [evidence];
+  if (items.some(_isCitation)) return { ok: true, violations: [] };
+  return {
+    ok: false,
+    violations: ['false-positive/safe verdict requires a file:line citation'],
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Classify a fix into FULL | MITIGATION | WORKAROUND, conservative-first.
+ *
+ * @param {object} signals
+ * @param {boolean} signals.sinkSignatureChanged
+ * @param {boolean} signals.allCallersRouted
+ * @param {boolean} signals.testDiscriminates - a test that fails pre-fix, passes post-fix
+ * @param {boolean} [signals.rateLimitOnly]
+ * @param {boolean} [signals.docsOnly]
+ * @param {boolean} [signals.logOnlyNoReject]
+ * @param {boolean} [signals.partialSanitization]
+ * @returns {'FULL'|'MITIGATION'|'WORKAROUND'}
+ */
+function computeFixTier(signals) {
+  const s = signals && typeof signals === 'object' ? signals : {};
+  if (s.rateLimitOnly || s.docsOnly || s.logOnlyNoReject) return 'WORKAROUND';
+  const complete = s.sinkSignatureChanged && s.allCallersRouted && s.testDiscriminates;
+  if (s.partialSanitization || !complete) return 'MITIGATION';
+  return 'FULL';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Compose the three gates for a single fix's output.
+ *
+ * ok = residual-honesty ok AND evidence-citation ok, further constrained by the
+ * tier/residual consistency invariant:
+ *   - a FULL tier must NOT carry a residual (a full fix has nothing left);
+ *   - a non-FULL tier MUST document a residual (say what's still open).
+ *
+ * @param {{ residual?: string, verdict?: string, evidence?: any, signals?: object }} input
+ * @returns {{ ok: boolean, tier: string, violations: string[] }}
+ */
+function gateFixOutput({ residual, verdict, evidence, signals } = {}) {
+  const tier = computeFixTier(signals);
+  const residualCheck = checkResidualHonesty(residual);
+  const evidenceCheck = requireCitedEvidence(verdict, evidence);
+
+  const violations = [...residualCheck.violations, ...evidenceCheck.violations];
+  let ok = residualCheck.ok && evidenceCheck.ok;
+
+  const residualEmpty = typeof residual !== 'string' || residual.trim() === '';
+  if (tier === 'FULL' && !residualEmpty) {
+    violations.push('FULL tier cannot carry a residual');
+    ok = false;
+  }
+  if (tier !== 'FULL' && residualEmpty) {
+    violations.push('non-FULL tier must document a residual');
+    ok = false;
+  }
+
+  return { ok, tier, violations };
+}
+
+const _internals = Object.freeze({ BANNED_RESIDUAL_PHRASES, CITATION_RE, FP_VERDICTS });
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/test-runner.js
+// R5 (partial, roadmap) — the project's own test suite as a verification
+// stage for `verifyFix()` (see `fix-verify.js`). Closes the gap where a
+// "verified" fix only proved a finding's stableId stopped firing — a patch
+// that deletes the feature entirely would satisfy that just as well as a
+// real fix. Running the project's own tests is the cheapest available check
+// that the application still works.
+//
+// Execution-safety note: this spawns the TARGET PROJECT's own test command
+// in the target project's own directory. That is deliberately NOT routed
+// through the R1 confinement sandbox (`../sandbox/`). That sandbox exists to
+// contain untrusted proof-of-concept exploit code the scanner itself
+// synthesizes — code nobody has vetted, being run for the first time. A
+// project's pre-existing test suite is the opposite case: it is the
+// project's own trusted source, already sitting on disk, and running it is
+// exactly what a human developer does by hand before trusting a fix.
+// Wrapping "npm test" / "pytest" / "go test" in the PoC sandbox's
+// syscall/network/filesystem restrictions would break the large majority of
+// real test suites (they bind local ports, spawn child processes, write temp
+// fixtures, etc.) for no corresponding security benefit.
+
+
+
+
+
+const DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS = 300_000;
+const NPM_PLACEHOLDER = /Error: no test specified/i;
+
+function _exists(scanRoot, rel) {
+  try { return external_node_fs_.existsSync(external_node_path_.join(scanRoot, rel)); } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+function _isDir(scanRoot, rel) {
+  try { return external_node_fs_.statSync(external_node_path_.join(scanRoot, rel)).isDirectory(); } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+function _binaryAvailable(cmd) {
+  try {
+    const r = (0,external_node_child_process_.spawnSync)(cmd, ['--version'], { timeout: 5_000, stdio: 'ignore' });
+    return !(r.error && r.error.code === 'ENOENT');
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+// Detect the project's test command. Read-only — never spawns the actual
+// test run, only (optionally) a cheap `--version` probe to confirm a tool
+// like `pytest` is actually installed before committing to it. Returns
+// `null` when nothing detectable is found — most scanned repos will hit
+// this path, and that must not be treated as a failure by callers.
+function detectTestCommand(scanRoot) {
+  if (!scanRoot) return null;
+
+  // JS/TS — package.json with a real (non-placeholder) `scripts.test`.
+  let pkg = null;
+  try { pkg = JSON.parse(external_node_fs_.readFileSync(external_node_path_.join(scanRoot, 'package.json'), 'utf8')); } catch { pkg = null; }
+  const testScript = pkg && pkg.scripts && pkg.scripts.test;
+  if (testScript && !NPM_PLACEHOLDER.test(String(testScript))) {
+    if (_exists(scanRoot, 'pnpm-lock.yaml')) return { cmd: 'pnpm', args: ['test'], kind: 'pnpm' };
+    if (_exists(scanRoot, 'yarn.lock')) return { cmd: 'yarn', args: ['test'], kind: 'yarn' };
+    if (_exists(scanRoot, 'bun.lockb') || _exists(scanRoot, 'bun.lock')) return { cmd: 'bun', args: ['test'], kind: 'bun' };
+    return { cmd: 'npm', args: ['test', '--silent'], kind: 'npm' };
+  }
+
+  // Python — pytest.ini / pyproject.toml / tox.ini / a tests/ dir, and the
+  // `pytest` binary actually available. If pytest isn't installed we do NOT
+  // report a python test command — falling through lets a later language
+  // marker (e.g. go.mod in a polyglot repo) still be detected.
+  const pyMarker = _exists(scanRoot, 'pytest.ini') || _exists(scanRoot, 'pyproject.toml') ||
+    _exists(scanRoot, 'tox.ini') || _isDir(scanRoot, 'tests');
+  if (pyMarker && _binaryAvailable('pytest')) {
+    return { cmd: 'pytest', args: ['-q'], kind: 'pytest' };
+  }
+
+  // Go
+  if (_exists(scanRoot, 'go.mod')) {
+    return { cmd: 'go', args: ['test', './...'], kind: 'go' };
+  }
+
+  return null;
+}
+
+// Run the detected test command with a walltime budget. Always returns a
+// result object — never throws. Distinguishes four outcomes:
+//   - no detectable/runnable command  -> status: 'skipped'  (does NOT fail)
+//   - ran and exited 0                -> status: 'passed'
+//   - ran and exited non-zero         -> status: 'failed'
+//   - ran past the timeout budget     -> status: 'failed', timedOut: true
+function runProjectTests(scanRoot, { timeoutMs = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MS } = {}) {
+  const startedAt = Date.now();
+  const command = detectTestCommand(scanRoot);
+  if (!command) {
+    return {
+      status: 'skipped', passed: null, skipped: true,
+      reason: 'no-test-command-detected', exitCode: null, timedOut: false,
+      durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+    };
+  }
+
+  let r;
+  try {
+    r = (0,external_node_child_process_.spawnSync)(command.cmd, command.args, {
+      cwd: scanRoot,
+      encoding: 'utf8',
+      timeout: timeoutMs,
+      env: { ...process.env, CI: '1' },
+    });
+  } catch (e) {
+    // The spawn call itself threw (rare — e.g. cwd vanished). Treat as
+    // "could not run", not "ran and failed".
+    return {
+      status: 'skipped', passed: null, skipped: true,
+      reason: `spawn-error: ${e.message}`, exitCode: null, timedOut: false,
+      durationMs: Date.now() - startedAt,
+    };
+  }
+  const durationMs = Date.now() - startedAt;
+
+  if (r.error && r.error.code === 'ENOENT') {
+    // The detected tool isn't actually installed on this machine. Not a
+    // test failure — the suite never ran.
+    return {
+      status: 'skipped', passed: null, skipped: true,
+      reason: `${command.kind}-not-installed`, exitCode: null, timedOut: false, durationMs,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (r.status === null) {
+    // spawnSync sets status:null both on timeout-kill and on being killed by
+    // another signal; either way the run did not complete, which is a
+    // verification failure, never a skip — we asked for a result and the
+    // process was terminated before producing one.
+    return {
+      status: 'failed', passed: false, skipped: false,
+      reason: 'timed-out', exitCode: null, timedOut: true, durationMs,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    status: r.status === 0 ? 'passed' : 'failed',
+    passed: r.status === 0,
+    skipped: false,
+    reason: r.status === 0 ? null : 'test-failures',
+    exitCode: r.status,
+    timedOut: false,
+    durationMs,
+  };
+}
+
+;// CONCATENATED MODULE: ./src/posture/fix-verify.js
+// Closed-loop /fix verification (Sentinel-parity FR-L4-4, FR-L4-5).
+//
+// Given a candidate patch (the new file content + the finding stableId being
+// fixed), verify it:
+//
+//   1. The original finding's stableId no longer fires on the patched file.
+//   2. No new findings at severity ≥ medium were introduced by the patch.
+//   3. The project's existing linter (when present) passes on the patched file.
+//   4. The project's own test suite (when detectable) still passes. This is
+//      the R5 gap-closer: a patch that silently deletes the feature would
+//      satisfy (1) and (2) just as well as a real fix — only running the
+//      tests catches that. See `test-runner.js` for detection + execution.
+//
+// If any of those fail, the caller is expected to NOT apply the patch and
+// instead surface a "fix plan" — a numbered list of steps the engineer can
+// follow — rather than dump a broken patch on the user.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+const SEVERITY_RANK = { critical: 0, high: 1, medium: 2, low: 3, info: 4 };
+
+// Run a focused re-scan over just the patched file(s) using the in-memory
+// engine. No filesystem write needed — we hand the new content in via the
+// fileContents map.
+async function verifyPatch({
+  scanRoot,
+  originalFindingStableId,
+  files,   // { [relPath]: newContent }
+  depFileContents = {},
+} = {}) {
+  if (!files || typeof files !== 'object') return { ok: false, reason: 'no-files-provided' };
+  const fileContents = { ...files };
+  let scan;
+  try {
+    scan = await (0,engine/* runFullScan */.wW)({ fileContents, depFileContents, scanRoot }, () => {});
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'rescan-failed', error: e.message };
+  }
+  const findings = (scan && scan.findings) || [];
+  const stillHasOriginal = !!originalFindingStableId &&
+    findings.some(f => f.stableId === originalFindingStableId);
+  if (stillHasOriginal) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: 'original-finding-still-present', stableId: originalFindingStableId };
+  }
+  const introducedHighOrAbove = findings.filter(f =>
+    (SEVERITY_RANK[f.severity] ?? 9) <= SEVERITY_RANK.medium);
+  // Don't count findings on lines outside the patched files — but our
+  // fileContents map IS the patched files, so every finding is in-scope.
+  return {
+    ok: introducedHighOrAbove.length === 0,
+    reason: introducedHighOrAbove.length === 0 ? 'verified' : 'introduced-new-findings',
+    introduced: introducedHighOrAbove.map(f => ({
+      vuln: f.vuln, file: f.file, line: f.line, severity: f.severity,
+      stableId: f.stableId,
+    })),
+  };
+}
+
+// Detect which linter the project uses and run it on the patched files.
+// Returns { ok, runner, output } or { ok: true, runner: 'none' } when no
+// linter is configured (silent pass).
+function runProjectLinter(scanRoot, filePaths) {
+  if (!scanRoot || !Array.isArray(filePaths) || filePaths.length === 0) {
+    return { ok: true, runner: 'none' };
+  }
+  const has = (p) => { try { return external_node_fs_.existsSync(external_node_path_.join(scanRoot, p)); } catch { return false; } };
+  // Pick the linter by config file present in the repo root.
+  const jsFiles = filePaths.filter(f => /\.(?:js|jsx|ts|tsx|mjs|cjs)$/i.test(f));
+  const pyFiles = filePaths.filter(f => /\.py$/i.test(f));
+  const goFiles = filePaths.filter(f => /\.go$/i.test(f));
+  const javaFiles = filePaths.filter(f => /\.java$/i.test(f));
+
+  if (jsFiles.length && (has('.eslintrc') || has('.eslintrc.json') || has('.eslintrc.js') || has('eslint.config.js') || has('eslint.config.mjs'))) {
+    return runLinter(scanRoot, 'eslint', ['--no-error-on-unmatched-pattern', ...jsFiles]);
+  }
+  if (pyFiles.length && (has('pyproject.toml') || has('ruff.toml') || has('.ruff.toml'))) {
+    return runLinter(scanRoot, 'ruff', ['check', ...pyFiles]);
+  }
+  if (pyFiles.length && has('.flake8')) {
+    return runLinter(scanRoot, 'flake8', pyFiles);
+  }
+  if (goFiles.length && (has('.golangci.yml') || has('.golangci.yaml'))) {
+    return runLinter(scanRoot, 'golangci-lint', ['run', ...goFiles]);
+  }
+  if (javaFiles.length && has('checkstyle.xml')) {
+    return runLinter(scanRoot, 'checkstyle', ['-c', 'checkstyle.xml', ...javaFiles]);
+  }
+  return { ok: true, runner: 'none' };
+}
+
+function runLinter(cwd, cmd, args) {
+  let r;
+  try {
+    r = (0,external_node_child_process_.spawnSync)(cmd, args, { cwd, encoding: 'utf8', timeout: 60_000 });
+  } catch (e) {
+    return { ok: true, runner: cmd, skipped: true, reason: 'binary-missing', error: e.message };
+  }
+  if (r.error && r.error.code === 'ENOENT') {
+    return { ok: true, runner: cmd, skipped: true, reason: 'binary-missing' };
+  }
+  if (r.status === null) {
+    return { ok: false, runner: cmd, reason: 'timed-out', output: (r.stderr || r.stdout || '').slice(-2000) };
+  }
+  return {
+    ok: r.status === 0,
+    runner: cmd,
+    exitCode: r.status,
+    output: ((r.stderr || '') + (r.stdout || '')).slice(-2000),
+  };
+}
+
+// Top-level verify: re-scan + lint. Returns the combined verdict + a
+// human-readable summary string suitable for surfacing to the user.
+// Addition #7 — deterministic honesty gates on fix output. When the caller
+// supplies `fixMeta` ({ residual, verdict, evidence, signals }) — e.g. the
+// security-fixer agent's residual-risk text + completeness signals — the fix's
+// claims are checked mechanically (no hand-wave residual prose, a cited
+// file:line for any FP/safe verdict, and a FULL/MITIGATION/WORKAROUND tier). A
+// dishonest or over-claiming fix fails the gate. When `fixMeta` is absent
+// (the deterministic MCP write path, which has no claims to check) the honesty
+// gate is skipped and behavior is unchanged.
+// R5 (partial) — the test-suite stage. Runs the target project's own tests,
+// in the target project's own directory, against whatever is currently on
+// disk there. See `test-runner.js`'s header comment for why that run is
+// deliberately NOT routed through the R1 PoC-confinement sandbox: this is
+// the project's own already-trusted suite, not untrusted synthesized code.
+//
+// Caveat that matters for callers: `verifyPatch` above re-scans the
+// candidate patch purely in memory (no write to disk), but a test runner
+// needs real files — there is no cheap way to hand a runner an in-memory
+// overlay. So this leg reports on the CURRENT on-disk tree, not the
+// candidate `files` map, when `verifyFix` is used as a pre-write preview
+// (e.g. the `verify_fix` MCP tool). Callers that apply the patch first and
+// then re-verify get the strongest signal; that ordering is not enforced
+// here — it's the caller's responsibility, same as it already is for the
+// closed-loop `fix-verify-loop.js` path.
+// Does the caller's candidate patch differ from what is on disk right now?
+// If so, any test run necessarily exercised the pre-patch tree. Compared by
+// content so a patch that happens to match disk (already applied) is correctly
+// treated as NOT pre-patch.
+function _candidateDiffersFromDisk(scanRoot, files) {
+  if (!files || typeof files !== 'object') return false;
+  for (const [rel, content] of Object.entries(files)) {
+    if (typeof content !== 'string') continue;
+    try {
+      const abs = external_node_path_.resolve(scanRoot, rel);
+      if (external_node_fs_.readFileSync(abs, 'utf8') !== content) return true;
+    } catch {
+      return true; // candidate file absent on disk -> definitely not applied
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+async function verifyFix({
+  scanRoot,
+  originalFindingStableId,
+  files,
+  depFileContents,
+  fixMeta,
+  testTimeoutMs,
+} = {}) {
+  const rescan = await verifyPatch({ scanRoot, originalFindingStableId, files, depFileContents });
+  const lint = runProjectLinter(scanRoot, Object.keys(files || {}));
+  const tests = runProjectTests(scanRoot, testTimeoutMs != null ? { timeoutMs: testTimeoutMs } : {});
+  // True when a candidate patch was supplied but has not been written, so the
+  // suite necessarily ran against the pre-patch tree. Surfaced in the summary
+  // and on the result so a caller cannot mistake it for a verified patch.
+  const _testedPrePatch = !tests.skipped && _candidateDiffersFromDisk(scanRoot, files);
+  const testsOk = tests.skipped ? true : tests.passed === true;
+  let honesty = null;
+  if (fixMeta && typeof fixMeta === 'object') {
+    try { honesty = gateFixOutput(fixMeta); } catch { honesty = null; }
+  }
+  const ok = rescan.ok && (lint.ok || lint.skipped) && testsOk && (honesty ? honesty.ok : true);
+  const summary = [
+    `re-scan: ${rescan.ok ? 'PASS' : 'FAIL — ' + rescan.reason}`,
+    `linter:  ${lint.runner === 'none' ? 'skipped (no linter config)'
+              : lint.skipped ? `${lint.runner} not installed`
+              : lint.ok ? `${lint.runner} PASS`
+              : `${lint.runner} FAIL (exit ${lint.exitCode})`}`,
+    // Say which tree the suite actually ran against. `files` is a candidate
+    // patch held in memory; the runner needs real files, so it sees whatever is
+    // on disk. Reporting a bare "PASS" here would let a caller believe the
+    // PATCH passed the tests when the suite may have run on unpatched code.
+    `tests:   ${tests.skipped ? `skipped (${tests.reason})`
+              : tests.timedOut ? 'FAIL (timed out)'
+              : tests.passed ? `PASS${_testedPrePatch ? ' — on the CURRENT on-disk tree, NOT the candidate patch' : ''}`
+              : `FAIL (exit ${tests.exitCode})`}`,
+    honesty ? `honesty: ${honesty.ok ? `PASS (${honesty.tier})` : 'FAIL — ' + honesty.violations.join('; ')}` : null,
+  ].filter(Boolean).join('\n');
+  return { ok, rescan, lint, tests, testedPrePatch: _testedPrePatch, honesty, summary };
+}
+
+
+/***/ })
+
+};

package/dist/637.index.js

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ export const modules = {
 /* harmony export */   renderPrDeltaText: () => (/* binding */ renderPrDeltaText)
 /* harmony export */ });
 /* harmony import */ var node_child_process__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(1421);
-/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(3793);
+/* harmony import */ var _engine_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_1__ = __webpack_require__(4660);
 // Shadowscan / security-DELTA on PR (v0.72).
 //
 // Most SAST PR-comment integrations show absolute counts — "12 findings

package/dist/826.index.js

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ export const modules = {
 /* harmony export */   renderPrComment: () => (/* binding */ renderPrComment)
 /* harmony export */ });
 /* unused harmony export _internal */
+/* harmony import */ var _util_untrusted_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__ = __webpack_require__(7097);
 // Advisor-tone PR comment renderer (v0.72).
 //
 // Replaces the typical "12 findings detected, see SARIF" wall of text
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@ export const modules = {
 // route through an LLM for richer prose when AGENTIC_SECURITY_LLM_ENDPOINT
 // is configured.
 
+
+
 const SEVERITY_GLYPH = {
   critical: '🟥',
   high:     '🟧',
@@ -147,7 +150,7 @@ function renderPrComment(delta, { repoName, prNumber, prTitle } = {}) {
     const sev = SEVERITY_GLYPH[f.severity] || '⬜';
     const route = _route(f);
     const where = route ? `\`${route}\` (\`${f.file}:${f.line}\`)` : `\`${f.file}:${f.line}\``;
-    lines.push(`${sev} **${meta?.name || f.vuln}** — ${where}`);
+    lines.push(`${sev} **${meta?.name || (0,_util_untrusted_js__WEBPACK_IMPORTED_MODULE_0__/* .escapeMarkdown */ .FV)(f.vuln)}** — ${where}`);
     if (meta) lines.push(`  > ${meta.why}`);
     if (f.remediation) {
       const onelineFix = String(f.remediation).split('\n')[0].slice(0, 240);

package/dist/830.index.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ export const id = 830;
 export const ids = [830];
 export const modules = {
 
-/***/ 449:
+/***/ 2830:
 /***/ ((__unused_webpack___webpack_module__, __webpack_exports__, __webpack_require__) => {
 
 /* harmony export */ __webpack_require__.d(__webpack_exports__, {